ORDER Murlidhar, J. -This is a tenants petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings under Section 21, Act No. XIII of 1972, for release of the residential house portion occupied by the petitioner. 2. The brief relevant facts are these: The petitioner has been a tenant in the disputed portion for quite some time. The landlady was one Smt. Phoolwati who resides in a portion of the same building. Phoolawati executed a gift-deed of the whole house in favour of Arya Samaj, Najibabad. The said body has been running an inter College for girls. An application for permission to sue for ejectment under Section 3 of the Act No. III of 1947, was moved by the Arya Samaj on the ground that the primary section of the institution on account of paucity of a space was located in a Muslim locality at a great distance from the Higher Secondary section though the students mostly belonged to localities near the Higher Secondary Section also that one had to pass through a usually muddy bazar to get there. It was claimed that the building in which the disputed premises lay was near the Higher Secondary Section and suitable for housing the primary Section. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer granted the permission. A revision filed before the Commissioner against that order came to be transferred to the District -Judge under the provisions of Section 43 (m) of Act XIII of 1972. The District Judge treated the revision as an appeal under Section 22 and has dismissed it and passed an order for ejectment of the tenant under Section 21, Act No. XIII of 1972. This is the order challenged by this petition. 3. It would prima facie seem that Section 43 (m), Act No. XIII of 1972, does not ipso facto convert a revision pending before a Commissioner and transferred under that provision to the District Judge into a full-fledged proceeding under Section 21. Legally, therefore, the proceeding continued to be a revision against an order for grant of permission under Section 3 of U. P. Act III of 1947. There is also no indication that the transferred proceeding was treated to be one under Section 21 by consent of parties. In this situation the only effect of S. 43 (m) was that instead of the Commissioner the revision was to be decided by the District Judge. There is also no indication that the transferred proceeding was treated to be one under Section 21 by consent of parties. In this situation the only effect of S. 43 (m) was that instead of the Commissioner the revision was to be decided by the District Judge. The decision should, however have confined itself to the scope of the proceeding namely grant of permission for suing for ejectment under Section 3, Act No. Ill of 1947. It is another matter that by virtue of Section 43 (rr) this order would have conferred benefits somewhat similar to an order of eviction under Section 21 on the landlord. There is, however, a difference. Under Section 43 (rr), the order of grant of permission can be the basis for an order of eviction only if the order fulfils the conditions laid down in that section and not ipso facto. This defect might have been a ground for interference with the order but for the fact that this ground has not been raised in the petition which treats and seeks to challenge the District Judges order as an appellate order passed in proceedings under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act. In these circumstances, I would ignore the defect in treating the revision as an appeal under Section 22 of the Act and consider only the grounds of attack raised in the petition. It is quite proper to adopt this course while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 22S of the Constitution. 4. The main point raised is that in view of Clause (ii) to the third proviso to Section 21 (1) (a), no application lay for release of a residential building for occupation for business purpose. There can be no question that this is a residential building. The District Judge in his judgment has observed that this clause does not apply because running of a school for a charitable or religious purpose cannot be said to be a business because the motive of earning profit is absent. It is not possible to accept this proposition. There can be no question that this is a residential building. The District Judge in his judgment has observed that this clause does not apply because running of a school for a charitable or religious purpose cannot be said to be a business because the motive of earning profit is absent. It is not possible to accept this proposition. The legal position is clear that the word 'business as used in this clause is not confined to business in the narrow sense of a pursuit or activity for earning profit but is used in the wider sense of being equivalent to any profession, trade or calling and covers any employment or occupation and in fact all occupations or duties in which men engage; vide, Dr. Bashiruddin v. District Judge, (1978 All WC 105): (1978 All LJ 82). In Badri Lal. v. Digambar Jain Panchayat, (1973 Ren CR 675): (AIR 1973 Madh Pra 272), the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that running of a Pathshala or school for religious instruction was a business within the meaning of Section 12-F, M. P. Accommodation Control Act. This was also in the context of the statute making a distinction between residential or non-residential accommodation. Therefore the finding about non-application of clause (ii) of the third proviso cannot be supported on this basis. 5. The learned District Judge has, however, also observed that this clause does not apply because the accommodation was acquired for the purpose of a charitable trust. He has not dealt with this point at any length but the reasoning is clear and has substance. Sec 21 (1) (a) covers release applications of two categories: one by the landlord for occupation by himself either for residential purpose or for purpose of any profession, trade or calling and two where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust for the objects of the trust. The two clauses are separated in the provision by the use of disjunctive 'or. This would imply that the residential or non-residential purposes have nothing to do with the second clause. It, therefore, seems clear that clause (ii) of the third proviso applies only to applications for release by a landlord for his own occupation where such landlord is not the trustee of a public charitable trust. Where the application is by a trustee of a public charitable trust, clause (ii) does not apply. It, therefore, seems clear that clause (ii) of the third proviso applies only to applications for release by a landlord for his own occupation where such landlord is not the trustee of a public charitable trust. Where the application is by a trustee of a public charitable trust, clause (ii) does not apply. The only part of the proviso applicable to such cases is clause (i) which forbids relief if the objects of the trust discriminate against the beneficiaries on the grounds of religion, caste or place of birth and does not apply to applications other than those by trustees of a public charitable trust. Thus the non-application of clause (ii) of the third proviso is sustainable on the ground that the application was by the trustee of a public charitable trust for objects of the trust. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that this finding of the learned Additional District Judge is not supported by any evidence. He has referred to Annexure 1 the application in which there was no allegation that the petitioner Arya Samaj, Najibabad was trustee or that the purpose of running a primary section was one of .the objects of the trust. He has further urged that if the facts were alleged, the petitioner would have been in a position to consider whether eviction for housing the primary section was for the objects of the trust, whether the petitioner was strictly trustee of a public charitable trust and even whether the trust was of a kind entitled to relief in the face of clause (i) of third proviso. There is substance in the contention and if the point were raised, I would have felt bound to remand the case for consideration of this aspect. But the petition does not raise any such ground of attack and in the circumstances of this case, I am not prepared to allow an amendment of the petition at this stage or to allow this ground to be raised even though not pleaded. 7. The petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. Stay order is vacated. Three months time is, however, allowed for vacating the premises after which the eviction order shall be enforceable. There shall be no order as to costs.