JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. -This is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment from a shop. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal by the plaintiff the lower appellate court decreed the suit. Hence the second appeal by the defendant-appellant. 2. The plaint case was that the defendants were the tenants of the shops in dispute at a monthly rental of Rupees 15.94 including the house tax. The plaintiff applied for and was granted a permission under Section 3 of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act to file a suit. The permission was granted by the District Magistrate. On a revision preferred by the tenants, the Commissioner by his order dated 28-1-1966 while dismissing the revision modified the permission by adding a condition that the permission shall not be operative until one Mahesh Chandra Jain the son of the landlord came to reside in the house in dispute at Bulandshahr and continued to do so throughout the pendency of the litigation. This condition was illegal and inoperative in law and was liable to be ignored. A notice to quit was given to the defendant but they did not comply. Hence the suit for ejectment as well as the recovery of Rs. 565.96 P. as arrears of rent including damages for use and occupation. 3. The suit was contested by defendants. Their defence was that the conditions imposed by the Commissioner in his order dated 28-1-1966 was valid and binding on the plaintiff-landlord and that, inasmuch as, the condition had not been complied with by the landlord, there was no effective permission available to the plaintiff for filing the suit. The suit was, therefore, barred under Section 3 of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent & Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act No. 3 of 1947). As regards the claim for arrears of rent it was asserted that the defendant had sent the amount to the plain- tiff but that the plaintiff refused to accept the same, as a result of which the defendants were compelled to deposit the same under Section 7-C of the aforesaid Act. As regards the claim for arrears of rent it was asserted that the defendant had sent the amount to the plain- tiff but that the plaintiff refused to accept the same, as a result of which the defendants were compelled to deposit the same under Section 7-C of the aforesaid Act. The bar of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act was also pleaded on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to ignore the condition subject to which alone the permission was granted to the plaintiff for instituting the suit. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, relevant issues were framed. The trial court came to the conclusion on the basis of the admitted position conceded by the plaintiff in his plaint that the condition attached by the commissioner in his order had not been fulfilled by the plaintiff, there was no effective permission in law and that consequently the suit for ejectment of the defendants was not maintainable. The trial court, therefore, dismissed the suit for ejectment. However, it decreed the suit for recovery of Rs. 565.96 P. being the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. 5. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court the plaintiff filed an appeal. The appellate court came to the conclusion that the order of the Commissioner modifying the permission granted by the District Magistrate was invalid and ineffectual in law in so far as the condition requiring that Sri Mahesh Chandra Jain to come and stay with the plaintiff-landlord at Bulandshahr was concerned. The lower appellate court was of the view that the condition was severable from the rest of the order passed by the Commissioner. It also took the view that the condition imposed was illegal and could therefore, be ignored by the court, Taking the view that the permission minus the condition, was valid, the lower appellate court decreed the suit for ejectment as well. 6. Before the lower appellate court an argument was raised on behalf of the defendant-appellants to the effect that some of the heirs of the original plaintiff No. 2, Guru Charan Das Jain who died during the pendency of the appeal not having been substituted on the record, the decree for ejectment could not legally be passed as the suit was liable to fail in its entirety. The lower appellate court came to the conclusion that even if all the heirs were not substituted upon the death of a party, the suit would not abate in view of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 49 . 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted two points for my consideration and these are :- (1) The lower appellate court has erred in law in taking the view that the condition imposed by the Commissioner while granting the permission was invalid, and being severable, could be ignored. The condition was inseverable and was so bound up with the rest of the order that unless the condition was complied with, the permission could not come in operation. The condition not having been complied with, no effective permission was available to the plaintiff on the date of the institution of the suit. (2) The suit of the plaintiff was liable to abate as a whole in view of the fact that some of the heirs of Guru Charan Das Jain had admittedly not been substituted on the record upon the death of Guru Charan Das Jain who was one of the plaintiffs. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that this appeal is entitled to succeed on the first point urged on behalf of the appellants. 9. The order which was passed by the Commissioner disposing of the revision filed by the defendant-appellant reads as follows:- "I, therefore, hold that there has been no illegality or irregularity in granting permission in this case. I would, however, not like to leave thus case without amending the order of the lower appellate court to the extent that the suit for eviction will be filed only when Mahesh Chand Jain comes to Bulandshahr with a view to establish himself there and stays on in Bulandshahr so long as the case is pending in Bulandshahr. Further the accommodation in dispute will not be rented out by the owners to anyone else and will be used solely by Mahesh Chand Jain or the owners themselves for a period of three years from the date of this order." 