JUDGMENT : H.N. Seth, J. This application in revision by the Plaintiffs is directed against the revisional order passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Mathura dated August 26, 1977 affirming the order of the Judge Small Cause Court, rejecting Plaintiffs prayer for striking off the defence of the Defendants and allowing Defendants' representation and permitting them to deposit admitted arrears of rent. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present application are that the Plaintiffs as landlords filed a suit for the ejectment of the Defendants and eventually 11-3-1976 was fixed for hearing of the suit (parties are agreed that this was the first date on which the hearing of the suit took place). The Defendants had deposited a sum of Rs.1960/- towards the arrears of rent on earlier dates and a sum of Rs.1012/-remained outstanding against them. Neither the Defendants nor their counsel were present when the case was taken up for hearing on 11-3-1976. Accordingly, the court made an order directing the suit to proceed ex-parte against the Defendants and started recording Plaintiffs evidence. At this stage, learned Counsel for the Defendants appeared before the court and after giving a satisfactory explanation for his non-appearance at the time when the case was taken up for hearing, obtained an order adjourning the hearing till 18-3-1976. The Plaintiffs then moved an application stating therein that as the Defendants had failed to deposit the admitted amount of arrears of rent in the court before the first hearing of the suit, their defence was liable to be struck off as provided in Order 15 Rule 5 CPC and prayed that the same be struck off. The Defendants deposited the entire arrears of rent admitted due against them on 18- 3-1976 and on 25-3-1976, they filed an application purporting to be a representation explaining the reason why they could not deposit the amount of Rs.1012/- by 11-3-1976 and prayed that the delay in depositing the same be condoned. The trial court found that the explanation offered by the Defendants was satisfactory. It accordingly, accepted the representation made by the Defendants and vide its order dated 29-4-1976, rejected Plaintiffs request for striking off the defence. The Additional District Judge, Mathura vide his order dated 26-8-1977 upheld the order of the trial court and dismissed the application in revision filed by the Plaintiffs. It accordingly, accepted the representation made by the Defendants and vide its order dated 29-4-1976, rejected Plaintiffs request for striking off the defence. The Additional District Judge, Mathura vide his order dated 26-8-1977 upheld the order of the trial court and dismissed the application in revision filed by the Plaintiffs. Being aggrieved, the Plaintiffs have now come up in revision before this Court. 3. The case of the applicants before the learned single Judge, who beard this revision application, was that as the Defendants did not deposit the entire admitted arrears of rent by 11-3-1976 which was the first day of hearing, and as they did not make any representation praying for extention of time on that date, the trial court had no opinion but to strike off the defence of the Defendants and that it could not, on the basis of the representation made subsequently, extend the time for making the deposit. In support of this submission, learned Counsel for the applicants relied on the cases of Bal Mukund Agarwal v. District Judge, Rae Bareilly 1977 AWC 225 , Sohan Lal Vs. Hodal Singh and Others, (1979) AWC 179 and Onkar Prasad v. Awadhesh Sahi 1979 UPRCC 179 and submitted that the provisions or Order 15 Rule 5 CPC being mandatory the court below had no option but to strike off the defence of the Defendants. Attention of the learned single Judge was also drawn to a decision of this Court in the case of Mathura Prasad v. Vikram Jeet Singh 1978 AWC 523 , wherein a contrary view had been taken and it was held that the provisions of Order 15, Rule 5 CPC are directory and that they left a discretion with the court either to strike off the defence or not to do so. As the learned single Judge thought that there was a conflict of judicial opinion on this point, he referred the case to a larger Bench and this is how the case has now come up before us. 4. As the learned single Judge thought that there was a conflict of judicial opinion on this point, he referred the case to a larger Bench and this is how the case has now come up before us. 4. Only submission made by the learned Counsel for the applicants for impugning the order passed by the trial court is that as the Defendants failed to deposit the entire arrears of rent in the trial court on 11-3-1976, the first date of hearing, and as they did not, on that date, after furnishing security make a representation seeking further time, the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the representation for the purpose made subsequently. 5. Rule 5 of Order 15 of the CPC was inserted in the Code by Section 7 of the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act of 1972 which came into effect on 27-9-1972. This rule as introduced in the CPC reads thus: 5. Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent etc. In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable property after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use of or occupation thereof, whether instituted before or after the commencement of the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 the Defendant Shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of the said Act, the first hearing after such commencement) deposit the entire amount of rent or compensation for use and occupation, admitted by him to be due and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly, the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him, and in the event of any default in this regard, the Court may unless considering any representation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount, refuse to entertain any defence or, as the case may be, strike off his defence. 6. 