JUDGMENT : MURLIDHAR, J. 1. These are two petitions by the landlord arising out of a proceeding u/s 21 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 (hereinafter called the Act) for release of three small shops abutting the main road. 2. The brief relevant facts are these: The three shops are approximately 8'x 7' each. The middle one is occupied by Ram Kishan Respondent of writ petition No. 2329 of 1977 and the corner shop ones were occupied by Behari Lal Respondent of writ petition No. 2335 of 1977 and one Mohammad Hanif respectively. Behind these shops lie three more or less equal sized portions described during the proceeding as Nikas gallery and Baithak. It is common ground that there is a lane on the side of the building on which Bahori Lal's shop is situate so that the small Baithak behind Bahori Lal's shop opens into this lane. Behind this Baithak there is another larger Baithak opening into the lane. Rest of the building consists of the residential portion occupied by the landlord. The landlord retired after having served as a primary school teacher and the family consists of himself and his wife. The property belongs to his wife. She sought release of the three shops on the ground that after retirement he wanted to start a private primary school in the premises. Pending proceedings one corner shop of Mohd. Hanif fell vacant and was released in his favour. As regards the two other shops, the Prescribed Authority found in the landlord's favour and passed an eviction order. The two tenants filed appeals. The District Judge as appellate authority has held that there was sufficient accommodation for starting the school and there was no bona fide requirement for the two shops at present. He, however, observed that such requirement may arise in future if the school "starts going in a big way" and in that case "the landlady can always move a fresh application upon such ground." The appellate authority also found the test of comparative hardship to operate in favour of the tenants. 3. He, however, observed that such requirement may arise in future if the school "starts going in a big way" and in that case "the landlady can always move a fresh application upon such ground." The appellate authority also found the test of comparative hardship to operate in favour of the tenants. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has attacked the finding on the question of bona fide requirement on two grounds: firstly that it is based on misreading of documents and secondly that the splitting and phasing of landlord's need in the circumstances of this case was manifestly erroneous and resulted from a wrong approach to the role of Prescribed and Appellate Authority in proceedings u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act. There appears to be substance in both these contentions. 4. It appears that in the initial application for release the landlady had only mentioned that she needed the shops to start a school and had not stated anything about any alterations in the structure or joining of any back portion with the shop premises for conversion into school premises. However, when some of the tenants objected that the school could be started in the three small similar rooms at the back admittedly referred to as godown during evidence and the larger Baithak abutting the lane the Petitioner and her husband in their affidavits which are annexures 3 and 4 to petition No. 2329 of 1977 expressly asserted that the portion behind the shops was without sufficient light and air and the school could only be set up by joining this portion with the shop premises and that the Baithak could only be used for office and staff room purposes. The appellate authority in the course of its order has observed that the landlady could use the rooms behind the shop as class room as the sizes were the same and that "it is not the case of Applicant that she would get shops and rooms behind them remodelled before getting the school opened." The learned Counsel for the Respondent tried to justify this observation on the ground that there was no mention of such remodelling in the initial application. I am, however, of the opinion that the rules of pleading cannot be applied so rigidly to these proceedings and in the present case the initial application u/s 21 about the requirement of the shops should be read as supplemented by the landlady's affidavit, annexure 3. This means that the landlady's case is to be read as of requirement for, the shops so that after joining with the three similar rooms at the back the same along with the Baithak could be used for setting up a private school. The learned District Judge in my opinion wrongly assumed that the requirement according to the landlady's case was only for the three shops for setting up the school. This wrong assumption led him to the erroneous conclusion that the similar sized rooms at the back would serve the purpose of the school. He also erred in ignoring the specific plea that the rooms at the back were without light and air and unless joined with the shops in front could not serve the purpose of the School. Thus the finding that the requirement for the two remaining shops was not bonafide is vitiated by misreading of evidence. 