Om Prakash v. Salig Ram — 1979 DIGILAW 1191 (ALL)

JUDGMENT : H.N. Seth, J. By this application u/s 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Respondent Salig Ram prays that the memorandum of appeal filed by Om Prakash and others be rejected as full amount of court fee payable thereon has not been paid and that the interim stay order passed in the appeal may also be vacated. 2. Respondent, Salig Ram filed a suit for possession over certain properties, valued at Rs. 1,20,000/-. The trial court decreed the suit for joint possession. Being aggrieved, the Defendants Om Prakash and others filed the present appeal valuing it at Rs. 60,000/-, and prayed that the decree for joint possession passed by the trial court be set aside. They affixed the memorandum of appeal with court fees stamps amounting to Rs. 200/-. which was reported by the Stamp Reporter to be sufficient. 3. The Respondent contends that the Appellants were liable to pay court fee, calculated on the basis of the valuation of the appeal as laid down in Article 1 of Sch. I of the Court Fees Act. As they have not paid full amount of court fees, the memorandum of appeal filed by them deserves to be rejected. Learned Counsel for the Appellants, however, submits that, as has been accepted by the Stamp Reporter, they were, in the instant case, liable to pay fixed court fee of Rs. 200/- as provided in Article 17 (vii) of Sh. II of the Court Fees Act. 4. Sri Vishnu Sahai, learned Counsel for the Appellant urged that as laid down in Article 17(vii) Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, fixed court fee of Rs. 200/- is payable in a suit the valuation for purposes of jurisdiction of which exceeds Rs. 10,000/- and for which no other provision exists in the Court Fees Act. He cited the decisions in the cases of B. Balmukand v. Secretary of State 1941 AWR 185, Rup Chand v. Fateh Chand 8 ALJ 1821, Neko Tewari and Others Vs. Kishun Prasad Pande and Others, AIR 1924 Patna 582, Nemi Chand and Another Vs. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. and Another, AIR 1953 SC 28 , Baljit Singh Vs. T. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1973 All 228 and Sheo Narain Vs. Kishun Prasad Pande and Others, AIR 1924 Patna 582, Nemi Chand and Another Vs. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. and Another, AIR 1953 SC 28 , Baljit Singh Vs. T. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1973 All 228 and Sheo Narain Vs. Radhey Shyam and Others, AIR 1973 All 315 , and contended that court fee payable on a memorandum of appeal has to be calculated on the basis of the decree granted by the trial court of which the Appellant wishes to disembarrass himself. As in the instant case, the Appellants seek to get rid of a decree for joint possession over certain properties, the court fee payable on the memorandum of appeal would be that which is payable in a suit where a decree for joint possession is sought. Section 7(v) of the Act which lays down that court fee payable in a suit for possession over land or building is to be computed in accordance with the value of the subject matter, does not apply in the instant case, as the claim for joint possession of property is something quite different from a claim for its possession. There being no other provision in the Court Fees Act which deals with the amount of court fee payable in a suit for joint possession over properties, the court fee had been rightly computed and paid under Article 17 (vii) Sch. II of the Court Fees Act. 5. Learned Counsel for the Respondent refuted the aforesaid submission and contended that a suit for possession envisaged by Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act, includes within its ambit a suit for joint possession as well. Since there exists a specific provision in the Court Fees Act, providing for payment of court fee for such suits for joint possession, the present case cannot be governed by Article 17 (vii) Sch. II of the Court Fees Act and the Appellants are liable to pay ad valorem court fee in accordance with Article 1 Sch. I of the Act. 6. In order to appreciate and pronounce upon the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties, we think, it will be useful to analyse and understand the scheme underlying some of the provisions of the Court Fees Act, having a bearing on the controversy. I of the Act. 6. In order to appreciate and pronounce upon the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties, we think, it will be useful to analyse and understand the scheme underlying some of the provisions of the Court Fees Act, having a bearing on the controversy. Sections 4 and 6 of Court Fees Act are the charging sections which lay down that no document of any kind specified in Sch. I or Sch. II annexed to the Act as chargeable with fee shall be filed, exi-bited or recorded in or shall be received or furnished by any High Court, Mufassil Court or Public Office unless in respect of such document there has been paid an amount not less than that indicated by either of the two Schedules as the proper fees for such documents. Whereas Schedule I mentions the documents on which ad valorem court fee i. e. court fee