VIDYA SAGAR v. UNION OF INDIA — 1979 DIGILAW 128 (DEL)

S. RANGANATHAN ( 1 ) THE petitioner, Vidya Sagar, seeks orders restraining the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority (D. D. A.) from taking further steps in the matter of the dispossession of the petitioner from house property bearing old Municipal No. 819 (new Municipal No. 1301), situated in Bagichi Tansukh Rai, Mohalla Kundewalan, Ajmere Gate, Delhi. ( 2 ) THE property in question was notified for acquisition on 19-3-1938 under S. 36 of the U. P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 (hereinafter referred to as the 1919 Act) for the purpose of the Delhi-Ajmere Gate Slum Clearance (DAG) Scheme. In pursuance thereof a notification under S. 42 was made on 29-4-1946 and the Special Land Acquisition Collector made an award on 13-1-49 being award No. 492/632. According to the petitioner, however, he took possession of the house from his uncle (who had been his guardian) in 1955 and continued to be in possession thereafter. He had applied to have the house de-requisitioned and according to him the authorities had also agreed to abandon the house and placed it in the Betterment List under S. 64a of the Act. Despite this, he alleges, the authorities have suddenly decided to proceed further in the matter of acquisition and have started taking steps to disturb and interfere with the possession of the petitioner. Hence this Writ petition, ( 3 ) BEFORE proceeding to deal with the merits of the petition, it is necessary to deal with certain preliminary objections raised by Sri Keshav Dayal, counsel for the D. D. A. ( 4 ) THE first point made by Sri Dayal is that the petitioner has suppressed material facts and has not come to the Court with clean hands. In para 7 of the petition, after referring to the award, the petitioner has stated "that the acquiring authorities did not pay any compensation to the guardian of the petitioner. " Again in para 13 it was stated that the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector "has not so far been paid to the petitioner. " Sri Dayal points out, with reference to the original records, that the compensation awarded was deposited immediately in the Land Acquisition Tribunal. That apart, the petitioner s predecessor-in-interest had aplied to the Tribunal for an enhancement of the compensation and had also partly succeeded therein. " Sri Dayal points out, with reference to the original records, that the compensation awarded was deposited immediately in the Land Acquisition Tribunal. That apart, the petitioner s predecessor-in-interest had aplied to the Tribunal for an enhancement of the compensation and had also partly succeeded therein. The petitioner has deliberately suppressed these facts and sought to give an impression, in order to get the writ petition admitted, that the authorities had acted high-handedly in interfering with the petitioner s right to property without paying any compensation and without taking possession of the property for a long time a contention which will be dealt with later in accordance with law. Learned counsel for the DDA cited the decisions in Janardana Mallan Venkiteswara Mallan v. The Cochin Dewaswom Board, AIR 1957 Trav-Co. 307, Barn Saran Sharma v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 Pat 181 and Deptylal Lessee v. Collector of Nilgirs AIR 1959 Mad 460 , in support of his plea that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed in limine for this lack of bona fides on the part of the petitioner. ( 5 ) SRI Madan, appearing for the petitioner tries to answer this in three ways. He submits, firstly, that there is no misstatement of fact in the writ petition inasmuch as, while it is true that the compensation amounts have been deposited in Court, the petitioner or his uncle have not so far drawn the moneys out and it is thus literally true that no part of the compensation has been paid to the petitioner or his guardian. Secondly, the award and application for enhancement of compensation were made at a time when the petitioner was a minor and his uncle was in charge of the estate and that the petition had been drafted by a counsel who is no more and that, even if there is any misstatement, it was born of ignorance and should be condoned. Thirdly, he argues that not any suppression, but only the suppression of a material fact, will disqualify a petitioner and in this case the alleged false statement is not in regard to a material fact and, is therefore, of no consequence. ( 6 ) I am unable to accept these contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. Thirdly, he argues that not any suppression, but only the suppression of a material fact, will disqualify a petitioner and in this case the alleged false statement is not in regard to a material fact and, is therefore, of no consequence. ( 6 ) I am unable to accept these contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. It is well settled that the grant of a writ is an equitable and discretionary relief which will be refused when a petitioner comes to the Court with clean hands and places all the material facts in his possession fairly and fully before the Court. It is clear that the petitioner here has attempted suppression of material facts in order to gain admission of the writ petition. Though, literally, the