JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. -This is a defendant second appeal in a suit for mandatory injunction for removal of certain projections shown by letters E F G H I J K L M N on the plant map and two additional projections and iron bars at two places in the southern wall of the defendants house, moris and parnalas and five manholes said to have been constructed after the suit was filed on the land m dispute. 2. The defendant had purchased a plot of land from the plaintiff. The plain-( tiffs house was to the south of the land sold. The plaintiff had left a 15-6" wide strip of land between his house and the plot of land sold to the defendant. This strip of land is described on the map annexed to the sale-deed as "common Rasta 15-6" "wide". This common Rasta ended on the west with the western boundary line of the plot sold to the defendant and also the plaintiffs house, North-eastern comer of the plot sold to the defendant was somewhat semi-circular and a Rasta (passage) is shown to exist to the east and the north east of the plot sold to the defendant as also to the east of the plaintiffs house 15-6" wide common Rasta between the land sold to the defendant and the plaintiffs house opened on the said Rasta on the eastern side. This 15-6" wide strip of land is the land in suit. In constructing his house on the plot of land purchased by the defendant he did not leave any space on the south along common Rasta. Instead he raised a Wall at the very end of the southern boundary of the plot purchased by him and extended the sunshades of the windows and doors of his house on the land of the common Rasta in dispute, and also appears to have laid his sewer lines through the common Rasta and allowed the Moris and pamalas of his house to open on the common Rasta. The plaintiffs case was that this strip of land was left merely to give a right of passage over it to the defendant and for no other purpose, and, accordingly, the projections made, the moris and the panamas opened and the sewer lines laid by the defendant on the land of that common Rasta were unlawfully made and were liable to be removed. 3. 3. The defence was that the land of the common Rasta was joint property and that the defendant had every right to project the sun shades of his windows and doors thereon and to use it in the manner in which he had used the same. Several issues were framed in the suit. Issues Nos. 2 and 3 related to the question whether the plaintiff is the sole owner of 15-6" wide strip of land or that it was joint property an tissues Nos. 4 and 5 related to the question whether the defendant had the right to make the projections in question on the land of the common Rasta in suit. The trial Court found that the land was not joint property and that the plaintiff was the sole owner of the disputed land and further held that the defendant had no right to make projections or to construct man-holes, panamas and morris over the land in suit and in the result decreed the suit for removal and demolition of the projections, the two morris panamas and the man-holes in question. The lower appellate court has confirmed the decree of the trial Court. 4. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant raised before me the point that the defendant had the right to use the land of the common Rasta in suit for the purposes of making projections in question, opening the Morris and pamalas of his house and constructing his sewer lines and man-holes etc. thereon. He urged that these rights went with the right to use the common Rasta for the purposes for which it was left as a open strip of land between the plaintiffs house and the house to be constructed on the land purchased by the defendant. Learned counsel did not press the plea that the land of the common Rasta was the joint property of the parties, in the sense of being jointly owned by them, but he urged that the right to project the sun-shades of the doors and windows-of his house, to open the Morris and panamas and to lay the sewer lines and construct man-holes from his house were all attached to the right of ownership which was transferred to him by the plaintiff vide sale-deed Ext. I, and were in that sense property rights attached to the ownership of the plot purchased by the defendant and inasmuch as the plaintiff also had the same kind of rights on the land of the common Rasta on account of the ownership of his house to the south thereof, the parties jointly enjoyed those proprietary rights over the common Rasta. No one else had these rights. Learned counsel invited my attention in this connection to the habendum in the sale-deed. It reads:- "The vendor hereby transfers conveys by way of sale all that plot of land mentioned in map along with all liberties, privileges ways easement and appurtenances thereto and all the estate right, title interest claim whatsoever of the vendor to the property hereby conveyed and every part thereof to hold the same to the purchaser, his heirs administrators assigns absolutely." The boundary of the land sold is described thus: "South 15 ft. common passage between the plot in question and Kothi No. 70-A left out by the vendor." In the map annexed to the sale-deed also' the land is described as a common Rasta 15-6" wide. 5. The description of the land in the right of the words of the habendum clause can leave no room for doubt that the words "common passage" do not restrict the user of the land as a passage only but are merely descriptive. A