Judgment Shivanugrah Narain, J. This application in revision by the judgment-debtor is directed against an order of the Second Court of the Munsif, Begusarai, rejecting the objection under sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed be the judgment-debtor Union of India in Execution Case no. 23 of 1976, in which the plaintiff-decree-holder-opposite party had put under execution the decree passed in Title suit No. 95 of 1971. 2. The decree-holder-opposite party had filed the aforesaid suit for a declaration that the order of dismissal from the service of the judgment debtor-Union of India dated the 10th February, 1969, was illegal, void without jurisdiction and unconstitutional and for a direction asking the defendants namely, the Union of India, through the General Manager, North Eastern Railway, Gorakhpur and some officers of that Railway, to reinstate the plaintiff opposite party and for a further declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to got his salary, emoluments, etc. and promotions with effect from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement, along with damages besides costs. The order of dismissal was impugned on, amongst others the ground that the plaintiff was not given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the order of dismissal or to defend himself against the charges inquired into by the Enquiring Officer and therefore, the order was passed in contravention of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 3. The suit was contested by the petitioner the Union of India and other defendants. 4. By its judgment dated 3.7.75 the Munsif, 2nd Court, Begusarai, held that the plaintiff was not given reasonable opportunity to defend himself at the enquiry stage by the Enquiring Officer with respect to the charges levelled against him and therefore, the Order of dismissal was illegal void and without jurisdiction and that the plaintiff was entitled to the salary and other allowances admissible to him under the rules from the date of dismissal till the date he is reinstated in service on the post which he held prior to the date of dismissal. The operative portion of the judgment of the learned Munsif reads thus: "That the suit be decreed on contest with cost and pleader's fee Rs.16/- only. It is hereby declared that the order of dismissal from service of the plaintiff on 10.2.1969 is illegal. The operative portion of the judgment of the learned Munsif reads thus: "That the suit be decreed on contest with cost and pleader's fee Rs.16/- only. It is hereby declared that the order of dismissal from service of the plaintiff on 10.2.1969 is illegal. The defendants are directed to reinstate the plaintiff to the post he held on the date of dismissal and make payment of the salary and the allowances admissible under the rules from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. Plaintiff will not be end nod for interest," A decree was prepared in accordance with the judgment and the relevant portion thereof runs thus; “........It is hereby declared that the order of dismissal from Service of the plaintiff dated 10.2.1968 is illegal. The defendants are directed to reinstate the plaintiff to the post be held on the date of dismissal and make payment of the salary and other allowances adjustable under the rules from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. Plaintiff will not be entitled for interest, and that the sum of Rs.68.25 paise cost to the suit be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff on account of the cost of this suit with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum from this date to the date of realisation." 5. The plaintiff decree bolder opposite party put the decree into execution and claimed a sum of Rs.21,947,95 as arrears of salary and allowances due to him, besides the cost awarded by the court. I should have stated that the decree holder opposite party was reinstated in accordance with the decree passed by the learned Munsif. The Union of India filed an objection under section 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging that the decree for the amount of salary and other emoluments was not executable as it was a declaratory decree, pure and simple and, also because the decree holder had not paid any court-fee on the amount claimed as salary. A plea was also taken that the amount claimed was in excess of the pay and other allowances and that the amount given in the execution was wrong. The learned Munsif, as I have stated above, has rejected the objection. 6. A plea was also taken that the amount claimed was in excess of the pay and other allowances and that the amount given in the execution was wrong. The learned Munsif, as I have stated above, has rejected the objection. 6. Shri Madhusudan Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, besides raising other contentions, to which I shall refer presently has reiterated the objection that the decree so far as it relates to the amount of salary and allowances, is not executable as it is a mere declaratory decree. He urges that no amount is mentioned as payable by the defendant to the plaintiff and therefore, the decree is mere declaratory decree. 