RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) WHETHER the, compulsory sale of cement by a manufacturer to the State trading Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the STC) as regulated under the Cement Control Orders promulgated by the Central Government under S. 18-O of the Industries (Development and, Regulation) Act, 1951, amounts to sale as defined in Sec. 2 (t) of the Karnataka Sales-tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and consequently liable to sales-tax under Sec. 5 (3) (a) 0f the Act, is the precise question that arises for consideration in these five revision petitions presented by a cement manufacturer under Sec. 23 (1) of the Act against the order of the Karnataka sales-tax Appellate Tribunal. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are as follows: The petitioner in, all these petitions is M|s Bagalkot Uciyog Ltd. , Bagalkot, which is a manufacturer of cement. Under Sec. 5 (3) (a) of the Act, sales-tax is made payable at the earliest sale of commodities specified in column 2 of the Second Schedule to the Act at. the ra,tejs specified against the corresponding entry in column 3 of the said, Schedule. The Central Government in exercise of its power under S. 18-O of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, promulgated an order dated 30-6-1958 called the Cement Control Order 1958 according to that order every manufacturer of cement was required to sell the entire quantity of cement manufactured by him to the. State Tradin corporation (hereinafter referred to as the STC) and at the price fixed the schedule to the said order except such quantity as. may be mutually agreed upon between the concerned manufacturer and the Central Government. The said qrder was replaced by a subsequent order dated 31-10-1961. The price fixed under the 1953 Cement Control Order for the sale of cemen by the manufacturer to the STC was at Rs. 62-50 per metric tonne and for the sale of cement by the, STC was at Rs. 117-50 per metric tonne and the corresponding prices under the 1961 Cement Control Order was Rs. 69-50 and Rs. 97-00, respectively. There is no dispute that the clauses which are relevant for these cases in both these Cement Control Orders, are substantially similar. The STC in turn appointed the petitioner-manufacturer as their agent under an agreement for the sale of cement to the customers. 69-50 and Rs. 97-00, respectively. There is no dispute that the clauses which are relevant for these cases in both these Cement Control Orders, are substantially similar. The STC in turn appointed the petitioner-manufacturer as their agent under an agreement for the sale of cement to the customers. The petitioner in accordance with the Cement Control Orders, sold the cement to the STC in the first instance at the prescribed price and thereafter sold the, cement fo others a directed by the STC and as their agents in accordance with the price specified by the STC. The Commercial-tax officer, Bagajlkot, who, is the assessing Officer, made, assessment for the five assessment years in question and levied sales-tax at the, rates prevailing during the relevant period. He fixed the sale turnover of the assessee taking into account the sale price of the cement sold by the assesses as the agent of the STC. In other words, the assessing officer declined to consider the first sale by the assessee in favour o,f the STC as required under the Cement control Orders as sale for purposes of the Act and treated the sale by the petitioner as agent of STC in favour of others as the first sale and fixed the sale, turnover and tax liability oto that basis. The relevant particulars to the five assessment years, which are the subject matter of the five- revision petitions, are as follows: ( 3 ) IT is common ground that under S. 5 (3) (a) of the Act only the first sale of cement is exigible^ to sales tax and at the rates specified in the Second schedule to the) Act. From the facts stated above, it may be seen that under the Cement Control Orders, the petitioner manufacturer is under a legal obligation to sell the entire quantity of cement manufactured by it except to the extent exempted by the Central Government, to the STC. The rate fixed u/r. the 1958 Cement Control Order was Rs. 62-50 per metric tonne. It is also not in dispute that under an agreement entered into between STC and the petitioner, the petitioner became the sole selling agent of the STC and the price at which the cement could be sold by the STC to others was at Rs. 117-50 per metric tonne. 