JUDGMENT J.M.L. Sinha, J. - This revision is directed against the judgment dated 20th January, 1977, passed by Sessions Judge, Lalitpur, maintaining the conviction recorded against the applicant by trial court under section 16 (l)(a) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, but reducing the sentence to three months rigorous imprisonment, besides a fine of Rs. 1000/-. While admitting this revision it was directed that a notice be issued to show-cause why the sentence given to the applicant be not enhanced. It is thus, that this revision has come up before us. 2. Facts of the case, very briefly stated, are as follows :- On 15th March, 1975, at about 2.45 P.M. Shri Dinesh Kumar (P.W.1), Food Inspector, Lalitpur, collected sample of mustard oil from the shop of the applicant. On being sent to the chemical examiner it was found that the sample was adulterated and further that prohibited coal tar dye was mixed in it. Complaint was, therefore, filed for the prosecution of the applicant for the offence under section 16 (1) (a) of the Act. 3. The applicant during his examination in the trial court admitted the collection of the sample from his shop on the date and time alleged, but pleaded that the oil was not meant for edible purpose. During his examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he added that the oil was meant for burning and that the applicant told this fact to the Food Inspector when the sample was collected. 4. The trial court on consideration of the evidence on record held the applicant guilty of the offence under section 16 (1) (a) of the Act and sentenced him to one years rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In default of payment of fine, the applicant was directed to undergo two months further rigorous imprisonment. 5. Aggrieved against it, the applicant filed an appeal in the court of Sessions. The learned Sessions Judge found no substance in the appeal, but while dismissing the appeal, reduced the sentence to three months rigorous imprisonment besides a fine of Rs. 1000/-. It is against that order that the present revision is directed. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant in the first instance urged that the oil, out of which the sample was collected, was not meant for edible purposes. 1000/-. It is against that order that the present revision is directed. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant in the first instance urged that the oil, out of which the sample was collected, was not meant for edible purposes. Learned counsel for the applicant added that at the time of the collection of the sample the Food Inspector was expressly told that the oil was meant for burning purposes. We have given our careful thought to this contention, but we express our inability to accept the same. Shri Dinesh Kumar, Food Inspector (P.W. 1), during his examination in the trial court, stated that at the time the sample was collected, the applicant had told him that the oil was meant for edible purposes, the tact that the oil, out of which the sample was collected, was meant for edible purposes is also mentioned in the notice Ext. Ka. 1, which bears the signatures of the applicant on the reverse thereof. 7. Learned counsel for applicant, however, invited our attention to the evidence of Ram Dayal (D.W. 1) and Nawab (D.W.2), who deposed that the applicant had told the Food Inspector, when the sample was collected, that the oil was not meant for edible purposes. It is, however, significant that Ram Dayal (D.W. 1) signed the notice Ext. Ka.1, wherein it was mentioned that the sample was taken out of food stuff. He was, therefore, cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution with respect to the contents of the documents Ext. Ka.1. All that Ram Dayal (D.W. 1) said in reply was that he signed the document without reading it. In view of the fact that Ram Dayal (D.W. 1) signed the document Ext. Ka. 1, which clearly stated that the sample was taken out of edible stuff, the statement to the contrary made by him in the trial court cannot be accepted. It is evident that he colluded with the applicant and made a false statement in order to save him. So far as Nawab (D.W. 2) is concerned, we do not think that his testimony can outweigh the testimony of the Food Inspector. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court accepted the testimony of Food Inspector. We have no reason to disagree with the assessment of evidence made by the courts below. 8. So far as Nawab (D.W. 2) is concerned, we do not think that his testimony can outweigh the testimony of the Food Inspector. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court accepted the testimony of Food Inspector. We have no reason to disagree with the assessment of evidence made by the courts below. 8. We, therefore, refuse to accept the contention raised by learned counsel for the applicant that the oil, out of which the sample was collected, was not meant for edible purposes. 