statement in the writ petition that-the compensation has not been paid is a correct one, the statement suggests and perhaps was intended to suggest that the respondents are high-handedly attempting to disturb his possession even without paying any compensation although several years have lapsed. The petitioner is guilty of suggestio faisi in regard to a material fact. Though the award and application for enhancement were made when the petitioner s uncle was in-charge of the estate, the facts on record (some of which will be referred to later) clearly show that the petitioner was fully aware of all the events and developments. The impugned misstatements are also repeated in the amended writ petition filed by the petitioner. It is therefore, not possible to agree that these misstatements are of no consequence or that they should be ignored. There is force in the contention of Sri Dayal that the writ petition merits dismissal on this score. ( 7 ) THE second preliminary objection put forward by Sri Dayal is that of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Court for relief. He points out that the notifications for acquisition were issued in 1938 and 1946, and that the award was made in 1949 and urges that the petitioner should not be allowed to challenge the validity of these proceedings after a lapse of about 25 years. On behalf of the petitioner, an attempt has been made to explain the apparent delay. He points out that the notifications for acquisition were issued in 1938 and 1946, and that the award was made in 1949 and urges that the petitioner should not be allowed to challenge the validity of these proceedings after a lapse of about 25 years. On behalf of the petitioner, an attempt has been made to explain the apparent delay. It is stated in the petition that the petitioner s father died in 1935, when the petitioner was barely 2 years old, and his uncle was appointed by Court as the guardian of his properties. There were certain family feuds which rendered it necessary for the petitioner to remain away from Delhi and so the petitioner who was taken to Kanpur by his mother in 1937 could come back to Delhi only in 1906. It was only in January 1955 that the Court guardian was removed and the properties of the petitioner including the above house, were restored to him. To this extent, the respondents are not in a position to challenge the petitioner s version and it can be taken that the failure to challenge the proceedings till 1955 is explained. The writ petition has, however, been filed only in December 1975 and the further lapse of time till then needs an explanation. Here the case put forward by Sri Madan is that soon after 1956, the petitioner applied to the Delhi Improvement Trust (DIT) for whose purposes the acquisition had been made, to release the property from aoquisition. The DIT by its letter dated 5-3-56 (Annexure A) was willing to consider this request on certain conditions. The petitioner expressed his willingness to abide by those conditions on 12-3-56 (Annexure B) but there was some hitch in the actual implementation of this agreement, though there was mutual correspondence on the subject, partly due to the abolition of the DIT and the transfer of its functions first to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and then the DDA. Even as late as 23-8-73, the MCD had called upon the petitioner to attend its office for further discussions. The matter having been thus kept alive and under consideration of the concerned authorities till late in 1973, Sri Madan contends that the approach of the petitioner to this Court relief is well within the normal period of limitation for actions viz. The matter having been thus kept alive and under consideration of the concerned authorities till late in 1973, Sri Madan contends that the approach of the petitioner to this Court relief is well within the normal period of limitation for actions viz. three years and that the writ petition is, therefore, not liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. ( 8 ) A careful consideration of the material on record however shows that the long lapse of time in the present case has not been satisfactorily explained. The nature of the correspondence between the petitioner and the DIT in 1956 and 1957 will have to be referred to later but at best, it furnishes an explanation as to why the petitioner did not consider it necessary to come to Court till 1957. But , after that, there is a complete and absolute silence till 1973. The letter dated 23-8-73 is of no help. It refers to a letter from the petitioner dated 13-7-1973 in regard to the ownership of the house and calls upon him to attend the office of the to him. Neither the letter dated 13-9-73 nor the subsequent developments, if any, have been referred to in the petition or in the arguments, There is evidence to show that certain suits had been filed by some of the tenants of the property because both the petitioner and the D. D. A. were claiming to be owners. By a judgment dated 28-1-69, the petitioner s claim to receive the rents succeeded but it was held that "the question as to whether the properties in suit has been acquired by the Union of India and it vests in defendants 2 and 3 (DDA and MCD) shall remain open between the parties to be decided in separately instituted proceedings