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1979 DIGILAW 125 (KER)

Seethalakshmi v. Chembakammal

1979-06-21

V.KHALID

body1979
ORDER V. Khalid, J. 1. This civil revision petition is directed against the order dismissing I.A. No. 1693 of 1978 in O.S. No. 114 of 1974 of the Sub Court, Palghat, filed under S.10 and S.151 Civil Procedure Code to stay all proceedings in O.S. No. 114 of 1974, Sub Court, Palghat, till the disposal of A. A. T. 2182 of 1977 pending before the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Trichur. The petitioners are supplemental defendants 2, 4 to 6 and 9 in the suit. They are the legal representatives of deceased first defendant. The suit was for recovery of possession of the properties on title. The first defendant raised a question of tenancy in the suit. The question was referred to the Land Tribunal. The finding was against the tenancy raised. The first defendant had earlier applied under S.72B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act for purchase of the right, title and interest of the landlord as per O.A. No. 4370 of 1972 before the Land Tribunal, Kollengode. That application was dismissed. The finding was that the lease set up was not true. A. A. No. 2182 of 1977 was filed against that order. It is at this stage that the application under S.10 and 151 of the Civil Procedure Code was filed. According to the petitioners, the substantial question involved in the original suit and in the appeal before the Appellate Authority is the same. The prayer in the application was to stay the suit filed later and await the order of the appellate authority in the appeal against the earlier order. The said application was dismissed. Hence this C.R.P. 2. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order to be passed by the Appellate Authority would operate as res judicata on the Trial Court and hence it was unnecessary for it to proceed with the suit. He further submitted that to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and mutually conflicting decisions, it was better to await the order of the Appellate Authority. According to him, the Trial Court has to respect the finding of the Appellate Authority and has to dispose of the suit in terms of the order to be passed by it. 3. Reliance is placed for this contention on the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Govindan Gopalan v. Raman Gopalan ( 1978 KLT 315 (FB)). According to him, the Trial Court has to respect the finding of the Appellate Authority and has to dispose of the suit in terms of the order to be passed by it. 3. Reliance is placed for this contention on the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Govindan Gopalan v. Raman Gopalan ( 1978 KLT 315 (FB)). There, the Full Bench held that the principle of res judicata was of universal application and the said principle operated on orders of Land Tribunal also. Once it is proved that the question, which is raised before the Land Tribunal, or which comes before it on reference, has been decided earlier, it is obligatory on the part of the Land Tribunal, before whom the question of tenancy is again raised, to follow the earlier decision. It is also stated that where a question of tenancy has already been decided by a Land Tribunal of competent jurisdiction, there need not be a further reference of the same question to a Land Tribunal under S.125(3) of the Act. 4. In the case before me, the Trial Court has received a finding from the Land Tribunal after reference. The question is, whether the said court has jurisdiction to go out of the finding so received and await a decision to be rendered by some other authority (here the Appellate Authority) touching the same question. This is the contention raised by the petitioners' counsel. This is clearly going against the mandate contained in S.125(4) and (5) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Under S.125(4) of the Act, when a question is referred to the Land Tribunal, it shall decide the question referred to it and return the records together with its decision to the civil court. Under S.125(5), the civil court shall then proceed to decide the suit or other proceedings accepting the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it. Under S.125(6), the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it shall, for the purpose of appeal, be deemed to be part of the finding of the civil court. A reading of these sub-sections would clearly show that the jurisdiction of the civil court is limited to the acceptance of the finding received from the Land Tribunal. It is not permissible for it to travel outside the finding entered. A reading of these sub-sections would clearly show that the jurisdiction of the civil court is limited to the acceptance of the finding received from the Land Tribunal. It is not permissible for it to travel outside the finding entered. It cannot be asked to wait for the decision by the Appellate Authority against an earlier order as in this case and decide the case accordingly. To do so, would be to violate the mandate contained in S.125(5) of the Act. 5. In Lissy v. Kuttan ( 1976 KLT 571 (FB)) a Full Bench of this court held that the crucial provision in S.125 is S.125(3) which is sweeping in its ambit. In that decision, the Full Bench held that when a question regarding the rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran arose, the civil courts had necessarily to stay the suit or other proceedings and refer the same to the concerned Land Tribunal. The combined effect of sub-s.(3) and (4) was to place a bar on the civil court to try the question. The language of the section is absolutely clear that the civil court cannot travel outside the limitations contained in S.125(4) and (5) of the Act and it is bound to accept the finding referred by the Land Tribunal. In Alavi v. Radha Varasyaramma ( 1976 KLT 691 (FB)), the same principle is reiterated by another Full Bench. 