9. Learned counsel for the applicant next urged that it was at best a case of misbranding. The expression misbranded is defined in sub-clause (ix) of section 2 of the Act. The relevant part thereof reads as follows : "Misbranded"an article of food shall be deemed to be Misbranded (a) if it is an imitation of, or is a substitute for, or resembles in a manner likely to deceive, another article of food under the name of which it is sold and is not plainly and conspicuously labelled so as to indicate its true character ; (b) x x x x x (c) x x x x 10. In the instant case the oil, out of which sample was collected, could not be said to be imitation, or substitute of the mustard oil. It was mustard oil mixed with some other article. Clause (ix) of section 2 of the Act cannot, therefore, apply to the present case. The contention raised is, accordingly rejected. 11. No other contention having been raised regarding the merit of the case, we accept that the applicant was rightly held guilty and convicted under section 16(l)(a) of the Act. 12. This takes us to the question of enhancement of sentence. 13. According to section 16(l)(a) of the Act, as it stood on the date on which the sample was collected, the minimum sentence was six months rigorous imprisonment together with a fine of Rs. 1000/-. A court could, however, award a lesser sentence if the case was covered under any clause of the proviso occurring immediately after clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 16. It is conceded that clause (ii) of the proviso could not apply to the present case. All that we have to examine is whether clause (i) of the proviso could apply. It is conceded that clause (ii) of the proviso could not apply to the present case. All that we have to examine is whether clause (i) of the proviso could apply. Admittedly, if clause (i) of the proviso also could not apply, it was not open to the court below to award a sentence less than that prescribed by the Act. According to clause (i) of the proviso a sentence of less than the prescribed can be awarded if the offence : (i) is under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 16(a) and is with respect to an article of food which is adulterated under sub-clause (1) of clause (i) of section 2 or is misbranded under sub-clause (k) of clause (ix) of that section. 14. We have already held earlier that it is not a case of misbranding. There is no controversy that it is a case falling under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 16 of the Act. The question, however, is whether it is a case falling under sub-clause (i) of clause (i) of section 2 or it falls under any other sub-clause. Sub-clause (1) reads as under : "If the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescribed limits of variability." 15. We have however, already mentioned earlier that in this case the report of the Public Analyst was that prohibited coal tar dye was mixed in the oil. This fact was expressly mentioned in the charge and it was also put to the applicant during his examination in the trial court. When an article of food is adulterated by mixing a prohibited colour it falls under sub-clause (j) of clause (i) of section 2 and not under sub-clause (i) of the Act. 16. It will, therefore, follow that clause (i) of the proviso appended to section 16 could not be applied in the instant case. The lower appellate court was, therefore, wrong in reducing the sentence of imprisonment from 1 years rigorous imprisonment to three months rigorous imprisonment. 17. Learned counsel for the applicant urged that the applicant has been out of the jail for quite some time and that it would be too hard to send him to jail. The lower appellate court was, therefore, wrong in reducing the sentence of imprisonment from 1 years rigorous imprisonment to three months rigorous imprisonment. 17. Learned counsel for the applicant urged that the applicant has been out of the jail for quite some time and that it would be too hard to send him to jail. In view, however, of the fact that the provision contained in that section is mandatory this court has no discretionary power in the matter. The letter of law has to be complied. The sentence imposed by the lower appellate court must, therefore, be enhanced from three months rigorous imprisonment to six months rigorous imprisonment. 18. The revision tiled by the applicant, accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed. The sentence of imprisonment of three months rigorous imprisonment awarded to the applicant is, however, enhanced to six months rigorous imprisonment besides a fine of Rs. 1000/-. awarded by the lower appellate court. Applicant is on bail. He shall surrender forthwith to serve out the sentence as modified by this court. 19. Learned counsel for the applicant made a request for a certificate of fitness to appeal to Supreme Court being granted under Article 134A of the Constitution. In our opinion no substantial question of law meriting consideration of Supreme Court is involved in the case. The request is therefore, refused.