calculated in accordance with the value of the subject matter in dispute is payable and lays down the scale for calculating such fees, Sch. II mentions the document on which, irrespective of the value of the subject matter in dispute, fixed amount of court fees as mentioned therein is payable. The Legislature realised that in certain cases where il intended that ad valorem court fee should be paid, the subject matter in dispute may either not be capable of being evaluated in terms of money or that the normal and commonly understood method for its evaluation i.e. by reference to its market value, may not be apt. It, therefore, enacted Section 7 and laid, down the yard-stick or the method For evaluating the subject matter in dispute in suits including appeals and second appeals (as per definition of the word 'suit' as contained in Section 2(iv) of the Act), of the nature specified in Cls. (i) to (xi) thereof, for the purposes of computing the amount of court fee payable under the Act. What Section 7 of the Act in effect, lays down is that where a document specified in Sch. I, on which ad valorem court fee is payable, is filed in connection with a suit (as defined in Section 2(iv) of the Act), of the nature covered by Cls. What Section 7 of the Act in effect, lays down is that where a document specified in Sch. I, on which ad valorem court fee is payable, is filed in connection with a suit (as defined in Section 2(iv) of the Act), of the nature covered by Cls. (i) to (xi) thereof, the value of the subject matter of dispute involved in such document shall be computed in the manner laid down in the relevant sub-clause of the section. Section 7 is neither a charging section nor does it on its own provide for payment of court fee on any particular type of document filed in connection with a suit. Article 1 Sch. I dealing with advalorem court fee- * * * * 7. It provides for payment of court fees on plaints, written statement, pleading, a set off or counter claim or memorandum of appeal which are not otherwise provided for in the Act, presented to any civil or revenue court except those mentioned in Section 3 (we are in this case not concerned with courts mentioned in Section 3) and states the proper amount of fees payable in such cases calculated in accordance with the value of the subject matter in dispute. It is implicit in this Article that before computing the court fee by applying the scale mentioned therein, the subject matter of dispute in the plaint or memorandum of appeal must be capable of valuation either in the normal way or in accordance with the method or yardstick provided for that purpose in Section 7 of the Act. The Article further provides that court fees on plaints and memorandum of appeals etc. shall be payable on the basis of the value of the subject matter in dispute in accordance with the scale mentioned therein provided there is no other provision in the Act, which provides for payment of court fee on such plaints and memorandum of appeal for example Article 2 of Sch. I lays down a different scale for computing court fees payable on a plaint in a suit for specific performance. Article 2(B) of Sch. I provides for payment of court fee in respect of memorandum of appeal filed u/s 23 of the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934. Article 4 of Sch. I lays down a different scale for computing court fees payable on a plaint in a suit for specific performance. Article 2(B) of Sch. I provides for payment of court fee in respect of memorandum of appeal filed u/s 23 of the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934. Article 4 of Sch. II states the fixed amount of court fee payable on plaints or memorandum of appeal in suit to obtain possession under Act No. XVI of 1938 as also m suits to establish or disprove right of occupancy. Article 11 of Sch. II specifies the amount of court fee payable on a memorandum of appeal where the appeal is not from a decree or order having the force of a decree. Article 11A of Sch. II speaks of the fee payable on a memorandum of appeal u/s 39 of the Arbitration Act. Likewise Article 17 Sch. II provides for payment of fixed court fee on plaint and memorandum of appeal in suits, (which expression, in view of the definition contained in Section 2(iv), includes an appeal and a second appeal as well) of following nature: (i) to alter or set aside a summary decision or order, not being one passed under Order XXI Rules 60, 61 or 62 of the CPC of any of the Civil Courts not established by Letters Patent or of any Revenue Court, (ii) to alter or cancel any entry in a register of the names of the proprietors of revenue paying estates, (iii) to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed, in any suit, not otherwise provided for by this Act. (iv) & (v) deleted. (vi) for relief u/s 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, or u/s 91 or Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (vii) every other suit not otherwise provided for by this Act. 8. So for as the fixed court fee payable on plaint or memorandum of appeal under various articles of Sch. II mentioned above are concerned, it is so payable even though the subject matter of dispute in the suit or in the appeal may be capable of being evaluated. 