5. The appellate authority has also misdirected itself in holding that the school could and should initially be started in the premises other than the two disputed shops and, therefore, there was no bona fide requirement for these shops at present though when the school gets going in a big way a case for release of these shops would arise. u/s 21 of the Act the Prescribed or, the Appellate Authority is to order eviction only after it is satisfied that the whole or any part of the building under tenancy is bona fide required by the landlord. The enquiry of the authority is directed to the question whether the landlord bona fide requires the premises. This means that the bona fide requirement has to be judged giving due weight to the landlord's point of view. This aspect is important because while the authority has power to adjudicate whether the landlord bonafide requires the whole or part of the tenanted premises it cannot convert itself into a designer of the landlord's requirement. This means that the bona fide requirement has to be judged giving due weight to the landlord's point of view. This aspect is important because while the authority has power to adjudicate whether the landlord bonafide requires the whole or part of the tenanted premises it cannot convert itself into a designer of the landlord's requirement. If the landlord can be found to bona fide require the accommodation in the manner alleged by him the authority is not entitled to refashion or reshape the requirement according to its own notions. Ordinarily this distinction is of no consequence because if the authority does not find the landlord's claim about requirement convincing this leads to the finding that there is no bona fide requirement. But the distinction becomes relevant in cases where the authority accepts the over all requirement of the landlord but disagrees with the landlord's claim in some matters of detail. It then becomes a question of deciding whether it is a case of genuine finding of about non-existence of bonafide requirement to the extent of these details or a case where the authority exceeding its role has chosen to trim the details as' if it were the landlord himself. 6. The present case in my opinion falls in the latter category so far as the finding that though there was requirement for the school initially the same should be started in the remaining premises and only If it gets going in a big way should it be extended to the shops in question goes. 7. As already noted the landlord's case has to be read in the light of his affidavit as of requirement of the shops for purposes of the school after joining with the similar rooms at the back. If this be so the authority can find whether it is a genuine and bona fide need or not, but in my opinion it will be going too far if it said that the need is genuine but the school should be started in the back rooms without joining the shops in dispute. If this be so the authority can find whether it is a genuine and bona fide need or not, but in my opinion it will be going too far if it said that the need is genuine but the school should be started in the back rooms without joining the shops in dispute. Again, it is pertinent to remember that it is a small school, the total covered area in which the school is proposed to be set up being less than 500 square feet and the two shops may be having an area between 120 to 150 square feet (vide dimensions found in the orders of the two authorities). Even as regards the point of time if the school is to get going it will do so soon after the start. So splitting of the requirement into the initial commencement phase and an adult phase when it gets going in a big way appears to be wholly artificial. In recording a finding about requirement with these modifications of the landlord's case the authority has converted itself into an arbiter of how the landlord shall meet his requirement, in how many and which rooms the school should start and when it should expand into the two shops. Not being content with enquiring and deciding if the alleged requirement is bona-fide it has substituted its own conception of requirement in place of the landlord's and over looked the basic position that it is the landlord to decide his own requirement in the first place and the authority only judges if the same is bona fide. The phasing of the requirement into the initial and adult stage in this case must also be disapproved on another ground. Considering the difficulties and delays of litigation in such proceedings it is only on strong grounds that the authority may be entitled to allow the application with regard to a part as first instalment giving the hope that the next one would be released if the school flourished. The criticism that the Appellate Authority in recording the present finding on the bona fide requirement deviated from the critical question, namely, whether the landlord's alleged requirement for the disputed shops was a bona fide one and went on to decide how in his view the landlord should proceed to set up the school is therefore correct. The criticism that the Appellate Authority in recording the present finding on the bona fide requirement deviated from the critical question, namely, whether the landlord's alleged requirement for the disputed shops was a bona fide one and went on to decide how in his view the landlord should proceed to set up the school is therefore correct. The finding on the question of bona fide requirement is in my opinion vitiated on this ground also and must be quashed. 8. Because it is the pressure of requirement that determines the hardship ordinarily an incorrect appraisal of requirement affects the finding about comparative hardship. Therefore, in my opinion, the finding about the comparative hardship should also be quashed along with the finding of bona fide requirement and the matter gone into afresh after a proper finding on the question of bona fide requirement. 9. Both the petitions are, therefore, allowed. The orders of the II Additional District Judge, dated 10-9-1977 are quashed and he is directed to decide the appeals afresh according to law in the light of observations made in this order. No orders as to costs in both the cases.