62-50 per metric tonne. It is also not in dispute that under an agreement entered into between STC and the petitioner, the petitioner became the sole selling agent of the STC and the price at which the cement could be sold by the STC to others was at Rs. 117-50 per metric tonne. The controversy between the petitioner and the dpartment is whether the sale of the cement by the, petitioner in favour of stc at Rs. 62-50 per metric tonne, constitutes the first sale exigible, to tax under section 5 (3) (a) of the Act or whether the sale of cement by the petitioner as agent of STC to others at the rate of Rs. 117-50 per metric tonne constitutes the first sale which attracts levy of tax under S. 5 (3) (a) of d. Act. The word sale is defined in S. 2 (t) of the Act thus: "sale" with all its grammatical variations and cognate expression means e-very transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge. " sd S G. Sundaraswamy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Rajendra Babu, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the Department, addressed arguments in support of their respective case. The rival contentions urged for the petitioner-assessee and the. Department are, as follows. (1) Learned counsel for the assessee contended that the pale of cement which was exigible to sales-tax under S. 5 (3) (a) of the Act was the first sale by the manufacture assessee, to the STC as required under the cement Control Orders and not this subsequent sales effected by the ss- sesee in favour of others, only as an agent of STC and as such the assesse; was also entitled for deduction of the amount, of excise duty from the, sale turnover as provided in rule 6 (4) (j) of the Rules. (2) Learned counsel for the, Department contended that the sale of cement by the ; ssessee, as an agent of STC to others, was in truth and substance the first sale and the; so called sale of cement by the maliafacturer assessce to the STC was noi sale at all within the meaning of that word ag defined in S. 2 (t) of the Act and, therefore, sales tax was exigible on the said sales of cement effected by the assessee as an agent of STC and con- sequently the assesses was not also entitled to have the benefit of deductio of excise duty under rule 6 (4) (j) of the Rules as the excise duty was paid earlier in the capacity of manufacturer and the sales tax was exigible only on the sales effected as an agent of the STC. ( 4 ) THOUGH on the question, as to what are the essential ingredients which render the transfer of property in the form of goods from one person to another, for a price, a sale, the decisions of tho Supreme Court disclose divergence of views on certain aspects, a detailed discussion of those decisions with reference to the relevant criteria to be applied, in deciding the question is rendered unnqcessary in view of the latesi, decision of the supreme Court in Vishnu Agencies v. Commercial Tax Officer (1 ). The said decision fully supports the contentions urged on behalf of the assepsee. Therefore, it would have been sufficient to set out only the ratio in Vishnu agencies' case (1) and to proceed to answer the questions arising for consideration in these cases. But as the learned counsel for the Department maintained that the question arising for consideration in these cases was not covered by the said judgment, in order to make the order a self contained one, we proceed to summarise briefly the views expressed by the supreme Court in several earlier decisions and the v'ew taken in Vishnu agencies (1) case either approving or dissenting from, those views, as follows: (1) State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. , (2 ). , (2 ). In that case which arose out of assessment proceedings under the Madras General Sales- tax Act, thei two points decided were, as follows: (1) that the words 'sale of goods' in entry 54 of State, List in the 7th schedule to the Constitution should be interpreted broadly and should be given the legatl sense in that the transfer of property in goods takes place from one person to another for a price; and (ii) that the words 'sale of goods' should be given the meaning assigned to it under the Sale of Goods Act and should not be allowed to vary in accordance with the definition of sale in the laws relating to sale of goods as may be in force from time to time and, therefore, the essential attribute of sale is that it must be, in pursuance to an agreement between the buyer and seller and transaction resulting in transfer of title in goods from one to another in which they have no volition or option to bargain, is no sale. (2) New India Sugar Mills v. Commissionnr of Sales Tax ( AIR 1963 SC 1207 . ). In this case the Supreme Court relying on Gannon Dunkerley's case ( AIR 1958 SC. 560 - 1959 SCR 379 .) held by majority that a transaction resulting in the transfer of title in goods form one to another in accordance with certain obligatory terms of a statute was not a sale, Hiddyatulla, J. who dissented from the majority opinion held that to make a transaction a sale, consent in the elementar form was unnecessary and that though the buyer and seller were brought together by the operation of law, a contract emerged and the consent must be held to exist impliedty. (3) Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd. v. State of Madras ( AIR 1968 SC 478 - (1968) TSCR 479 ). In that case, which raised the question as to whether certain supplies of steel made to several persons in the State of Madras in accordance with the directions of Steel Controller in exercise of his powers under Iron and steel (Control of Production and Distribution) Order, the Supreme Court held that so long mutual consent was not completely excluded, the trans action amounted to sale. (4) Andhra Sugars Ltd. v. State of A. P. ( AIR 1968 SC 599 - (1968) 1 SCR 705 ). In this case, the Supreme court held that though under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation and Supply and Purchases) Act, 1961, the owner of a sugar factory was under