JUDGMENT 1. - This application has been presented under section 482, Cr. P.C., for quashing the proceedings initiated under section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ganganagar by his order dated 7-2-1978. 2. I may briefly state the relevant and material facts. The Food Inspector Mangilal visited the shop of the accused Ranjeet Rai on 24-11-1976 purchased a sample of pine-apple country liquor for analysis and after completing usual formalities sent one of the sample for analysis. On examination it was found that it contained chloral-hydrate, but the accused then sent the sample for analysis to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, Calcutta, whereof the report was in negative, but it was reported that there was contravention of rule 24 inasmuch as there was no label of extraneous colouring matter. The trial of the accused Ranjeet Rai proceeded for contravention of rule 24. After trial it was found that for the alleged contravention Ranjeet Rai was not liable. It was the Ganganagar Sugar Mills, which was liable. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate recorded finding to that effect and ordered to proceed against the applicants under section 20A of the aforesaid Act and cognizance was taken against them under section 17. After taking cognizance Ranjeet Rai was acquitted for the contravention of rule 24. There was also a charge for contravention of rule 40(2) and for that it was found that it is not applicable to the commodity in question, so he was also acquitted of the alleged contravention of rule 40(2). 3. In this application it has been urged on behalf of the applicants that provision of section 20A can only be attracted during the course of trial and not after the conclusion of the trial. Ranjeet Rai, the vendor, stood the trial and was acquitted, after this finding having been recorded that he is not liable for the contravention of rule 24. The learned counsel submitted that the question is no more res integra. It stands concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration and another, 1975 (I) F.A.C. 259 . 4. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submitted that before entering into the order of acquittal, trial against Ranjeet Rai was not concluded and prior to that proceedings under section 20A were ordered to be initiated against the manufacturer. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submitted that before entering into the order of acquittal, trial against Ranjeet Rai was not concluded and prior to that proceedings under section 20A were ordered to be initiated against the manufacturer. Thus, the learned Magistrate has acted legally under section 20A. 5. I have considered over the respective contentions of both the sides. From the language of section 20A it is clear that the proceedings against manufacturer, distributor or dealer can be initiated only during the course of trial if they are concerned with the commission of the offence for which any other person is being tried. But after the trial against the original accused is concluded then the manufacturer, distributor or dealer cannot be proceeded against under section 20A. From the perusal of section 20A it would appear that the trial of manufacturer, distributor or dealer would continue along with the trial of the person who is already facing the same. But in case his trial comes to an end then in that situation provision of section 20A cannot be invoked. In the present case virtually the trial of Ranjeet Rai had come to an end and a finding was already recorded in his favour that he is not liable for the contravention of rule 24. Having recorded such a finding, order for taking action against manufacturer, and its agents was passed. In my opinion, this is not permissible under section 20A. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case observed as under:- "Section 20A contemplates action which can only be taken during the course of the trial. A separate trial would require a "written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or of a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority", unless it is a complaint by a purchaser, other than Food Inspector, who could rely upon Section 12 of the Act. But, an addition of an accused under Section 20A constitutes an expressly laid down exception to the requirement of a sanction under section 20V1J." 6. The above decision of the Supreme Court arose from the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in 1973 Crl. L.J. 690. But, an addition of an accused under Section 20A constitutes an expressly laid down exception to the requirement of a sanction under section 20V1J." 6. The above decision of the Supreme Court arose from the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in 1973 Crl. L.J. 690. In para 27 of the judgment the learned Judges considered the scope of section 20A and after quoting that section observed as under "This section provides for the impleading of the manufacturer, distributor or dealer in case in which initially a complaint was filed only against the vendor. Section 20A is an exception to Section 20 of the Act and therefore, the manufacturer etc. may be impleaded in the case even without a complaint having been filed against them under Section 20 of the Act. Section 20A is also an exception to Section 351(1) of the Code and the manufacturer etc. may be impleaded in the case even if they are not present in Court. Now the question is at what stage can Section 20A be invoked. It is clear from the language of Section 20A of the Act, that this section can be invoked only during the trial of the vendor and that it cannot be invoked after the trial of the vendor has concluded either by his discharge or acquittal. Apart from the marginal heading of the section in which the word 'implead' is used, the section itself states that if the Court is satisfied "at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act" that the manufacturer etc. "is also concerned with that offence", then the Court may proceed against the manufacturer etc. This underlining is by us. Reference to sub-section (1) only of Section 351 of the Code is also significant. It means that Section 20A of the Act is not an exception to sub-section (2) of Section 351 of the Code which provides that "the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-head." Section 20A, therefore, can be invoked after the trial of the vendor has commenced and before it has concluded but not thereafter." 7. It would appear from the above observations that during the trial if the court is satisfied that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is concerned with the commission of the same offence for which the vendor is being tried, the court may proceed against the manufacturer etc. Their Lordships clearly observed that they can be proceeded against only before the conclusion of the trial and not thereafter, meaning thereby they had to be tried together, that is, jointly and not separately after the conclusion of the trial of the original accused. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the initiation of the proceedings by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar, against the applicants are liable to be quashed. 8. In the result, this application is allowed and the proceedings against the applicants are quashed.Application allowed. *******