Judgment : Mookerjee, J. : The Commissioner of Dum Dum Municipality have constructed a Municipal Town Hall with municipal funds and also with financial assistance of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority. The Commissioners had thereafter issued advertisement inviting offers for taking lease of the said Town Hall for staging theatrical performances or exhibiting cinema shows. Several offers were received in response to the said advertisement. The Commissioners of the Municipality at a meeting held on 8th June, 1975 purported to consider the said offer and further decided to accept the offer of Sri Nikhilesh Ghosh for the lease of the said Town Hall for exhibiting cinema shows at an annual rent of Rs. 50,000/- payable in advance by monthly instalments for 5 years with the option for renewal for three more such terms at an enhanced rent of 10% for each successive term. The Commissioners authorised the Chairman to enter into an agreement incorporating the points discussed in the meeting dated 8th June, 1975. 2. On June 26, 1975 and Indenture of Lease between the Commissioners of Dum Dum Municipality represented by their Chairman of the one part and Sri Nikhilesh Ghosh of the other part, was executed purporting to demise and lease out the said Town Hall to Nikhilesh Ghosh for a term of 5 years with option for renewal for three successive terms pursuant to the aforesaid resolution of the Commissioners of the said Municipality. 3. Sanatan Roy, who is the appellant in F.M.A. No. 180 of 1979, filed a writ petition inter-alia praying that the said resolution of the Commissioners of Dum Dum Municipality dated June, 8, 1975 be cancelled and the respondents be prohibited from giving any effect or taking any steps in pursuance of the said resolution dated June ,8, 1975. The said petitioner also prayed that the licence for permanent cinema shows granted by the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas in favour of the respondent No.7 be also cancelled and/or withdrawn. 4. At this stage, it may be pointed out that in his writ petition, Sanatan Roy did not give sufficient particulars relating to the grant of a licence under the West Bengal Cinema (Regulation of public Exhibitions) Rules, 1956 in favour of Nikhilesh Ghosh, the respondent No.7. 4. At this stage, it may be pointed out that in his writ petition, Sanatan Roy did not give sufficient particulars relating to the grant of a licence under the West Bengal Cinema (Regulation of public Exhibitions) Rules, 1956 in favour of Nikhilesh Ghosh, the respondent No.7. He merely averred that the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas by a letter had informed one of the citizens that he had rejected the application of Nikhilesh Ghosh for licence but his order was revised by the State Government and matter could be taken up with the concerned department of the Government and no further action was possible from his end (vide paragraph 5 of the writ petition). No copy of the order of the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas rejecting the said application of the respondent No.7, Nikhilesh Ghosh, was annexed to the writ petition. Neither the petitioner nor the respondents to the Civil Rule disclosed the precise terms of the order of the State Government purporting to revise the said order of rejection by the District Magistrate, 24 Parganas. The writ petition did not contain any prayer for quashing the said revision order of the State Government. The judgment of the learned Single Judge disposing of the Civil Rule No. 1989(W) of 1977 also makes no reference to the granting of the said cinema licence. For all these reasons, we do not propose to consider the legality or otherwise of the purported granting of licence under the West Bengal Cinema (Regulation of Public Exhibitions) Rules, 1965 in favour of Nikhilesh Ghosh and keep open all claims and contentions of the parties with regard to the validity, legality or otherwise of the said licence for exhibiting films in the Town Hall at Dum Dum. Accordingly, both parties will be entitled to take recourse to appropriate legal proceedings for establishment of their said claims and contentions. 5. S.C. Deb J. by his judgment dated 10th January, 1979 disposed of the Civil Rule No. 1989 (W) of 1977. His Lordship held the lease in question was not valid. He directed the respondent Dum Dum Municipality to act in accordance with law regarding the grant of any lease in favour of the respondent No.7. The learned Judge also stayed the operation of the order for 8 weeks. He further recorded that his order was without prejudice to the rights and contention of all parties. He directed the respondent Dum Dum Municipality to act in accordance with law regarding the grant of any lease in favour of the respondent No.7. The learned Judge also stayed the operation of the order for 8 weeks. He further recorded that his order was without prejudice to the rights and contention of all parties. Sanatan Roy, the petitioner being aggrieved by the said order, has preferred F.M.A. 180 of 1977. The Commissioners of Dum Dum Municipality have also preferred F.M.A.T. 317 of 1979. The order of the learned Single Judge did not record that the parties had consented to the passing of the said order. Therefore, we take no notice of the submission that the order appealed against was by consent of parties. 