JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendants second appeal in a suit for declaration that the proceedings taken by it for declaring certain land to be a public street are illegal, void and Ineffective. The suit was decreed by the trial court and the decree has been maintained by the lower appellate-court. 2. The land in suit belongs to the plaintiffs who have their houses along the land and used it as passage to the public road. Three other persons had' their houses to the North of the land who had a right but that too came to an end when the defendant Municipal Board constructed a lane which could be used as passage by them from their houses to the Public road. The land in suit was not used as a passage by the public and the defendant Municipal Board had no right in law to declare it a public street; but one of those three persons, namely, Jai Prakash who has his house immediately to the north of the land in question and had only a right of easement through it, out of enmity with the plaintiffs initiated a proceeding before the defendant Municipal Board for declaring it as a public street. The plaintiffs objected but the defendant Municipal Board rejected their objection and purported to declare it as a public street by its Resolution No. 337 dated 29th April, 1964. The plaintiffs thereupon served a notice under Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act that having had no effect, they brought the suit for the aforesaid declaration. 3. The defendant Municipal Board denied the plaintiffs ownership of the land in suit and their locus standi to maintain the suit. The defendant Municipal Board claimed that the procedure prescribed by Section 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act was followed and the land had lawfully been declared to be a public street. It was alleged, that the land in suit had long been used as a passage, as of right by the members of the public whose houses abutted towards the west and to the north of the plaintiffs houses. 4. It was alleged, that the land in suit had long been used as a passage, as of right by the members of the public whose houses abutted towards the west and to the north of the plaintiffs houses. 4. The trial court held the notice under Section 326 to be valid; that the plaintiffs were the owners of the land in suit and that it had not been used as of right as a passage by the members of the public and, therefore, the defendant Municipal Board had no right in law to declare it a public street. These findings have been affirmed by the lower appellate court. 5. Mr. S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the appellant Municipal Board, did not contest before me the correctness of the findings about the validity of the notice under Section 326, nor the findings that the plaintiffs are the Owners of the land in suit and that it had not been used generally by the members of the public as a common passage as of right. To be precise, the finding of the lower appellate court was that the three persons who had their houses to the north of the plaintiffs houses had been using the land in suit as passage by way of easement of necessity and not as members of the general public. He, however, contended that the finding that the land which had been used as a passage by persons other than owners of the land could not be declared to be a public street by a Municipal Board under Section 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act was incorrect. 6. Now, under Section 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, a Board may declare a street which is not a public street to be a public street. 6. Now, under Section 221 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, a Board may declare a street which is not a public street to be a public street. A street is defined by clause (23) of Section 2 of the U. P. Municipalities Act to mean "any road, bridge, footway, lane, square, court yard alley or passage which the public or any portion of the public has a right to pass along and includes on either side, the drains or gutters and the land up to defined boundary of any abutting property, notwithstanding the projection over such land of any verandah or other superstructure." A public street has been defined by clause (19) of Section 2 of that Act to mean a 'street (a) which is declared a public street by the board under the provisions of Section 221; or (b) which with the consent, express or implied, of the owner of the land comprising the street had been levelled, paved, metalled, channelled, severed or repaired out of the Municipal or other public funds." 7. Obviously the land in suit was not a public street within the meaning of sub-clause (b) of clause (19) of Section 2 of the Act. The question is whether it was a street at all and on this the finding being that the public did not have a right to pass along the land, as of right, it cannot be said that, it was a street. The result is that the findings of the two courts below that it was not a street and could not, therefore, be declared to be a street, is impeccable. 8. There is no force in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.