Judgment :- 1. These two Second Appeals are connected and raise a common question of law. These were admitted on the question: "Whether the court below was justified in disposing of the appeal before disposing of the application made under 0.41 R.27 for reception of additional evidence". The courts below had concurrently found against the appellant in the two suits. The counsel for the appellant forcefully contended that the appellate court decided the appeals without disposing of an application filed under 0.41 R.27 CPC. This was an improper exercise of jurisdiction which has rendered the judgment bad. The respondents' counsel contended that no substantial question of law as contemplated by S.100 CPC. (amended) arose in these appeals and as such the appeals should be dismissed. It was further submitted that the appeals involved only questions of fact which had been concurrently found by the courts below against the appellant. 2. Since the appeals were admitted on this question and no other question of law was involved, this question alone was agitated at the bar. It was contended by the appellant's counsel that the right given to a party under 0.41 R.27 was a valuable right and an improper exercise of jurisdiction vested under the said provision had worked to the detriment of the appellant, and that reception of additional evidence on proper grounds and consideration of such evidence either by the appellate court or on its direction by the trial court would have swung the case to the advantage of his party. Under 0.41 R.27 (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence has to satisfy the court why the documents could not be produced earlier. If the appellate court is satisfied that the documents, have to be admitted, it shall do so after recording reasons. When an application for reception of additional document is made, the appellate court can proceed with the appeal only after passing orders on such application. Decision of the appeal without bestowing proper attention on the application for reception of additional evidence is bad in law. 3. The question for consideration is whether the question of law raised in the Second Appeals is a substantial question which deserves to be considered by this Court. It was contended by the respondents counsel that this was not a substantial question of law. 3. The question for consideration is whether the question of law raised in the Second Appeals is a substantial question which deserves to be considered by this Court. It was contended by the respondents counsel that this was not a substantial question of law. The appellate court was satisfied on the merits of the case that the appeal had to be dismissed and did not think it necessary to admit the documents as additional evidence. May be, that the order is not happily worded. The order "Appeal dismissed. Hence this LA. is also dismissed." was perhaps made inadvertently instead of dismissing the' application and then dismissing the appeal; for, the judge need not assign any reasons while dismissing the application. It was therefore contended that there was no need for remitting the case back to the appellate court for the mere formality of disposing of the application before disposing the appeal. 4. The appellant's counsel contended that the right available to a suitor under Order XLI R.27 was a valuable one. This right, if properly extended to him can tilt the case in his favour. Hence it is made obligatory on the part of an appellate judge to consider the application on merits before disposing of the appeal. Incidentally, he contended that under S.100 CPC. as amended, the respondents cannot, after the question of law is formulated, argue that the question so formulated is not a substantial question of law. All that he can be allowed to argue is that the case does not involve such question. This is on the strength of the 2nd part of S.100(5) CPC. According to him, once the question is formulated by the court as a substantial question of law, that has to be decided by the court either way and the respondents cannot urge that it is not a substantial question. I find it difficult to agree with this contention. From the wording of S.100(5) CPC. it is clear that appeal can be heard on the question so formulated, which means both sides can argue on the question formulated and it would be open to the respondents to satisfy the court that the question formulated is not a substantial question of law and the court can after hearing both sides decide whether the case involves the substantial question formulated by it. The second part of S.100(5) CPC. The second part of S.100(5) CPC. has to be read with the first part, when the difficulty projected by the appellant's counsel will disappear. More so vhen we read the proviso to sub-section (5) of S.100 CPC. which enables the court to hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, after it is satisfied for reasons to be recorded, that the appeal involves other substantial questions of law. This contention raised by the appellant counsel has therefore to be negatived. 5. In answer to the contention by the respondents' counsel that the question formulated is not a substantial question of law, the appellant's counsel relied upon the decision reported in Secretary to Government Home Department v. Hari Rao (AIR. 1978 Madras 42), where a learned judge of the Madras High Court, considering S.100 CPC. (amended) observed as follows: "Misconstruing of evidence and acting without evidence is certainly a substantial question of law as between the parties. The second appeal is therefore allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court are restored. I make no order as to costs in the second appeal. On the strength of the decision it was contended that a question of law to be substantial, it is sufficient, if it is a substantial question of law between the parties. Here, failure to admit additional evidence, contrary to the procedure laid down in 0.41 R.27 CPC, has resulted in failure of justice, in a case affecting rights of party and hence is a substantial question of law between the parties. The matter needs, according to me, further probe and a little more elucidation. 