6. Section 102 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 (an amended by Section 4 of W.B. Act XVI of 1966) deals with the powers of the Commissioners of a Municipality to purchase, sell, lease or exchange. The Commissioners at a meeting under clause (b) of Section 102 may- "(b) sell, lease, exchange or otherwise transfer- (i) any land which they have acquired for the purpose of re-coupment, or (ii) with the previous sanction of the State Government, any land which is not required for the purposes of this Act : Provided that no such sanction shall be necessary for granting a lease for a period not exceeding three years." 7. It is not disputed that before granting the impugned lease in favour of respondent No.7 Commissioners did not obtain any previous sanction of the State Government in terms of the said sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of Section 102 of the Bengal Municipal Act, Secondly, the Commissioners of the Dum Dum Municipality in their impugned resolution dated 8th June, 1975 did not record that the property proposed to be demised was not required for the purpose of the Act Mr. N.N. Gooptu appearing on behalf of the Commissioner of Dum Dum Municipality, has not seriously disputed that in case the Section 102 (b) (ii) was applicable, then there has been no compliance with the said provisions. Both Mr. Gooptu, appearing on behalf of the Dum Dum Municipality, and also Mr. A. P. Chatterjee, for the respondent No.7, submitted before us that in the instant case the Commissioners have leased out their building known as the Town Hall and not land. Both Mr. Gooptu, appearing on behalf of the Dum Dum Municipality, and also Mr. A. P. Chatterjee, for the respondent No.7, submitted before us that in the instant case the Commissioners have leased out their building known as the Town Hall and not land. Our attention was drawn to the definitions of building under section 3(2) and of "Land" under Section 3(27) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932. Both these expressions have been given inclusive definitions. Secondly, there is no reason to hold that the expression "Land" does not include a building. Under Section 3(27) 'Land" includes benefits arising out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Thus, Section 3(27) has verbatim adopted the definition of the term "immovable property" given in Section 3(21) of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899. We may also usefully refer to the definition of the expression "attached to the earth" in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The said expression means : (a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs; (b) imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings or (c) attached to what is so imbedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached. In our view, the same meaning should be ascribed to the expression "attached to the earth" appearing in Section 3(27) of the Bengal Municipal Act. Therefore, we conclude that the expression "land" under Section 102 of the Bengal Municipal Act includes buildings. Any other interpretation would be contrary to the express wording of Section 102 and also against the manifest intention of the Legislature to place restrictions upon the power of the Commissioners to transfer municipal lands by sale, lease or otherwise. The Commissioners of a Municipality is a body incorporated under a statute. The powers, duties and functions of the Commissioners have been elaborately enacted in the Bengal Municipal Act and Rules and bye-laws thereunder. It would be absurd to hold that although Section 102 has restricted the power of the Commissioners to purchase, lease and sell lands, the Act has not put similar limitations upon the power of the Commissioners to sell, lease or exchange buildings belonging to the Municipality although such buildings may be much more valuable than bare land. It would be absurd to hold that although Section 102 has restricted the power of the Commissioners to purchase, lease and sell lands, the Act has not put similar limitations upon the power of the Commissioners to sell, lease or exchange buildings belonging to the Municipality although such buildings may be much more valuable than bare land. The proviso to Section 102 indicates the exception to the provisions of Section 102(b). In other words, previous sanction of the State Government would not be necessary only in case of granting lease of municipal land for a period not exceeding three years. In the instant case the Commissioners by impugned resolution and by and Indenture of Lease executed by the Chairman of the Dum Dum Municipality purported to grant lease for a term of 5 years with option for renewal for three successive terms. Therefore the proviso to Section 102 of the Bengal Municipal Act has no manner of application to the instant case. 8. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Chatterjee, learned advocate for the respondent No.7, that a lease granted in favour of his client should be deemed to be for a period not exceeding three years and therefore, the said lease would be saved under the aforesaid proviso. The Court cannot make out a new bargain for the parties. The Commissioners purported to resolve that Mr. Chatterjee's client be granted lease of the Municipal Town Hall for a term of 5 years with option for renewal for three successive terms. The said resolution was not in compliance with the sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of Section 102 of the Bengal Municipal Act and therefore, the same was in excess of the powers of the Commissioners to lease Municipal lands. This Court cannot modify the said resolution of the Commissioners or the terms of the Indenture of Lease made in pursuance of the said resolution and hold that the defendant would be a lessee of the Town Hall for three years. 