JUDGMENT V.S. DESHPANDE J.-Appellant No.1 is a public trust while appellants Nos. 2 to 6 are the trustees thereof. A property bearing No. 566A of Town Planning Scheme III, Bandra, admeasuring about 1780 square yards was purchased by this trust on which its Masjid, and other structures stand. Defendant No.1 purchased the adjacent plot of land bearing plot No. 566B admeasuring 1580 square yards near about the same time. Under an agreement in writing dated 23rd August, 1934, defendant No. 1 agreed to offer the said land at market rate to plaintiff No 1 trust before selling the same to anyone, in the event of his deciding to sell it, and to confer a right of presumption on plaintiff No. 1 to have a prior right of purchase. In the month of February, 1973, the plaintiff learnt that defendant No. 1 was trying to sell the said land to defendant No.2. The plaintiff asserted its presumptive right to purchase the same at the current market rate, in terms of the said agreement by letters and notice. The plaintiff then instituted this suit in the City Civil Court on 30-1-1978 in view of the failure of any response. The land is claimed to be worth Rs. 75,000 at the date of the suit. Clauses (a) and (b) of the prayers in the plaint read as follows : "(a) That the 1st Defendant be restrained by an order of permanent injunction of this Hon'ble Court from selling or disposing of the said property namely plot No. 566B of Town Planning Scheme III Bandra without first offering the same to plaintiffs; (b) That the 2nd defendant may be ordered and restrained by an order of permanent injunction from purchasing the said property namely plot No. 566B of Town Planning Scheme III Bandra from the 1st defendant." 2. Each one of the reliefs claimed in paras (a) and (b) of the plaint is valued in para 11 of the plaint at Rs. 300. Thus the suit is valued in all for Rs. 600 for the purposes of jurisdiction and court-fees. 3. On plaintiff's motion for injunction pending suit, an ad-interim injunction was granted. Each one of the reliefs claimed in paras (a) and (b) of the plaint is valued in para 11 of the plaint at Rs. 300. Thus the suit is valued in all for Rs. 600 for the purposes of jurisdiction and court-fees. 3. On plaintiff's motion for injunction pending suit, an ad-interim injunction was granted. At the stage of the hearing of notice of motion, the defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Court, contending that the suit being essentially for enforcing the right of pre-emption, the suit was liable to be valued for the purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction at the market rate of the land in accordance with section 6, sub-clause (vi) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. 4. The learned Judge accepted the contention of the defendants and held that it was a suit for enforcement of right of pre-emption. He found the market value of the suit plot to be Rs 75,000, on plaintiff's own averment in the plaint and accordingly further found that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction. By his impugned order dated 6th July, 1978, the learned Judge directed the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper Court. Pendse J., before whom this appeal by the plaintiffs was argued, referred the case to this Division Bench in view of the importance of the point involved: 5. Mr. Vyas, the learned advocate appearing for the appellants, contends that in this suit, the plaintiffs are neither seeking specific performance of contract to sell, nor possession of the plot nor any "interest" therein. "The kind of reliefs of injunction claimed in the plaint, so contends Mr. Vyas, do not amount to enforcing right of pre-emption contemplated under section 6 (vi) of the Court-fees Act. This being not a suit covered by any of the clauses of section 6 of the Act, according to Mr. Vyas, the kind of relief is not provided for by any other articles and as such clause (f) of Article 23 of Schedule III is attracted. Valuing each one of these reliefs claimed in paras (a) and (b) of the plaint at Rs. 300 in terms of the said clause is perfectly legal. The same valuation would be valid for jurisdiction, according to Mr. Valuing each one of these reliefs claimed in paras (a) and (b) of the plaint at Rs. 300 in terms of the said clause is perfectly legal. The same valuation would be valid for jurisdiction, according to Mr. Vyas, under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, it being not the suit of the excepted categories mentioned thereunder. Mr. Sanghavi and Mr. Pandit, learned Advocate for respondents I and 2 on the other hand, support the reasoning of the impugned order. 6. Para I of the agreement, on which the plaintiff's suit is founded is extensively quoted in the judgment of the trial Court. It casts an obligation on defendant No. 1 to offer the said plot, in the first instance, at the market rates, to the trust, before the same is sold to others. It also, secondly, entitles the said trust to have a right of pre-emption or purchasing the same before anybody else. It is important to note that, the plaintiffs do not seek to enforce the defendant's obligation to offer the land to them nor do they seek to enforce their right of purchase described in the agreement as right of pre-emption. This is plain from the prayers (a) and (b) already quoted. Defendant No. 1 is sought to be restrained from selling or disposing the plot 'without first offering the same to plaintiffs' under prayer (a) while defendant No.2 is sought to be restrained from purchasing the same under prayer (b). These relief prayers for injunction against selIing the land by defendant No.1 and purchasing the same by defendant No.2 are no doubt based on the said agreement. Notwithstanding this reliefs actually claimed being incidental still fall short of the far larger rights conferred thereunder. The plaintiffs cannot acquire any right, title and interest in the land or get possession thereof even if the claim is decreed in toto. Preventing the sale of the land to defendant No.2 or anybody else, does not ipso facto result in passing the title in the suit land to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cannot be prevented from claiming lesser relief merely because they are entitled to a larger relief on the basis of the same agreement. This distinction between the rights conferred and reliefs actually claimed; can hardly be missed and, makes all the differences to the point raised in this appeal. 