1s it enough that a question of law arises between parties to make it a substantial question of law as contemplated by S.100 CPC. According to me, not. In every second appeal involving some question of law it can be said that a question of law between the parties arises. This is not sufficient to bring it within the expression "substantial question of law". The section has been amended with a purpose and that is to make the first appellate court, a final court of appeal, as far as possible. This is not sufficient to bring it within the expression "substantial question of law". The section has been amended with a purpose and that is to make the first appellate court, a final court of appeal, as far as possible. The jurisdiction of this court can be invoked only when a party who invokes it satisfies that the question of law decided affects his or her rights or is of public importance, in the sense, that there is no binding precedent on the point, that a decision is necessary as a guide to the subordinate courts, that the question raised has been differently interpreted by different High Courts and that decision under appeal has decided the question in a grossly erroneous manner. S.100 in its amended form makes it obligatory on the judge who admits an appeal to formulate the question which according to him is a substantial question of law. The judge who hears the appeal may be different. He can formulate further questions at the time of hearing, after recording reasons. Different interpretations are possible as to the requirements of the new section. There is a lack of clarity in the section. It would be better to clearly delineate the requirements of the section, to avoid a flexible approach, to second appeals, if the object is to reduce their number. 6. The ambit of S.100 CPC. fell for consideration, though not directly, before the Supreme Court in a decision reported in Mohindra And Mohindra Ltd. v Union of India (1979) 2 SCC.529, at page 551. There the Supreme Court was considering the effect of S.55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 read with S.100 CPC. The question considered was whether S.55 was inseparably linked or yoked to S.100 CPC. and whether all the changes that take place in S.100 should be automatically read into S.55. Under S.55 an appeal is permissible on any of the grounds mentioned in S.100 CPC. The question which arose before the Supreme Court was that whether an appeal under S.55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act should satisfy the ingredients of the amended S.100 CPC. to entitle a person to file an appeal under the said section. The Supreme Court held otherwise. But in so doing observed as follows regarding the scope of S.100 CPC. relying upon the decision reported in Sir. to entitle a person to file an appeal under the said section. The Supreme Court held otherwise. But in so doing observed as follows regarding the scope of S.100 CPC. relying upon the decision reported in Sir. Chunilal F. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (AIR. 1962 SC. 1314): "What should be the test for determining whether a question of law raised in an appeal is substantial has been laid down by this Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and it has been held that the proper test would be whether the question of law is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties, and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. The question of interpretation of S.13(2) which arises in the present appeal directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and it is an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court and it is, therefore, clearly a substantial question of law within the meaning of this test. We must, therefore, reject the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents against the maintainability of the present appeal." The Supreme Court was considering the meaning of the expression'substantial question of law' occurring in S.110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The last clause alone is sufficient, which reads: "and where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such judgment, decree or final order, the appeal must involve some substantial question of law." Dealing with the contentions raised, the Supreme Court observed thus: "(6) We are in general agreement with the view taken by the Madras High Court and we think that while the view taken by the Bombay High Court is rather narrow the one taken by the former High Court of Nagpur is too wide. The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the Highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is probably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." The above observation was relied upon in 1979 (2) SCC. 529. The requirements of S.100 have to be understood in the light of the above observations. To hold whether a second appeal raises a substantial question of law, the first test to be applied is whether the question raised is of general importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties. These two requirements are put alternatively which means that it is sufficient if one or the other ingredient is present for a