a legal compulsion to purchase sugarcane grown when the grower offered to sell, the purchase by the factory owner was by free consent as it was not caused on account of coercion, undue influence, fraud or mistake as defined in S. 14 of the Contract Act and that a legal compulsion did not amount to coercion as defined in S. 15 of that Act. It was also held that as parties, were competent to contract and the sale was for lawful consideration and lawful obje,ct, the purchases were exigible to tax by the State Legislature under entry 54 of 7th Schedule to the Constitution. (5) Salarjang Sugar Mills v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1972 SC. 87 . ). This case arose under the provisions of the Act (then called, the Mysore Sales-tax Act) itself. In this case though the factory owners were under statutory obligation to purchase sugarcane from growers and at a price not less than the minimum price statutorily fixed, the Supreme Court held that inspite of those conditions contained in the relevant Control Orders, there was still option to the parties in regard to purchase of higher quantities/of sugarcane at higher rates and to reject goods after inspection and also as regards manner of payment of price and combination of these factors rendered the transaction a 'sale' as defined in S. 2 (t) of the Act. This view was followed in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Stale of Bihar (AI-R -1976 SC 2$78 - (1977) 1 SCR 354 . ). This view was followed in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Stale of Bihar (AI-R -1976 SC 2$78 - (1977) 1 SCR 354 . ). (6) Chittermal Naraindas v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. (8) in that case, having regard to the provisions of the U. P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order, 1959, the Supreme Court held as follows: (i) that the food-grains supplied to Food Controller, was in the, nature of compulsory acquisition and cannot be regarded as sale and consequently could not be exigible to sales-tax under the U. P. Sales-tax Act; and (ii) that even if there was scope for consensual arrangement in the matter of place of delivery, or place of payment of price the transaction would, not amount to a sale. (7) State of Tamil Nadu v. Cement Distributors (AIR 1973 $c 668 - (Itfzs) 2 SCR 1019 ). In this case, the transaction which came up for consideration was the sale of Cement by a manufacturer to STC under the 1958 Cement Control Order. In that case, the Court proceeded on the basis that there was no dispute on the question that such a transaction did not amount to sale apd further even regarding the gunny bags in which the cement was, supplied, the parties did not dispute that if the price of the gunny bags was also controlled, even that part of the transaction by which the title to the gunny bags was transferred to the STC could not be considered as sale. As it was found that price of the gunny bags had also 'been fixed by the Government, it was held that it did not constitute a 'sale'. The decision rested on the earlier decision in New india Suger Co. As it was found that price of the gunny bags had also 'been fixed by the Government, it was held that it did not constitute a 'sale'. The decision rested on the earlier decision in New india Suger Co. , (3) and the second point decided in Chittermal's case, ( AIR 1970 SC 2000 - (1071) 1 SCR 57-1.) ( 5 ) IN the case of Vishnu Agencies (1), the Supreme Court considered all the above decisions and the views expressed with reference to those decisions are as follows: (1) Regarding Gannon Dunkerley's case, (2) : in Vishnu Agencies' case (1) the Supreme Court observed that the view taken in that case required further consideration, but prefeaxed, to proceed on the basis that the aforesaid view might 'be taken as representing the correct legal position and by applying those principles held that transactions by which /goods in the form of cement, were sold by persons, who became dealers of cement by taking licence, only to permit holders and at a price fixed statutorily under the terms of the West Bengal Cement Control Order did constitute sales, as there were several matters in respect of which consent was necessary, notwithstanding statutory limitation on the normal rights of dealers and purothers. 'the relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: "33. In order, therefore, to determine whether there was any Agreement or consensuality between the parties, we must have regard to their conduct at or about the time when the goods changed hands. In thefirst place it is not obligatory on a trader to deal in cement not on any one to acquire it. The primary fact, therefore, is that the decision of the trader to deal in an essential commodity is volitional. Such volitioin carries with it the willingness to trade in the com modity strictly on the terms of Control Orders. The consumer too, who is under no legal compulsion to acquire or possess cement, decides as a matter of his vqlition to obtain it on the terms of the permit or the order of allotment issued in his favour. That brings the two parties together, one of whom is willing to supply the essential commodity and the other to receive it. When the allottee presents his permit to the dealer, he signifies his