P. R. RANGACHAR v. LAND TRIBUNAL, HOSKOTE — 1979 DIGILAW 117 (KAR)

( 1 ) THE petitioner, Rangachar. son of Ramanujachar of Bangalore, has preferred these petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the orders of the Land Tribunal Hoskote dated 26-10-1976, 28-10-1975 aad 31-10-1975 passed respectively in proceedings Nos. (i)LRF (I) VA-195/75-76, (ii) LRF/j/va-19/1875/74-75, and (iii) LRF (I) 3/455/74-75. ( 2 ) THE aforesaid three proceedings were initiated at the instance of Narayanappa (respondent-2) in W. P. No. 11969/76 ). Krishnappa (respondent No. 2 in W. P. No. 11970/76) and Sanjeevappa Bin Veerappa (respondent No. 2 in w. P. No. 11971/76) on each of them filing an application separately in form No. 7 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, (the Act) claiming occupancy rights re : he lands mentioned in their respective applications. ( 3 ) AFTER holding enquiries the Tribunal, by the impugned orders, allowed the claims of Narayanappa, Krishnappa and Sanjeevappa. ( 4 ) SINCE common questions of law and facts arise in all these petitions, they were clubbed, heard, and disposed of by a common order. ( 5 ) WHILE trying to assail the validity of the orders in question, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that (i) the Tribunal while holding these enquiries has not followed the procedure laid down in this regard (ii) the lauds in question being inam lands had vested in the State government by virtue of the provisions of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) inams Abolition Act, 1954 (the Act of 1954) and occupancy rights thereof were granted to the petitioner only during 1974 (after 1-3-74.) and hence cannot be said to have vested in the State Government on 1-3-1974 as provided under Sec. 44 of the Act, with the result the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to deal with the claims made, by these respondents for occupancy rights ; (iii) even otherwise, as the petitioner had, earlier obtained a declaration in a competent forum that the lands \vere not non-resumable, these respondents should not have been construed as lawfully cultivating lessees and conferred with occupancy rights ; and (iv) since the respondents had failed to obtain occupancy rights under the provisions of the Act of 1954 they were not entitled to claim occupancy rights under the provisions of the Act, and the Tribunal had erred in treating them as tenants and allowing their applications. ( 6 ) THE contesting respondents, (Narayanappa and the two others) even though have been notified of these proceedings, have not entered appearance. ( 7 ) IT is not in dispute that these lands, situated as they were in an inam village called Vagata Agrahara, were inam lands. The inam tenure was abolished by the provisions of the Act of 1954, and the lands came to be vested in the State Government during the year 1959. The writ petitioner, Rangachar, claiming himself to be a permanent tenant of these lands sought for occupancy rights under S. 5 of that Act. This claim was enquired into by the authorities concerned under S. 10 of the said Act and Rangachar was held entitled to conferment of occupancy rights. Somewhere during the month of December, 1964 he received an endorsement (Ext. A) intimating him of the decision of the authorities in this -regard and was called upon to remit the premium fixed in this connection in ten annual instalments. His case is that he remitted the 10th the last-instalment in the month of March 1974 and subsequent to 1-3-19. 74. According to him it is only after he had paid the 10th instalment he had become the holder in occupancy of the lands and had acquired full title thereof: Until then, he says, the lands could not have been deemed to be of his ownership, and should, on the other hand, have been considered still vesting in the State Government. In this view of the matter, it was argued on his behalf, that the lands in question which were vested in the State Government as provided in S. 3 of the Act of 1954. could not be said to have been vested again iu the State Government on 1-3-1974, the date on which the Karnataka Land Reforms: (Amendment) Act, 1974, (Act No. 1 of 1974) had come into force. ( 8 ) IT is a fact that under S. 44 of the Act all lands held by or in the possession of tenants immediately prior to the date of the commencement of the Amend ment Act stood transferred to and vested in the State Government. In respect 'of such lands vested in the State, the tenants and other inferior holders have the right to claim occupancy rights under the provisions of the Act. In respect 'of such lands vested in the State, the tenants and other inferior holders have the right to claim occupancy rights under the provisions of the Act. But one thing has to be lorne in mind, and that is, that vesting of lands as contemplated by these various tenure abolition Acts, including the inam abolition laws and land reforms laws, is only notional subject to the rights and interests of the occupants onactual cultivators of the lands concerned. Even so, it is a fact, that if a land can be said to have vested, in the State Government under one enactment, the same land cannot be, said to have vested under a similar provision of an enactment made applicable to such a land subsequently