JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the order and decree dated May 10, 1972 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, reversing the decree dated September 30, 1969 passed by the Assistant Collector, First Class, Kanpur in a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The appellants Raghuraj Singh and Sheo Nath Singh since deceased and substituted by his minor son Kishan Pal Singh had filed a suit seeking declaration of their Sirdari/Bhumidhari rights in certain plots on the basis that they were father's brothers' sons of the previous deceased tenure-holder Sheo Ratan Singh. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Chandan contested the suit claiming that she was the widow and the heir of the deceased Sheo Ratan Singh. The trial court had decreed the suit holding that the plaintiffs were the heirs of Sheo Ratan Singh and that Smt. Chandan was not the legally wedded wife of Sheo Ratan Singh. The lower appellate court has, however, reversed the Judgment and has held that Smt. Chandan was married to Chandan Singh. 4. The ground taken in the second appeal are first that the order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner is perverse, secondly that the trial court after a considerations of the entire evidence has come to the conclusion that the marriage of Smt. Chandan with Sheo Ratan Singh has not been legally proved, but the learned Additional Commissioner has given no consideration to the evidence adduced and thirdly that the order passed by the Additional Commissioner is based more on surmises than on record. 5. The sole question on which the entire matter hinges is whether or not Smt. Chandan is the widow of Sheo Ratan Singh. Before I consider this question, I may here refer to some of the rulings cited by the learned counsel for either side. 5. The sole question on which the entire matter hinges is whether or not Smt. Chandan is the widow of Sheo Ratan Singh. Before I consider this question, I may here refer to some of the rulings cited by the learned counsel for either side. The first ruling cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in Sarjoo Prasad Mahadeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari, 1951 A.I.R. (S.C.) 120 in which a learned Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "Where the question for consideration for the appellate court is undoubtedly one of fact the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of oral evidence adduced in the case, the appellate court has got too bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived by the trial judge. The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice - that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses then unless there is some special features about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial judge on a question of fact." 6. The second decision is Ram Lakhan v. Bharat, 1978 R.D. 112 in which it has been held that the oral evidence should have been considered and analytical assessment should have been arrived at and an order contrary to the evidence on record cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 7. The third decision is Ram Naresh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 R.D. 118. The fourth is Rafu Bux v. Smt. Hameedan, 1973 R.D. 29. These decisions are also to the same effect. 8. 7. The third decision is Ram Naresh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 R.D. 118. The fourth is Rafu Bux v. Smt. Hameedan, 1973 R.D. 29. These decisions are also to the same effect. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent has on the other hand referred to V. Ram Chandra Ayyar and another v. Ramalingan Chettiar and another, 1963 A.I.R. (S.C.) 302 the case the learned bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held as follows:- "The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining second appeals has been considered by several High Courts in India as well as the Privy Council on numerous occasions, and the true legal position in that behalf is not at all in doubt. In hearing a second appeal in the High Court is satisfied that the decision is contrary of law or some material issue of law or usage having the force of law, or if there is a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code, or by any other law for the time being in force which may be produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits it can interfere with the conclusions of the lower appellate Court. That in plain terms is what cls. (a), (b) and (c) of Section 100(I) provide. Mr. Chatterjee however, relies on clause (c) of Section 100(I) and contends that the High Court found that there was a substantial error or defect in the procedure affecting the decision on the merits; and he seeks to support this contention on the ground that all the reasons given by the trial court in support of its finding that respondent No. 1 was not bound by the agreement had not been duly considered by the lower appellate court is a substantial error and defect in the procedure he says that if the lower court's conclusions of fact it was necessary that all the reasons given by the trial court should have been examined and the whole of the evidence set out by the trial court in the Judgment should have been taken into account. Since the Judgment of the lower appellate court is not elaborate and some of the grounds set out in that trial court's Judgment have not been examined, that constitutes an error or defect, because the said error or defect affected the decision of the merits in the case. The Judgment of the appeal court, Mr. Chatterjee contends, must come into close quarters' with the Judgment of the trial court and meet the reasoning given therein, before it can be treated as conclusive between the parties for the purposes of Section 100. It is necessary to remember that Section 100(1)(c) refers to a substantial error or defect in the procedure the defect or error must be substantial that is one fact to remember, and the substantial error or defect should be such as may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits that is another fact to be borne in mind. The error or defect in the procedure to which the clause refers is, as the clause clearly and unambiguously indicates an error or defect connected with, or relating to the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. On the other hand, if in dealing with a question of fact, the lower appellate court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact in the result, substantially of this wrong approach that may be regarded as a defect in procedure; if in dealing with questions of fact, the lower appellate court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, that may be introduced an error or defect in procedure. If the lower appellate court fails to consider an issue which had been tired and found upon by the trial court and proceeds to reverse the trial court's decision without the consideration of such an issue that may be regarded as an error or defect in procedure if the lower appellate court allows a new point of fact to be raised for the first time before it, or permits a party to adopt a new plea of fact, or makes out a new case of a party that may in some cases be said to amount to a defect or error in procedure. But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate court however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be, the High Court, because as the Privy Council has observed however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court because as to Privy Council has observed however gross, so inexcusable the error may seem to be there is no jurisdiction under Section 100 to correct that error." 