willingness to obtain the commodity from the dealer on the terms stated in the permit. That brings the two parties together, one of whom is willing to supply the essential commodity and the other to receive it. When the allottee presents his permit to the dealer, he signifies his willingness to obtain the commodity from the dealer on the terms stated in the permit. His conduct reflects his consent. And when, upon presentation of the permit, the dealer acts upon it, he impliedly agrees to supply the commodity to the allottee on the terms by which he has voluntarily bound himself to trade in the commodity. His conduct too reflects his consent. Thus, though both parties are bound to comply with the le,gal requirements governing the transaction, they agree as between themselves to enter in to the transaction on statutory terms, one agreeing to supply the- commodity to the other on those terms and the other agreeing to accept it from him on the very terms. It is therefore not correct to say that the transactions between the appellant and the allotted are not consensual. They, with their free consent, agreed to enter into the transactions. "34. We are also of the opinion that though the terms of the transaction are mostly predetermined by law, it cannot be said that there is no area at all in which there is no scope for the parties bargain. " (2) As regards other earlier decisions, after discussing the decisions in New India Sugar Mitts; (3) Indian Steel and Ware Products Ltd. (4) andhra Sugar Millss Limited; (5) and Salarjang Sugar Mills (6) the Supreme; court approved the dissenting view of Hidayutulla, J. in New India sugar Mills, case, (3) and the observation? in Andhra Sugar Mills' case (5) which cautioned a,gainst the majority view in New India Sugar Mills' case (3) and held that the majority view in New India Sugar Mills' case (3) was not good la,w. The view so taken also agrees with the view taken in India Steel and Wire! Products (4), Sajarjang Sugar Mills (6) and Oil and Natural Gas Commission (7 ). (3) Considering the view in. Chittermal's case (8) the Supreme, Court approved the view taken on the first point i. e. , that cases of compulsory acquisition in favour of the State did not constitute 'sale'. Products (4), Sajarjang Sugar Mills (6) and Oil and Natural Gas Commission (7 ). (3) Considering the view in. Chittermal's case (8) the Supreme, Court approved the view taken on the first point i. e. , that cases of compulsory acquisition in favour of the State did not constitute 'sale'. However, on the second point, the Court disagreed and held that the correct position in law is that the case of compulsory acquisition only stands apart and could nobe regarded as sale and that the view taken in that case to the effect that even if in respect of the place of delivery and the place of payment of price there was scope for agreement, such transaction would not amount to sale, was not correct law. (See page 467 para 45 ). This view taken, therefore, in Vishnu Agencies' case (1) is that so long mutual consent, express or implied, is not completely excluded and is available even in respect of some of the matters concerning the transaction, transfer of title of goods from one person to another for a price, though most of the matters are under statutory compulsion, still amounts to sale. In the result the law laid down in Salar Jang Sugar Mills' (6) and Oil and Natural Gas Commission (7) is approved. (4) As regards Cement Distributors' case (9) the Supreme Court in vishnu Agencies' case (1) held that the above judgment to the extent it was inconsistent with the minority judgment of Hidayutullah, J. in New india Sugar Mills' case (3) and the view in India Steel and Wire products case (4) and Salarja-ng Sugar Mills's case (6) was not good law. ( 6 ) THE two cases which arose in Vishnu Agencies' (1) were decided by applying the above principles. The first case, namely, Vishnu Agencies v. Commercial Tax Officer arose out of assessment proceedings in respect ol sales of cement made by M/s. Vishnu Agencies in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal Cement Control Act and the orders made thereunder to allottees from time to time pursuant to the allotment order issued by the competent authority in the State of West Bengal. The Suprem court held that the sale of cement by Mjs Vishnu Agencies in favour of allqttees though made in accordance with the directions of the competent authority under the West Bengal Cement Control Act and the orders passed thereunder amounted to sales under S. 2 (g) of the Bengal Finance (Sale-tax) Act, 1941 and consequently exigible to sales-tax. The other case - dhanyalakshmi Rice Mills v. The Commercial Tax Offi er decided in the same judgment arose out of the assessment proceedings taken in the state of Andhra Pradsh against procuring agenis, rice-mill owners and the growers on the one hand and the wholesale dealers and retail dealers on the other. It was held that these were transactions of sales within the moon ing of S. 2 (n) of the General Sales-tax Act of Andhra Pradesh and consequently exigible to sales-tax or purchase-tax, as the case might b be under the said Act, though the procuring agents and ricemill owners were compelied to sell the rice in accordance with