9. It is significant to note that where Article 1 of Sch. I speaks of ad-valorem court fee on plaints, written statements, pleadings, set off or counter claim and memorandum of appeals not otherwise provided for in the Act, Article 17 (iii) Sch. 9. It is significant to note that where Article 1 of Sch. I speaks of ad-valorem court fee on plaints, written statements, pleadings, set off or counter claim and memorandum of appeals not otherwise provided for in the Act, Article 17 (iii) Sch. II provides for payment of fixed court fee on a plaint or memorandum of appeal in suits, appeals to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed which is not otherwise provided for by the Article 17 (vii) lays down that on plaints and memorandum of appeals in suits, appeal not otherwise provided for by the Act fixed court fee as mentioned in the Article has to be paid. Let us for the time being omit from consideration the provisions of Article 17 (iii) of Sch. II and proceed to consider the scope and ambit of the words 'not otherwise provided for by the Act' used in Article 1 Sch. I and Article 17 (vii) Sch. II. Normal meaning and effect of the expression 'not otherwise provided for in the Act,' used in Article 1 of Schedule I is that the court fee payable on all plaints and memorandum of appeals for which no other provision exists in the Act, has to be computed in accordance with the provisions of that Article. Likewise the use of the same expression in Article 17 (vii) also means that where there exists no provision in the Act for computing Court fees on a plaint or memorandum of appeal court fees mentioned in the Article has to be paid. Whereas Article 1 Sch. 1 shows that in cases where there is no specific provision in the Act providing for payment of court fee on plaints and memorandum of appeals, the court fee shall be paid on the basis of the value of the subject matter in dispute and in accordance with the scale mentioned therein. Article 17 (vii) Sch. II lays down that in plaints and memorandum of appeals in suits not otherwise provided for, a fixed court fee as mentioned in that Article has to be paid. It is obvious that the Legislature could not have intended that for purposes of payment of court fee plaints and memorandum of appeals for which no other provision has been made in the Act should be covered both by Article 1 Sch. I and by Article 17 (vii) Sch. II. It is obvious that the Legislature could not have intended that for purposes of payment of court fee plaints and memorandum of appeals for which no other provision has been made in the Act should be covered both by Article 1 Sch. I and by Article 17 (vii) Sch. II. In the very nature of things the field covered by the two Arts. viz. Article 1 Sch. I and Article 17 (vii) Sch. II cannot be one and the same. The question, therefore, that arises for consideration is as to how are the two provisions to be reconciled. 10. As mentioned above Article 1 Sch. I postulates computation of court fee on the basis of the value of the subject matter in dispute in a plaint or memorandum of appeal. Accordingly the plaint or memorandum of appeal which has otherwise not been provided for, contemplated by this Article must be such plaint or memorandum the subject matter of dispute in which should be capable of being evaluated either in the normal way or with the aid of the provision of Section 7 of the Act. The cases where either the subject matter in dispute in the plaint or memorandum of appeal is not capable of valuation or where it is capable of valuation, but the Legislature intended payment of fixed amount of court fees, are grounds by Schedule II of the Act. The applicability of Article 17 (iii) of that Schedule must, therefore, be confined only to such cases where the subject matter of dispute in the suit or appeal is not capable of evaluation in the manner mentioned above or for which other provision exists in the Act. This, in our opinion, is the only way in which the provisions of Article 1 Sch. I and Article 17 (iii) can be harmonized. (Their Lordships then discussed 1941 AWR 185 and observed-) These observations indicate that the learned Judge while deciding the appeal was of opinion that it is the value of the subject matter of dispute in appeal which provides the basis for determining the court fee payable in appeal. There is nothing in this case which runs counter to the scheme of the Act as analysed by us above. There is nothing in this case which runs counter to the scheme of the Act as analysed by us above. (Their Lordships then discussed 8 ALJ 821 and noticed as follows-Editor) It may be noticed that in this case the High Court came to the conclusion that the substance of the relief prayed for in the appeal was one for a declaration and as such the case was covered under Article 17 (iii) Sch. II and the court fee paid was sufficient. Although it has not been said so in the judgment but it appears that the learned Judge was of opinion that inasmuch as the relief claimed in the appeal was one for declaration, the matter was covered by Article 17 (iii) Sch. II and Article 1 of Sch. I