Short Note : 1. This second appeal is at the instance of the defendants against whom the Courts below have passed a decree for eviction from the tenanted premises in favour of the respondent plaintiff by holding that the plaintiff-landlord had established the ground as contemplated by clause (f) of sub section (1) of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to 'as' the Act,). Held: First of all, I would like to take up the objection regarding the allegation about the agreement said to have been entered in between the defendants and the previous landlords, whereby the defendants 'Claim to have become entitled to occupy the suit shop on lease for a period of 10 years. The Courts below were right in rejecting the aforesaid contention for the reason that the aforesaid document being unregistered and unstamped could not be relied for the purpose of claiming a lease for more than one year. On behalf of the appellants. it was contended that the lease was already monthly and the aforesaid letter relied by the defendants was not itself the document of lease. It was simply a piece of evidence disclosing the fact that the landlords had accepted the condition of continuing the lease for a period of 10 years. This argument is seemingly ingenious and seeming ingenuity as does not pay elsewhere is also not of any consequence in the Courts of law. The requirements of the law of stamp duty and registration cannot be circumvented by putting forth such reasonings. It is apparent that by the aforesaid agreement, the terms and conditions of the lease which was monthly were sought to be varied by making the same for more than one year. But the same could not be done except by a registered document. Even otherwise. this story is nothing but a concoction. It was quite possible for the tenants to obtain such a letter on a plain paper from the previous landlords whose relations with the present plaintiff. i.e., the purchaser, were undisputedly strained because there was some dispute in connection with the transaction of sale and a litigation was already pending seeking cancellation of the deed of sale. The story apparently does not inspire confidence. Thus. neither on fact nor on law the aforesaid. i.e., the purchaser, were undisputedly strained because there was some dispute in connection with the transaction of sale and a litigation was already pending seeking cancellation of the deed of sale. The story apparently does not inspire confidence. Thus. neither on fact nor on law the aforesaid. letter is of any avail to the appellants, and the plaintiff was fully entitled to bring a suit for eviction after serving a quit notice according to law and obtain a decree on establishing any of the grounds as contemplated by section 12 (1) of the Act. 2. The other objection that the apportionment of rent done in the earlier suit to which the plaintiff and the defendant of the present suit were also parties could not be relied by the plaintiff and that he was again required to institute a suit himself seeking apportionment is absolutely misconceived. As a matter of fact, the appellants themselves during the pendency of the suit for eviction contended that since the decision in the suit for apportionment to which both the defendants and the plaintiff were parties will operate as resjudicata for the purposes of this suit, the same may be stayed under Section 10 CPC and ultimately. got the suit stayed. Now. when the earlier suit had been decided, they want to get rid of the effect of the same by contending that the plaintiff was again required to file a separate suit. 3. As regards the other objection that Smt. Chameli the mother of Roop Kishore and Swaroop Kishore, had not joined the sale deed by which the suit shop was purchased by the plaintiff is also of no material consequence for [he purpose of the claim made in the suit giving rise to this second appeal. It was not disputed that the defendants were the tenants of Swaroop Kishore and Roop Kishore. The Courts below have found it as a fact that the appellants had recognised the plaintiff as their landlord. Even otherwise, by operation of law, the plaintiff became the landlord by virtue of the deed of sale executed in his favour by Swaroop Kishore and Roop Kishore who were undisputedly, the landlords of the appellants. This objection also therefore fails. 4. Even otherwise, by operation of law, the plaintiff became the landlord by virtue of the deed of sale executed in his favour by Swaroop Kishore and Roop Kishore who were undisputedly, the landlords of the appellants. This objection also therefore fails. 4. As regards the other objection that since the plaintiff is already a partner in a shop doing the retail business of general goods and has now become sufficiently aged, his requirement for the suit shop for starting his own business should be held to be not bona fide is also misconceived. There is material on record to show that the income from the retail business of general goods in which the plaintiff is a partner is not much, and he gets a sum of Rs. 2000/- to Rs. 3000/- only per annum according to his share in the. partnership business. Simply because he happens to be a partner in some other business he does not become disentitled to seek eviction of the tenants from his own shop for starting his own business. The plea that now the plaintiff has become aged about 53 to 54 years is also of no consequence. It is really unfortunate that the plaintiff who instituted the present suit for eviction when he was aged about 37 years. had to wait for 16 years to obtain vacant possession of the suit shop. The suit was instituted in the year 1963 and 16 years have been lost in the long pendency of the litigation upto second appeal. Simply because the plaintiff had reached the age of 52 or 53 years it cannot be said that he is not capable of doing the business by opening a Kirana shop.