9. There was another fatal lacuna in the transaction it is not disputed that the Indenture of Lease was in respect of sum exceeding Rs. 500/-. But the same was signed only by the Chairman of the said Municipality and not by atleast two Commissioners including the Chairman. 9. There was another fatal lacuna in the transaction it is not disputed that the Indenture of Lease was in respect of sum exceeding Rs. 500/-. But the same was signed only by the Chairman of the said Municipality and not by atleast two Commissioners including the Chairman. Therefore, the lease in favour of the respondent No. 7 was also in breach of sub-section (1) of Section 103 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932. Sub-Section (3) of Section 103 of the Bengal Municipal Act provides "unless so executed such contract shall not be binding on the Commissioners" Therefore, the Indenture of Lease between the Commissioners of Dum Dum Municipality on the one hand, and the respondent No.7, on the other, was not binding upon the Commissioners. It is unnecessary for us to refer to all the case law on the subject. We find that the uniform view is that a lease which is not in compliance with Section 103 of the Bengal Municipal Act is not merely viodable but void. It would be sufficient to mention the decision of Bijayesh Mukherjee, J. in (1) Jitendra Nath Mukherjee v. Commissioners of Baduria Municipality &. Anr., AIR 1967 Calcutta 423 which refers to the judicial decisions on the said point. In this connection, we may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in (2) Dr. H.S. Rikhv v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1962 SC 554 . The Supreme Court with reference to the similar provision contained in Section 47 of the Punjab Municipal Act at page 561 of the report held that where the essential conditions are not fulfiled there could be no contract and no transfer of property. The Supreme Court further held that a contract not in accordance with provisions of the Act in question would be unenforceable and therefore void. A lease which does not fulfil formalities under a statute relating to a public corporation, would be ultra vires and therefore null and void 10. We also reject the submission of Mr. The Supreme Court further held that a contract not in accordance with provisions of the Act in question would be unenforceable and therefore void. A lease which does not fulfil formalities under a statute relating to a public corporation, would be ultra vires and therefore null and void 10. We also reject the submission of Mr. Chatterjee that a lease in writing for a term of 5 years in respect of the Municipal Town Hall is not a contract and therefore, Section 103 of the Bengal Municipal Act has no application in the instant case, Mulla on Transfer of Property Act (5th Edition) at page 637 quoted :- "The relation of lessor and lessee is one of the contract, and in Bacon's Abridgement a lease is defined as 'contract between the lessor and the lessee for the possession and profits of land, etc., on the one side and recompense by rent or other consideration on the other". The instant lease in favour of the respondent No.7 originated in an agreement between the Commissioners, on the one hand, and the respondent No. 7 on the other. The said agreement purported to result in transfer in favour of the defendant No.7 of right to enjoy the Municipal Town Hall subject to certain express and implied terms. The impugned Indenture of lease contained several covenants. We may also refer to Section 4 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which provides that "the Chapters and Sections of this Act which relate to contracts shall be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act. Undoubtedly, there is a clear distinction between a completed conveyance and an executory contract (see discussions at page 47 of Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 1882, 6th Edition). Bijayesh Mukherji, J. in Jitendra Nath Mukherjee's case (supra), at page 427 paragraph 27, has correctly stated the law on the subject and we respectfully agree with the same. 11. Our attention was drawn to the following subsequent facts. On 28th December, 1977 the Commissioners of the said Municipality purported to execute a deed in favour of Nikhilesh Ghosh ratifying the registered lease dated 26th June, 1975. A contract which is not in compliance with Section 103 is ultra vires and, therefore, there could be no question of ratification of a void act. On 28th December, 1977 the Commissioners of the said Municipality purported to execute a deed in favour of Nikhilesh Ghosh ratifying the registered lease dated 26th June, 1975. A contract which is not in compliance with Section 103 is ultra vires and, therefore, there could be no question of ratification of a void act. The Supreme Court in (3) State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal, AIR 1962 SC 779 (783) with reference to Article 299(1) of the Constitution held that a contract which is void, may not be capable of ratification. The Supreme Court also explained their earlier decision in (4) Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram and others, AIR 1934 SC 236. But the Supreme Court pointed out that under certain circumstances Section 70 of the Contract Act may be attracted in such cases of void contract. 12. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, rightly held that the lease by the Commissioners of the Dum Dum Municipality in favour of the respondent No.7 was not a valid one. But the learned Single Judge in his ordering portion did not direct issue of appropriate writ and/or directions. Secondly, it would not be for this Court to give any direction upon the Commissioners to make a fresh grant of lease in favour of the respondent No.7. Undoubtedly, the respondents to the Rule including the Commissioners and the State Government may be given liberty to proceed according to law. In fact, the learned Single Judge has not really intended to give any direction as to how the respondents are to proceed. Needless to say, they are at liberty to proceed according to law. 13. Mr. A.P. Chatterjee, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 7, has contended that the petitioner, Sanatan Roy, was not even a ratepayer of Dum Dum Municipality, He has no interest in the properties of the said Municipality and he is a stranger. Secondly, according to Mr. Chatterjee no injury of a substantial nature was caused to him by reason of the Commissioners of the Dum Dum Municipality granting the impugned lease in favour of the respondent No.7. Mr. Chatteljee has accordingly contended that Sanatan Roy has no locus standi to file any writ petition and the Civil Rule out of which these two appeals arise ought to have been dismissed in limine. 14. Mr. Chatteljee has accordingly contended that Sanatan Roy has no locus standi to file any writ petition and the Civil Rule out of which these two appeals arise ought to have been dismissed in limine. 14. The judgment of the learned Judge does not indicate that any of the respondents in the Civil Rule had urged in the trial court the above question of locus standi of Sanatan Roy to file the writ petition in question. However, above two points go to the root of the matter and therefore, we proceed to consider them. Sanatan Roy in paragraph (1) of his writ petition averred that he is a citizen of India and had been residing within Dum Dum Municipality and he claimed that he was interested in the maintenance of the municipal amenities of the area. Mr. Noni Coomar Chakraborty in course of his submission made a statement from the Bar that his client's name has bcen included in the current Electoral Roll for the election of Commissioners of Dum Dum Municipality. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Commissioners of Dum Dum Municipality has not disputed this assertion. Therefore, prima facie the petitioner Sanatan Roy is a resident in an area comprised within Dum Dum Municipality and he is also prima facie qualified to vote at an election of the Commissioners of the said Municipality. Therefore, as an elector of the said Municipality Sanatan Roy has locus standi to apply under Article 226 of the Constitution to restrain the Commissioners of the Municipality from acting ultra vires. In this connection, we may refer to the observations of D.N. Sinha J. (as he then was) in paragraph 23 of his judgment in (5) Narendra Nath Chakravarti v. Corporation of Calcutta and others, AIR 1960 Cal. 102 . The learned Judge declined to follow the contrary view taken in (6) AIR 1925 Cal. 48 and relied upon the decision in (7) AIR 1925 Cal. 373 and (8) AIR 1949 Bom. 229. The observations of Chagla C.J, and Gajendragadkar J. in AIR 1949 Bom. 229 were quoted at page 11 of the judgment of D.N. Sinha J. in Narendra Nath Chakravarti v. Corporation of Calcutta and others (supra). 15. 48 and relied upon the decision in (7) AIR 1925 Cal. 373 and (8) AIR 1949 Bom. 229. The observations of Chagla C.J, and Gajendragadkar J. in AIR 1949 Bom. 229 were quoted at page 11 of the judgment of D.N. Sinha J. in Narendra Nath Chakravarti v. Corporation of Calcutta and others (supra). 15. Now that the Bengal Municipal Act no longer requires payment of rates or fees as qualification for voting in an election of Commissioners and the franchise is based on residence and inclusion in the Assembly Electoral Roll for the areas comprised within the Municipality, we hold that every elector of a municipality has real interest in seeing that the municipal affairs are carried on in accordance with law. Therefore, in case a municipality acts ultra vires, a resident of the municipal area who is also a municipal voter is certainly seriously prejudiced. He need not further prove special damages by way of nuisance or annoyance to him. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission of Mr. Chatterjee that the petitioner Sanatan Roy did not prove that he would personally suffer any loss or injury. Not physical proximity but proximity of interest is material. Undoubtedly, subject to certain exceptions, only a person whose interest is affected, can file a writ petition but such interest need not be proprietory. In support of this proposition, we may rely upon the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph (8) in (9) Gadee Venkateswar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others, AIR 1966 SC 828 . In the said case, the petitioner as the President of a Panchayat Samity had filed a writ petition in the matter of establishment of a primary health centre. Subba Rao J. (as he then was) in Gadde Venkataswar Rao's case (supra) inter alia observed that a petitioner who seeks to file an application under Article 226 of the Constitution should "ordinarily" be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest : It can also relate to an interest of a trustee. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest : It can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart in exceptional cases, as the expression "ordinarily" indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietory or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter thereof. Subba Rao J. in this connection referred to the decision of (10) Calcutta Gas Company Proprietory Limited v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 at page 1047. 16. The decision of the Supreme Court in (11) Jashibhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar & Others, AIR 1976 SC 578 , upon which Mr. Chatterjee had placed his reliance, was distinguishable on facts. In the said case, the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films attempted to invoke the Certiorari Jurisdiction in respect of a no objection certificate granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade. According to the Bombay High Court the said no-objection certificate suffered from a patent lack of jurisdiction but the Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that no right vested in the appellant had been infringed or prejudicially or adversely affected as a direct consequence of the order impugned by him and as such he was not an aggrieved person having locus standi to invoke Certiorari jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in paragraph 12 of their judgment upheld the said view but at the same time the Supreme Court laid down that the expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic and, to an extent, an elusive concert. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. The Supreme Court in J.M. Desai's case (supra), referred to a number of reported decisions including the (12) Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Debholkar, AIR 1975 SC 1092. The Supreme Court in J.M. Desai's case (supra), referred to a number of reported decisions including the (12) Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Debholkar, AIR 1975 SC 1092. The Supreme Court further held that the Bombay Cinemas Regulation Act and the Rules made thereunder were not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. They regulate the exercise of private rights. Therefore, the persons aggrieved must receive a strict interpretation. 17. In the instant case, the Commissioners of the Municipality were elected by voters whose names were included in the Electoral Roll for the time being in force. The petitioner, Sanatan Roy, is one of the said electors. The Commissioners are a public authority vested with statutory powers and duties to be exercised for the benefit of and in the interest of the residents of the area comprised within the Municipality. By purporting to grant the impugned lease in contravention of Sections 102 and 103 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, the Commissioners of Dum Dum Municipality committed breach of their statutory duties and obligations towards the residents of the said municipal area. In the instant case, the Commissioners did not purport to violate private rights and therefore, in the present context the expressions "person aggrieved" and "substantial injury" should receive liberal construction. The observations of the Supreme Court in (13) K. Ramadas Shenoy v. The Chief Officers Town Municipal Council, Udipi & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 2177 , would be applicable to the present case. In the said case, the Municipal Commissioners of Udipi Municipality made certain orders in respect of conversion of a Kalyan Mantap-cum-Lecture Hall into one for exhibiting films. A resident of the area by filing a writ petition challenged these actions. Ray C.J. in paragraphs 27 and 28 rejected his contention that the appellant-petitioners had no locus standi. The learned Judge observed that where the Municipality acts in excess of the powers conferred by the Act or abuses those powers it is usurping powers which it does not possess. An illegal construction of a cinema building materially affects the right to or enjoyment of the property by persons residing in the residential area The Municipal Authorities owe a duty and obligation under the statute to see that the residential area is not spoilt by unauthorised construction. An illegal construction of a cinema building materially affects the right to or enjoyment of the property by persons residing in the residential area The Municipal Authorities owe a duty and obligation under the statute to see that the residential area is not spoilt by unauthorised construction. The scheme is for the benefit of the residents of the locality. The rights of the residents in the area are invaded by an illegal construction of a cinema building. If the scheme is nullified by arbitrary acts in excess and in derogation of the powers of the Municipality, the courts will quash such orders. We respectfully follow the above decision and hold that petitioner, Sanatan Roy, had locus standi to file the writ petition. 