of the Court Fees Act had no application to the facts of the case. (Next case discussed by their Lordships was Neko Tewari and Others Vs. Kishun Prasad Pande and Others, (supra), and it was observed-Editor) We respectfully agree with the learned Judge that in the circumstances of that c ase, after temporary injunction had been granted by the trial court, the suit became a pure and simple suit for declaration without there being any consequential relief. Memorandum of appeal in that case, therefore, pertained to an appeal wherein only a declaratory decree had been prayed for. Such a memorandum of appeal clearly fell within the purview of Article 17 (iii) Sch. 11 of the Act, As the provisions of Article 17 Schedule II were attracted in the case, court fee under Article 1 Sch. I could not be demanded even though the subject matter in dispute in appeal was capable of valuation. There is nothing in this case which runs counter to the view expressed by us, namely, that the memorandum of appeal, subject matter of dispute whereof is capable of evaluation and for payment of court fees on which no other provision exists in the Act, is to be governed by Article 1 Sch. I. (Again after discussing Nemi Chand and Another Vs. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. and Another, (supra), it was opined by their Lordships that-Editor) In bur opinion, these observations made by the learned Judge in the context of an appeal filed by a Plaintiff who had given up the consequential relief, show that when a case falls under Article 1 Sch. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. and Another, (supra), it was opined by their Lordships that-Editor) In bur opinion, these observations made by the learned Judge in the context of an appeal filed by a Plaintiff who had given up the consequential relief, show that when a case falls under Article 1 Sch. I the court fee is to be paid according to the value of the subject matter in dispute and that the subject matter in dispute has to be ascertained in the light of the relief claimed in the appeal. Further, it is always open to the Plaintiff to give up a part oi the relief claimed by him. Accordingly, where in a suit for declaration with a consequential relief the Plaintiff gives up the consequential relief, the suit becomes a suit for declaration only. The appeal in such a suit is governed by Article 17 Sch. II of the Court Fees Act and falls outside the purview of Article 1 Sch. I of the Act. There is nothing in the observations made by the learned Judge which runs counter to the view expressed by us above. 11. In the case of Baljit Singh Vs. T. Ranjit Singh, (supra), a suit filed by the Plaintiff for specific performance, had been decreed. The Defendant went up in appeal only questioning the terms on which he had been required to execute the sale deed. J.M. Lal, J. held that the subject matter in dispute in appeal being incapable of valuation the Appellant could not be asked to pay ad valorem court fee under Article 1 Sch. I and the case before him was covered by Article 17 (iii) Sch. II of the Act. Similar view was expressed by O.P. Trivedi, J. in the case of Sheo Narain Vs. Radhey Shyam and Others,(supra). There is nothing in these cases which runs counter to our view that Article 1 Sch. I shall apply to all cases wherein the subject matter of dispute in suit or appeal is capable of valuation and that the cases falling under Article 1 Sch. I will fall outside the purview of Article 17 (vii) Sch. 11. 12. There is nothing in these cases which runs counter to our view that Article 1 Sch. I shall apply to all cases wherein the subject matter of dispute in suit or appeal is capable of valuation and that the cases falling under Article 1 Sch. I will fall outside the purview of Article 17 (vii) Sch. 11. 12. A resume of the authorities cited by learned Counsel for the parties merely shows that the subject matter of dispute in appeal may in some cases be different from the subject matter of dispute in a suit from which the appeal arises and that, the subject matter of dispute in an appeal has to be determined in the light of the relief claimed in the appeal and, that the answer to the question whether the memorandum of appeal is to be stamped under Article 1 Sch. I of Article 17 Sch. II will depend upon such determination. 13. Crucial questions that arises for consideration in this case, therefore, are: (1) What is the subject matter of dipute in an appeal where the Appellant seeks to get rid of a decree for joint possession. (2) Whether such subject matter is capable of valuation, and (3) Whether there is any provision in the Court Fees Act providing for payment of court fee in such cases. 