JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwala, J. - M/s. Tannery & Footwear Corporation of India Ltd., a Government Company incorporated under the Companies Act, by means of this petition has challenged the order dated August 25, 1977 of the Labour Court II, Kanpur, holding the domestic enquiry held against Sri Intizam Ali, workman. opposite party No. 4 to this petition, as being in violation of the principles of natural justice. 2. Sri Intizam Ali, opposite party, No. 4 was employed in the Closing Department, as a Closing Mechanist in the factory of the petitioner at Kanpur. He was workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and also U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Ghulam Rasool, Technical Officer in the Closing Department, on June 28, 1973, made a complaint that Intizam Ali had abused and assaulted him. This complaint was also forwarded to the Assistant Manager of the Closing Department Sri P. S. Bhanu who under his note of the same date forwarded the same to the Manager, Footwear Department for necessary action. Since the matter was considered to be serious it was forwarded for consideration and necessary orders to the Works Manager, who in his turn forwarded the same to the Personnel Manager. A charge sheet was served on Intizam Ali on June 29, 1972. He was also suspended with immediate effect. Upon request having been made by Intizam Ali, the Manager (Personnel and Administrative) sent a copy of the complaint made by Ghulam Rasool and also intimated that Sri R. K. Saxena Deputy Manager (Personnel) had been appointed Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges. Intizam Ali was required to present himself before the Enquiry Officer on such date, time and place as may be fixed. Upon a permission sought by Intizam Ali, he was permitted to be assisted in the enquiry by one M. Y. Rahmani, an office bearer of Kanpur Chamra Mill Karmachari Union, Kanpur opposite party No. 3 to this petition. 3. The enquiry was conducted by Shri R. K. Saxena. Witnesses were examined, and cross-examined for several days. After full opportunity had been given to Intizam Ali to defend himself, the proceedings terminated on September 27, 1973 and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. It was found by him that the charges were fully proved and they amounted to disorderly behaviour subversive of discipline and recommended for adequate punishment being awarded to Intizam Ali. 4. After full opportunity had been given to Intizam Ali to defend himself, the proceedings terminated on September 27, 1973 and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. It was found by him that the charges were fully proved and they amounted to disorderly behaviour subversive of discipline and recommended for adequate punishment being awarded to Intizam Ali. 4. Thereafter the Managing Director issued a show cause notice to Intizam Ali requiring him to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service of the petitioner Corporation as he had been found guilty of misconduct. In reply to show cause notice, a representation was made by Intizam AIL After due consideration of the representation, the Managing Director by an order dated October 22/ 23, 1973 dismissed Intizam Ali from service. 5. An industrial dispute thereafter arose. The State Government made a reference to the Labour Court II, Kanpur for adjudication of the industrial dispute. Written statements were filed by both the parties. 6. Before the Labour Court, the petitioner raised a preliminary objection to the effect that since a domestic enquiry had been conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, it was not open to the Labour Court to interfere with the order of dismissal. Consequent to this objection, a preliminary issue was framed to the effect as to whether the domestic enquiry held was proper and in accordance with the principles of natural justice and, if so, what is the effect thereof. The Labour Court recorded evidence on this preliminary issue and ultimately by the impugned order held that the -enquiry was vitiated on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. Broadly speaking the following are the reasons stated by the Labour Court for its arriving at the aforesaid conclusion :- (1) No copy of the complaint made by Ghulam Rasool was furnished to Intizam Ali, workman. (2) The complaints of Sri P. S. Bhanu and Shri Ghulam Rasool (Exts. 9 and 10) were not proved. (3) No copy of the enquiry report was given along with show cause notice given by the Managing Director. (4) Previous report and earlier conduct was not taken into account while awarding punishment. 7. Sri N. B. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed these reasons before us. 9 and 10) were not proved. (3) No copy of the enquiry report was given along with show cause notice given by the Managing Director. (4) Previous report and earlier conduct was not taken into account while awarding punishment. 7. Sri N. B. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed these reasons before us. He has submitted that the Labour Court has manifestly erred in law in holding that the enquiry stood vitiated on account of these reasons. He has, also challenged the correctness of some of these reasons which we shall also refer to hereinafter. 