by either of them. " Despite this, the petitioner appears to have remained content and failed to challenge the legality or validity of the acquisition proceedings. It, therefore, the attempt of the writ petitioner is to challenge the validity or legality of the notifications of acquisition of 1938 or 1946 or the award of 1949, then it is clear that, by all standards of reasonableness, and diligence, the petitioner has come too late to seek relief from this Court. It, therefore, the attempt of the writ petitioner is to challenge the validity or legality of the notifications of acquisition of 1938 or 1946 or the award of 1949, then it is clear that, by all standards of reasonableness, and diligence, the petitioner has come too late to seek relief from this Court. ( 9 ) SRI Madan, however, urges that his attempt in the writ petition is not to challenge the correctness of the acquisition proceedings which, as far as he could see, had been initiated for a public purpose and in accordance with the statutory requirements. He stated that he is attacking only the steps recently initiated by the respondents for disturbing his possession of the property on two grounds: (A) that the award having been made in 1949, the steps to take possession initiated after an unconscionably long lapse of time are without jurisdiction and illegal; and (b) that having regard to the correspondence between the parties, and the failure to take possession of the property within a reasonable time of the award it should be inferred that the respondents had decided to drop the acquisition proceedings and so, having abandoned the acquisition, it was not open to them to start proceedings afresh for taking possession of the property. The merits of these contentions will be discussed later but the question now, apropos of the plea of delay and laches put forward by the respondents, is whether it is true that the respondents have started taking steps for the possession of the property only now, as alleged by the petitioner, Sri Keshav Dayal, appearing for the respondents refutes this allegation. According to him, the respondents took possession of the property on 13-1-1949 itself and he further contends that, if the petitioner challenges the correctness of this statement, the appropriate remedy for him would be to file a suit and that complicated and contested issues of fact cannot be gone into in a writ petition. ( 10 ) IN support of his contention that possession of the property was taken over on 13-1-49 itself, Sri Keshav Dayal relies on Annexures R-II and R-III to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the DDA. ( 10 ) IN support of his contention that possession of the property was taken over on 13-1-49 itself, Sri Keshav Dayal relies on Annexures R-II and R-III to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the DDA. Annexure R-II is stated to be a report of Gosain Anand Sarupa, Tahsildar Nazul, dated 5-4-49 stating that "possession of the properties of Trust s DAG Slum Clearance Scheme, has been taken over from the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi Improvement Trust on the dates shown against each" and the list includes the suit property against which the date shown is 13-1-49. Annexure R-III is an extract from the property register maintained by the Trust which contains details of Ward No. , House No. Area with description, Owner with description, mode of acquisition, details of award and amount paid, date of taking over possession and remarks. In respect of the property in dispute, the date of taking over possession is given as 1-3-1949 and the remarks column says: "the damages are being realised by File No. 423 (98) 50/a2. " There are two further later remarks, one regarding the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and the other to the effect; "the properties entered in this page have been transferred to the MCD at Delhi in connection at DAG Scheme vide EMS orders dated 12-9-61 in File No. LA (7)61. " ( 11 ) BUT it seems to me that this evidence does not help the respondents in answering the question as to when, in pursuance of the award, possession of the house property was taken by the respondents from the petitioner. Before explaining my reasons for this conclusion, it is necessary to refer to S. 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) which has been made applicable by the U. P. Act earlier referred to with certain changes and to S. 17-A which is one of the additions made to the Land Acquisition Act in its application to the proceedings under the U. P. Act: "16. Power to take possession where the Collector has made an award under S. 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Power to take possession where the Collector has made an award under S. 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. 