ORDER K.C. Agrawal, J. -These two writ petitions arise from a decision of the Second Additional District Judge, Etawah, dated 21-.1-1976. 2. Dr. Sada Shiv Verma, the petitioner, was the landlord of a house, situate in Mohalla Saidwara, Etawah. Three separate portions of the aforesaid house had been let out to Smt. Najuman, Smt. Lalai and Smt. Bibbi Bai. In 1975, the landlord filed three applications against the aforesaid three tenants for release under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. These cases were consolidated by the Prescribed Authority and were disposed of together. The landlord had filed these three applications against the three tenants on the ground that he was formerly employed as Medical officer in the T. B. Hospital, Etawah, and at that time he was living in Government Quarter. After having left the Government service, he started his private practice and since then he was living in a tenanted house in Mohalla Purbia Tola, Katra Kapoor Chand, Etawah. He alleged that he had a large family consisting of four children and his wife, and that the accommodation in the house in which he was living was insufficient to meet his requirement. The further ground stated in the aforesaid three applications for eviction of the tenants was that the petitioner was running his clinic at three places in the city and on account of the same his patients were facing a lot of inconvenience. He alleged that on the property being released, he would have all the three establishments at one place, and that would not only facilitate the patients but himself also. 3. The applications were contested by the tenants. Apart from denying the ownership of the petitioner, the tenants also alleged that the need of the landlord was not bona fide. The tenants claimed that the petitioner was doing his medical practice near the District Hospital, in the heart of the city, where he had installed X-ray Plant and other machines, and that the landlord did not require the premises for his occupation. The tenants also claimed that they were poor ladies and could not get alternative accommodations on reasonable rent. 4. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties led evidence. The tenants also claimed that they were poor ladies and could not get alternative accommodations on reasonable rent. 4. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties led evidence. On 5-6-1975, the Prescribed Authority allowed the three applications on the finding (i) that the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Explanation (ii) to Section 21 (1), and (ii) that the petitioner was likely to suffer greater hardship. According to the view of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioner used to suffer a lot of inconvenience in attending the patients at three places. 5. Aggrieved, the three tenants filed three appeals before the District Judge, which were transferred to the Second Additional District Judge, Etawah. On Jan. 21, 1976, the three appeals were allowed. Against the allowing of the appeals, the present two writ petitions have been preferred. Writ Petition No. 460 has been filed against Smt. Bibbi Bai, while Writ Petition No. 1891 has been preferred against Najuman. The petitioner has not filed any writ petition against the third tenant, viz., Smt. Lalai. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, stated before me that since a compromise had been arrived at between the petitioner and the aforesaid tenant, the petitioner was not required to file any petition against Smt. Lalai. 6. Writ petition No. 560 of 1976 had been dismissed by me on 19-1-1979. The petitioner filed a review application in that case claiming that as Sri K. C. Saksena, counsel engaged by the petitioner, was seriously ill and that he had not been heard on the aforesaid date, the order be reviewed. Although the writ petition was dismissed after hearing Sri Y. S. Saxena, who held the brief of Sri K. C. Saksena, but in order to avoid any complication, I have heard Sri Saxena again and for that reason I have passed a separate order granting the review application. 7. Coming to the points, it may be stated that the appeals had been allowed on two grounds., These grounds (1) that Explanation (ii) to Section 21 (1) did not apply to the facts of the present case and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority erred in allowing the applications of the landlord on that ground, and (2) that the applications filed for the release of the premises were not maintainable inasmuch as under Cl. (i) to the Third Proviso of Section 21 (1), no residential building could be released for business purposes. 8. (i) to the Third Proviso of Section 21 (1), no residential building could be released for business purposes. 8. Challenging the second ground, Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the appellate authority has not recorded a clear finding that the entire premises in occupation of the tenants was required by the petitioner for occupation for business purposes, hence the judgment given against the petitioner was liable to be set aside. He contended in the alternative that since Smt. Bibbi Bai was, admittedly, carrying on the business in a portion of the building let out to her and was residing in the other, the appellate authority should have held that the application filed as against Smt. Bibbi Bai was not liable to be rejected on that ground. 9. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not acceptable to me. The question as to whether the premises was required for business purposes or for residential purpose is a question of fact. For deciding the same, the authority was required to go into the merits and other circumstances and, thereafter, to record a finding whether the bar contained in Cl. (ii) of the third Proviso to Section 21 (1) applied. In the instant case, the appellate authority considered the evidence and found that: "From this it can be easily inferred that the bigger part of the house will be used by his medical profession and not for his residence. Second proviso to Section 21 (ii) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 lays down that "no application for release shall be entertained in the case of any residential building for occupation for business purposes". The above finding of the learned Additional District Judge is one of fact. Counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that since the petitioner had made an application not exclusively for the business purpose but also for residential as well as business purpose, the appellate authority was not justified in rejecting the applications by applying the bar contained in Cl. (ii) to the third Proviso of Section 21 (1). It is true that the application had been filed for both the purposes. In such a situation, an authority is required to consider the main or the principal purpose for which the application is filed. (ii) to the third Proviso of Section 21 (1). It is true that the application had been filed for both the purposes. In such a situation, an authority is required to consider the main or the principal purpose for which the application is filed. If the main purpose of filing an application for release against a tenant is business purpose, the mere fact that the nominal purpose is that of residence as well would not affect the applicability of Cl. (ii) to the Third Proviso to Section 21 (1). This again will be a question of fact to be decided on the basis of evidence and circumstances emerging in a particular case. In the present case, the learned Additional District Judge found that the landlord did not need the house for residential purpose alone but mainly needed for his medical profession. Nothing could be shown to satisfy me that the finding was either perverse or unreasonably wrong. This is a finding of fact. 10. In Bashiruddin v. Additional District Judge (1978 All LR 24 (28)), a Division Bench of this Court was called upon to decide whether the need of a doctor to occupy a premises for medical profession was a business purpose, and that an application under S. 21 (1) (a) was not maintainable in view of the bar contained in Cl. (ii) of the third proviso to S. 21 (1). Answering the question in the affirmative, the Division Bench held that the need of a doctor to have a premises occupied for medical profession exclusively was a business purpose. 11. In S. Mohan Lal v. R. Kondiah ( AIR 1979 SC 1132 ), the Supreme Court was considering the import of the expression "business" used in Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease and Eviction) Control Act (15 of 1960). It observed that the act of an advocate to occupy a premises exclusively for his profession was a business purpose. 12. Sri B. D. Mandhyan, counsel for the petitioner, however, attempted to distinguish the aforesaid two cases on the ground that in both of them the only need for which the applications had been filed by the landlord was for business purpose, and since in the present case the applications filed by the landlord were for dual purposes, the applications could not be rejected on the said ground. The determination of this question again required the authorities to find the main or the substantial purpose for which the applications had been filed. If the substantial purpose was to obtain the premises for business purposes, the mere fact that the landlord also desired to occupy a portion of it for non-residential purpose would not convert the essential character of the applications being one for commercial purpose. Accordingly, the distinction drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the present case. On the facts found the finding of the appellate authority that the application was barred by1 Cl. (ii) to the third Proviso of S. 21 (1) is correct. 13. The next point was relating to the application of Explanation (ii) to Section 21 (1). This Explanation had been deleted by U. P. Act XXVI of 1976. This will, however, not affect the judgment either way. The fact remains that the benefit of this Explanation could be availed by a doctor who was posted outside the municipality where the house relating to which an application under Section 21 (1) is situate. The finding of the appellate authority was that the petitioner was posted in Etawah itself and, therefore, the said Explanation did not apply. Nothing could be pointed out to show that the view of the appellate authority holding that Explanation (ii) did not apply, was erroneous. The Prescribed Authority, in fact, committed a gross error in basing its judgment solely on Explanation (ii) and applying the same to the facts of the present case. On the admitted case of the parties, the said Explanation did not apply. The Prescribed Authority was required to consider the need of the landlord on merits and to have given a finding thereon. It should not have confined its judgment to Explanation (ii) and allowed the applications of the landlord. This is additional reason on which the judgment of the Additional District Judge can be justified. 14. For these reasons, both the writ petitions are dismissed with costs.