14. Whereas according to learned Counsel for the Appellant, the subject matter of dispute in such an appeal is the controversy with regard to the right to joint or exclusive possession of the property which is not capable of being evaluated either in the normal way or with the aid of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, the case of the Defendants is that the subject matter of dispute is the property itself in respect of which the Appellant is claiming the right. Such property has a market value on the basis of which Court Fees can be computed under Article 1 Sch. I of the Court Fees Act. 15. In our opinion, there is a clear distinction between a dispute and its subject matter. It is possible that different types of disputes may be raised in respect of the same subject matter. Such property has a market value on the basis of which Court Fees can be computed under Article 1 Sch. I of the Court Fees Act. 15. In our opinion, there is a clear distinction between a dispute and its subject matter. It is possible that different types of disputes may be raised in respect of the same subject matter. For example where in an appeal the Appellant challenges a decree for declaration that the Respondent is the owner of the property, the dispute involved in the appeal undoubtedly would be as to whether or not the Respondent is the owner of the property and whether he is emitted to the declaration granted by the trial court, but then the subject matter of the dispute would be the proprietary rights in the property in respect of which the declaration has been granted. 16. Likewise, whether the relief claimed is for possession over the property or for its joint possession the subject matter of dispute in both the cases would be the rights in the property over which possession or dispossession is being claimed. If such subject matter is capable of valuation in a case where a relief for possession is claimed, which it admittedly, is, it would equally be capable of such evaluation even in case of joint possession. We are, accordingly, of opinion that in the instant case as the subject matter of dispute is capable of valuation, the provision of Article 1 Sch. land not that of Article 17 (iii) Sch. II, are attracted and the Appellant has to pay advatorem court fee. 17. We now proceed to consider how is the subject matter of dispute in the present appeal to be evaluated. In this connection we are inclined to agree with the view expressed by Braund, J. in the case of B. Balmukund v. Secratary of State 1941 AWR 185 wherein he observed thus: In such a case one has to ask oneself this question 'what is the value to the Appellant of immunity from the decree?" Upon the answer to that question must, I think, depend the value at which the appeal ought to be assessed. In other words one has to find out the value of the relief granted which it is sought in the appeal to get rid of. 17a. In other words one has to find out the value of the relief granted which it is sought in the appeal to get rid of. 17a. The Appellant in this case wants to get rid of a decree for joint possession of the property in dispute so as to enable him to become the owner of the entire interest in the property. The decree as it stands certainly deprives him of possession over his share of the proprietary interest in the property. It is not disputed that the value of full proprietary interest in the property is Rs. 1,2000/-. The relief sought in the appeal, therefore, can easily be valued at Rs. 60,000/-. and the Appellant has to pay court fee on this amount as provided in Article 1 Schedule 18. Learned Counsel for the Appellant also contended that a decree for joint possession does not entail any body's dispossession from the property in dispute. Such a decree is, as provided in Order 21, Rule 35(2) or the CPC to be executed by affixing a copy of the warrant at some conspicuous place on the property and by proclaiming by beat of drum or other customary mode at some convenient place, the substance of the decree. In the circumstances, the decree which merely declares that the decree holder has a right to enjoy the property along with the judgment debtor, in substance is a declaratory decree without any consequential relief and an appeal against such a decree comes within the purview of Article 17 (iii) Sch. II. We are unable to accept this submission. Declaratory decrees are not executable under the provisions of CPC. Merely because a decree for joint possession has been passed it does not have the effect of putting the decree-holder in such possession of the property. In order to obtain joint possession, the decree-holder has to put his decree into execution and it is only when it has been executed in the manner provided in Order 21, Rule 35(2) of the CPC that he can claim to have entered into joint possession of the property. In order to obtain joint possession, the decree-holder has to put his decree into execution and it is only when it has been executed in the manner provided in Order 21, Rule 35(2) of the CPC that he can claim to have entered into joint possession of the property. The manner of execution of a decree for joint possession is identical to the procedure prescribed in Order 21 Rule 36 for obtaining, in execution of a decree delivery of possession of an immovable property which is in the occupation of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same and not bound by the decree to relinquish such occupancy. It is, in our opinion not possible to argue that a decree for possession of immovable property which is in possession of a tenant or other person who is, in pursuance of the decree, not bound to relinquish