17-A. Transfer of land to Trust In every case referred to in S. 16 or S. 17 the Collector shall, upon payment of the cost of acquisition make over charge of the land to the Trust and this land shall thereupon vest in the Trust, subject to the liability of the Trust to pay any further costs which may be incurred on account of its acquisition. "there are thus two stages in regard to the taking of possession one by the Land Acquisition Collector from the owners of the land and the second, the transfer of the same by the Land Acquisition Collector to the Trust. The documents relied on by the respondent refer to the latter. They are entries in the books of the Trust symbolising the assumption of possession of the land by the Trust tor the purposes of the Scheme. But the owner will be deprived of his ownership only when possession is taken from him of the land or building that has been acquired. There is nothing placed on record by the respondents to show that such possession had been taken over. It will also be appreciated that the award itself was dated 12-1-49. The records placed before me show that the compensation was not paid to the petitioner but was deposited in the Tribunal much later. Also, at the relevant time, the petitioner, in whose name the property stood was a minor. In these circumstances it is highly improbable that possession was taken immediately on the next date without some definite and specific records of the mode of take over. On the other hand the material placed on record substantiates the stand of the petitioner. ( 12 ) AS has already been mentioned, the property, in question is a house. According to this petitioner, the house was occupied in part by him and in part by tenants. A survey report dated 27-3-78 placed on record by the respondents as part of Annexure R-III also acknowledges this position. ( 12 ) AS has already been mentioned, the property, in question is a house. According to this petitioner, the house was occupied in part by him and in part by tenants. A survey report dated 27-3-78 placed on record by the respondents as part of Annexure R-III also acknowledges this position. According to the petitioner, again, ever since he took over the property from his uncle in 1955, he has been collecting the rents from these tenants the tenants having in accordance with the Court s directions attorned to the petitioner. This is also borne out by the judgment dated 28-1-69 of the Sub-Judge, Delhi (earlier referred to) in a batch of suits (Nos. 518, 519, 520, 629 and 715 of 1966 ). Two of the suits were by the petitioner for recovery of rents from the tenants, the "otherwise" suits, by the tenants impleading the petitioner, the DDA and MCD as defendants. The plea of the tenants was that they had been tenants under the petitioner s uncle, that they had also been paying rents to the petitioner till December 1963, that DDA was asking them to pay the rents to it as the property had been acquired by the Union of India on its behalf in 1947-48, that the petitioner was claiming that he was entitled to receive the rent since the acquisition proceedings were not complete and that the MCD which claimed to have had the house transferred to it by the DDA was threatening to take coercive methods for the recovery of arrears of rent. They stated that they were prepared to pay rents to the rightful owner and prayed for a declaration as to which of the defendants was entitled to receive the rents. It will be relevant to quote here the contention urged by the present petitioner in the above suit, as extracted in the judgment: "on merits, it was admitted that the Union of India had issued a notification for the acquisition of the property in dispute and the Award was made determining the amount of compensation. It was, however, alleged that the final acquisition proceedings had not been completed and that the property in suit did not vest in the Union of India or any of the defendants. It was, however, alleged that the final acquisition proceedings had not been completed and that the property in suit did not vest in the Union of India or any of the defendants. It was also alleged that the possession of the property in suit was not taken over by the Union of India and that Sri Vidya Sagar had remained in its possession as its owner and was entitled to receive rent from the tenants thereof. "the DDA and MCD, however, claimed that the Union of India had acquired the property and also taken possession thereof. It is rightly pointed out by Sri Madan that having regard to the nature of the property the possession thereof could have been taken by the Union, in so far as the portion occupied by the petitioner was concerned, by dispossessing him or allowing him to continue in possession on payment of rent and, in so far as the other portions were concerned, by collecting the rents from the tenants. The pleadings in the suit clearly show that the petitioner was collecting the rents at least till December 1963 and there is no allegation that the DDA/mcd were doing so. In fact in the survey report dated 27-3-1978 (which forms part of Annexure R-III and has been already referred to) it is specifically mentioned "rent has never been collected against this property". In the face of this evidence, the plea on behalf of the petitioner that possession of the land was not taken on 13-1-1949 as alleged by the respondents is correct. Merely because the respondents have disputed this fact here and in the suit earlier referred to, this Court is not precluded from going into the question and deciding it on the materials placed on record. Otherwise, as contended for by Sri Madan, the respondents to any writ petition can render it infructuous by merely disputing some material fact and then pleading that the controversy cannot be resolved in a writ petition but can be resolved only