the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Procurement, Levy and Restriction of sale) Order 1967. ( 7 ) TO put it shortly the law declared by the Supreme Court in Vishnu agencies' case (1) is as follows: (i) If the process by which title to the goods stands transferred from one person to another in a given case is in fact or in substance in the nature of compulsory acquisition of goods in favqur of the State, it cannot be, considered as 'sale' and consequently cannot be subjected to lev- of sales-tax. (ii) If in the process by which title to the goods stands transferred from one person to another for a price, however, wide may be the area in which statutory compulsion operates, so long it does not amount to compulsory acquisition in favour of State and there is some area left for consensus, however, small it may be, the transaction has to be regarded as 'sale' and ist exigible to sales-tax if under the relevant law tax is leviable on sale of such goods. ( 8 ) WE shall now proceed to apply the above decision to the facts of these cases. ( 8 ) WE shall now proceed to apply the above decision to the facts of these cases. Learned Counsel for the Department strenuously contended that in view of clause 3 of the, Control Order, though the manufacturer was required to sell all the, quantity of cement except to the, extent exempted by the Central Government to the STC, in truth and substance) it was no sale, and the transfer of title in cement manufactured by the assessee in favour of STC was in the nature of compulsory acquisition. Learned counsel for the assesses, submitted that the transaction had to be regarded as sale as there were some area in which consent of parties could operate, such as, place of delivery, mode, of payment of price, discqunt or commission, which the manufacturer might allow to the STC. ( 9 ) IN order to appreciates the contention, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Cement Control Orders. As the 1958 and 1961 cement Control Orders are, in pari materia, it is sufficient to set out the clauses in the latter and the same read as follows :"3. Producers to sell cement to Corporation. (1) Every producer shall sell (a) the entire quantity of cement which may be produced by him from the date of commencement of this order upto 31st March, 1966 (inclusive) except such quantity as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between him and the Central Government to the Corporation, and deliver the same, to such person or persons as may be specified by the Corporation, in this behalf from time to, time- (2) Notwithstanding any contract to the; contrary, no producer shall dispose, of cement held in stock or produced by him except in accordance, with the provisions of sub-clause (1) controlled prices of cement. 6. 6. (1) The price' at which a producer may sell cement other than rapid harding cement and low heat cement shall be as specified in the schedule; Prqvided also tha,t except in the case of any sale toi the Government for the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals,, where a producer on the basis of a separate agreement has, agreed or agrees to" allow a rebate, discount or commission, the Corporation shall be entitled to deduct from the price payable in respect of the cement sold to it the amount of the rebate, discount or commission so agreed upon; provided also that in respect of cement intended for export outside india, it shall be open to the Corporation to negotiate with a, cement producer the ex-works price payable to him. Explanation: The price fixed in the Schedule is exclusive of (i) the excise duty payable by the producer in respect of the ceme and (ii) the cost of packing or of containers, if any. . . . . . . "the question for consideration is whether the 'sale' of cement by a manufacturer to STC in terms of the Cement Control Orders is sale as defined in the; Act. In the first instance, it may be pointed put that the definition of the word 'sale' in the Act is, similar to the definitions in the West bengal Finance (Sales-tax) Act and the Andhra Sales-tax Act, which were considered by the Supreme Court in Vishnu Agencies cases (I it is no doubt, true that under the provisions of the Cement Control Order in respect of three matters, namely, the extent of quantity, out of the cement manufactured, to be sold, the price at which it should be sold and the person to whom it should be sold, there is no choice to, the manufacturer. In view of clause 3, all the cement, which was in stock on the date of promulgation of the Cement Control Order, and all the quantities of cement; manufactured after that date, except to the extent allowed by the Centra; government to las retained by a manufacturer has to be sold, at the price fixed in the, Cement Control Orders only to the STC. Even so, in our opinion: the process cannot be termed as, compulsory acquisition in fayour of the state. It may be seen that the manufacturer is required to sell the cement. Even so, in our opinion: the process cannot be termed as, compulsory acquisition in fayour of the state. It may be seen that the manufacturer is required to sell the cement. to STC which is a company incorporated under the Companies Act and cement is not acquired in favour of the State. Further as far as the fixation of