Judgment 1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing Annexure-1 through which Shri Jamuna Pathak (respondent No. 5) has been declared elected as Pramukh of Narkatiyaganj Block in the district of West Champaran. The election of the Pramukh of the Narkatiyaganj Block was scheduled to be held on the 10th of March, 1979. The petitioner and four others including respondent No. 5 filed nomination papers for the post of Pramukh. Respondent No. 5 was the Vice-Chairman of the Notified Area Committee and was a member of the Panchayat Samiti both in the capacity of his being Vice-Chairman and also in the capacity of having been co-opted as social worker. 2. When the scrutiny of the nomination papers was taken up an objection was raised to the effect that respondent No. 5 could not contest in the election of Pramukh as he was Vice-Chairman of the Notified Area Committee. Relying on Sec. 6(3) of the Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961 (hereinafter called "the Act") the Returning Officer rejected his nomination. Thereafter, as the case is, respondent No. 5 created a serious apprehension of breach of peace and, finding the situation dangerous the Returning Officer again accepted his nomination paper. Thereafter, three candidates withdrew their nominations leaving in the field only two candidates, namely, the petitioner and respondent No. 5, and election was held on that very day in which respondent No. 5 secured 23 votes and the petitioner secured 12 votes. Respondent No. 5 was, therefore, declared elected. He also took oath. 3. In this writ petition it has been contended that the Returning Officer had no right to accept the nomination paper of respondent No. 5 after having rejected it once and as such the election itself is void. 4. Respondent No. 5 has contested the case on two grounds. The first ground is that the petitioner, if he has to challenge the election, has to file an election petition before the Election Commissioner and, he cannot be allowed to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court for the same. The second ground is that the petitioner and the Returning Officer belonged to the same caste and, so the Returning Officer, in order to help him, has made false entry in the order sheet regarding the apprehension of breach of peace by respondent No. 5. The second ground is that the petitioner and the Returning Officer belonged to the same caste and, so the Returning Officer, in order to help him, has made false entry in the order sheet regarding the apprehension of breach of peace by respondent No. 5. He had also pleaded that having co-opted as a social worker the bar under Sec. 6(3) of the Act would not apply in his case. 5. The first and most important point for consideration is whether the election of the Pramukh can be allowed to be challenged in this writ petition. Before considering this point I may, however, refer to Annexure-1 which is the order-sheet of the Returning Officer (Sri R.F. Srivastava, Executive Magistrate, Bettiah). The order shows that objection was taken to the acceptance of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5 on account of his being Vice-Chairman of the Notified Area Committee. He (Returning Officer) accepted the objection and rejected the nomination paper. Only the next order shows that Jamuna Pathak (respondent No. 5) claimed to contest on the ground that he was co-opted member and, after rejection of his nomination paper the situation became alarming and serious breach of peace was apprehended. The order clearly shows that he accepted his nomination paper only to pacify the situation. 6. With this background I would refer to certain provisions of Part XVII of the Bihar Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads (Elections, Co-options and Election Petitions) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter called "the Rules"). This Part XVII. deals with election petitions. Rule 148 thereof reads as follows :- "148. No election held under these rules shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the rules contained in this Part. Explanation :- The word "election" in this part means election, co-option and nomination of a member of a Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad or election of an Executive thereof. Rule 149 says that the election petition has to be presented by any candidate or elector to the District Judge or Judicial Commissioner of the district hereinafter referred as "Election Commissioner". The District Judge and the Judicial Commissioner have also been empowered to delegate his authority to any Judge not below the rank of Subordinate Judge hereafter to be referred as "the Additional Election Commissioner". The District Judge and the Judicial Commissioner have also been empowered to delegate his authority to any Judge not below the rank of Subordinate Judge hereafter to be referred as "the Additional Election Commissioner". The details required to be given in the election petition have also been enumerated in the subsequent provisions of Part XVII of the Rules. Obviously, therefore, it appears that the intention of legislature is that the election can be challenged only through an election petition presented before the Election Commissioner or Additional Election Commissioner, if any. 7 On behalf of the petitioner, however, an argument has been made that Rule 148 would apply only in those cases where the election has been held under these Rules. It has been contended that nomination papers once rejected could not have been accepted again under the Rules and so the election in question cannot be said to be an election held under these Rules. Thus, relying on the opening words of Rule 148 learned counsel for the petitioner contends that since the impugned election cannot be said to be "election held under these Rules" this Rule will have no application. I am afraid this contention of the learned counsel can never be accepted. The opening words refer to the Rules under which the elections are held. They do not mean that if any rule is violated then that election will not be said to be an election under these Rules. Whenever an election will be challenged it will be challenged on some violation or infringement of the Rules. In that event if the non-observance of the Rules or infringement of the Rules make the election "not under these Rules", then there can be no election petition before any Election Commissioner. Thus, there is no doubt left that the opening words of Rule 148 relate to the Rules under which the particular election has been held. The election of Pramukh has been held under the Bihar Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads (Elections, Co-options and Election Petitions Rules, 1963 and it is these rules which are meant by the opening words of Rule 148. Whether any rule is infringed or not, the election will be "an election held under these Rules." This contention of the learned counsel in this regard is, therefore, ruled out. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the explanation to Rule 148 quoted above. Whether any rule is infringed or not, the election will be "an election held under these Rules." This contention of the learned counsel in this regard is, therefore, ruled out. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the explanation to Rule 148 quoted above. According to him "election" means only the election, co-option and nomination of a member of a Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad or election of an executive thereof. It has been argued that the election of Pramukh does not find mention in the explanation and, therefore, so far the election of Pramukh is concerned Rule 148 would have no application. I am afraid even this contention cannot be accepted. As pointed out on behalf of the State as also respondent No. 5 the Pramukh comes within the term "executive" mentioned in the explanation. For this reliance has been placed on Section 81 of the Act itself the relevant portions of which run as follows :- "81. Barring of jurisdiction of Courts in all matters relating to elections, co-options and nominations : Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no election, co-option or nomination of a member of a Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad or election of an executive thereof held under this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the District Judge or the Judicial Commissioner or any other Judge not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge, authorised in this behalf by the District Judge or the Judicial Commissioner, as the case may be, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed and no court shall, except as specified above, have jurisdiction :- x x x x x Explanation :- (1) The word Executive in this Section means Pramukh or Up-Pramukh of a Panchayat Samiti or Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha of a Zila Parishad." From the explanation to Section 81 of the Act it is clear that the Pramukh is an "executive" and the election of Taramukh would come within the ambit of Rule 148 of the Rules. Needless to say that Rule 148 is only in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 81 of the Act. Needless to say that Rule 148 is only in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 81 of the Act. Thus the intention of the legislature is made more than amply clear, by both Section 81 of the Act and Rule 148 of the Rules, that any election should be challenged only through an election petition and election petition alone before the Election Commissioner. 9. In support of the above proposition reference may be made to an unreported decision of this Court in Laxmi Narain Gurmaita V/s. Lakhanand Mishra, Letters Patent Appeal No. 17 of 1978 disposed of on 2nd March, 1979 by Division Bench of which I was also a member. That case related to an election of a Mukhia under Gram Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 and Rules made thereunder. The nomination paper of one Lakhanand Mishra for election as Mukhia had been rejected and he had, therefore, filed C. W. J. C. No. 1191 of 1978 for quashing the election. It was heard by a single Judge who was of the opinion that when a nomination of a candidate was illegally rejected, this Court could intervene in a writ application. The relevant portion of Rule 70 of the Bihar Panchayat Rules runs as follows :- "70. No election held under these rules shall be called in question in any other manner on any ground whatsoever other than by a petition before the Election Tribunal appointed under these rules :- The provision here is more or less the same as the provision in Rule 148 of the Bihar Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads (Elections, Co-options and Election Petitions) Rules, 1963. After considering the views of the learned single Judge, we observed as follows in paragraph No. 5 of the Judgement of LPA No. 17 of 1978 : "The learned Single Judge is of opinion that rule 70 is not applicable to a case where nomination of a candidate has been illegally rejected by the Election Officer. In other words, he means to say that if a nomination paper is rejected illegally, then an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable. We are unable to agree with the opinion of the learned Single Judge". In this view of the matter also the remedy of petitioner lies before the Election Commissioner and not this Court. In other words, he means to say that if a nomination paper is rejected illegally, then an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable. We are unable to agree with the opinion of the learned Single Judge". In this view of the matter also the remedy of petitioner lies before the Election Commissioner and not this Court. 10 In this very connection reference may also be made to the case of Ram Naresh Rai V/s. The State of Bihar, 1978 0 BBCJ(HC) 677. In this case the provision of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, came to be considered by a Full Bench which after considering a number of cases also held that the proper remedy would be through an election petition and not through a writ application. In the case of Lakshman Lal V/s. Rameshwar Ram, 1963 0 BLJR 710, also a Division Bench of this Court had held that the proper remedy for setting aside the election of a Mukhia under the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules is to file an application under Rule 72 of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules and not to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. I have already stated above that the provision of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act and the Rules framed thereunder in this regard are similar to the provisions of the Act and the Rules under consideration here. In the case of K.K. Srivastava V/s. Bhupendra Kumar Jain, AIR 1977 SC 1703 , the Supreme Court came to consider the desirability of a writ application where there is specific remedy provided in the law. In that case the election to the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh had taken place under the Indian Advocates Act. There are rules framed by the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh with the approval of the Bar Council of India regulating the dispute regarding the election. There is specific provision regarding constitution of election tribunal. Rule 31(4) thereof says that all disputes arising shall be decided by a tribunal to be known as an election tribunal. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh entertained the writ application on the ground that it was a case where the entire election to the Bar Council has been challenged and an election petition would not be considered to be equally efficacious remedy. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh entertained the writ application on the ground that it was a case where the entire election to the Bar Council has been challenged and an election petition would not be considered to be equally efficacious remedy. The Supreme Court, however, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The relevant observation from paragraph 4 of the reported judgement may be quoted as follows :- "It is well settled law that while Article 226 of the Constitution confers a wide power on the High Court there are equally well settled limitations which this Court has repeatedly pointed out on the exercise of such power. One of them which is relevant for the present case is that where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hand off. This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election. Still more so where there is a statutorily prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory terms. While we need not in this case go to the extent of stating that if there are exceptional or extraordinary circumstances the Court should still refuse to entertain a writ petition it is perfectly clear that merely because the challenge is to a plurality of returns of elections, therefore, a writ petition will lie, is a fallacious argument." In the Act and Rules under consideration here also there is the statutorily prescribed remedy which almost read in mandatory terms. The authority quoted above thus clearly indicates that the petitioner in the instant case should have gone to the Election Tribunal and he should not be given any relief in this writ application. 11. Before concluding, however, I may refer to some other authorities on which the petitioner relied to show that his alternative remedy could not be barred. 12. One of those cases is the case of Bidhya Singh V/s. Vakil Singh - a single Bench decision of this Court - reported in 1971 Pat LJR 136. In that case the application had been filed before the declaration of election of the other candidate as Mukhia, Thus on the date of the election the petitioner had no alternative remedy. The case for consideration before me is entirely different. Here the election has been completed and the result thereof has been announced. Hence, the authority relied upon has no application. The case for consideration before me is entirely different. Here the election has been completed and the result thereof has been announced. Hence, the authority relied upon has no application. Similarly in another single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Kishore Prasad Singh V/s. The State of Bihar, AIR 1973 Pat 139 , relied upon by the petitioner, the application has been filed prior to the declaration of the election result and hence that case also is of no help to the petitioner. Yet another case relied upon by the petitioner is a Division Bench case of this Court Vidhya Nand Singh V/s. The State of Bihar, AIR 1976 Pat 31 . Their Lordships in that case have held that the existence of alternative remedy is no bar for entertaining an application under Articles 226 and 229 of the Constitution, as the power to grant relief under those provisions is discretionary and its exercise depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. in that case the petitioner had proved for a writ to show cause as to why the respondents should not allow the petitioner a certain scale of pay with effect from a certain date, but in that case there was no specific mandatory provision or bar as exists in Rule 148 of the Rules in the instant case. Hence, that case will also be of no help to the petitioner. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a decision of 5 judges of Gujarat High Court in the case of A bad Cotton Manufacturing Company V/s. The Union of India, AIR 1977 Guj 113 . That was a case relating to Trade Notice and action against the authority in which the violation of Article 31(1) of the Constitution was involved. My attention has been invited to the certain observations in that judgement but I think that the Supreme Court authority reported in AIR 1977 SC 1703 , discussed above is much more applicable to the instant case and, so it is unnecessary to consider in any detail the case of Gujarat High Court. The last case relied upon by the petitioner is a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of the Director of Inforcement Directorate, Cabinet Secretariat Department V/s. Saroj Kumar Bhotika, AIR 1978 Cal 65 . The last case relied upon by the petitioner is a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of the Director of Inforcement Directorate, Cabinet Secretariat Department V/s. Saroj Kumar Bhotika, AIR 1978 Cal 65 . I am afraid that the authority is of no help to the petitioner because it has been held therein that in each case the High Court should examine whether the grounds on which the challenge is based can be entertained, tried, and determined by the authority which the statute has created and, if the Court finds that that authority is incapable of dealing with that ground or making any pronouncement upon it, the Court may entertain a writ application. The Election Commissioner in the case before me is fully entitled and competent to go into the election of proper or improper acceptance or rejection of nomination paper and, as such, this authority is also of no help to the petitioner. 13. My discussions aforesaid clearly show that this Writ Application cannot be entertained and the petitioner should have filed an Election Petition before the Election Commissioner. In view of these findings it is not at all necessary for me to discuss the other points taken by the respondents mentioned in paragraph 4 of this judgement. 14. In the result the case is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, the parties will bear their own costs.