7. Plaintiffs cannot be prevented from claiming lesser relief merely because they are entitled to a larger relief on the basis of the same agreement. This distinction between the rights conferred and reliefs actually claimed; can hardly be missed and, makes all the differences to the point raised in this appeal. 7. Turning now to section 6 of the Act, so far as relevant, it reads as follows: "6. The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows: (vi) In suits to enforce a right of pre-emption according to the value computed in accordance with paragraph (v) of this section of the land, house or garden in respect of which the right is claimed;" This clause will be attracted, only if this suit is found to be in fact, or in essence, to enforce "a right of pre-emption". The right of pre-emption in its essence is the creature of the Mohammedan Law. Mohammedan Law as such has now ceased to be in existence anywhere in India. The right of pre-emption is nonetheless enforceable in some parts of India on the basis of the custom of the statutory provisions to that effect. At the time of the enactment of this Act in 1959, such right was enforceable at any rate in some parts of Gujarat and Marathwada areas of the then Bilingual State of Bombay. The right of pre-emption can also be created by a contract even incases where no such legal right is in existence. In the City of Bombay thus, where customary or statutory right of pre-emption was not and is not in existence, on agreement to that effect still can give rise to such a right of pre-emption. We have, however, seen how the suit is not aimed at enforcing any such right of pre-emption, inasmuch as it does not seek the relief of enforcing defendant No. 1's obligation to sell or plaintiffs' right to the offer thereof. The relief of preventing defendant No. 1 from selling the same to defendant No.2 or anybody else, actually sought, is distinctly different, though springs from the larger right of priority to purchase over others. The Court has no doubt to ascertain the substance of the claim and mere form of relief cannot be determinative as to which clause or article of the Court-fees Act applies. The Court has no doubt to ascertain the substance of the claim and mere form of relief cannot be determinative as to which clause or article of the Court-fees Act applies. Even so, the distinction between the shorter relief sought and the larger relief available, cannot be ignored without deliberately choosing to miss the wood for the tree. 8. Right to the relief claimed no doubt, springs from the same clause I of the agreement. In a broad sense, the suit for lesser relief also can amount to enforcing the right under the agreement, where distinction between the larger and lesser reliefs, based thereon, may not be relevant. But the Court fees Act itself recognises distinction between a suit for injunction and a suit for possession, based on the rights to the properties flowing from the same title, and requires the litigants to value their claims differently for Court-fees and jurisdiction depending on the relief claimed. The choice to claim the relief in a given suit always vests in the plaintiff exclusively subject to any limitation placed by any law. The present suit is essentially a suit to prevent invasion of the right of pre-emption and not for enforcement thereof. 9. Clause (vi) of section 6 of the Act can have no application to any suit in which possession is not claimed. This will be clear if this clause is read against the setting and context of the wording of clauses (v) and (vii). Clause (v) of section 6 provides for suit for possession of houses and gardens, while clause (vii) deals with suit for possession on partition. Clause (vi) in fact requires the valuation of the suit for pre-emption to be made according to the value contemplated under clause (v) earlier. This could only be on the hypothesis that the right to possession is implicit in the contemplated suit to enforce the right of pre-emption under clause (vi) of section 6 of the Act. 10. Mr. Sanghavi and Mr. Pandit drew our attention to a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bishan Singh v. Khaman Singh1, in support of their contention that right of pre-emption is not confined to claiming possession alone and any other relief flowing from such right also amounts to enforcing right of pre-emption This very passage was relied on before the trial Judge and the contention found favour with him. 11. 