price is concerned, there is nothing special about it. The fixation of price statutorily in respect of all essential commodities, is now a well established feature of social control to ensure supply of such commodities at reasonable prices to the community. When prices are fixed the owner of the goods is no doubt compelled statutorily to sell such goods at a rate not higherthan the price so fixed. He can sell at lower price. Therefore, the fixation on price at which cement should be sold, which is a reasonable restriction imposed in public interest, does not affect the nature of the, transaction as sale. As far as compulsion to sell to STC is concerned, it is needless to state that a manufacturer manufactures cement only for the purpose Of selling it, Hence the consent of the manufacturer to sell the cement manufactored by him is implicit in its manufacture itself. One aspect which prima facie gives an appearance, of compulsory acquisition is the requirement to sell the entire, quantity of manufactured cement to the STC. Even this on a closer examination does not affect the nature of the, transaction as sale. In Vishnu Agencies (1) (see page 468 para 46) the Supreme, Court referred to Salarja Sugar Mills' case (6) in which it was pointed that even when a commodity was required to be sold only to permit holders or ratior card holders, that statutory compulsion to sell goods, at a fixed, price only to a permit holder did not deprive the transaction of the ingredients of sale and there was indisputably a, sale. If we examine the statutory compulsion to sell the entire quantity of manufactured cement to STC in that light, all that it means is instead of there being several permit holders to whom alone cement could be sold at the price fixed by law, there is only one sole permit holder i. e. , STC to whom alone a manufacturer has to sell all the cement manufactured by him except to the extent of the quantity the Central Government allows the manufacturer to retain. Therefore in substance the facts of the present cases are in no way different from those of the two cases considered by the Supieme Court in Vishnu Agencies (1 ). As the manufacturer produces cement only to sell, and he is bound to sell at a price fixed by law, it matters little whether he is required to sell to several persons to whom permits are issued by the, prescribed authority or to one person like STC as in this case and the only effect of the cement control orders is that the seller and the buyer are brought together for effecting the transaction of sale of cement. Apart from the above reasoning, which persuades us to hold that the sale of cement by the; manufacturer to STC in terms of the cement control order amounts to 'sale' within the meaning of that word as defined in 9. 2 (t) of the Act, notwithstanding the- statutory compulsion to sell to STC at fixed price, there are also other matters in respect of which there is scope for agreement between manufacturer and STC as pointed out for the assessee. They are- (i) The rebate or commission which the manufacturer may allow to the STC, (ii) The place and time at which cement could be delivered. (iii) The mode of payment oi price by STC to a manufacturer, i. e. , whether in cash or on, credit facility or whether in a lumpsum or in instalments. (iv) Cost of packing and the price of bags in, which cement is supplied. (iii) The mode of payment oi price by STC to a manufacturer, i. e. , whether in cash or on, credit facility or whether in a lumpsum or in instalments. (iv) Cost of packing and the price of bags in, which cement is supplied. (See; Clause 6 (1) Explanation (ii) ) therefore applying the ratio of Vishnu Agencies case (1) we hold tha 'sale' of cement by the manufacturer-assessee in these cases to STC, is sale within the meaning of that word as defined in S. 2 (t) of the Act and as it constitutes the first sale, it is exigible to tax under Sec. 5 (3) (a) of the Act read with entry 36 of the Second Schedule to the Act. As the manufaeturer- assessee, who has paid the excise, duty on the cement, is also the seller, who is liable to pay sales-tax on the sale turnover calculated on the basis of the cement sold to the STC it follows that the assessee is also entitled to the deduction authorised by ru'e 6 (4) (j) of the Rules. Therefore, the orders of the assessing officer, the appellate authority and the Appellate Tribunal, are liable, to be set aside. For the reasons aforesaid, we make the following order; (i) The common order of the Sales-tax Appellate Tribunal dated 5-12-1974 confirming the common order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Dharwar, dated 31-3-1963 and the five assessment orders made by the Commercial-tax Officer, Bagalkot, viz. , (i) dated 17-9-70 for the assessment period 1-4-1959 to 31-3-1960; (ii) detect 28-6-1969 for the assessment period 1. 4. 1961 to 31-3-1962; (iii) dated 17-9-70 for the assessment period 1-4-1962 to 31-3-1963; (iv) dated 18 (20-2-1967 for the assessment period 1-4-1963 to 31-3-1964 and (v) dated, 17-9-1970 for the assessment period 1. 4. 1964 to 31-3-1965, are set aside. (ii) Tha matters are remanded to the Commercial tax Officer, Bagalkot with a direction to make fresh assessments in the light of this order, (iii) No costs. --- *** --- .