Short Note : 1. This Second Appeal is at the instance of the defendant tenant seeking interference with the judgment and decree made by the Courts below directing his eviction from the tenanted premises by holding that the ground under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 regarding inconsistent user of the premises was fully established. Held : The tenant, after about one year, started a School undisputedly being run by a Committee known as 'Bal Sudhar Shiksha Samiti'. According to the defendant, he himself was the Secretary of the said institution. Admittedly, more than 100 students were enrolled and the school was being run in the tenanted premises. This started in the year 1968. The plaintiff objected to the same and instituted a suit after serving a quit notice in the year 1969. The plea raised by the defendant was that he had taken the suit premises on rent in the capacity of the Secretary of the Institution. It was also contended that the suit premises were taken for the purpose of running a School. On this defence, an effort was made to urge that there was neither any case of sub-letting nor of any inconsistent user. The Courts below found it as a fact that the suit premises were let out for residential purposes, and running of a full-fledged school of about 100 students in the tenanted premises was apparently an inconsistent use. The lower appellate Court, however, observed that the decree for eviction was liable to be sustained even on the ground of sub-letting though no specific claim for eviction was made on this account by the plaintiff before trial Court. 2. The finding concurrently arrived by the Courts below that the suit premises were let out for residential purposes appears to be quite reasonable and proper and, therefore, remains binding for the purposes of this Second Appeal. I have gone through the rent note. It gives a clear impression that the tenanted premises were neither let out for running a School nor was there any occasion for the tenant to have the lease for the said purpose. The School itself was started in the year 1968 i.e. after about one year from the date of the lease. There is evidence on record that initially the defendant was residing in the tenant premises. The School itself was started in the year 1968 i.e. after about one year from the date of the lease. There is evidence on record that initially the defendant was residing in the tenant premises. So long as he used to give tuition to one or two students at his residence, the plaintiff did not object. The occasion for objection arose when the defendant shifted his residence to some other place and started a full-fledged school in the tenanted premises. The plaintiff landlord resides in the upper floor of the house and felt highly inconvenienced by the activity of the plaintiff by running, a school in the residential premises. The defendant himself has admitted that he is residing at some other place. It is not a case of such use of the premises which could be treated as not affecting the dominent use of the premises for the purpose of residence. The tenant undisputedly does not reside in the tenanted premises at all. The lease was for residential purposes. Under these circumstances, the Courts below were right in holding that the tenant had done an act which was inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted as a tenant in the suit accommodation. In view of this finding, the ground under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act stands established and the decree for eviction can be sustained on this ground alone. 3. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to deal with the question of availability of the ground under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act regarding sub-letting or parting with possession in favour of other person. It is true that from the undisputed circumstances that the School is being run by a Society, and that the tenancy was in favour of the defendant tenant in his individual capacity and not as a Secretary of the institution, there was sufficient justification for holding that the ground of sub-tenancy had been made out. But since no such claim was specifically made on this account in the plaint and when there was no issue on this point, it would not be proper to base a decree on such a ground which has not been pleaded and tried. The lower appellate Court, however, relied on the said ground because it was made out from the case put up by defendant himself. The lower appellate Court, however, relied on the said ground because it was made out from the case put up by defendant himself. Appeal dismissed.