9. The second decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is Sheo Raj Singh v. Civil Judge Sitapur, 1977 R.D. 317 the learned judge of the Allahabad High Court has made the following observations:- "There is a sanctity attached to the electoral roll and unless there was any contrary piece of evidence produced by the other side and finality and the sanctity that is attached to the electoral roll could not be brushed aside." 10. In the present case it cannot be said the lower appellate court has failed to consider either the oral or the documentary evidence. What can be said is that the appraisal of the evidence by the lower appellate court is quite different from that of the trial court. The first appellate court is quite entitled to do so and the finding of the first appellate court cannot be interfered with unless there is any perversity. Far from there being any perversity I find that the appraisal of evidence by the lower appellate court is more sound and convincing than that of the trial court. It is actually the trial court which has failed to consider certain vital pieces of evidence. Far from there being any perversity I find that the appraisal of evidence by the lower appellate court is more sound and convincing than that of the trial court. It is actually the trial court which has failed to consider certain vital pieces of evidence. In support of the finding that Smt. Chandan is the legally married wife of the deceased Sheo Ratan Singh there are the following vital pieces of evidence:- (1) The extract of the Khatauni of 1376F in which Smt. Chandarn widow of Sheo Ratan Singh is recorded as the heir of the deceased Sheo Ratan Singh in the remarks column of the Khatauni by the order of the S.K. (2) The extract from the Khasra in which Smt. Chandan is recorded to be the widow of Sheo Ratan Singh. (3) A number of land revenue receipt in which Smt. Chandan is recorded to be the window of Sheo Ratan Singh. (4) Extract from the electoral roll of the village for the year 1968 in which Smt. Chandan is recorded to be the widow of Sheo Ratan Singh in village Bemaur, Ghatampur, district Kanpur. (5) A copy of the criminal revision No. 9/69 in the court of A.D.M. (J), Kanpur, in which Smt. Chandan is described as w/o Sheo Ratan Singh. (6) Oral evidence of 5 witnesses including Sada Sheo Bajpai, Gulab Singh, Babu Lal Raghu Raj Singh and Nanhe Singh. 11. The trial court has obviously erred in ignoring the electoral roll of 1968. It is true that in the earlier electoral roll of 1966 Smt. Chandan is recorded as window of Kedar Singh. But, as the learned Additional Commissioner has found Smt. Chandan was earlier married to Kedar Singh and was his widow before she remarried Sheo Ratan Singh. The trial court had not believed the theory of remarriage on the ground of disparity in age between Smt. Chandan and Sheo Ratan Singh and has remarked as follows:- "It is highly improbable that Sheo Ratan would be married at the age of 65 or 70 years. I also could not understand why Smt. Chandaniya left her own children to marry such an old person." 12. This remarks of the trial court is not based on either any evidence or not any legal principle. The law does not lay down any bar on an old man remarrying or marrying a middle aged widow. I also could not understand why Smt. Chandaniya left her own children to marry such an old person." 12. This remarks of the trial court is not based on either any evidence or not any legal principle. The law does not lay down any bar on an old man remarrying or marrying a middle aged widow. The trial court was also not required to go into the motivation of Smt. Chandaniya in marrying an old person. Apart from other things there can be a reasonable explanation that Smt. Chandaniya being a widow could have married an old person because of his landed property. The trial court has also observed that in the court of the S.D.M. it appeared that Chandaniya did not claim remarriage with Sheo Ratan Singh and she had given application to the Collector to live with Sheo Ratan Singh. This is a very significant statement and shows that she was not remarried with Sheo Ratan Singh. This interpretation of the trial court is not sound and is merely a conjecture. I have looked into the certified copy of this statement, which was recorded in the court of the S.D.M. on March 25, 1968/April 8, 1968. In this statement Smt. Chandaniya has said that my name is Smt. Chandaniya d/o Sheo Ratan Singh...." It is obvious that the words d/o are a clerical error in place of w/o Sheo Ratan Singh. It is no body's case that Smt. Chandaniya is the daughter of Sheo Ratan Singh. She had in her cross-examination admitted that she has started living with Sheo Ratan Singh since 4 years and has further stated that it is wrong to say that she was not the wife of Sheo Ratan Singh. Living with Sheo Ratan Singh in his house does not mean that Smt. Chandaniya could not have married him. It is apparent that this reply must have come with reference to the question worded like this. 'Since when you have started living with Sheo Ratan? Since no such question was asked about the marriage, Smt. Chandaniya did not say that she was married to Sheo Ratan Singh out when it was put to her that she was not the wife of Sheo Ratan Singh she categorically said that it was wrong to say that she was not the wife of Sheo Ratan Singh. Since no such question was asked about the marriage, Smt. Chandaniya did not say that she was married to Sheo Ratan Singh out when it was put to her that she was not the wife of Sheo Ratan Singh she categorically said that it was wrong to say that she was not the wife of Sheo Ratan Singh. It is not really necessary for to go into the sociological or psychological questions arising out of the marriage of an order man with a widow younger in age to him. Suffice it to say that the finding of the lower appellate court on the question of marriage of Smt. Chandan with Sheo Ratan Singh is to my mind based on a judicial appraisal of the entire oral and documentary evidence and I would uphold this finding. Sheo Ratan Singh may have died a few years after his remarriage. This does not, however, render the marriage itself void or doubtful. The oral as well as the documentary evidence to refute the theory of marriage is extremely weak as compared to the evidence in favour of the theory of marriage. 13. I thus hold that there is no force in this second appeal and hereby dismiss it.