6. This rule was subsequently substituted by a new Rule 5 by enactment of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976, relevant portion of which runs thus: (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the Defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest therein at the rate of nine per centum per annum and whether or not be admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making, the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the court may subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2) strike off his defence. Expln. (1).... Expln. (2).... Expln. (3).... (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the court may consider any representation made by the Defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days, of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in Sub-section (1) as the case may be. 7. The case before us is governed by Rule 5 as introduced by Section 7 of the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 and not by the Rule 5 as substituted by the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1976. The rule as introduced by the 1972 Act requires that in a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent filed against the tenant, the tenant has to deposit the entire amount of rent admitted to be due at or before the first hearing of the suit. He also has to go on regularly depositing throughout the continuance of the suit, the amount of monthly rent falling due at the rate admitted by him. If the tenant commits a default either in depositing all the arrears of rent at or before the first hearing of the suit, the court is called upon to strike off his defence. He also has to go on regularly depositing throughout the continuance of the suit, the amount of monthly rent falling due at the rate admitted by him. If the tenant commits a default either in depositing all the arrears of rent at or before the first hearing of the suit, the court is called upon to strike off his defence. However, the rule also permits the tenant who has defaulted to make a representation to the court, explaining the reason why he could not deposit the money at or before the first hearing of the suit and if the court is satisfied with the explanation offered by the tenant, it has been empowered to allow to the tenant further time for depositing the entire arrears and for making good the default on his furnishing security for payment of such rent. The rule contemplates making of a representation by a tenant who has committed default in not paying the arrears of rent admitted to be due by him at or before the first hearing of the suit takes place. Till the first hearing of the suit takes place the tenant can save himself of the consequences of being in default by his own action by depositing the arrears of rent and no question of making a representation by him arises. The representation by the tenant, for extending the time for depositing the arrears of rent, can be made only after the first hearing of the suit takes place. It is true that the rule does not contemplate that the trial court should, on its own, afford an opportunity to a tenant who has defaulted in depositing the entire arrears of rent at or before the first hearing of the suit, to make a representation before proceeding to make an order striking off the defence. In case the tenant does not, after committing the default, make a representation, the court can make an order striking off his defence immediately after commission of such default. The fact, however, remains that there will always be a hiatus between the default committed by the tenant and the making of an order u/Order 15 Rule 5 CPC striking off the defence. The fact, however, remains that there will always be a hiatus between the default committed by the tenant and the making of an order u/Order 15 Rule 5 CPC striking off the defence. The rule neither provides that an order striking off the defence must be made simultaneously with the commission for default nor does it lay down any time limit for making such an ordeRule There is nothing in the rule which prevents a tenant from making a representation before an order striking off his defence is actually made. In our opinion, where before an order striking off the defence is made, the tenant makes a representation seeking further time for depositing the arrears, the court has to, before making such an order, consider the representation and it will be able to make the order striking off the defence only if it finds that the explanation given by the tenant is unsatisfactory or that be has failed to make out a case for extention of time. 8. Learned Counsel for the applicants urged that in the absence of the provisions like Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 as substituted in the year 1976, which gives 10 days time to the defaulting tenant to make a representation and also prevents the court from making an order for striking off the defence within that period, it should be taken that the legislative intention as expressed in Rule 5, as introduced by Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1976 was that an order striking off the defence must be made on the same day on which first hearing of the suit takes place unless the tenant on that very day makes a representation seeking extension of time and also furnishes the security as contemplated by the rule. 9. We are unable to appreciate the logic behind this argument. Merely because the rule as substituted in the year 1976, lays down a period of limitation for making the representation and forbids the court from making the order striking off the defence before ten days, it does not mean that the legislative intendment behind the earlier rule was that in the absence of a representation made by the tenant on the same date on which first hearing in the suit takes place, the court must make an order striking off the defence. As already explained, under the rule as it stood prior to its substitution in the year 1976, it was possible for the court to make an order striking off the defence soon after the first hearing took place. In some cases where the order striking off the defence is made very soon after the failure on the part of the tenant to deposit the entire admitted arrears of rent, it could so happen that the tenant may be deprived of an opportunity to make a representation and to explain the circumstances in which he was unable to make the deposit at or before the first date of hearing. The object underlying the new rule as substituted in the year 1976 seems to be to cover up such cases and afford to such a defaulter an opportunity to offer an explanation and also to prevent such defaulter from taking undue advantage and delaying the proceedings on this pretext. 