7. In my opinion, this contention is clearly misconcieved. The test to ascertain whether a decree is executable is whether there is a direct and definite order to a definite person to do or refrain from doing a definite thing. See Lakshmi Narayan Vs. Iyanapurapu Suryanarayana citing Lalibai Vs. Valiram Ghanisham Das 7 S.L.R. 192 and Banu Mal V. Parash Ram A.I.R. 1930. Lahore 110. I have already quoted the material portion of the decree. The decree contains a direct and definite order not only to reinstate the plaintiff but also to make payment of the salary and other allowances admissible under the Rules, (the word adjustable' appearing in the certified copy of the decree seems to be a mistake for the word 'admissible); from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement and this order is directed to the defendant. The decree as regards the amount or money, therefore, satisfies the aforesaid test or executability. It is true that the exact amount payable by the defendant to the plaintiff is not mentioned in the decree but that does not make the decree unexecutable, because, that amount is a sum which can be clearly and exactly as certain. The amount of salary and allowance admissible under the rules though it is not an ascertained sum can definitely be ascertained by ascertaining the facts of the case. It is true that the date by which payment is to be made is not mentioned, but if no time is fixed for payment a reasonable time is necessarily implied. In Bapurao Vs. It is true that the date by which payment is to be made is not mentioned, but if no time is fixed for payment a reasonable time is necessarily implied. In Bapurao Vs. Hanumanthrao the argument was that the decree was not ekecutble as it did not mention any fixed amount nor did it stipulate the date by which the amount was payable. It was held that the amount as well as the date could well be ascertained. Sri Singh argued that this case was wrongly decided but was unable to refer to any principle of law, which goes counter to this decision or to any decision which takes a contrary view. The argument that the decree was not executable as it was a mere declaratory decree was therefore, correctly overruled by the court below. 8. Shri Singh also argued that tae decree for the amount or salary etc. could not be executed as no court fee had been paid or the aforesaid amount by the plaintiff decree holder. It is well settled that an executing court cannot go behind the decree, and except in cases where the decree is nullity, it cannot go into the question whether or not the decree passed was legal. It may have been illegal on the part of the court to have passed a decree for the amount of salary in the absence of any Court-fee having been paid on the aforesaid amount but certainly does not reader the decree a nullity. There is a well recognised distinction between a decree passed wit bout jurisdiction and a decree made under illegal exercise of jurisdiction, as pointed out in Nilmani Dora V. Ripunandan Gountia. Sri Singh also attempted to argue that the decree in question was without jurisdiction as the suit with the reliefs claimed was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsif. Though a plea was raised by the defendant that the suit was undervalued and the Court-fee paid was insufficient no plea was raised that the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. In such a situation it is not open to the judgment-debtor to raise plea that the suit was beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree. As to whether a Court has jurisdiction or not depends upon the averments in the plaint. In such a situation it is not open to the judgment-debtor to raise plea that the suit was beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree. As to whether a Court has jurisdiction or not depends upon the averments in the plaint. On the averments in the plaint it is not disputed that the suit was within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsif as it was valued only at Rs.51/-. It is, therefore, not a case where absence or jurisdiction appears on the face of the record. And it is well settled that where the objection as to jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. - See Vasudev Dhanibhai Modi V. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman at pages 1476-77. This contention must, therefore, also fail. 9. Shri Madhu Sudan Singh Pressed the argument that there was inherent absence of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit in view of the provisions or the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is urged that being a boiler maker Khalasi employed under the North Eastern Railway, the decree holder was a workman employed in an industry within the meaning of the expression as used in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter cased 'the Act') and that he had a right to raise an Industrial dispute in the matter of wrongful termination of his service and in regard to any grievance in the matter the only remedy open to him was to raise an industrial dispute and to approach Government to refer the same to the appropriate Tribunal or Labour Court. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke. In my opinion, the ratio of that decision has no application to the facts of this csse. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke. In my opinion, the ratio of that decision has no application to the facts of this csse. In that case the plaintiff respondents before the Supreme Court were seeking to protect their right which flowed from an agreement entered into between the Union to which the plaintiff-respondents belonged, and the Premier Automobiles Ltd. and such a collective agreement, the Supreme Court held, created a right in favour of the members of the Union only under section 18 (1) of the Act and not under the general law of the Country. Applying the principle that where a person seeks to enforce a right or an obligation created by a particular statute, which also provides remedy for the same, and not a right under the general law, independent of that statute the only remedy available is the statutory remedy provided by the particular statute, the Supreme Court held that the only remedy available to the plaintiff-respondents was the remedy of raising an Industrial dispute and getting it adjudicated and that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was ousted. In the present case, the plaintiffs' right to get a declaration that the order of