his occupancy, is a declaratory decree. Accordingly, merely because a decree for joint possession is executed by symbolic delivery of possession as provided in Order 21 Rule 35 CPC, it does not mean that such a decree is merely a declaratory decree and that the appeal in respect thereof is governed by Article 17 (iii) Sch. 19. Learned Counsel for the Respondents relied upon the following observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhola Nath v. Ajodhia Nath 1949 ALJ 444: In appeal before us it has been argued on behalf of the Appellant that the learned Judge was wrong in holding that relief (A) for joint possession of the Zamindari property should have been valued at Rs. 1,526-0-0. Learned Counsel points out that although for purposes of payment of court-fee the valuation is taken u/s 7(iv)(B) of the Court Fees Act at the value of the share of the Plaintiff, yet for purposes of valuation for jurisdiction the valuation is to be taken at the value of the entire property affected by the suit. We think this contention is correct. Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act (as amended for these Provinces) mentions suits under paragraph (iv) (B) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act along with other suits which shall be valued for purposes of jurisdiction at the market value of the property "involved in or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought". In this suit the relief is for joint possession over the entire property belonging to the Plaintiff as well as the Defendant. It is clear that the relief claimed affects the entire property and not only share of the Plaintiff. The relief, therefore, for joint possession of Zamindari property must be valued at thirty times the land revenue of the entire property for purposes of jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, relief (A) should have really been valued at Rs. 3,053-2-0. The total valuation of the suit would, therefore, have been more than Rs. 5,000/- and the suit was cognizable only by the Civil Judge and not by the Munsif at all. and urged that the Appellant should be asked to pay ad valorem court fee on a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- and not merely on Rs. 60,000/-. In our opinion there is no merit in this submission. In the case cited by the learned Counsel, the Bench was dealing with the question as to how a suit, in which relief for joint possession had been claimed, should have been valued for the purposes of jurisdiction. Valuation of a suit for the purposes of jurisdiction is governed by the provisions of Suits Valuation Act and not by that of the Court Fees Act. As pointed by the learned Judges, the suit in that case fell within the ambit of Section 7(iv)(B) of the Court Fees Act, which according to Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act had to be for the purposes of jurisdiction, valued in accordance with the market value of the property involved in or effected by or title to which is effected by the relief sought and held that in a suit for joint possession the relief claimed effects the entire property and not merely share of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, for the purposes of jurisdiction, such suit had to be valued according to the value of the entire property. Under Article 1 Sch. I court fee has to be computed on the basis of the subject matter of the dispute in appeal and not on the basis of the value of the property involved or effected by relief in the appeal. There is, in our opinion, a clear distinction between the value of the subject-matter of the dispute and that of the property involved or effected by the relief claimed as explained above. There is, in our opinion, a clear distinction between the value of the subject-matter of the dispute and that of the property involved or effected by the relief claimed as explained above. The value of the relief claimed in the present appeal as stated earlier can be fixed at Rs. 60,000/-. 20. In the end learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that the Appellant bona fide believed that in the present case fixed court fee of Rs. 200/-was payable and that he had paid the game accordingly. As the Court has now ruled that court fee is to be paid in accordance with. Article 1 Sch. I of the Court Fees Act some time should be allowed to him to make good the deficiency in court fee. The bona fide of the Appellant is borne out by the fact that even the Stamp Reporter had when the memo was placed before him for scrutiny, opined that court foe of Rs. 200/- paid by the Appellant was sufficient. In our opinion, this is a fit case in which the Appellant should be afforded an opportunity to make good the deficiency in court fee. The Stamp Reporter, shall immediately prepare a fresh report with regard to the amount of court fee payable on the memo of appeal and the Appellants are granted six months’ time from the date of the report of the Stamp Reporter to make good the deficiency in court fee. 21. The application for vacating the interim stay order may accordingly be listed for order after the time allowed for making good the deficiency in court fee has expired.