10. We now proceed to deal with the cases which during the course of hearing, were brought to our notice. In the case of Bal Mukand Agarwal v. District Judge Rae Bareilly 1977 AWC 225 , the landlord had on 17-5-1973 made an application under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC which was heard on 20-10-1973. Eventually the court allowed the application on 31-10-1973 and directed that the defence of the tenant be struck off. This Court held that in the circumstances of the case 20-10-1973 and not 17-5-1973 was the first date of hearing, as contemplated by Order 15 Rule 5 of the CPC. The tenant neither deposited the entire arrears of rent due from him by that date nor did he make any representation seeking extention of time and that the orders striking off the defence correctly made on 31-10- 1973. This was not a case where the tenant made a representation to the trial court in between 10-11-1973 and 31-10-1973 seeking further time for depositing the admitted arrears of rent and the question which has arisen before us did not arise for consideration in that case. This was not a case where the tenant made a representation to the trial court in between 10-11-1973 and 31-10-1973 seeking further time for depositing the admitted arrears of rent and the question which has arisen before us did not arise for consideration in that case. However, while dealing with the submission made on behalf of the Defendants that the trial court was bound to afford an opportunity to the Defendants to make a representation, before directing, under Rule 5 of Order 15, that the defence of the tenant be struck off, the learned Judge observed thus: The whole object of adding Rule 5 of Order 15 was to deter the tenants from contesting suits for ejectment without having to pay any rent or damages...which enjoins the deposit of the entire arrears of rent and damages etc. would become wholly ineffective and the object of the provision shall not be achieved.... 11. We agree that the object of the Legislature in introducing Rule 5 of Order 15 CPC was, as mentioned by the learned Judge, but are unable to agree with him when he holds that the request for extention of time had to be made contemporaneously with the first hearing of the suit for to hold otherwise would be to make the first and essential part of Rule 5, which enjoins that the entire arrears of rent and damages etc., should be deposited at or before the first date of hearing would become wholly ineffective and the object of the provision shall not be achieved. 12. As already explained, even though the rule contemplates that where the tenant defaults in depositing the rent his defence should be struck off. It also intends that the tenant in default should get an opportunity of making a representation. So long as he has not committed the default, no question of making a representation, contemplated by the rule, arises. Surely before an order striking off the defence is made by the trial court, it has to be satisfied about the default. In some cases it may have to, before making such an order, hold an enquiry for finding whether such default has been committed. The rule, therefore, cannot be interpreted as meaning that in all cases the order striking off the defence must be made on the very date of default. In some cases it may have to, before making such an order, hold an enquiry for finding whether such default has been committed. The rule, therefore, cannot be interpreted as meaning that in all cases the order striking off the defence must be made on the very date of default. If a person in default is allowed to make a representation before the order striking off his defence, it does not mean that he is being given a chance to make representation at any time that he likes. Such representation has necessarily to be made before the actual order of striking off the defence is made and under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC the order striking off the defence is intended to be made by the court soon after it was satisfied about the default committed by the tenant. Mere fact that is hiatus enables the Defendants to obtain an extention of time after explaining why he could not deposit the admitted arrears of rent at or before the first hearing, it does not mean that the object of enacting Order 15 Rule 5 CPC shall be defeated. We, therefore, do not agree with the observations made by the learned Judge that the request for extention of time must in all cases be contemporaneous with the first hearing of the suit. 13. In the case of Sohan Lal v. Hodal Singh 1979 AWC 225 , the Defendant did not deposit the admitted arrears of rent at or before the first date of hearing of the suit. He also did mot make any representation for extention of time for making the deposit. An application for striking off the defence was made but the trial Judge did not pass any order on that application and instead observed in the judgment and in the circumstances of the cue it would sot be proper to strike off the defence. The first revisional court upheld the order passed by the trial Judge. K. C. Agarwal, J. held that in a case where a default had admittedly been committed and no representation seeking for extention of time as contemplated by Order 15 Rule 5, was made, the trial court had no option but to make an order striking off the defence. The first revisional court upheld the order passed by the