second appeal to be admitted. It is not enough if the question only affects the rights of party; it should substantially affect the right of parties. If this test is, satisfied, the Court has to see whether the question raised has been settled either by the Supreme Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court. If the Court finds that the question raised is so settled the second appeal has to be rejected at the threshold. If it is not so decided, the Court can see whether the question raised is not free from difficulty, or calls for a discussion of alternative views. This is an area where a flexible approach, perhaps, may be possible. Whether a question is free from difficulty or not is a matter of opinion. Equally so, is the plea whether a question calls for a discussion of alternative views. The section was amended with the avowed object of reducing the number of second appeals. This is an area where a flexible approach, perhaps, may be possible. Whether a question is free from difficulty or not is a matter of opinion. Equally so, is the plea whether a question calls for a discussion of alternative views. The section was amended with the avowed object of reducing the number of second appeals. The Law Commission while formulating their recommendations for amendment of S.100, noted the plethora of conflicting decisions in interpreting S.100 (a), (b) and (c) and also the unduly lenient admission of the second appeals, and observed thus: "The mere fact that a question of fact has been wrongly decided by the Court of first appeal, should not constitute a ground for second appeal. The mere fact that a finding of fact is supposed to be perverse or manifestly unjust will not, under our proposal, justify admission of a second appeal. But the second appeal would be admissible if a question of law, whether the question relates to substance, procedure or evidence has been wrongly decided." The question of law raised, should not only be an arguable one, it should impress the court as one which needs to be decided. If the decision of the court below on the question of law is neither absurd nor grossly erroneous, it will not afford a ground for admission. If the court holds, at the admission, stage, that the question has been properly decided, though there are no binding authorities on it, admission will be refused. In other words a party will not be allowed the mere luxury of a debate on a question of law raised in a second appeal, by admitting it. The court has to do justice to the new section and bear in mind the object with which it is enacted. I find it difficult, with great respect, to agree with the observation widely put in the judgment reported in AIR. 1978 Madras 42. According to me, it is not enough if a question of law between the parties to the suit is raised. The tests laid above must be satisfied. 7. For the purpose of this case I find that the question formulated substantially affects the rights of parties. Reception of additional documents can in appropriate cases tilt the scales of the judgment either way. The tests laid above must be satisfied. 7. For the purpose of this case I find that the question formulated substantially affects the rights of parties. Reception of additional documents can in appropriate cases tilt the scales of the judgment either way. Denial of reception of these documents in a manner opposed to law is denial of justice to a party. Production of additional documents is a valuable right given to the parties. The court can, for reasons to be recorded in writing, on being satisfied that the party was disabled from production of these documents for valid reasons, admit the documents, and the court shall look into such additional documents before deciding the appeal. In this case this has not been done. It might well be that on considering the reasons given in the application, the court might hold that they are not sufficient in which case the same judgment could be rendered. It might also be that the court on being satisfied that the reasons are sufficient, admit the document and on application of its mind to the documents so admitted, dispose of the appeal in the light of those documents also. This is a duty cast upon the court. While admitting documents as additional evidence the court has to assign reasons. But while dismissing it, it need not. I am of the view that it is highly desirable and useful that the court while dismissing the application also, gives reasons for it, so that the appellate court can appreciate why the documents were rejected; for the rejection of documents at the appellate stage will always be the subject matter of attack in the appeal. What has happened in this case is that the appeal was dismissed first and the application for reception of additional documents dismissed thereafter. I have not been taken through any decision similar to the facts of the case. I hold that the question raised is a substantial question of law. The Appellate Judge not having considered the application for reception of additional documents before the disposal of the appeal has committed an error of law and has not exercised the jurisdiction vested in it properly. I therefore set aside the decrees and judgments of the court below, send the case back to it for passing orders on the application I. A. 893 of 1975 and thereafter dispose of the appeals. I therefore set aside the decrees and judgments of the court below, send the case back to it for passing orders on the application I. A. 893 of 1975 and thereafter dispose of the appeals. The Appellate Judge is directed to dispose of the appeals within two months of receipt of this judgment. These second appeals are ordered as above. Allowed.