6. That being the law, it is idle to contend that the civil courts can ignore the finding of the Land Tribunal received on reference and wait for an order to be passed by the Appellate Authority on the same question of tenancy arising in another proceeding. As the section stands, the only possible course to be adopted by the civil court is to accept the finding. Therefore, no purpose would be served by staying the suit at this stage for the reason that the civil court is bound to accept the finding. To accept the contention of the petitioners' counsel would be, as already indicated, to go against S.125(5) of the Act. 7. It is true that the procedure contained in S.125(3), (4) and (5) is cumbersome as observed by Raman Nair, C. J. in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 659). To accept the contention of the petitioners' counsel would be, as already indicated, to go against S.125(5) of the Act. 7. It is true that the procedure contained in S.125(3), (4) and (5) is cumbersome as observed by Raman Nair, C. J. in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 659). The learned Chief Justice observed, at page 695, thus: "The Act sets up a special Tribunal, namely, the Land Tribunal, to decide certain matters. These matters are specified by the Act itself and are not left to the will and pleasure of any executive authority. That being so, the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the Land Tribunal to decide these questions and the ousting of the jurisdiction of the civil courts under S.125(1) seem to us unexceptionable. So also the provision in sub-s.(3) by which questions regarding the rights of tenants and kudikidappukaran including the question whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran are to be referred by a civil court to this special expert tribunal if such a question arises in any proceeding before it and the Court is to decide that question in accordance with the decision of this Tribunal although the provision seems to us rather cumbrous and to make for protraction." But it is not for the courts to question the wisdom of the Legislature. However, it is necessary to prevent anomalous situations that this procedure creates. 8. The finding returned by the Land Tribunal on a reference to it by a civil court has necessarily to be accepted by the civil court. This is a statutory mandate and there is no escape from it. This finding will be incorporated in the judgment of the Trial Court and can be subjected to appeal. The appellate court can on a consideration of the finding arrived at by the Tribunal remand the case back to the civil court for a reappraisal and reassessment of the evidence. S.125 is silent whether the Trial Court has to send the case again to the Land Tribunal for decision after a remand order. Under the Civil Procedure Code, the Trial Court is bound to accept the remand order and act accordingly. In such cases, the ouster of jurisdiction contained in S.125(1) yields place to the remand order. The appellate court has powers to accept additional evidence. Under the Civil Procedure Code, the Trial Court is bound to accept the remand order and act accordingly. In such cases, the ouster of jurisdiction contained in S.125(1) yields place to the remand order. The appellate court has powers to accept additional evidence. When the appellate court is satisfied that additional evidence is to be admitted, it can consider the additional evidence itself or direct the Trial Court to consider the evidence and enter a finding accordingly. Here again, on the strength of the remand order, the Trial Court is bound to reconsider the case in the light of the additional evidence admitted by the appellate court and directed to be considered by it. It need not refer the matter again to the Land Tribunal. Strictly, the Trial Court in such cases will be deciding questions of tenancy. It might well be, that in such cases the Trial Court decides the case against the finding already entered by the Land Tribunal. The combined operation of the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and the Civil Procedure Code renders, in such cases, the findings of the Land Tribunal, ineffective. 9. A court of civil jurisdiction competent to decide a question of tenancy need not be denied such jurisdiction unless it be for excellence of adjudication. I, for one, can never subscribe to the view that the Land Tribunals constituted under the Land Reforms Act can produce findings better in quality and excellence than that of a civil court. The cumbersome procedure, provided in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, could be easily overcome if the jurisdiction of the civil courts is kept intact. There is no sanctity for a finding by a Land Tribunal. The Appellate Authority is a civil court. Revisions are to the High Court. When the jurisdiction of these courts is kept intact, no useful purpose is served by ousting the jurisdiction of the Trial Court in deciding disputes of tenancy. The lack of a proper legal approach in deciding disputed rights of parties, more often than not, results in the orders of the Land Tribunal being set aside. One fails to see whether the object with which the sections have been enacted has been achieved by taking away the jurisdiction of civil courts. Disputed rights of parties can be satisfactorily decided more by the ordinary courts of the land than by special tribunals. One fails to see whether the object with which the sections have been enacted has been achieved by taking away the jurisdiction of civil courts. Disputed rights of parties can be satisfactorily decided more by the ordinary courts of the land than by special tribunals. I am persuaded to make these observations from experience. The conferment of appellate powers also on persons without proper legal training makes matters worse. There is no reason why the ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts cannot be taken away especially now when civil litigation has been reduced to a minimum. The Civil Revision Petition has no merits and has only to be dismissed. I do so. The parties are directed to bear their costs.