ORDER VYAS, J.-1. This revision application is directed against the appellate judgment given by the Additional Sessions Judge, Neemuch, whereby the applicant's conviction under S. 25 (a) of the Indian Arms Act and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year have been maintained. 2. The prosecution case against the applicant was that on 12-9-1976 some officers of the Narcotics Department had taken a search of the house of the accused-applicant at about 9 a.m. in village Barlai, police station Rampura and during this search a 32 bore revolver with 20 live cartridges and 9 empty cartridges were recovered. The applicant was absent, but his wife was present. The applicant had no licence for possession of this fire-arm and ammunitions. The officers of the Narcotics department then forwarded the report, Ex. p/3, to the Rampura police station After seizing the revolver and the ammunitions a Panchnama (Ex. P/1) was made. On the report, Ex. P/3, an offence was registered by the police vide. Ex. P/4. The Station House officer, Rampura then investigated into the matter and after obtaining the sanction of the District Magistrate, Mandsaur, prosecuted the accused for the aforesaid offences. 3. The defence of the accused at the trial was that he was not' in possession of the fire-arm and the ammunitions and that he was innocent. Both the lower Courts have rejected the defence and relying upon the prosecution evidence have concluded that the house from which the fire-arm and the ammunitions were seized was in the exclusive possession of the applicant and since he had no valid licence for their possession, he was liable to be convicted and sentenced. 4. In this Court the learned counsel for the applicant raised the following grounds: (i) that there is no valid sanction for the prosecution of the applicant for the alleged commission of the aforesaid offences; (ii) that the applicant's son was proved to have been III exclusive and conscious possession of the fire arm and ammunitions, and (iii) also that the prosecution has failed to prove that what was with the accused applicant was the fire-arm and ammunitions as defined in the Indian Arms Act. Land counsel for the State however supported the findings of the Courts below and fully justified both on facts as well as in law. Land counsel for the State however supported the findings of the Courts below and fully justified both on facts as well as in law. I have considered the respective contentions of both the parties and in my opinion this revision application deserves to be allowed on one of the aforesaid grounds only. Section 39 of the Arms Act provides that no prosecution shall be instituted against any person in respect of any offence under S.3 without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate. No doubt in this case while filing the challan against the accused for the trial of the offence under S.3 of the Arms Act the document purporting to be the sanction of the District Magistrate for the applicant's prosecution, was filed along with the other papers by the Station House Officer, Rampura. But during the trial of the accused no attempt was made either to tender this document in evidence or to prove that the sanction as required by S. 39 for the applicant's prosecution was accorded by the District Magistrate, Mandsaur. In my opinion, by what evidence the sanction as contemplated by S. 39 of the Arms Act could have been proved, was the matter with which the prosecution alone was concerned. Ordinarily, the fact that the sanction for prosecution of the applicant was accorded by the District Magistrate, should have been proved either by examining the District Magistrate or any other person who was acquainted with his signatures. It was also necessary for the prosecution to prove that the district Magistrate accorded the sanction after a proper application of his and on the material placed before him. As already stated above, there is no iota of evidence either oral or documentary, to show that any such sanction was accorded by the District Magistrate. Mere filing of a document along with other papers at the time the police report was submitted, cannot be said to be a proper compliance of giving evidence to prove the requirements of S. 39 of the Arms Act. 6. Learned counsel for the State then contended that once a document purporting to be the sanction of the District Magistrate was filed, then judicial notice should have been taken by the Court. This contention, in my opinion, cannot be accepted as held in Lal Singh Kobui v. The State of Assam (1971 Cr. 6. Learned counsel for the State then contended that once a document purporting to be the sanction of the District Magistrate was filed, then judicial notice should have been taken by the Court. This contention, in my opinion, cannot be accepted as held in Lal Singh Kobui v. The State of Assam (1971 Cr. L. J. 1564); Sawaransingh v. Stare (1963 (1) Cr L. J.770) and State v. Fulchand (A.I.R. 1956 M.B. 50). It is necessary that prosecution should prove that the District Magi1itrate on a proper application of his mind to the facts and the material placed before him accorded the sanction for prosecution of an accused under the Arms Act. 7. Learned lower Courts have taken the view that since in the aforesaid document there is an endorsment about return of the case-diary to the Station House Officer it should be presumed that sanction was accorded after perusal of the case-diary. In my opinion no such presumption can be drawn on the basis of the aforesaid endorsement on the said document. In fact when the said document has not been even tendered in evidence and does not form part of the evidence adduced against the accused, it is, therefore, not possible to look to that document for the purposes of the requirements of S. 39 of the Arms Act. Why and for what reasons the officer incharge of the prosecution in the trial Court did not deem it necessary to give the evidence, which should have been given, regarding sanction of the applicant's prosecution by the District Magistrate is a matter which has not been explained either in the Courts below or in this Court also. accordingly, it bas to be held that in this case there was no sanction for the applicant prosecution and the applicant's prosecution on that ground alone is liable to be quashed. In other words, there was no valid trial of the accused and any order of conviction or sentence passed in such a proceeding becomes liable to be quashed. 8. In the light of the view that I have taken above regarding the requirements of S. 39, the other grounds raised on behalf of the applicant need not be considered. 9. In the result I hold that the prosecution of the accused-applicant without a valid sanction from the District Magistrate was bad in law and is liable to be quashed. In the light of the view that I have taken above regarding the requirements of S. 39, the other grounds raised on behalf of the applicant need not be considered. 9. In the result I hold that the prosecution of the accused-applicant without a valid sanction from the District Magistrate was bad in law and is liable to be quashed. This revision application is therefore, allowed. The applicant's prosecution and the proceedings for his trial resulting in his conviction and sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment are hereby quashed. The applicant is on bail. His bail bonds are hereby discharged.