passage of that kind is generally used as a sanitary lane and could be used for all such purposes as of enjoying light and air through windows opening on that land, egress and ingress through that passage, and connections with such public or other services as water supply, sewage, electricity and telephone lines etc.; but the question which remains is whether the defendant could have extended the sunshades of his windows and doors or to have so fixed the Moris and Pamalas or other things as to occupy any part of the air space over the common passage, such as to narrow it. The plaintiff appears to have objected to the projections of the doors and windows after they had been made, and although the projections do narrow down the breadth of the passage by about 2 feet, it may not be very fair to order their demolition, inasmuch as the plaintiff did not take the necessary steps to prevent the making of the projections before they were made, and inasmuch as their existence has not been proved to cause any such irreparable injury to the plaintiff as cannot be compensated in damages. The common Rasta (passage) has not been narrowed down to any such extent as may have made it unusable for the purposes for which it was left. However, since the plaintiff was originally and continues to be the owner of the land of the 15-6" wide common Rasta, the projections do amount to an encroachment on his land, and although the projections have made it permanently impossible for the plaintiff to use a 2 feet wide strip of the common Rasta (passage) along the defendants house, the plaintiff could be compensated by being awarded the market price of that 2 feet wide strip of land. 6. Faced with this situation had put it to the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent whether he would like to claim damages in addition to or in substitution of the relief for mandatory injunction claimed by him, in view of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Specific Relief Act. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, however, reiterated before me, and his statement was thereupon recorded by me, that notwithstanding the plaintiff -respondents refusal to claim damages whether in the alternative or in substitution of the relief of injunction, in case the court came to the finding that the constructions complained of were wrongfully made by the defendant-appellant, he on his part unconditionally offered to pay the maximum sum of Rs. 2000/- as damages to the plaintiff-respondent. 7. The plot of land to which the common passage in suit appertains was sold by the plaintiff to the defendant for the sum of Rs. 18,700/-. The area of the plot of land sold was 905 sq-yds. The rate works out to approximately Rs. 20/- per square yard. The sale was of the year 1964. 7. The plot of land to which the common passage in suit appertains was sold by the plaintiff to the defendant for the sum of Rs. 18,700/-. The area of the plot of land sold was 905 sq-yds. The rate works out to approximately Rs. 20/- per square yard. The sale was of the year 1964. The encroachments complained of were made very soon thereafter, as the suit is Suit No. 814 of 1965, and on the date of the cause of action pleaded in the plaint which is 10th March, 1965, the value of the land could not be said to have gone up very much between the date of the sale and the date when the encroachments in question are said to have been made on the land of the common passage in suit. The total length of the southern wall of the defendants building in which the projections in question have been made is 71 feet according to the scale map filed along with the plaint. The area of the land encroached upon works out to 142 square feet which would be equivalent to about 16 square yards. The market price of this land would have been about Rs. 350/-. 8. About the panamas and morris, even if they project outside the defendants southern wall on to the land of the common passage in suit by a few inches they must be well within the breadth of 2 feet covered by the projections. So far as the man-holes and the sewer lines are concerned, they must be all underground and it must be held that it was within the plaintiffs rights to lay them on the common passage. Their construction cannot be called wrongful. 9. The only question which now remains is whether any decree for damages should be awarded in favour of the plaintiff in spite of his refusal to claim damages, whether in the alternative or in substitution of the relief for mandatory injunction. Sub-section (2) of Sections 40 along with its proviso lays down that no relief for damages shall be granted under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such relief in his plaint, but that the court may at any stage of the proceeding allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including such claim. Since the learned counsel for the plaintiff refused to avail of the opportunity to claim damages even when it was offered to him, I have no alternative but to refuse any relief to the plaintiff, although if the plaintiff had claimed the same, in my opinion, he would have been entitled to a decree for recovery of Rupees 350/- as damages. As observed above, the relief for injunction cannot be allowed to the plaintiff. 10. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree under appeal is set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed, but in the circumstances the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.