JUDGMENT : Murlidhar, J. This is a judgment-debtor's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against the revisional order dated 27-8-1976 of the District Judge by which the landlords' revision was allowed, the order of the Judge, Small Causes Court, allowing the Petitioner's restoration application was set aside and the restoration application itself dismissed. 2. The brief relevant facts are these. The suit was one for arrears of rent and ejectment from a shop. The first relevant date fixed was 6-9-1974. On that date an application was moved on behalf of the tenant-Petitioner for time for payment of the admitted arrears. The court directed that Rs. 500/- be deposited within 15 days and the rest on 13-12-1974, the next date fixed. On 13-12-1974 neither any money was deposited nor the Petitioner appeared. The suit was, therefore, directed to proceed ex-parte and the evidence of the Plaintiff was recorded. The ex-parte judgment was delivered on 17-12-1974. An application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC was moved on 17-1-1975 with the allegations that the Petitioner had been ill on 6-9-1974 and had sent his brother to the counsel, that the brother had come away after instructing the counsel allegedly with the advice that he should enquire about the next date later on. The Petitioner claimed to have visited the counsel after some time and to have been told that he had to deposit the arrears of rent within 15 days but now he should do to on 13-12-1974. Further that on 13- 12-1974 he again went to the courts in the afternoon but the counsel had left and the clerk told him that it was too late for deposit and that the counsel would get the money deposited on some other date. According to the Petitioner he then came away and inspite of his enquiries the counsel did not inform him of the date and he learnt of the correct position after the Amin's visit on 15-1-1975 to execute the ex-parte decree. This application was accompanied by an affidavit of the Petitioner himself. The Petitioner had also enclosed with the application the surety bond of one Shyam Lal but there was no application for permission to file security. The record further shows that a tender for the decretal amount had also been appended to the restoration application. This application was accompanied by an affidavit of the Petitioner himself. The Petitioner had also enclosed with the application the surety bond of one Shyam Lal but there was no application for permission to file security. The record further shows that a tender for the decretal amount had also been appended to the restoration application. The J.S.C.C. on the stay application moved the same day passed an order that the execution be stayed if the Petitioner deposits the amount "as the decree-holder's counsel has no objection if it is deposited ". The record shows that the whole decretal amount was deposited on 18-1-1975, the next day after moving the application. The Judge Small Causes Court noting that only an objection but no counter-affidavit had been filed and the fact that the Petitioner was not aware of the date was a sufficient cause allowed the application on payment of Rs. 20/-. The District Judge in revision u/s 25 Provincial Small Cause Courts Act pointed out that the application was time barred by one day but the Judge Small Causes Court had not considered this aspect. Further that the Judge Small Causes Court had also not applied his mind to the question whether the Petitioner had knowledge prior to 15-1-1975 and had only peremptorily observed that this lack of knowledge was a sufficient cause. Thereafter, the District Judge himself considered the allegations is the affidavit in tne light of the dates fixed in the case and observed that but for carelessness and negligence on the part of the Petitioner he would have learnt of the dates fixed in the case and the ex-parte order and, therefore, the Judge Small Causes Court's finding about sufficient cause could not be accepted and the application must be held to be time barred and based on insufficient cause for non-appearance. The District Judge also observed that prior permission of the court for filing security had not been obtained. These findings have been challenged by this writ petition. 3. The record was summoned to ascertain if the question of security u/s 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was really involved in the case. Now that it transpires that the decretal amount was deposited in cash on 18-1-1975 it is obvious that this question does not arise. These findings have been challenged by this writ petition. 3. The record was summoned to ascertain if the question of security u/s 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was really involved in the case. Now that it transpires that the decretal amount was deposited in cash on 18-1-1975 it is obvious that this question does not arise. The utmost that can be said about the effect of the deposit one day after the moving of the application is that the restoration application may be treated to have been moved on 18-1-1975. For all practical purposes this can make no difference because if the application of 17-1-1975 be treated to be based on sufficient cause and within time it would be nonetheless so even if it be deemed to be moved on 18-1-1975. 4. The next contention is that the District Judge in a revision u/s 25 Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was not justified in (i) reappraising the evidence and finding that there was no sufficient cause for non-appearance of the Petitioner because he had been negligent and careless and (ii) recording a finding that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay u/s 5 Limitation Act and the application was barred by limitation by one day. 5. On the first question, the order of the Judge Small Cause Court was clearly not according to law inasmuch as there was no application of mind to the material on record and the Judge Small Cause Court had peremptorily observed "applicant has given the reason that he was not aware of the date. This can be called sufficient cause as held in Devi Ramchand Waswani Vs. S.V. Bastikar, AIR 1968 Bom 57 . The opposite parties have not filed a counter-affidavit. 4C deserves to be allowed on heavy costs." This cursory finding in which no notice was taken of the circumstances which led to unaware-ness of the date could rightly be struck down in revision as vitiated by an omission to consider material date. But whether thereafter the revisional court could itself decide the matter is doubtful. It was held in Civil Revision Nos. 190 and 2999 of 1977 and 64 of 1978 decided on 29-10-1979 by a Division Bench of this Court (1979 AWC 746) that the revision court u/s 25 P.S.C.C. Act has no power to consider the evidence itself nor to determine an issue of fact. It was held in Civil Revision Nos. 190 and 2999 of 1977 and 64 of 1978 decided on 29-10-1979 by a Division Bench of this Court (1979 AWC 746) that the revision court u/s 25 P.S.C.C. Act has no power to consider the evidence itself nor to determine an issue of fact. The proper course is to remand the case to the trial court. Whether there was sufficient cause for non-appearance for which the ex-parte decree should be set aside under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC is a question of fact. Therefore, this part of the revisional court's finding may be regarded as vulnerable. 