in a suit. ( 13 ) IN my opinion, however the above finding that the respondents did not take possession of the property on 13-1-1949 or within a reasonable time of the award, does not help the petitioner. ( 13 ) IN my opinion, however the above finding that the respondents did not take possession of the property on 13-1-1949 or within a reasonable time of the award, does not help the petitioner. The proceedings referred to earlier clearly show that even as early as 1966/1969 the petitioner had raised the issue that the acquisition proceedings were incomplete for want of take over of possession. He was also conscious that the stand of the respondents was different and that they were claiming to be the owners of the property and trying to interfere with his possession. The Sub-Judge had also held that this was a question to be agitated in appropriate proceedings. But the petitioner took no steps to approach a Court by way of suit or writ, petition to vindicate his stand. Sri Madan says that this was unnecessary because he succeeded the suit and it was for the respondents if they -considered it necessary, to go to a Court of law. I am unable to accept this plea. The petitioner s case is that any attempt by the respondents to interfere with his possession after expiry of a reasonable time from the date of the award is illegal. Such an interference arose at the time of suits. Though the petitioner succeeded in the suits for a number of technical reasons, he became fully aware of the respondent s stand and could well have anticipated such attempts to be repeated. There is also nothing to show that after the suit was disposed of in 1969 nothing had happened. The letter of 23-8-1973 (Annexure-I) speaks to the contrary. The petitioner does not disclose any particular date on which or act by which the respondents had started fresh action against him which necessitated the filing of the writ petition. In these circumstances I am inclined to accept the plea of Sri Keshav Dayal that the petitioner has slept over his rights for an unduly long time without any reasonable cause or grounds. I think that there has been such undue delay and laches on the part of the petitioner as to disentitle him from relief in a writ petition. ( 14 ) HOWEVER, I shall also proceed to discuss the contentions raised by the petitioner on the merits. I have referred to the two branches of Sri Madan s contentions in para 9 above. ( 14 ) HOWEVER, I shall also proceed to discuss the contentions raised by the petitioner on the merits. I have referred to the two branches of Sri Madan s contentions in para 9 above. I shall deal with the second of these contentions first. In the petition, a reference has been made to Section 64-A of the 1919 Act and it has been urged that as the house was placed in theBetterment List, it could not any longer be acquired by the Government. A typed version of this section was also produced before me but it is unnecessary to set it out or discuss it at length for, after the learned counsel for the respondent had referred to the details of these provisions, Sri Madan conceded that the conditions of that section were not fulfilled in the present case and that he could base no claim, on that Section. He, however, referred to the correspondence between the petitioner and the DIT in 1956-57 and contended that this correspondence clearly showed that the respondents had withdrawn the property from the acquisition proceedings and in this connection, he relied on the provisions of Section 48 of the Central Act which runs as follows: "48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed: (1) Except in the case provided for in S. 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land. (3) xx xx xx xxx and he contended that such withdrawal has taken place in this case. ( 15 ) BEFORE dealing with the effect of the correspondence, it is necessary to notice the argument of Sri Keshav Dayal that a withdrawal from acquisition can be effected only by a formal gazette notification under Section 48. This contention appears to be based on the decisions in Mammad Koyi v. Province of Madras (AIR 1946 Mad 450) and M. Siddilingia v. State (AIR 1972 Mys 9 ). This contention appears to be based on the decisions in Mammad Koyi v. Province of Madras (AIR 1946 Mad 450) and M. Siddilingia v. State (AIR 1972 Mys 9 ). In my opinion, this contention is not well founded. Section 48 does not lay down any particular procedure for withdrawing the land from acquisition. The decisions relied upon by counsel turned on the rules prescribed under the Act by the respective State Government Rule 5 in Madras and Rule 8 (b) in Kamataka. My attention has not been drawn to any rule made by the appropriate Government which will have application to the present case. But granting that there is no particular mode or procedure for withdrawing lands from acquisition, it is clear that no withdrawal can be implied or presumed and the onus will be on the petitioner to establish clear and cogent facts showing that the Government had decided to abandon or withdraw acquisition proceedings in any particular case. ( 16 ) I am unable to see any facts in the present case which would justify such a conclusion. The correspondence relied upon is inconclusive and unhelpful. Annexure-A (15/3/56) shows that the petitioner had