8. Before dealing with the aforesaid submissions made by the learned counsel, it appears necessary to address ourselves to the correct nature of a domestic enquiry held by the employers, and the principles applicable thereto. This appears all the more necessary as the Labour Court, in the instant case, has appreciated the matter from the point of view of a regular departmental enquiry upon a charge of misconduct of an employee. / It is this wrong approach of the Labour Court which has resulted in its order, which has 'been impugned in this petition. 9. A domestic enquiry is generally conducted by a layman. He has limited powers, unlike a regular Court where oath can be administered and attendance of witnesses can be compelled and where counsel can represent the parties. It is well accepted that domestic enquiries are not governed by strict rules of evidence. While judging therefore, the evidence led before such a domestic enquiry it is not open to apply a strict standard; at the same time substantive rules forming part of principles of natural justice cannot be ignored. A fact sought to be proved must be supported by statements made in the presence of the workmen. The Tribunal cannot record its finding on hearsay evidence. The findings must find support from legal evidence. Broadly speaking, the rules of natural justice will have to be observed in the conduct of such a domestic enquiry against the workmen. Further, before holding that a particular lapse has vitiated the enquiry, it must also be shown that as a result of that lapse prejudice has been caused. Similarly, if a certain course of procedure is objected as being violative of the principle of natural justice, it must be shown that the deviation of that procedure has caused prejudice. Further, before holding that a particular lapse has vitiated the enquiry, it must also be shown that as a result of that lapse prejudice has been caused. Similarly, if a certain course of procedure is objected as being violative of the principle of natural justice, it must be shown that the deviation of that procedure has caused prejudice. The Supreme Court has rightly pointed out that too much legalism cannot be expected in domestic enquiry. (See Fire Stone T & R Co. v. Workmen. AIR 1968 SC 236 ). Also (see Central' Bank of India v. Prakash Chand Jain (1969) 2 Lab LJ 377 (SC) and Lennox Arthur Patrick O.' Reilly v. Cyril Cuthbert Gittens, AIR 1949 PC 313 ). 10. It is well settled now that rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The question whether the requirements of natural justice have been complied with by the procedure adopted in a given case, must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case. Recently, the Supreme Court in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ( (1978) 1 SCC 248 ) observed that rules of natural justice are flexible enough to permit modifications and variations required by the situation. 11. As already observed, before breach of principles of natural justice can be urged as a ground of attack to the proceedings, likely prejudice either directly or indirectly, must lie established, and if no prejudice has been caused, the proceedings cannot be held as vitiated on this score. (See Azizuf Haque v. State. ( (1971) 3 SCC 796 ) and (Janki Nath Sarangi v. State of Orissa ( (1969) 3 SCC 392 ). 12. Applying, the principles applicable to domestic enquiries, we are of the opinion that the domestic enquiry held in the instant case could not be said to have been vitiated as a result of alleged breach of principles of natural justice, and, the view of the Labour Court to the contrary is manifestly illegal. 13. As noticed above, the first reason given by the Labour Court was the alleged non-furnishing of the complaint made by Shri Ghulam Rasool. The complaint of disorderly behaviour was made by Sri Ghulam Rasool in his complaint, a copy of which was given to the workman. What was not given to the workman was the forwarding note of Sri P. S. Bhanu, the Assistant Manager. The complaint of disorderly behaviour was made by Sri Ghulam Rasool in his complaint, a copy of which was given to the workman. What was not given to the workman was the forwarding note of Sri P. S. Bhanu, the Assistant Manager. We have perused both the complaint of Shri Ghulam Rasool (Ext. 10) as also the forwarding note of Shri P. S. Bhanu, which have been annexed as Annexure to the writ petition. The real complaint was that of Sri Ghulam Rasool. In substance, no other allegation of disorderly behaviour or misconduct has been made by Sri P. S. Bhanu in his forwarding note, other than that what has been made by Sri Ghulam Rasool in his complaint. The copy of the complaint made by Sri Ghulam Rasool was sent under letter dated 4th of July, 1973 to the Manager (Personnel and Administrative). Sri Intizam Ali did not deny the receipt of this complaint either orally or by examining himself as a witness before the Labour Court, or in writing. He did not care to examine himself before the Labour Court. The Labour Court manifestly erred in relying upon the statement of M. Y. Rahmani, an office bearer of the Union in holding that the complaint made by Ghulam Rasool was not received by the workman. 14. Further it is noteworthy that both Ghulam Rasool and Shri P. S. Bhanu were examined as witnesses before the Inquiry Officer. Sri M. Y. Rahmani, on behalf of the workman, cross-examined both these persons at great length. Thus assuming that no copy of the complaint, was received by the workman, it certainly, caused no prejudice, as the case of the complainant was clearly brought in his own statement before the Enquiry Officer. Sri P. S. Bhanu also made it known in his statement as to what was said by him in the forwarding note. In case, it was not clear to the workman as to what was the case against him, he could have further cross-examined Sri Ghulam Rasool and Shri P. S. Bhanu. The workman also made no such grievance of his not being supplied with the copy of the complaint, in his statement before the Enquiry Officer. Clearly, therefore, no prejudice could, in any event, be said to have been caused to the workman. 