18. There is also no substance in the submission that the petitioner, Sanatan Roy, has not suffered any substantial injury by reason of the grant of the aforesaid lease of the Municipal Town Hall. We have already referred to several reported decisions which allegedly hold that a rate-payer or an elector has the real interest in municipal affairs being carried on according to law. The expression "substantial" in the context of Article 226(1)(b) and (c) means real and material and not merely triffling or inconsequential injury. In fact, we are inclined to hold that sub clauses (b) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 226 embody the principles which were well-settled by a long catena of case law. What was previously implicit has been now nude explicit by providing the said sub-clauses (b) and (c) that a person who suffers injury of a substantial nature or substantial failure of justice has locus standi to file a writ petition. It is, therefore, unnecessary to elaborate this judgment. Further, in this connection, we may only refer to the recent Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh in (14) The Government of India & Ors. v. The National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., Calcutta, AIR 1977 A.P. 250 (258) paragraph 15 and the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in (15) A'bad Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1977 Guj. 113 , paragraphs 22 and 23. We conclude that the petitioner, Sanatan Roy, had locus standi to file the writ petition. 19. of India Ltd., Calcutta, AIR 1977 A.P. 250 (258) paragraph 15 and the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in (15) A'bad Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1977 Guj. 113 , paragraphs 22 and 23. We conclude that the petitioner, Sanatan Roy, had locus standi to file the writ petition. 19. In view of our finding that the impugned resolution and the Indenture of lease in favour of the respondent No.7 for granting lease of the Town Hall were ultra vires, it is unnecessary for us to decide the abstract question whether or not a Municipal Town Hall can be leased out for holding cinema shows. The Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 does not contain any express prohibition in this behalf. The extent of the power of the Commissioners to sell, lease or otherwise transfer municipal property has been laid down by Section 102 of the Bengal Municipal Act. The decision in K. Ramdas Shenoy's case (supra) inter alia held that the impugned actions of the Municipality were in contravention of the Town Planning Scheme and of Mysore Municipality Act, 1964. Therefore, the decision in K. Ramdal Shenoy's case (supra), is distinguishable. Secondly, according to the respondents, the Municipal Town Hall was erected for recreational facilities and for augmenting the revenue of the Municipality. In the facts of this case it is not necessary to decide the said question whether a Town Hall can be used for the exhibiting of cinema films by a lessee from the Municipality. 20. We have kept open all the questions relating to grant of cinema licence in favour of the respondent No.7. Therefore, we need not also discuss the submission of Mr. Chakraborty, learned advocate for the appellant in F.M.A. No. 180 of 1979, that neither the Commissioners nor the respondent No. 7 had obtained any permission before commencing construction in terms of sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) of Rule 4 of the W.B. Cinema (Regulation of Public Exhibitions) Rules, 1956. Therefore, according to Mr. Chakraborty, the State Government was not entitled to revise the order of the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas and to direct granting a licence in favour of the respondent No.7 under sub-rule (6) Rule 4 of the said Act. We need not decide the above point. According to Mr. Therefore, according to Mr. Chakraborty, the State Government was not entitled to revise the order of the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas and to direct granting a licence in favour of the respondent No.7 under sub-rule (6) Rule 4 of the said Act. We need not decide the above point. According to Mr. Chakraborty, his clients have not been granted certified copies of the relevant orders relating to the grant of cinema licence. We may observe that the said certified copies be expeditiously granted according to relevant rules. 21. We, accordingly, dismiss the F.M.A.T. No. 317 of 1979 preferred by the Commissioners of Dum Dum Municipality. We allow in part the appeal preferred by Sanatan Roy, F.M.A. No. 180 of 1979. We modify the order of S.C. Deb J. in Civil Rule No. 1989(W) of 1979. Let a writ of Mandamus issue commanding the Commissioners of the Municipality, the Chairman of the Municipality, the State of West Bengal and the District Magistrate, 24-Parganas not to give effect or further effect to the impugned resolution of the Commissioners of the Municipality dated 8th June, 1975 and the Indenture of Lease dated 26th June, 1975, and the ratification deed dated 20th December, 1977. Liberty is given to the respondents to act and proceed in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.