requested for the release of the property from the acquisition and that the Executive Officer of the DIT was prepared to lay the matter before the Board of the Trust if certain terms and conditions were acceptable to the petitioner and he gave a clear-cut reply within 10 days to enable further action being taken. Annexure-B (12/3/56) is the letter of the petitioner ostensibly expressing his acceptance to the "terms and abandonmeat" but Annexure-C (4/5/56) shows that the petitioner had asked for the relaxation of two of the terms of Annexure-A and he was asked to state whether he was prepared to accept all the terms or not. The next letter produced is Annexure-D (17/4/57) calling upon the petitioner to deposit Rs. 6240 "as release money" within a month, whereafter further action would be taken in the case. This amount the petitioner did not pay and went on asking for permission and time to pay it in instalments, which were not granted, Actually, this correspondence appears to represent negotiations under Section 64-A of the Act which, admittedly as mentioned earlier, never came to a fruition. But, even de hors Section 64-A, it is difficult to read into this correspondence an abandonment and withdrawal. But, even de hors Section 64-A, it is difficult to read into this correspondence an abandonment and withdrawal. The best that can be said is that, at the request of the petitioner, the DIT was prepared to consider a proposal for abandonment if certain conditions were fulfilled but there is nothing to show that these conditions were ever complied with. The letter of 1973 (Annexure-I), as already discussed, does not improve matters. There is, therefore, nothing in the correspondence to justify the plea of abandonment/withdrawal A ground has been taken in the petition that the DAG Scheme for which large extents of land and buildings were acquired has itself been "practically abandoned and has become ineffective due to the changed circumstances". This has been denied by the respondent and nothing has been placed before me in support of this contention. Even assuming that the scheme has in fact been abandoned subsequently long after the notification, the appropriate remedy for the petitioner would only be to approach the Government with a request for withdrawal of this property from acquisition in the changed circumstances. There is no legal infirmity in the Government proceedings, to take possession of the lands acquired legally which would justify the issue of a writ. Another factor relied upon for drawing an inference of withdrawal abandonment is the long delay in taking possession. This again, in my opinion, is not a possible inference in this case as it was in the case considered by Sarkaria J. , (as he then was) in Badan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1972 Pun LJ 391 relied upon by Sri Madan. While the said decision supports the stand of Sri Madan that a withdrawal from acquistion does not need a formal notification and that there should be satisfactory proof of the Government s take-over of possession of acquired lands, it does not help him for drawing an inference of withdrawal on the facts of the present case. In that case the Government had taken possession of the land but allowed the land owners to continue in actual possession for more than 30 years after the acquisition. In that case the Government had taken possession of the land but allowed the land owners to continue in actual possession for more than 30 years after the acquisition. But, apart from this negative circumstances, there were positive acts on the part of the Government which were inconsistent with an intention to proceed further with the acquisition: (a) it charged land revenue from the owners for several years, (b) it induced the land owners to make substantial investment on the land; and (c) it allowed him to construct a residential house thereon. In the present case, the acquisition authorities have not been inactive. There has been some correspondence between the petitioner regarding the release of land till about 1957. Thereafter, steps have been taken tor realisation of the rents at one stage and they have also participated in the legal proceedings instituted by the tenants. The letter of 1973 also indicates that they have been taking steps thus inducing the petitioner to come forward with some request for consideration. In all these circumstances it is difficult to spell out by positive or definite conduct on the part of the respondents from which an inference of abandonment/withdrawal can be drawn. ( 17 ) THIS takes me to the second contention of Sri Madan. He points out that, under Section 16 of the Central Act, theacquired property vests in the Government only after it has taken possession thereof from the owners. He points out that Section 16 does not provide for any limit of time after the award within which the Government can take possession. He invites attention to the provisions of Section 48 (1) which enable the Government to withdraw from acquisition, without assigning any reasons, at any time before possession is taken. He points out that Section 16 does not provide for any limit of time after the award within which the Government can take possession. He invites attention to the provisions of Section 48 (1) which enable the Government to withdraw