until the rights of all concerned under the previous enactment are determined. Since the vesting in either case is only notional persons entitled to claim occupancy rights either under the one or the other enactment would be entitled to make their claims under the respective enactments. But while determining the claims, the authorities concerned should keep this fact in view and take up investigation into the claims firstly under- the provisions of the enactment brought into force earlier. After the rights of the parties are determined under the provisions of that enactment, and having in view the final decision arrived at thereon, investigation shall have to be made into the claims of the parties claiming under the provisions of the other enactment brought into force over the very lands subsequently. ( 9 ) NOW, in these cases even though the lands came to be vested in 1959 under the Act of 1954 and the permanent tenant paid the last instalment of the premium after 1-3-1974 and became entitled to or acquired the hiduvali rights on such payment, it cannot be said that the lands in question did not vest under s. 44 of the Act as on 1-3-1974 provided they were tenanted lands. It is so because not merely the vesting contemplated in both these enact ments is a notional one but also, because the acquisition of the occupancy right bya permanent tenant under S. 5 of-the Act of 19:54relates back to the^date of vesting. Subrsec. (1) of s. 5 of the Act of 1954 reads as follows : - 5. Permanent tenants to be registered as occupants on certain conditions. . . . . Subrsec. (1) of s. 5 of the Act of 1954 reads as follows : - 5. Permanent tenants to be registered as occupants on certain conditions. . . . . . . (1) Subject to the provisions of sub sec. (2), every permanent tenant of the inamdar shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of all lands of which he was a permanent tenant immieiately before the date of vesting provided that no person who has been admitted into possossion of any land by an inamdar on or after the first day of July 1948 shall except where the Deputy Commissioner after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise directs, be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of such land. " (underlining italic is supplied) now, if Rangachar cad be said to have acquired occupancy rights in full under the Act of 1954 somewhere in the month of March, 1974, but after 1-3-1974, he should be deemed to have acquired such rights with effect from the date of vesting which had taken place in 1959. Thus, by the time the Tribunal took up the claims of Narayanappa and two others for enquiries under the provisions of the Act, Rangachar had acquired ownership over these lands. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the lands did not vest in the State Government under S. 41 of the Act as on 1-3-1974 and that Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to go into claims of Narayanappa and two others. ( 10 ) ONE of the contentions of the writ petitioner is that if the respondents were tenants actually cultivating the lands in question, they should have obtained bccupancy rights under the provisions of the Act of 1954. He says that not merely they did not do so, but, on the other hand, he (the petitioner) has obtained occupancy rights under S. 5 of the Act, and that, in the circumstances, the respondents had no right to claim occupancy rights under the provisions of the act. Under the Act of 1954, in so far as the inferior holders are concerned, it is only the Khadim tenants, Permanent tenants, and Quasi-permanent tenants, who are entitled to occupancy rights. Sub-tenants cultivating under them cannot claim any occupancy fights under that Act (Act of 1954 ). Under the Act of 1954, in so far as the inferior holders are concerned, it is only the Khadim tenants, Permanent tenants, and Quasi-permanent tenants, who are entitled to occupancy rights. Sub-tenants cultivating under them cannot claim any occupancy fights under that Act (Act of 1954 ). Under S. 3 of the Act of 1954, as a consequence of the inam vesting in the State Government, it is only the relationship of landlord and tenant between the inatndar on the one hand and his khadim tenants, permanent tenants, and quasi-permanent tenants on the other that would be extinguished. The subsisting relationship of tenancy, if any, between the khadim tenant, permanent tenant, and quasi-permanent tenant and the holder of a minor inam on the one hand and that of their tenants (sub-tenants), cultivating the inam lands on the other would in no way be affected by the coming into force of the Act of 1954. Since there was some doubt in this regard it was clarified by the incorporation of S. 34-A in the Act of 1954 by Act No. 16 of 1960. That provision reads as follows:"34a. . Applicability of the provisions of Mysore Act XIII of 1952,- for the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that that the provisions of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952, for the time being in force shall, subject to the provisions of Chapter III-A, be applicable and shall govern the relations of the persons who are entitled to be registered as occupants under Ss. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 and of persons entitled to be registered as holders of minor inams under S. 8, and the agriculturists who had held land on lease from such persons as tenants immediately before the date of vesting. It is thus clear that persons cultivating as sub-lessees and tenants under the kadim tenants, permanent tenants, quasi permanent tenants, and holders of minor inam acquire the Status of tenants vis-a-vis their immediate superior holders after the abolition of the Inam tonure. If that state of relationship had continued as on 1-3-4974 such lands also would have vested in the State Government under the provision of the Act and such lawfully cultivating tenants would be entitled to apply for occupancy rights under the provisions of the Act. If that state of relationship had continued as on 1-3-4974 such lands also would have vested in the State Government under the provision of the Act and such lawfully cultivating tenants would be entitled to apply for occupancy rights under the provisions of the Act. We have enough indication, nay, proof, from the very material placed on record by Rangachar that Narayanappa and two others have been cultivating the lands in question under him since many years as lessees. So far as Narayanappa is concerned, the petitioner concedes that Narayanappa was in possession of the lands over which he was claiming occupancy rights. But further says that at best Narayanappa can be construed only as a licencee who has to quit on his (the petitioner) terminating the licence and calling upon him to quit (para 7 of the petition in WP. No. 11969/76 ). To far as Krishnappa is concerned, his (Rangachar's) case in wp. No. 11970/76 is that Krishnappa has nothing to do with the lands over which he was claiming occupancy rights, and that on the other hand, the said lands were in the joint possession of Sanjeevappa and Mariyanna (paras 4, 10 and 12 of the petition in WP. No. 11970/76 ). Not merely this, in this case Rangachar had also filed a written statement in the form of a petition (Ex. D) to the chairman of the Land Tribunal, Hoskote, in the impugned proceeding. At paragraph 3 therein he has stated that he had given the lands to Sanjeevappa and Mariyanna for joint cultivation temporarily and that he was entitled to rents from them. His grievance was that they were not paying any rents from the past ten years. The records show that Krishnappa is none other the son of Marianna. I shall be referring to another document also placed by the petitioner in these cases, which will show that Krishnappa's father Marianna, Narayanappa, and sanjeevappa, had been recognised by the petitioner as tenants in a previous proceeding started by him under the provisions of the Act itself. Even in the case of Sanjeevappa what Rangachar states in his petition is that at best Sanjeevappa and the aforesaid Marianna were licencees cultivating the lands who are liable to quit at his instance (Paras 9 and 10 of the petition in WP. No. 11971/76 ). 11. Even in the case of Sanjeevappa what Rangachar states in his petition is that at best Sanjeevappa and the aforesaid Marianna were licencees cultivating the lands who are liable to quit at his instance (Paras 9 and 10 of the petition in WP. No. 11971/76 ). 11. Rangachar had applied to the Court (constituted under the provisions of the Act as they stood then) under S. 14 for a declaration that Sy. Nos. 51, 54/2,55/1 and 103 of Vagata Agrahara (the lands in question) were not non-resu-mable. In that petition he had also sought for resumption of certain lands said to belong to him and situated in another village Pichaguntanahalli. He had made a certain Chaluvachar and 10 others as parties to that proceeding (RLC. No. 28 of 1970 on the file of the Munsiff, Kolar Gold Fields-Ex. D in WP. No. 11969/76 ). Subsequently, Narayanappa, Marianna father of Krishnappa, sanjeevappa and another Subbiah were added as additional respondents 1 to 4. S. 14 of the Act was deleted by Act No. 1 of 1974, and hence is no more available. But prior to 1--3-1974 before its deletion, any landlord if he bona fide required any land other than referred to in the first proviso of Cl: 29 of S. 2-A (as it stood then) could have sought resumption of the same from his tenant. For this he had to make an application before the court. It was for the Court to determine whether the land or portion of the same was liable for resumption from the tenant. On Rangachar's application (RLC. No. 28/70-Ex. D) the Munsiff, k G. F. , (the Court) in his order dated 31-5-1971 has observed as follows at paras 11,13 and 14 12. The petitioner sought for declaration that the lands situated in vagata Agrahara, namely, Sy. Nos. 51, 54/2, 55/1 and 103 as not non-resum-able. In the cross-examination the petitioner states that he did not want to resume the lands of Vagata Agrahara which are being cultivated by narayanappa, Marianna, Sanjeevappa and Subbiah, i. e. , the additional respondents 1 to 4. As already stated, this prayer has been added by way of amendment application, I-A No. 7, filed by the petitioner. The additional respondents J to 4 have contended that this declaration cannot be given in this application. 13. As already stated, this prayer has been added by way of amendment application, I-A No. 7, filed by the petitioner. The additional respondents J to 4 have contended that this declaration cannot be given in this application. 