10. I do not agree with the lower appellate court that the conditions subject to which permission was granted to the plaintiff-respondent was severable from the rest of the order. I do not agree with the lower appellate court that the conditions subject to which permission was granted to the plaintiff-respondent was severable from the rest of the order. Indeed from a reading of the order of Commissioner it seems clear that he was willing to grant permission to the plaintiff-landlord only upon the contingency of his son Mahesh Chand Jain coming to reside at Bulandshahr in the house in dispute and further that Mahesh Chandra Jains continuing to reside there during the pendency of the suit. It is not denied that Mahesh Chandra Jain did not come to Bulandshahr to reside in the house in dispute either before or even after the institution of the suit. Reading the order of the Commissioner as a whole, it is evident that the Commissioner was persuaded to grant the permission subject only to the condition mentioned by him being fulfilled. It is not possible to say that the Commissioner would have granted the permission minus the conditions mentioned in his order. In my judgment, the order of the Commissioner i is not capable of operating as a permission without the condition. The condition imposed by the Commissioner was in the nature of a condition precedent to the grant of permission. The lower appellate court was, therefore, not right in taking the view that the condition mentioned in the order of the Commissioner was severable and could be ignored. 11. The lower appellate court is also not right in taking the view that the condition imposed by the Commissioner was illegal. The permission was sought by the landlord precisely for the residence of Mahesh Chand Jain. The Commissioner does not appear to have been satisfied about the genuineness of the assertion that the house was really needed for the residence of Mahesh Chand Jain. It was on account of this that the Commissioner in order to dispel that doubt in his mind and in order to ensure that the permission was not obtained on misrepresentation of facts preferred to impose conditions subject to which alone the permission was to be operative. The conditions imposed by the Commissioner were relevant and proper in the context of those proceedings. The lower appellate court was wrong in taking the view that the riders added by the Commissioner were illegal and could be ignored by the court. 12. The conditions imposed by the Commissioner were relevant and proper in the context of those proceedings. The lower appellate court was wrong in taking the view that the riders added by the Commissioner were illegal and could be ignored by the court. 12. This court is, therefore, of the view that the order of Commissioner imposing the condition was a perfectly valid order and that it was incapable of being split up in the manner in which the lower appellate court sought to do. The landlord admittedly not having complied with the condition subject to which alone the permission was granted by the Commissioner, the suit was clearly incompetent in law in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the aforesaid Act. 13. Inasmuch as, the appellant is entitled to succeed on this point alone, it is not necessary to express any view on the second point urged on behalf of the appellant, though it seems to me prima facie that the view taken by the lower appellate court is correct in law. However, I am not expressing any concluded opinion on this aspect. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on two decisions which are already cited in the judgment of the lower appellate court. The case reported in 1956 All LJ 355 is clearly distinguishable on facts. There the permission has been granted by the District Magistrate. However, its operation had been postponed by two months. It was argued that the condition postponing the operation of permission by two months was severable, and the permission was otherwise valid. In the present case, I have held above that the condition is not severable and that the order passed by the Commissioner must stand or fall as a whole. The other case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in 1963 All LJ 193 (1980) is equally distinguishable on the facts of the present case. In that case also the order granting permission was not hedged by any condition. The order was sought to be challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the permission was granted to the landlord was no longer in existence or that the landlord was using the accommodation for some purpose other than that on the basis of which the permission has been granted. This court held that on these grounds the permission could not be challenged. This court held that on these grounds the permission could not be challenged. This case is of no assistance to the plaintiff-respondents. In the present case what is being contended is that in view of the terms in which permission was granted there was no valid and operative permission in existence at the time of institution of the suit. In the present case the defendants are not challenging any finding of the Commissioner but are contending that there is no permission which may be said to be in operation in view of the terms in which the permission was granted. Neither of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent has, therefore, any application to the facts of the present case. 15. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court in so far as the decree for ejectment is concerned is set aside. The suit of the plaintiff-respondent for ejectment of the shop in dispute is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court are restored. The appellants are entitled to their costs from the respondents of this second appeal.