6. The revisional court's order, however, would be sustainable if the finding on the question of limitation can be upheld. The question of limitation was a question of law and the question whether delay should be condoned u/s 5 Limitation Act is a mixed question of law and fact at any rate until the correct principles applicable have been appreciated. This matter was not considered by the trial court at all. It was urged that the Respondent not having raised the plea of limitation in his objection before the trial court was not entitled to raise it in revision. I am unable to agree. Section 3 of Limitation Act is a complete answer to this contention. This provision requires inter-alia that every application made after the prescribed period of limitation shall be dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence, the learned Counsel then contended that in any case when in the absence of any objection the trial court allowed the application for setting aside the decree and the same facts constituted the ground for condoning the delay as furnished the sufficient cause for non-appearance in finding that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance the trial court should be deemed to have also found that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay u/s 5 of Limitation Act. Prem Prakash v. Nabi Bux 1979 ACJ 299 was referred to in this connection. The facts of that case are different and of a special kind. There time was allowed by the court itself for furnishing security and in pursuance of this order security u/s 17 Provincial Small Cause Court Act was furnished beyond the period of limitation. Prem Prakash v. Nabi Bux 1979 ACJ 299 was referred to in this connection. The facts of that case are different and of a special kind. There time was allowed by the court itself for furnishing security and in pursuance of this order security u/s 17 Provincial Small Cause Court Act was furnished beyond the period of limitation. It was held in these circumstances that the delay can be taken to have been condoned u/s 5 Limitation Act. It is not possible to imply such a rinding. There is no order of the court justifying the delay. The considerations for regarding a cause as sufficient for non-appearance are different from those for regarding the cause as sufficient for condonation of delay u/s 5 Limitation Act. The absence of any negligence has more important bearing in the latter controversy where the condonation of delay leads to cancellation of a right accrued to the other party by expiry of limitation. Therefore, it is not possible to imply a finding that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay in the order of the trial court. 7. Now it is undisputable that the Petitioner was mistaken in assuming that limitation will run from the date of knowledge. Apparently the trial court fell into the same mistake. The correct legal position is that under Article 123 Limitation Act in this case where the Petitioner had been contesting the suit runs from the date of decree. The only way that this limitation could be extended was by condonation of delay u/s 5 Limitation Act. Because of the common mistake under which the Petitioner and the trial court laboured there was no occasion for making such an application before the trial court. But what is important is that even before the District Judge no such application was made although one of the specific grounds taken in the revision was that the application was time barred and had been illegally allowed without even an application u/s 5 Limitation Act. On behalf of the Respondents Sarswati Devi v. Sri Krishna Mehrotra 1979 UPRCC 487 has been cited. In this case the mistake was more or less similar and it was assumed by the District Judge while restoring a revision that the starting point for limitation was from the date of knowledge. There was no application u/s 5 Limitation Act. On behalf of the Respondents Sarswati Devi v. Sri Krishna Mehrotra 1979 UPRCC 487 has been cited. In this case the mistake was more or less similar and it was assumed by the District Judge while restoring a revision that the starting point for limitation was from the date of knowledge. There was no application u/s 5 Limitation Act. V.K. Mehrotra, J. in revision quashed the order observing that when no specific prayer for condoning the delay was made on behalf of the party seeking restoration, the mere fact that it did not have knowledge about the date of hearing could not be pressed into aid for virtually starting a new point for limitation. Also that in a case where the statute provides specifically a point for the start of limitation and no prayer for condoning the delay after the expiry of the time has been made the court did not have jurisdiction to recall the ex-parte order made beyond the period of limitation. This case bears out the Respondent's contention that the revisional court was correct in dismissing the application on the grounds of limitation as a matter of law when the lower court had not considered this aspect and no application for condonation of delay had been made even before the revisional court. 8. I also do not think that the District Judge committed an illegality in suo-moto considering if on the material on record the delay could be condoned u/s 5 Limitation Act. This was not a case of reappraisal of evidence nor a case of determining an issue on fact for there was no prayer for condonation of delay. It was an examination by the court to see if it should not itself condone the delay in the interests of justice. It need not have done so. Therefore, no grievance can be made of the fact that the District Judge himself went into the grounds for condonation of delay and did not choose to remand the case. 9. It was an examination by the court to see if it should not itself condone the delay in the interests of justice. It need not have done so. Therefore, no grievance can be made of the fact that the District Judge himself went into the grounds for condonation of delay and did not choose to remand the case. 9. I am also of the opinion that even if it should be assumed that the correct legal procedure was that the finding whether there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay should have been obtained from the trial court it would not be proper to interfere with the order of the District Judge in the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 for vindicating a technicality when substantial justice has been done. 10. In the result the petition fails and is hereby dismissed, The stay order, dated 19-9-1979, is vacated. The Petitioner is allowed three months' time to vacate the premises where after this order shall be enforcible. No order as to costs.