13. Though the declaration was sought at a later stage there was opportunity for the additional respondents 1 to 4 to adduce evidence and address the Court in this matter. As such, no prejudice would be caused if such a declaration has been given. 14. In the evidence, the petitioner states that Sy. No. 51/2 and 54/2 of Vagata Agrahara are being cultivated jointly by respondents Sanjeevappa and Marianna and that they have not paid the rents since several years. For Sy. Nos. 103 and 55/1 of Vagata Agrahara the respondent Narayanappa, his brother-in-law one Subbiah are tenants. According to his evidence. Narayanappa did not pay any rents for several years. "the Order reads as follows : ordera certificate, will be issued to the petitioner for resumption of lands situated in Pitchaguntenahally village comprising the Sy. Nos. 42/2, 53/3, 55 and 56/2 for personal cultivation. There will be also a declaration to the effect that the lands situated in Vagata Agrahara, namely, the Sy. Nos, 51, 54/2, 55/1 and 103 are not non-resumable. There will be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case. " ( 11 ) WITHOUT stopping at that, and perhaps mis-construing the provisions of S. 141 of the Act, Kangachar had also filed an application before the Tahsildar, hoskote, under S. 41 of the Act against Narayanappa, Sanjeevappa and Marianna (father of Krishnappa) claiming possession of these lands. He has also placed a copy of the same along with his petition (Exhibit-E ). At para-4 (f) of his application he has stated as follows : (f) Since I have been granted the lands as an occupant with the right to acquire ownership by paying premiums on this account, I am entitled to occupy them being within my ceiling limit for personal cultivation as owner of the lands. From the time I received the endorsement of the Special deputy Commissioner I have been taking action to obtain possession of the lands as the opponents are occupying the glands claiming tenancies. Since* the Land Reforms Act is applicable to all agricultural lands I had to establish my right under this Act before applying for possession. From the time I received the endorsement of the Special deputy Commissioner I have been taking action to obtain possession of the lands as the opponents are occupying the glands claiming tenancies. Since* the Land Reforms Act is applicable to all agricultural lands I had to establish my right under this Act before applying for possession. In my application rlc 28/70 to the Court of the Munsiff, I submitted that since S. 141 of the act is applicable to my lands my occupancy right should be retained though occupied by the opponents claiming the tenancies and prayed for a declaration that the lands do not get vested in Government (and non resumable) so that 1 can obtain possession when my prayer is granted. The opponents were parties to this application and objected to my prayer claiming statutory and protected tenancies: these facts, and particularly the order of the Court, Exhibit-D, referred to above clearly establish the fact that these respondents since long prior to 1-3-1974 were cultivating the lands in question as tenants under Rangachar. Though Rangachar does not say since when these respondents were cultivating the lands, the facts available in the record indicate that they have been cultivating since many years prior to 1-3-1974, and in all probability, since prior to the abolition of the Inam in 1959. Rangachar cannot go behind his own admissions and say that the respondents are not his tenants and they can at best be licencees. ( 12 ) EVEN otherwise it may incidently be mentioned that the Act has been subsequently amended by Karnataka Act No. 1 of 1979 amending amongst other provisions Cl. 34 of S. 2-A according to which a person who cultivates personally any land on lease under a lease created contrary to the provisions of S. 5 and before the commencement of the Amendment Act, (reference is to Act no. 1/74) should also be construed as a tenant as defined under the Act. This fact is mentioned because Rangachar, at some stage in the proceeding before the tribunal, had claimed that a land-holder could not have created any lease subsequent to 2-10-1965, the date on which the Act came into force and that therefore, the claim of these respondents that they were tenants should not be countenanced. This amended provision referred to above is an answer to that, if an answer is required. This amended provision referred to above is an answer to that, if an answer is required. In the circumstances and for the reasons mentioned above, I am of the view that the findings of the Tribunal that these three respondents were tenants, lawfully cultivating the lands in question are unassailable. ( 13 ) NOW, to consider the objection of Rangachar that the Tribunal had not held proper enquiries in these cases. In all these cases the contesting parties had examined themselves. The sum and substance of what they had stated has been referred to by the Tribunal in the orders. Parties had not chosen to examine any witnesses. The applicants before the Tribunal, it appears, had also placed some revenue records. After considering the materials placed before it and the statements of