from acquisition, without assigning any reasons, at any time before possession is taken. These two sections read together, he submits, enable the Government to acquire some property but thereafter take no steps in pursuance thereof at all for an indefinite period, thus leaving the owner of the property in an absolute state of uncertainty as to the intentions of the Government regarding the property; He cannot assume that the Government will take possession and ignore the property, as until possession is taken, he will continue to be the owner and responsible as such for maintaining it and in regard to all dealings with it Nor can he proceed on the basis that the Government may not take it over after all and exercise his rights of alienation and disposal thereupon. This disability, particularly in times when the prices of real property are escalating day by day, he contends, constitutes an unreasonable restraint on the fundamental right to hold and dispose of property. In support of this contention, Sri Madan draws upon the analogy of Section 6 of the Central Act. This provision originally stipulated no time limit for the interval that could elapse between notices under Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act. In view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Vishnupresad Sharma (AIR 19and6 SC 1593) the legislature introduced a proviso impoeing a maximum time limit of three years for a notification under Section 6 from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4. Applying the analogy of Section 6 before its amendment, Sri Madan contends that Section 16 should be held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional ( 18 ) I do not find force in the contention of learned counsel. Sections 6 to 17 of the Central Act lay down a dearly formulated and logical procedure to be followed in proceedings tor acquisition. After the notification under Section 6 declaring the intention of the Government that particular land is needed for the purpose mentioned in the Act, the successive steps outlined ta the following sections are initiated one after the other. After the notification under Section 6 declaring the intention of the Government that particular land is needed for the purpose mentioned in the Act, the successive steps outlined ta the following sections are initiated one after the other. Under Section 7, the Collector takes orders for the acquisition of the land. Section 8 provides for the land being measured and marked out Then follow notices to all persons interested to put forward their claims for compensation of all interests in such land. The enquiry and the ward by the Collector follows (Sees. 11 to 15 ). The next steps is the possession of the land. Section 16 lays down the normal rule that possession of the land is to be taken only after the making of the award and Section 17 makes special provision for taking possession even earlier in case of urgency. The very nature of these proceedings show that there cannot be a time-schedule applicable to all cases for all these steps to be put through as the facts and circumstances of each case are bound to differ. The extent of property acquired, the nature of the property, the types of interests and categories of occupants in possession thereof, the purpose of acquisition and several other factors come into operation and it would be impractical, if not impossible, to specify a time limit in respect of each or all the stages. In the very Scheme of the sections, there is an inbuilt implication that these proceedings should follow one another as quickly as possible in the circumstances. Secondly, the petitioner in the present case is challenging the proceedings which follow after an award. Under Section 31 of the Act, the Collector, on making an award, has to tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by one or other of the contingencies mentioned in the section. It will, therefore, be seen that once the acquiring authority has paid the compensation moneys, it has no longer any motive or inducement to delay taking possession of the property. On the other hand, it is in its own interest to take possession of the property as expeditiously as possible and the absence of a time limit will not, therefore, cause prejudice to any person except the Government. On the other hand, it is in its own interest to take possession of the property as expeditiously as possible and the absence of a time limit will not, therefore, cause prejudice to any person except the Government. Thirdly, the statute clearly provides that the ownership of the property will become vested in the Government only on taking possession thereof. As already mentioned, at this stage, the Government has parted with the compensation amount and it will be detrimental only to the interests of the Government if it postpones the taking over the possession. It is not reasonable tor a landlord, who has already received the worth of the land according to the statutory standards, to complain of an unreasonable restriction in that, after receipt of compensation, he is unable to dispose of the property. On the other hand, it will perhaps be in the interests of the public and public revenues, that the State having parted with the moneys, should be able to have control over the land immediately. But the statute places no restrictions over the landowners ownership of the property until the Government has actually taken posses and there is nothing unreasonable in this provision. Fourthly, the complaint of counsel based on the provisions of Section 48 is also unfounded, It has been pointed out by the Patna High Court in Jethmal Bhojraj v. State ( AIR 1975 Pat 339 ) that the provision contained in Section 48 is not arbitrary, observing: "the petitioners have also challenged the vires of sub-section (1) of Section 48 on the ground that the said provision is arbitrary and without any guideline. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention of the petitioners. The Legislature has provided a guideline to exercise of the said power, inasmuch as the State Government can exercise that power onlybefore taking possession of the land in question, and even in that case compensation is to be paid for any damage done to the property in question and for costs incurred by the owner in prosecuting the proceedings up to that stage. "it also contains provisions compensating the landowners for any damage done to them in consequence of the notice or any proceedings thereunder. It is also necessary and incidental that a power to acquire land should be coupled with a power to withdraw or abandon such acquisition if found to be not necessary. "it also contains provisions compensating the landowners for any damage done to them in consequence of the notice or any proceedings thereunder. It is also necessary and incidental that a power to acquire land should be coupled with a power to withdraw or abandon such acquisition if found to be not necessary. Such a provision is necessary in public interest. If all these provisions are thus read together, it will be clear that they form a complete well regulated code providing for various contingencies and eventualities that are bound to occur in such matters and it is not possible to accept the plea that Section 16 imposes unreasonable restrictions on the owner s right to property and is thus unconsitutianal. ( 19 ) THE position in regard to Section 6 was quite different. In Vishnu Prasad Sharma s case (supra) the Supreme Court held successive notifications under Section 6 with excessive intervening delay between the two notifications to be illegal. It was observed: "two things are plain when we come to consider the construction of Sections 4, 5-A and 6. The first is that the Act provides for acquisition of land of persons without their consent, and though compensation is paid for such acquisition; the fact however remains that land is acquired without the consent of the owner thereof and that is a circumstance which must be borne in mind when we come to consider the question raised before us. In such a case the provisions of the statute must be strictly constructed as it deprives a person of his land without his consent. Secondly, in interpreting these provisions the court must keep in view on the one band the public interest which compels such acquisition and on the other the interest of the person who is being deprived of his land without his consent. It is not in dispute thai it is open to the appropriate government to issue as many notifications as it deems fit under Section 4 (1) even with respect to the same locality followed by a proper notification under Section 6 so that the power of the locality ie not exhausted by the issue of one notification under Section 4 (1) with respect to that locality. On the other hand as the compensation has to be determined with reference to the date of the notification under Section 4 (1) the person whose land is to be acquired may stand to lose if there is a great delay between the notification under Section 4 (1) and the notification under Section 6 in case prices have risen in the meantime. This delay is likely to be greater If successive notifications under Section 6 can be issued with respect to land comprised in the notification under Section 4 with greater consequential loss to the person whose land is being acquired if prices have risen in the meantime. It is however urged that prices may fall and in that case the person whose land is being acquired will stand to gain. But as it is open to the appropriate Government to issue another notification under Section 4 with respect to the same locality after one such notification is exhausted by the issue of a notification under Section 6, it may proceed to do so where it feels that prices have fallen and more land in that locality is needed and thus take advantage of the fall in prices in the matter of acquisition. So it is clear that there is likely to be prejudice to the owner of the land if the interpretation urged on behalf of the appellant is accepted while there will be no prejudice to the Government if it is rejected tor it can always issue a fresh notification under Section 4 (1) after the previous one is exhausted in case prices have fallen. There is no such hardship to or dir crimination against an owner because of any possible delay in the taking of possession by the Goverment for the reasons already discussed. In my opinion, therefore, the decision does not help the petitioner. ( 20 ) FOR the above reasons, I reject the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed and the rules discharged. There will be no order as to costs.