11. The passage (paragraph II page 841) reads as follows: "To summarize: (1) The right of pre-emption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold. This right is called the primary or inherent right. (2) The pre-emptor has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold. (3) It is a right of substitution but not of repurchase, i.e, the pre-emptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the original vendee. (4) It is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold and not a share of the property sold. (5) Preference being the essence of the right, the plaintiff must have a superior right to that of the vendee or, the person substituted in his place. (6) The right being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place.'' 12. The passage, if we may say so with respect, succinctly pin points several facets of the right of pre-emption under the general1aw of the land as emphasised by the Supreme 'Court' in the opening of para 10 itself. The text of the judgment indicates how the words “general law” refer to the Muhanmedan law, of which it is the creature, as distinguished from the statutory 1aw of Punjab, under the provisions of which, relief was claimed in the said case. The contention of Mr. Sanghavi and Mr. Pandit that the present suit "Seeks to enforce the right under clause (i) above suffers from two fallacies. The first assumption that· any of the reliefs involves enforcing of right “of sale being offered" is demonstrated earlier by us to be ill-founded. The words "without first offering the same to the plaintiffs" in clause (a) of the prayer are merely descriptive of the main relief of restraining defendant No. 1 from selling the land, and are not meant to suggest enforcing the right to purchase. The second assumption that the remedial right adverted to in clause (2) of the passage can have any independent existence apart from the right in clause (I) thereof is equally ill-founded. The second assumption that the remedial right adverted to in clause (2) of the passage can have any independent existence apart from the right in clause (I) thereof is equally ill-founded. The words "remedial right to follow the thing sold" themselves are clear and unequivocal enough to demonstrate that the second clause merely refer to the remedy for enforcing the right referred to in clause (3). Section 6 (vi) of the Court-tees Act obviously can have relevance only when the claimant is driven to resort to the remedy of enforcing the "right to follow the land". The contention of the learned Advocates is thus untenable. 12. Not that each one of the clauses can have no independent relevance. Relevance of each one of these facets can be appreciated and grasped better if the occasion for the same, in the light of the facts of a given case, is present to the mind. Zila Singh case, twice taken to the Supreme Court and reported in A.I.R. 1979 S C 1066 and A.I.R. 1968 SC 1206, is illustrative of the facts adverted to in para I of the passage. During the pendency of the appeal against a decree for pre-emption, the pre-emptor died. The pre-emptor had sold the lands so pre-empted to third parties. The said third parties and legal heirs of the pre-emptor were brought on the record in the appeal. Title of third parties to the lands in the first case, and their competency to execute the decree of pre-emption in the second case was challenged on the ground that right of pre-emption being a personal right, could not survive after the death of the pre-emptor and title- in the- lands could not pass to the pre-emptor heirs or purchasers from him, after preemptor's death. This contention was rejected. It is while-overruling this contention that the Supreme Court had to emphasise how the right of pre-emption is attached to the land and in that sense exists even before the sale of any land though remedial right to enforce it arises only when sale takes place. None of the cases even remotely suggest any other mode of enforcing the right under the first clause apart from the one indicated in the second clause. 13. None of the cases even remotely suggest any other mode of enforcing the right under the first clause apart from the one indicated in the second clause. 13. On the other hand, it is well settled that the remedial “right to follow the land sold" does not come into existence unless the actual sale rakes place. This is what is emphasised at page 203 in Mulla's Muhammedan Law (18th Edition) and also in several cases including the two cases of Zila Singh (supra). No sale in point of fact having been effected by defendant' No.1 to defendant No.2 so far, the question of enforcing the right of preemption cannot and does not arise is the present case. 14. Right of priority to purchase neigbhours or partner’s property can also be the creature of contracts apart from the legal right of pre· emption as conceived under the Mohammedan Law. Mr. Sanghavi drew our attention to a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England to this effect. Dictionary meaning of the word "pre· emption" is to have a priority to offer of sale of property over others Such contractual right of pre-emption can come into existence under variety of circumstances. Every such contract, however, may not carry with it all the attributes of legal right of pre-emption or its incidents, adverted to in Bishan Singh's case (supra). Whether it in fact does or does not must depend on facts and facts of each case. The provisions in clause 1 of the agreement in the present case, entitling the plaintiff to purchase land at market rate, militates against the right of pre-emption being such legal right which contemplates substitution of the pre-emptor in place of the' vendee to have the entire bargain on the same terms as indicated in clause 3 of the passage in Bishan Singh's case. It is a moot point if clause- (vi) of section 6 applies to the enforcement of such contractual right of pre-emption, bereft of its legal elements. It is