trial Judge. K. C. Agarwal, J. held that in a case where a default had admittedly been committed and no representation seeking for extention of time as contemplated by Order 15 Rule 5, was made, the trial court had no option but to make an order striking off the defence. Judgment of K. C. Agarwala, J. cannot be interpreted to mean either that the trial court was bound to make an order striking off the defence on the same day on which the default was committed or that a representation made subsequent to that date but before making of an order striking off the defence, cannot be entertained. In this connection, a decision by the same learned Judge in the case of the City Board Mathura v. Ashok Kumar 1979 UP RCC 181 may also be looked into with advantage. In that case 21-1- 1974 was the first date of hearing. On that date the Plaintiff moved an application praying that the defence of the Defendant should as provided in Order 15 Rule 5 CPC be struck off. On 9-8-1975 Defendant City Board made a representation under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC explaining the reasons for the delay in making the deposit. The Judge Small Causes did not believe the case of the City Board as the application filed by it was not supported by an affidavit sworn by any of its official or office Rule K. C. Agarwal, J. held that in the special circumstances of the case, the Judge Small Causes Court was not justified in rejecting the application merely on the ground that it was not supported by any affidavit sworn by Board's official. In the result, he set aside the order passed by the trial court striking off the defence and remanded the case for being tried in accordance with the law. This shows that the learned Judge took the view that a representation made by the tenant after the default had been committed, but before the order striking off the defence was made, could be considered. There is thus nothing either in Sohan Lal's case or in the case of Onkar Prasad (supra) which runs counter to the view which is being taken by us. 14. So far as the case of Mathura Pd. There is thus nothing either in Sohan Lal's case or in the case of Onkar Prasad (supra) which runs counter to the view which is being taken by us. 14. So far as the case of Mathura Pd. v. Vikram Jeet Singh 1978 AWC 522 is concerned, it was a case covered by Order 15 Rule 5 CPC as substituted by U.P. Act 57 of 1976 and not by the rule with which we are concerned. 15. In the case before us the lessee had made the requisite representation before an order striking off his defence could actually be passed. Once such a representation was made the trial court could not, before disposing off the representation, make an order striking off the defence. The explanation offered by the lessee with regard to the circum stances in which he committed the default, has been accepted by the trial court to be good and valid. Once the court accepts that the explanation offered by the lessee is valid, it has to extend the time for depositing the admitted arrears of rent in accordance with the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 and no question of exercising any discretion in making of an order striking off the defence, would survive. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to ex press any opinion on the question as to whether under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC as substituted by 1976 Act, some discretion is left with the court in regard to making of an order for striking off the defence in a case where the tenant, after committing the default, does not make a representation or where the representation made by him is found to be un satisfactory. 16. Learned Counsel for the applicant next argued that under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC the court had jurisdiction to extend the time only if the Defendant furnished security for payment of amount in respect of which he was admittedly in arrears of rent. In this case the tenant deposited the amount of arrears of rent on 18-3-1976, after the first hearing of the suit which took place on 11-3- 1976. The Defendants were at no stage required to furnish any security nor did they furnish any security for payment of amount, as required by Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. In this case the tenant deposited the amount of arrears of rent on 18-3-1976, after the first hearing of the suit which took place on 11-3- 1976. The Defendants were at no stage required to furnish any security nor did they furnish any security for payment of amount, as required by Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. In the circumstances, the trial court had no option but to make an order striking off the defence. 17. We are unable to accept this submission. The Defendants had, before making the representation on 25-3- 1976 already deposited the entire admitted arrears of rent on 18-3-1976, By that time the court had not, as contemplated by Order 15 Rule 5 CPC decided to extend the time for making the deposit. In the circumstances, the deposit made by the Defendant was in the nature of security so that in case the court ultimately decided to extend the time, the money may be available for being appropriated towards payment of arrears of rent due to the Plaintiff. When the court allowed the representation dated 25-3-1976 and. extended the time for making the deposit, the security as contemplated by Order 15 Rule 5 CPC was already available with the court, and as soon as the representation was accepted the security stood encashed. The provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 CPC have therefore, been substantially complied with. 18. We are, accordingly, of opinion, that the court below had, in the circumstances of the case, jurisdiction to entertain and decide the representation for extention of time, made by the lessees and to absolve them of the responsibility for not depositing the entire arrears of rent at or before the first hearing of the suit. 19. In the result, we find no merit in this revision, which fails and is dismissed with costs.