his dismissal was void and without jurisdiction is not a right created by the Act. It is a right under the general law a right flowing from a constitutional provision, namely, Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In such a situation the principle on which the decision in Premier Automobiles' case (Supra) proceeded has no application. Untwalia, J., who spoke for the Supreme Court in that case summed up the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute thus: "(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in tile civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter-VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33C or the raising of an Industrial dispute, is the case may be. 10. Though In view of the provisions of Sec. 2A of the Act, this dispute as to the order of dismissal between the plaintiff and the Union of India will amount to an industrial dispute the dispute falls in category (2) mentioned by Untwalia, J. as the Industrial dispute arises out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief. It is true that Untwalia, J. pointed that there will hardly be a disputed which will be Industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. But Untwalla, J. specifically pointed out that such a contingency may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view of the provision of law contained in Section 2A of the Act will be an industrial dispute. A personal dispute could also be an Industrial dispute only because of section 2A of the Act, and, therefore, it will be an industrial dispute under the General or common law. A personal dispute could also be an Industrial dispute only because of section 2A of the Act, and, therefore, it will be an industrial dispute under the General or common law. That this reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court is the correct one is put beyond doubt by the specific approval, accorded by Untwalia, J, speaking for the Supreme Court, to the decision of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in M/S Austin Distributors Pvt. Lid. V. Nil Kumar Das and to the view taken by the learned single Judge of the Mysore High Court in Syndicate Bank Ltd. Vs. Vinsent Robert Lobo. In the Calcutta case, it was held that a suit for recovery of damages for wrongful dismissal on the grounds which are clearly entertainable in Civil Court, would lie in that Court, even though a special remedy is provided in the Act in respect or that matter. This decision was based on the principle "that the right, claimed in the instant case, was a right all along recognised under the general law and did not come into existence and was not brought into existence or created by the above special legislation." Similar view was taken in the Mysore case, referred to above. The right to a declaration that the order of dismissal was null and void because of the contravention of provision of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India was a right all along recognised under the general law and did not come into existence and was not brought into existence or created by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 11. I am unable to accept the argument of Shri Singh that the right to salary and allowances from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement was a right creates by section 33C of the Act. Once it is held that the order of dismissal was void and without jurisdiction, the plaintiff, who obtained such a decree, must be deemed to be in service and being in service he is entitled to receive salary and allowances admissible for the post held. The right to receive salary and allowances of the post is a right under the general law and is not certain or section 33C of the Act, which only provides for a particular method or realisation of certain amounts or money legally payable to a person. 12. The right to receive salary and allowances of the post is a right under the general law and is not certain or section 33C of the Act, which only provides for a particular method or realisation of certain amounts or money legally payable to a person. 12. Shri Singh referred to the decision in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad Vs. Jyotindra Hari Prasad Mehta but that cases proceeded on the footing that the right was one created by the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and not the one under the general law. The decision is, therefore, distinguishable. I would, accordingly, over rule this. 13. Shri Singh also contended that an application for amendment of the judgment and the decree had been filed and, therefore, the decree is not executable. I am unable to agree that the mere fact of the pendency of an application for amendment of the judgment and the decree makes the decree unexecutable. That may be ground for staying the execution of the decree but it cannot render the decree unexecutable and so long as it is not amended, the decree can be executed. 14. No other contention has been raised. 15. The objection that the decree was unexecutable was, therefore, rightly rejected. 16. I may, however, observe that in the objection petition filed the judgment-debtor had also pleaded that the account given in the execution petition was not correct. The learned Munsif in his order under revision has not said anything on the point, Before ordering realisation of the amount under the decree, it is certainly the duty of the court to ascertain the total amount of salary and other allowances admissible to the plaintiff under the Rules from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement before passing orders for realisation of the same. The Court will ascertain that sum, if necessary by taking evidence in the matter. 17. With these observations, the application is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs.100/- Application dismissed.