however unnecessary to pursue this point 'in this case. Suffice it to note that this suit seeks neither to enforce right of purchase provided in the second part of clause (1) which alone is referred to as pre-emptive right, nor to enforce offer of safe referred to in. the first part thereof. It is however unnecessary to pursue this point 'in this case. Suffice it to note that this suit seeks neither to enforce right of purchase provided in the second part of clause (1) which alone is referred to as pre-emptive right, nor to enforce offer of safe referred to in. the first part thereof. We are thus unable to uphold the view of the learned trial Judge and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 15. The question then is whether plaintiffs' valuation of the suit at Rs. 600 is correct. Section 6 of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887 reads as follows: "Where in suits other than those referred to in paragraphs (v), (vi) and (x) and clause (d) of paragraph (xi) in section 6 of the Bombay Court-Fees Act, 1959, court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the- value for purposed of jurisdiction shall be the same." We have found how clause (vi) of section 6 is not applicable. It was not suggested that any other clause of the said section has any relevance. The valuation of the suit for jurisdiction then will be the same as for the courtfees. This takes us to the contention of Mr. Vyas that clause (f) of the Artic1e 23 Gf Schedule II of the Court-fees Act alone is applicable. The correctness of this contention depends on firstly whether "the subject-matter of this suit is not capable of being estimated in money value" and whether the Court-fees Act does not contain any other provision for this kind of suits. We have already noticed how the plaintiffs do not seek to enforce the sale of the land to themselves or its possession. Even if the suit is decreed, they will not acquire any interest in the land itself. They will only succeed in preventing the apprehended invasion on their right to purchase by restraining the defendant No. 1 from selling the land to defendant No.2 or anybody else. This may or may not eventually compel defendant No.1 to offer the land to the plaintiffs alone. Any such decree cannot prevent him from giving up of his intention to sell and retaining the property with himself. The subject-matter of this suit is not thus capable of being estimated in money Value. This may or may not eventually compel defendant No.1 to offer the land to the plaintiffs alone. Any such decree cannot prevent him from giving up of his intention to sell and retaining the property with himself. The subject-matter of this suit is not thus capable of being estimated in money Value. In fact, suits for injunction invariably suffer from this infirmity and are ordinarily incapable of valuation. 16. The next question is does any other section or article deal with such a suit Mr. Sanghavi and Mr. Pandit drew our attention to Article 7 of Schedule I to the Act. Article 7 reads as follows: NumberProper Fee 1.2. 3. Any other plaint, application of petition A fee on the amount of the (including memorandum of appeal) to monetary gain or loss to be obtain 'substantive relief capable of being prevented, according to the valued in terms of monetary gain or preventionscale prescribed under Article of monetary loss including cases wherein1”. application or petition is either treated as a plaint or is described as the mode of obtaining the relief as aforesaid. This Article requires payment of ad 'valorem court-fees in certain cases when subject-matter is incapable of valuation, but 'the substantive relief' can be valued in terms of monetary gain or monetary loss involved. But the difficulty in ascertaining the monetary gain or loss for valuing the substantial relief is the same in this case as in estimating the money value of the subject-matter. If the subject-matter is incapable of valuation we shall have to hold that the substantive relief claimed in the suit also is not capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or monetary loss. According to Mr. Sanghavi, damages that defendants may suffer should furnish the basis for valuation. But this cannot be done unless dismissal of the suit is assumed. Secondly, his suggestion about the differences in the rates of land on the date of suit and the date of dismissal cannot be assessed or estimated to-day. Suffice it to observe that the suggestion is too speculative to warrant any serious consideration. No- other mode of valuation is suggested. None strikes to us also. Our attention is not drawn to any other provision or article of the Court-fees Act We are, therefore, unable to see why clause (f) of Article 23 of Schedule II of the Act should not be attracted. No- other mode of valuation is suggested. None strikes to us also. Our attention is not drawn to any other provision or article of the Court-fees Act We are, therefore, unable to see why clause (f) of Article 23 of Schedule II of the Act should not be attracted. It is not in dispute that in that event no fault can be found with the valuation made by the plain-tiffs for Court-fees. The same will be the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction in terms of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The City Civil Court cannot be said to have no jurisdiction. In the result the appeal succeeds. The impugned order is set aside. In the circumstances or the case, there will be no order as to cost. 17. Ad-interim injunction win continue and the motion will be disposed of by the learned trial Judge in accordance with law. Appeal allowed.