15. The workman also made no such grievance of his not being supplied with the copy of the complaint, in his statement before the Enquiry Officer. Clearly, therefore, no prejudice could, in any event, be said to have been caused to the workman. 15. We are, unable to sustain this reason as a ground for the domestic enquiry having been vitiated. 16. The next reason, as noticed above and given by the Labour Court, was, that the complaints were not proved. It was not necessary that the complaint ought to have been proved strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Exts. 9 and 10 were before the Enquiry Officer and the workman and his representative had obviously access to them. These complaints were on record and were perused by the workman as also by his representative. As already noticed, Shri Ghulam Rasool, as well as Sri P. S. Bhanu were examined as witnesses before the Enquiry Officer. In this situation, therefore, we are unable to appreciate this ground given by the Labour Court as a reason for the domestic enquiry having been vitiated. 17. We next come to the question as to whether it was incumbent to supply the copy of the enquiry report along with the show cause notice. Model standing orders annexed to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1964 dated 18th December, 1946 are applicable. These Standing Orders do not make any provision for supply of enquiry report along with the show cause notice. Clause 26 (c) of these standing orders relied upon by the learned counsel for the workman, does not also so require. Sri J. N. Tiwari, learned counsel for the workman, relied upon the cases of State of Maharashtra v. B. A. Joshi ( AIR 1969 SC 1302 ) as also Union of India v. H. C. Goel ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ). It was held in these cases that failure to furnish a copy of the report of enquiry officer amount to denial of reasonable opportunity contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The rule laid down in these cases will have no application to an enquiry of the instant nature. 18. As already noticed, there is no, such requirement under the Standing Orders applicable. The rule laid down in these cases will have no application to an enquiry of the instant nature. 18. As already noticed, there is no, such requirement under the Standing Orders applicable. The question which remains to be considered is as to whether such a requirement can be culled out as necessary ingredient of the principles of natural justice. No decision has been brought to our notice by the learned counsel wherein such a principle may have been laid down. 19. In the case of Fire Stone T & R Co. v. Workman (Supra), one of the questions for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether the failure to given copies of the minutes of the enquiry to the workman before asking him to reply to the show cause notice vitiated the enquiry. The Supreme Court held that the minutes were hardly necessary as the workman was present personally and had conducted the defence. The enquiry in the present case was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and full opportunity was given to the workman to cross-examine witnesses produced on behalf of the management and to give his defence. The workman made no complaint before the enquiry officer about the procedure adopted by . him. Clearly, no prejudice could have been caused to the workman as a result of the non-supply of the enquiry report. Nothing has been pointed out to us which may show any prejudice having been caused to the workman on this account. We are, hence, unable to accept this reason as a ground for holding the domestic enquiry as vitiated in law. 20. The last reason stated by the Labour Court for holding the domestic enquiry vitiated in law also cannot be sustained. The question as to whether previous record of the services of the workman should have necessarily been taken into consideration while awarding punishment is a question which has no relevance to the legality of the procedure adopted in domestic enquiry. Thus question was wholly beyond the scope of the preliminary issue which the Labour Court was deciding, namely, as to whether the proceedings before the enquiry officer were vitiated by the principles of natural justice. It is noteworthy that even Union in its written statement before the Labour Court did not take such a plea. 21. Thus question was wholly beyond the scope of the preliminary issue which the Labour Court was deciding, namely, as to whether the proceedings before the enquiry officer were vitiated by the principles of natural justice. It is noteworthy that even Union in its written statement before the Labour Court did not take such a plea. 21. Thus, having found ourselves unable to sustain any of the reasons given by the Labour Court for holding the domestic enquiry violative of the principles of natural justice, the order of the Labour Court is liable to be quashed. 22. In the result, therefore, we allow the writ petition and quash the order of the Labour Court II, Kanpur dated August 25, 1977 passed in Adjudication Case No. 423 of 1974. The Labour Court is directed to proceed with the case before it, in accordance with law. 23. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.