the parties, the Tribunal, in each of these cases, came to the conclusion that the applicants before it (respondents herein) were cultivating the lands in question since prior to 1959 (the year in which the inam came to be abolished ). It has further found that Rangachar had not obtained possession of these lands from the actual cultivators. On the basis of these findings it has held that the persons who had sought occupancy rights in respect of the lands in question were entitled to the same. It is stated that the Tribunal had not followed the mandatory provisions relating to the procedure while holding the enquiries ; that its order is arbitrary and that it had not provided the owner of the lands an opportunity of placing his case before it. ( 14 ) THERE is no basis for the bald assertion that Rangachar had no opportunity to place his case before the Tribunal. The order certainly is not an arbitrary one. He was unable to convince me about the Tribunal having committed any grve procedural irregularities going to the root of the matter. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari AIR 1976 SC 1177 "procedural prescriptions are the hand-maid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. Where the non-compliance though procedural will thwart fair hearing or prejudice doing the juctice to parties, the rule is mandatory. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari AIR 1976 SC 1177 "procedural prescriptions are the hand-maid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. Where the non-compliance though procedural will thwart fair hearing or prejudice doing the juctice to parties, the rule is mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a dominant desideratum. After all, Courts are to do justice, not to wreek this end product on technicalities. " (underlining is supplied ). ( 15 ) THE findings of the Tribunal are based on facts. The same should not ordinarily be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The following observation of the Supreme Court in Swaran Singh v. State of punjab AIR. 1976 SC. 232 may be noted :"it is well settled that Certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or Tribunals. A writ of Certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Art. 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the application of evidence cannot be re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. AIR 1964 SC 477 foil. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice. " ( 16 ) ALSO the observations of the Supreme Court made as early as the year 1955 in the matter of exercising of Certiorari jurisdiction by High Courts under art. 226 of the Constitution may be noted. The Court was dealing with an appeal preferred to it against the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan dismissing a writ petition filed before it challenging an order made by the Election Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act (as they stood then ). In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah (1955) 2 SCR. 1 the supreme Court has observed as follows:"that however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be exercised whenever there is an error of law. The High Courts do not, and should not, act as Courts of appeal under Art. 226. Their powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon that discretion it must be exercised along recognised lines and not arbitrarily ; and one of the limitations imposed by the Courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in this class of cases unless substantial injustice has ensued, or is likely to ensue. They will not allow themselves to be turned into Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense, for, though no legislature can impose limitations on these constitutional powers it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about these special rights decided as speedily as may be. Therefore, writ petitions should not be lightly entertained in this class of case. " (underlining is mine) ( 17 ) BESIDES this, in the light of what I have stated above on facts, I am of the view that the Tribnnal has done substantial justice in the matter. Therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in A. N. Allison v. B. L. Sen AIR 1957 SC. " (underlining is mine) ( 17 ) BESIDES this, in the light of what I have stated above on facts, I am of the view that the Tribnnal has done substantial justice in the matter. Therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in A. N. Allison v. B. L. Sen AIR 1957 SC. 227 "the High Court has the power to refuse the writ if it is satisfied that there was no failure of justice, or, as observed by a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in bux Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U. P. AIR 1966 All 156 "where orders impugned or equitable and substantial justice seems to have been done to the parties' High c ourt should not interfere with the same in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. ( 18 ) FOR the reasons mentioned above I am of the view that there are no good grounds to interfere with the impugned orders. Therefore, these three writ petitions are dismissed and the rules issued are discharged, ( 19 ) PARTIES to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .