Judgment R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---These two petitioners arise out of proceedings under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the "Bombay Rent Act". Petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 1311 of 1974 are the tenants of a piece of land situated in Pune City, details of which will be mentioned hereinafter. Petitioner No. 2 is a firm engaged in the business of supplying coal, while petitioner No. 1 is a partner of the same. Respondent No. 1, hereinafter referred to as the "respondent", is also a partnership firm engaged in, among other things, selling of automobiles and servicing the same. Judges of the two courts below have been joined as respondents Nos. 2 and 3, but no reference need be made to them as the respondent hereafter. The State of Maharashtra has been joined as respondent No. 4 because the petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Notice was issued to the Advocate General, in response to which Mr. R.S. Bhonsale, the learned Advocate General, has appeared and has made submissions on the constitutional validity of the provisions, to which reference will be made later in the judgment. 2. There is a plot, numbered as final Plot No. 790 situated in Bhamburda, part of Pune City. One Sitaram Rambhau Hole was the original owner of the said plot, which came to be divided into several sub-plots. By a series of transactions, notice of which need not be taken for the purpose of the disposal of these petitions, the respondent came to be the owner of sub-plots Nos. 7 to 11 (both inclusive). It has come in evidence that the total area of sub-plots Nos. 7 to 11, of which the respondent is the owner, is 38,851 square feets. Sub-Plots No. 7 8 together measure 15,985 square feet. The petitioners occupy a total area of 5,175 in Sub-plot No. 7 alone, which is said to measure 7,738 square feet. It may also be stated that the petitioners were inducted as sub-tenants in the area now in their possession sometime in November 1951 and after the respondent become the owners of sub-Plots Nos. 7 to 11 there was a merger of interests which ultimately resulted in the petitioners being the direct tenants of the respondent. It may also be stated that the petitioners were inducted as sub-tenants in the area now in their possession sometime in November 1951 and after the respondent become the owners of sub-Plots Nos. 7 to 11 there was a merger of interests which ultimately resulted in the petitioners being the direct tenants of the respondent. At this stage that the petitioners are the direct tenants of the respondent is not in dispute. The rent of the area in possession of the petitioner on the commencement of the proceedings in this case was Rs. 105/- per month. A further facts must be added because that is crucial to the several questions that are arising in these petitions and that is that what has been let out to the petitioners is an open plot of an area of 5,175 square feet without any structures belonging to the landlord. It is also now admitted that after the Panshet floods of 1961, whatever construction the petitioners might have made been washed-out. 3. The respondent issued a notice on 24th of November, 1962 terminating the tenancy of the petitioners and calling upon them to vacate the area in their possession, which will hereinafter be referred to as the "suit premises". On the petitioners non-compliance with the requisitions contained in the said notice, the respondent filed a suit on 15th of June, 1967. That suit was Civil Suit No. 1469 of 1967 and was filed in the Court of Small Causes at Pune. Several grounds were urged in support of the respondents prayer for eviction of the petitioners. Only two grounds need be mentioned, they alone being relevant for the disposal of these petitions. One was that the petitioners were illegally in possession of the suit premises. If they were sub-tenants of a previous lessor, the sub-tenancy created in their favour was itself illegal. It was one of the grounds urged in support of a prayer for eviction, but curiously the other grounds urged were the grounds available to a landlord under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. If it was a case of the respondent that the petitioners were illegal tenants and, therefore, were in illegal possession of the suit premises, they could be evicted on the ground that they were trespassers. If it was a case of the respondent that the petitioners were illegal tenants and, therefore, were in illegal possession of the suit premises, they could be evicted on the ground that they were trespassers. However, both the parties in this suit have treated this as a Rent Act, suit and it is unnecessary to dwell upon this point any further. The respondent also pleaded that the petitioners did not require the suit premises at all; that the suit premises were open piece of land without any structure on the same; and that the respondent reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises for their factory and motor workshop. In specific terms it was alleged that the respondent was entitled to possession of the suit premises on the ground mentioned in section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. The petitioners resisted the suit by denying that the respondent bona fide or reasonably required the suit premises. It was alleged that the respondent had enough space of their own which would meet their requirement, if any. They also denied that they were illegally inducted on the suit premises. 4. The learned trial Judge raised several issues which were warranted on the pleadings as they stood before him, but I will refer to only two issues which are relevant at this stage. Issue No. 6 was in the following terms :--- "Does the plaintiff prove that the suit premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiff for his personal use ?" Issue No. 7 was cryptically framed in the following words :--- "What about hardship ?" Issue No. 1 obviously related to legal tenancy of the petitioners and was in the following terms :--- "Have the defendants become plaintiffs tenant in the suit premises ?" Despite the fact that on the admitted position the petitioners had been inducted in the suit premises prior to May 1959, the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that they were illegal sub-tenant and, therefore, they could not become the tenant of the respondent. This was a manifestly erroneous finding. On the question of the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the respondent, the learned trial Judge held that the respondent had failed to prove that he bona fide and reasonably required the suit premises for his own purposes. This was a manifestly erroneous finding. On the question of the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the respondent, the learned trial Judge held that the respondent had failed to prove that he bona fide and reasonably required the suit premises for his own purposes. While he was thus discussing the question of bona fide requirement of the respondent, the learned trial Judge considered the evidence which had been produced by both the parties which has relevant to the question arising under section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. The respondent had asserted in the trial Court that because of his expanding business he has to construct a workshop and a showroom and for that purpose the open land in possession of the petitioners was required. Besides this, in the plaint itself the respondent had asserted that his requirement was under section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. Though, in my opinion, therefore, the issue was raised in a from which was relevant to the question arising under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act read with section 13(2), it was clear to the parties that they had to go to the contest on the question whether the respondent required the suit premises, which were an open piece of land, for the purpose of erecting a structure on the same. The evidence which has been thus led and taken on record on the basis that the parties proceeded on the supposition that the issue was one under section 13(1)(i) can be the proper basis of any finding in this case. If the parties are aware that they are to lead evidence on a particular issue which has not been specifically raised and have led evidence in support of their respective cases, no prejudice can be said to be caused to them because of the failure of the Court to raise a proper issue. See (Nagubai Ammal and others v. Shama Rao and others)1, 1956 Supreme Court Reports, page 451. The distinction between the two issue one arising under section 13(1)(g) and the other arising under section 13(1)(i) is, no doubt, of some importance, as will be clear from the arguments of Mr. Ganatra appearing for the petitioners in this case, to which copious references will be made in the course of this judgment. The distinction between the two issue one arising under section 13(1)(g) and the other arising under section 13(1)(i) is, no doubt, of some importance, as will be clear from the arguments of Mr. Ganatra appearing for the petitioners in this case, to which copious references will be made in the course of this judgment. As I have already mentioned above, the learned trial Judge gave a finding in favour of the petitioners on the question of the requirements. He, however, gave a finding that the petitioners were not the legal tenants of the respondent. On the latter ground, he proceeded to decree the suit by his judgment and order dated 29th of August, 1972. 5. This decree was challenged by the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 810 of 1972. The learned Second Extra Assistant Judge of Pune had no difficulty in nothing that the finding of the learned trial Judge on the illegality of the tenancy of the petitioners was patently erroneous and so in setting aside the same. Then he considered the question of the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the respondent. With respect to the learned Asstt. Judge, he also committed the same error in framing the points for determination on this question, which he did as follows :--- "Point (6) "Whether it is proved by the plaintiffs that they require the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for their own use and occupation." "Point (7) Whether greater hardship would be caused to the defendant than to the plaintiffs if a decree for possession is passed." The learned Extra Assistant Judge, after considering the evidence in paragraph 22 of his judgment, came to the conclusion that the respondent had proved that it required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for the construction of a building which was essentially for its expanding business. While so doing he took into account the total area of the sub-plots Nos. 7 and 8; the area in possession of the petitioners; and the area that would be required for the purpose of constructing a building which was evidenced by a map prepared by the architects of the plaintiffs, which is a part of Exhibit 133. He was satisfied that on the documentary and oral evidence which was before him, an area of 5919.19 square feet would be necessary for the construction of the proposed building. He was satisfied that on the documentary and oral evidence which was before him, an area of 5919.19 square feet would be necessary for the construction of the proposed building. It was also noticed by him that on the ground that the relevant building regulations permit the construction on one third of the plot, which would come only to 3603 square feet in sub-plot No. 8 which was entirely in the possession of the respondent. This would still leave a deficit of 2316 square feet which would necessarily will have to be taken from the area in possession of the petitioners. He was of the view that the case fell under section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. However, in the alternative he proceeded to consider the case also under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act in paragraph 23 of his judgment and came to the conclusion again that having regard to the circumstances on record greater hardship would be caused to the respondent than the plaintiffs if a decree for possession were not passed. A finding on the comparative hardship, it is needless to say, is necessary in a case where the landlord pleads that he requires the premises reasonably and bona fide for his own use and occupation. On all other points, the learned Assistant Judge held in favour of the petitioners, but confirmed the decree of eviction on the ground that the landlord had established his case under section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. The trial Court had given a finding in favour of the petitioners that the respondent did not require the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for its own use and occupation, but had decreed that the suit holding, erroneously, that the petitioners were not the legal tenants of the suit premises. On the other hand, the Appellate Court held that the petitioners were the legal tenants of the respondent, but confirmed the decree for eviction on the ground which had been negatived by the trial Court, namely, that the respondent required the suit premises, which are open land, reasonably and bona fide for the erection of a new building. Thus there are inconsistent findings, though there is decree passed by both the courts below. 6. It is this decree for eviction that is challenged by the petitioners in this petition bearing No. 1311 of 1974 under Article 227 of the Constitution. Thus there are inconsistent findings, though there is decree passed by both the courts below. 6. It is this decree for eviction that is challenged by the petitioners in this petition bearing No. 1311 of 1974 under Article 227 of the Constitution. It should have been mentioned earlier that in the trial Court the petitioner had contended that the rent of Rs.105/- was excessive. Upholding this contention of the petitioners, the learned trial Judge had given a finding that the Standard Rent of the suit premises was Rs. 8.50 per month. In the appeal preferred by the petitioners, but on a contention raised by the respondent, the Standard Rent was raised to Rs.10.50. The respondent-landlord in Special Civil Application No. 1311 of 1974 has preferred a petition, being Special Civil Application No. 2652 of 1974, challenging the correctness of the finding on the question of standard rent. Mr. Andhyarujina appearing for the landlord-petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2652 of 1974, has been unable to show any error of law committed on the question of fixation of standard rent. What is the amount of rent is essentially a question of fact and it would not be possible for this Court to interfere with that finding of fact. Apart from this, the two courts below have considered the total rent of all the sub-plots and have proportionately fixed the standard rent of the area in possession of the petitioners. This approach cannot be said to be erroneous. Special Civil Application No. 2652 of 1974 is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, rule in that Special Civil Application is discharged with no order as to costs. 7. Mr. V.B. Ganatra, the learned Advocate appearing in support in support of Special Civil Application No. 1311 of 1974, has assailed the judgment of the learned Assistant Judge on several grounds. In the first place Mr. Ganatra contended that on the pleading of the parties, the issue had been framed as if the parties were going to the context under section 13(1)(g) read with section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. The significant of this submission of Mr. Ganatra is that if it is found that the suit under section 13(1)(i) the issue regarding comparative hardship does not arise, thought Mr. The significant of this submission of Mr. Ganatra is that if it is found that the suit under section 13(1)(i) the issue regarding comparative hardship does not arise, thought Mr. Ganatra insisted, at a latter stage of his argument, that even in a suit filed from possession under section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act, an issue granting comparative hardship must necessarily be raised. About that a little later. 8. The suit premises which are tenanted to the petitioners are admittedly an open land. No structures constructed by the landlord were ever leased to the petitioners as tenants. Whether on the open land leased there was any structure belonging to the tenant is irrelevant while deciding the question whether the suit falls under section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. In (Sohan Singh Bharatsingh v. Narhar Narayan Godbole)2, LXXIII Bombay Law Reporter 282, it has been held that the word "land" in section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act means open land and this section covers a case where the premises are open land and the structure constructed thereon, if any, belongs to the tenant. While so holding, Deshpande J., refined to and relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in (Krishnapasuba Rao Kundapur v. Dattatraya Krishnaji Karani)3, A.I.R. (1966) Supreme Court, 1024. In that case, the Supreme Court pointed out that a combined reading of section 5(8) and section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act shows that under section 13(1)(i), the landlord can obtain a decree for eviction in respect of premises which are land and not in respect of premises which are a building or are garden, grounds etc., appurtenant to the building. 9. Admittedly, the respondent in this case has filed a suit for possession of the suit premises which are open land on the ground that it requires the same for a workshop which will be used for its own purposes. Relying on this aspect of the case pleaded by the respondent, Mr. Ganatra says that even if the premises leased are open land, if the same are required by the landlord for his own use and occupation-whether for erecting a building on the same or otherwise the case must be treated as one under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act and not under section 13(1)(i). Ganatra says that even if the premises leased are open land, if the same are required by the landlord for his own use and occupation-whether for erecting a building on the same or otherwise the case must be treated as one under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act and not under section 13(1)(i). In support of this argument, he relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in (Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth)4, A.I.R. (1964) Supreme Court, 1676. The facts of that case disclosed that the landlord had filed a suit for possession of the premises which include a building construction on the land for his own use and occupation. It had been found that the landlord was to demolish the bungalow standing on the land which was more than 75 years old and was in a dilapidated condition. After the demolition of the building which was standing, the landlord was to erect a new structure and possess the same for his own use and occupation. The suit was resisted by the tenant in the case by, among other things, contending that the suit must be treated as one under section 13(1)(hh) of the Bombay Rent Act and not as one under section 13(1)(g). Section 13(1)(hh) provides for a case where the premises consist of not more than two floor and are reasonable and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished. The arrangement before the Supreme Court was that since the building standing on the land was of less than two floor, and the landlord was demolishing the same and was erecting a new structure on the land, the suit was covered by the provisions contained in Clause (hh) of section 13(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. 10. This arrangement advanced on behalf of the tenant was rejected by the Supreme Court on the ground that the landlord himself has pleaded that he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and secondly that the provision of the Clause (hh) would not apply to a case where a landlord reasonable and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolished the premises and erect a new building on the same. It was further held by the Supreme Court that the provision of Clause (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not required the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants. A variation of this reasonable, though co-relating to the provisions of section 13(1)(i), was made by Mr. Ganatra. He contends that if the landlord requires the suit premises for erecting a building which he is going to use and occupy, the case must necessarily come under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act. He also invited my attention to a judgment of the Gujarat High Court (Thakkar Ishwarlal Hargovandas v. Ponchal Girdhalal Raichand)5, (1975)16, Gujarat Law Reporter, page 1005, wherein, on the basis of the reasoning contained in the Supreme Court judgement in Ramniklals case, it has been held that where a landlord seeks possession of his land for construction of building for his own occupation, his case would be governed by Clause (g) of section 13(1) of the Bombay Rent Act and not under Clause (i) of section 13(1). The Gujarat High Court has gone further and said that if the landlord states that he wants his open land only for erecting a new structure without stating anything more and if in evidence it turns out that he wants to occupy it after constructing a structure thereon, than he could not be allowed to resort to Clause (i) as a subterfuge to cloak his requirement under Clause (g). The judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Thakkar Ishwarlals case undoubtedly support the contentions of Mr. Ganatra. 11. However, this question has been considered by this Court in two judgments and both the judgments take the view which in contrary to the view propounded by Mr. Ganatra. I will also point out in a moment that both these judgments refer to the Supreme Court judgment in Ramniklals case and have even so come to the conclusion that where the landlord seeks possession of the demised premises which are open land for erecting a new structure, the case would be governed by section 13(1)(i), despite the fact that the structure that is going to be erected is to be occupied by the landlord. The first of these two judgments is by Sapre, J., in (Sampat Dharmalji Bodke and others v. Krishna Sakharam Zore and other)6, Special Civil Application No. 529 of 1973 (decided on 6th/7th December, 1973). In that case also the landlord had filed a suit for possession of the demised premises which were an open site in the town of Wai. It had been mentioned by the landlord that he required the premises for erection of a new building which was going to be utilised for the residence of himself and his family members. An argument similar to the one advanced by Mr. Ganatra before me was also advanced before Sapre, J., who rejected the same despite the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramniklals case. Sapre, J., opined that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Ramniklals case was necessarily influenced by the fact that a suit for possession of the premises under Clause (hh) necessarily implies that the landlord was required to let out at least a part of the re-constructed premises after he has obtained possession of the leased premises. He noticed the provisions of sub-section (3-A) of section 13 in that regard. In fact the observations of the Supreme Court in para 16 of the judgment in Ramniklals case are clear to that effect. It was on this ground, said Sapre, J., that the Supreme Court found that when the landlord asks for possession of the premises for his own use and occupation despite the fact that he has to demolish the existing building and erect a new one, the case will be governed by section 13(1)(g). In such a case, the obligation to provide accommodation to the tenants who have been thus dispossessed does not arise. Sapre J., also noticed that if the landlord pleads that the open land is required for erection of a new building and says nothing more, the Court is not required to launch on an inquiry as to whether the landlord is going to use the building newly erected for his own use and occupation or for letting out to the tenants. On these two counts, Sapre, J. held that a suit for possession of an open land for the construction of a building will be governed by the provisions contained in section 13(1)(i), despite the fact that the building so erected will be occupied personally by the landlord and despite the fact that there is a similarity of expression relating to the requirements of the landlord in the two clause viz., Clause (g) and Clause (i) of section 13(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. 12. The second of the judgment is by Chandurkar, J., in (Rukminibai Ramvilals Lahoti and others v. Dhanpal Baburao Havale and anothers)7, Special Civil Application No. 2659 of 1973, decided on 7th of March, 1978, Chandurkar, J., who took the same view as the one taken by Sapre, J., rested his judgment essentially on the view that Clause (i) of section 13(1) contains a special provision relating to open land whereas Clause (g) may apply to open land as well as premises consisting of constructed buildings and that a special provision excludes the general. Chandurkar, J., also referred to the Supreme Court judgment in Ramniklals case and held that judgment was of not much assistance because admittedly in that case the leased premises were not an open land. 13. I am respectfully bound by the view taken in the above two judgments of this Court. Even otherwise, in my opinion, the view put forth by Mr. Gantra cannot be accepted. Apart from the grounds given in the two judgments of this Court referred to above, I would refer to another ground. Section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act says that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied of one or the other of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1). The premises in the context must necessarily mean the premises which are leased to the tenant of which the landlord is seeking possession. The case covered by section 13(1)(i) would be one where a landlord wants to recover possession or any premises where the premises are land and such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new building. The case covered by section 13(1)(i) would be one where a landlord wants to recover possession or any premises where the premises are land and such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new building. It is clear if we bear the concept of the premises in mind that in this case even when the landlord occupies a building constructed by him, he has not occupied the premises possession of which has been obtained by him; the premises of which he has obtained possession were land and not the building which was constructed and which is occupied by him. Obviously, therefore, he has not obtained possession under section 13(1)(i) of the premises with the object of using and occupying the same. If, however, the landlord requires the premises which are open land for the purposes of occupying the open land itself, it is conceivable that the case will come under section 13(1)(g), and not 13(1)(i) because the premises possession of which he is seeking are the premises which he is going to use and occupy. Where, however, the landlord is seeking possession of the premises which are land and such land is reasonably and bona fide required by him for the erection of a new building whether he is going to occupy the latter or not the case will necessarily be one under section 13(1)(i). I am, therefore, in full agreement with the view taken in the two judgments of this Court referred to above and it is not possible for me to agree with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Thakkar Ishwarlals case. 14. Once it is held that the case is government by section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act, the question of considering the comparative hardship of the landlord and tenant does not arise at all on a proper reading of section 13 as a whole. Mr. Ganatra, however, contends that despite the absence of a provision similar to the one contained in sub-section (2) of section 13 relating to a case under section 1(3)(1)(i), the courts while interpreting section 13 as a whole must engraft a provision analogous to the one contained in sub-section (2) of section 13 to a case falling under section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. It is needless to say that it is not open to a Court to add anything which was not inserted by the legislature in its wisdom. It is not as if the consequences of passing a decree or eviction under section 13(1)(i) have not been considered by the legislature. 15. For example, sub-section (3) of section 13 is one which deals with the Courts powers to pass decree in respect of the part of the premises only on the ground specified in Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 13. Section 17 provides for a situation where a decree for eviction passed by the Court on the ground specified in Clause (i) of sub-section (1) is executed, but the work of erection contemplated in that clause is not commenced within a period of one month. These two provisions, in my opinion, clearly show that the legislature was fully aware of the consequences of a decree that will be passed under Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act and had made a provision for some of the consequences. The legislature has made a specific provision regarding the comparative hardship in sub-section (2) of section 13. If in its wisdom, therefore, the legislature thought it fit, not to apply section 13(2) to a case under section 13(1)(i), it is impermissible for the Court to fill in what is apparently a lacuna but which on a closer examination is not found to be so. If a meaning is to be read into the refusal of the legislature to make provision on the question of comparative hardship in a case where a decree is passed under section 13(1)(i), I would read it in this way that the legislature wanted to encourage construction of building on open plot which were in the possession of the tenants. 16. I have already mentioned above that the appeal Court below held against the petitioners on the question of comparative hardship. The question whether greater hardship would be caused to one party than to the other is, in my opinion, normally a question of fact provided, however, that the Court below has kept in mind the factors which ought to be taken into account while considering the question of hardship. The question whether greater hardship would be caused to one party than to the other is, in my opinion, normally a question of fact provided, however, that the Court below has kept in mind the factors which ought to be taken into account while considering the question of hardship. In the view which I take, even if we consider the question of hardship in this case, since that finding is against the petitioners, the petitioners are bound to fail. Similarly on the question whether the respondent required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for the construction of a building is also, in my opinion, a question of fact, provided, however, again the final Court of facts has kept in mind the meaning of the word "bona fide and reasonably requirement". These words do carry an element of legal connotation, but in a given set of facts whether the landlord has proved his bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises is ultimately a pure question of fact. Mr. Ganatra, however, disputes, this proposition relying upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in (Mohamed Shafi v. Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad and others)8, 1977(2) Supreme Court Cases, 226. The case before the Supreme Court was one under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. It was found by the Supreme Court that the explanation sub-section (1) of section 21 of the U.P. Act has been ignored by the final Court of facts. The Supreme Court held that whether a particular provision of law is applicable or not to the facts of case would be mixed question of fact and law and High Court would have been justified in interfering with the decision of the final Court of facts. The following are the words in which the Supreme Court express its opinion :--- "The language of the proviso is clear and explicit and it requires the Prescribed Authority to take into account the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant only in those cases which are not covered by the Explanation. If a case falls within the Explanation, the proviso would have no application and it would not be necessary to considered the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant in deciding whether or not to make an order of eviction. If a case falls within the Explanation, the proviso would have no application and it would not be necessary to considered the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant in deciding whether or not to make an order of eviction. The principal question which, therefore, arises for determination in this appeal is whether Explanation (iv) is attracted on the facts of the present case. The High Court seemed to take the view that the finding of the Prescribed Authority the Explanation (iv) is applicable in the present case was a finding of fact and since this finding of fact was affirmed by the District Court in appeal, it was not competent to the High Court to interfere with it in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and that was presumably the reason why the High Court accepted the hypothesis that the case was covered by Explanation (iv). But this view of the High Court is plainly erroneous because the question whether Explanation (iv) is attracted in the present case would depend on the applicability to the facts, of the correct interpretation of the Explanation and it would, therefore, clearly be a mixed question of law and fact". The part of the judgment of the Supreme Court which I have extracted above in somewhat great details clearly shows that the Supreme Court held that the question of the applicability of a provision of law would be a mixed question of law and fact. In the instant case, if the Court below had held that the case fell under section 13(1)(g) and had further held that the provisions of section 13(2) did not apply, than naturally it would have given rise to a question of law. 17. Similarly, in my opinion, whether on facts on a case the question whether the plaintiff had proved is reasonable and bona fide requirement is a question of fact. This proposition was also with equal vigour contested by Mr. Ganatra who took me through several decisions of the Supreme Court and which should be briefly noted, because according to Mr. Ganatra there is a conflict among the ratios laid down by these decisions and such a conflict should be resolved by following that ratio which is available to the tenant. The conflict has been noticed by the Supreme Court itself in (Mattulal Radhelal)9, A.I.R., 1974, Supreme Court, 1596. Ganatra there is a conflict among the ratios laid down by these decisions and such a conflict should be resolved by following that ratio which is available to the tenant. The conflict has been noticed by the Supreme Court itself in (Mattulal Radhelal)9, A.I.R., 1974, Supreme Court, 1596. This is a judgment of a Bench consisting of two judges, Palekar and Bhagwati, JJ. The judgment notices that in another judgement of the Supreme Court viz. (T.B. Sarvate v. Nemichand)10, 1965, Jabalpur Law Journal 973 (Per Shah, J.). It was held that the question whether the landlords requirement was bona fide and reasonable was a pure question of facts. Mattulals judgment itself further notices that in another judgment viz. (Smt. Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal), a contrary view was taken. Then Bhagwati, J., who delivered the judgment, proceeded to observe that the decisions of the Supreme Court in both these cases were patently contradictory with each other and it was possible to reconcile the observations in the two decisions. Then he said "That being so, we must prefer to follow the decisions in Sarvate T.B.s case as against the decision in Smt. Kamla Sonis case, as the former is a decision of a larger Bench than the latter. Moreover, on principle, the view taken in Sarvate T.B.s case commends itself to us and we think that is the right view..." 18. Mr. Ganatra points out the judgment in Kamla Soni' case was also delivered by Shah, J. and that judgment is of the year 1969. It is reasonable, therefore, says Mr. Ganatra, to infer that the later Bench consisting of Shah, J., abandoned the view taken by the Supreme Court itself in Sarvate's case. It is not possible to accept this interpretation, because as pointed out by Bhagwati J., in Mattulal's case, Sarvate's case was not brought to the attention of the Bench which delivered the judgment in Kamla Soni's case. In (Madanlal v. Sain Dass)11, A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 585, which is a judgment of three Judges, of whom one was Palekar, J., took a view similar to the one taken in Kamla Soni's case. This fact was underlined by Mr. In (Madanlal v. Sain Dass)11, A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 585, which is a judgment of three Judges, of whom one was Palekar, J., took a view similar to the one taken in Kamla Soni's case. This fact was underlined by Mr. Ganatra, who contended that the trend of the decisions after Sarvate's case is to hold the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement as a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, this Court must follow the said trend. I am unable to accept Mr. Ganatra's suggestion that there is such a trend in the judgment of the Supreme Court as suggested by him. On the other hand, Mattulal's judgment, though of a Bench of two Judges, noticed the contradiction in the two judgments of the Supreme Court, namely, in Sarvate's case and Kamla Soni's case, and resolved it by pointing out that the judgment of a larger Bench should be followed in preference to the judgment of the smaller Bench. 19. It is true, as Mr. Ganatra again points out, that in another judgment of the Supreme Court in (Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others)12, A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 2229, the Supreme Court has considered the judgments in the cases of Madanlal Mattulal's and Sarvate and proceeded to say "We do not think that for the purpose of this case we need express any opinion on the apparent conflict between these two decisions". It is, therefore, suggested by Mr. Ganatra that the question is open and a proper examination of all the relevant provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, which is a welfare piece of the legislation, should persuade this Court to hold that the questions raised by him are at least mixed questions of law and fact, it not pure questions of law. In view of the Supreme Court judgment in Mattulal's case, I do not regard myself free to consider these questions a fresh. On the other hand, I find that in another judgment of the Supreme Court delivered by Bhagwati J., sitting with Goswami J., it has been held that the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord would be a question of fact if the correct test is applied. See (Phiroze Bamnaji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel)13, A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 1059. See (Phiroze Bamnaji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel)13, A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 1059. It was found in that case that the District Judge did not misdirect himself in regard to the true meaning of the word 'requires' in section 13(1)(g) and interpreted it correctly to mean that there must be an element of need before a landlord can be said to 'require' premises for his own use and occupation. If applying this correct test the District Judge came to a conclusion, then it was not open to the High Court to interfere with what there was a pure question of fact. To the same effect are the views taken by the Supreme Court on the question of comparative hardship. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that if the final Court of facts below has, without misdirecting itself on the legal meaning of the provisions contained in the statute, come to a conclusion on the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord, or on the question of comparative hardship, then it is not open to this Court, to interfere with the said finding. I have held earlier that on the facts of this case section 13(1)(g) was not attracted and, therefore, the question under section 13(2) does not arise at all. 20. While narrating the facts earlier in the judgment I have mentioned that the trial Court had held that the respondent did not reasonably and bona fide require that suit premises but decreed the suit on the ground that the respondent was in illegal occupation of the suits premises. In the respondent's appeal, the finding of the trial Court on the illegal nature of the occupation was set aside but a decree was passed on the ground that the respondent reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises for reasons or on grounds mentioned in section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. Mr. Ganatra says that it was not open to the appeal Court to pass a decree for eviction especially under the Rent Act on a ground on which the trial Court had held against the landlord when the landlord had not preferred a cross objection against the finding on that ground. On the facts of this case, says Mr. Mr. Ganatra says that it was not open to the appeal Court to pass a decree for eviction especially under the Rent Act on a ground on which the trial Court had held against the landlord when the landlord had not preferred a cross objection against the finding on that ground. On the facts of this case, says Mr. Ganatra, the landlord could not obtain a decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in section 13(1)(i), when in the Court below a finding had been given against the landlord on that issue and the landlord had not challenged that finding by filing a cross objection. 21. In my opinion, this submission is misconceived. The provisions of Order XLI, Rule 22, of the Code of Civil Procedure enable a respondent to support a decree on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below. If, however, the respondent wants a decree higher than the one given by the Court below, he cannot get the same unless he files cross objection or an appeal. In other words, if the respondent is satisfied with the limited decree passed by the Court of first instance, then it is not necessary for him to prefer cross objection in an appeal preferred by the other side. He is, however, free to support whatever decree has been passed by the trial Court on any of the grounds which are decided against him. In such a case the appeal Court is free to alter the finding and maintain the decree. 22. In this connection, Mr. Ganatra took me through some of the important decisions which apparently support his contentions. In (Shri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar)14, A.I.R. 1927 Madras 801, it was held that though the word 'decree' has been used in Rule 22, what the rule contemplates really is the decision by the Court below and merely enables the decision arrived at by the lower Court to be supported on grounds other than those on which the lower Court proceeded. Under that rule that it is not open to a respondent to have adjudicated by the Appellate Court rights or causes of action which have been decided against him the Court below and in respect of which have has filled no appeal or memorandum of objection. Under that rule that it is not open to a respondent to have adjudicated by the Appellate Court rights or causes of action which have been decided against him the Court below and in respect of which have has filled no appeal or memorandum of objection. In other words, the Madras High Court took the view that if the plaintiff had asked for a decree on tow grounds and if on one ground he had failed, he could not in appeal support the decree on the ground on which he had failed in the trial Court. Mr. Ganatra was fair and quick enough to point out that though this judgement was followed by the same High Court in (A.I.R. 1931 Madras Page 513)15, subsequently both these decisions have been dissented from by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in (Gaddem Chinna Venkata Rao and others v. Koralla Satyanarayanamurthy and others)16, A.I.R. 1943 Madras, 698. However, he suggested that the reasoning contained in Sir Ranga's case should be adopted by me as it is more logical. It is especially so, says Mr. Ganatra, in Rent Act cases where a provision like section 13 enumerates several grounds on which a landlord can obtain possession but had failed to obtain possession on some grounds. In such a case, he should not be allowed to obtain a decree for possession on a ground which has been decided against him, except by challenging the same by a properly constituted appeal or by filing a cross objection. Fortunately for me and unfortunately for the petitioners, this question is no longer open to disputation. In (Sri Chandra Prabhuji Jain Temple and other v. Hari Krishna and anothers)17, A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court, 2565, this question has been finally settled, though it was noticed, that this question had been left open in an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court viz., (Management of Itakhoolle Tea Estate v. Its workmen)18, A.I.R. 1960, Supreme Court 1349. The Supreme Court also noticed the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Venkat Rao's case (A.I.R. 1943 Madras 698) and approved of the same. The Supreme Court also noticed the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Venkat Rao's case (A.I.R. 1943 Madras 698) and approved of the same. In Sri Chandra Prabhuji Jain Temple's case, the facts were briefly as follows :--- A minor's property had been alienated by his mother who was acting as a guardian by obtaining sanction from the Court without disclosing to the Court the curbs on her powers of alienation imposed by the will. The appellants before the Supreme Court filed a suit to recover the money due under the two mortgages executed in their favour by the mother as the guardian of the minor. The respondents, who included the minor son, resisted the suit by contending that the mother had no authority to execute the mortgages and that she had obtained the sanction for executing the mortgages by practising fraud upon the Court. The learned Judge who tried the suit held that the mother had deliberately suppressed the execution of the will and, therefore, the orders authorising her to raise the amounts by mortgaging the property of the minor were obtained by fraud. However, holding that the orders were voidable and since the mortgagees were not parties to the fraud, the appellants were held to be entitled to recover the amount from the properties mortgaged and passed a decree. The respondents preferred an appeal where the decree was modified for recovery of the amounts from one half of the properties mortgaged. Against this decree, the mortgagees went in appeal to the Supreme Court. The minor son did not prefer any appeal to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, on behalf of the respondents who, as I have already mentioned above, included the minor son, the decree passed in appeal in the High Court was sought to be supported on the ground that the sanction obtained by the guardian was illegal and the appellants were not entitled to any decree in the suit filed by them. On behalf of the appellants, the learned Advocate appearing for them before the Supreme Court urged that the respondents could not raise objection in that appeal that the orders of sanction were invalid as the respondents did not appeal from the decree of the High Court to recover the mortgage money from the one half share in the properties. On behalf of the appellants, the learned Advocate appearing for them before the Supreme Court urged that the respondents could not raise objection in that appeal that the orders of sanction were invalid as the respondents did not appeal from the decree of the High Court to recover the mortgage money from the one half share in the properties. These contentions were repelled by the Supreme Court in the following terms :--- "It is no doubt true that the respondents cannot be allowed to impugn the decree passed by the High Court in favour of the appellants as they did not file any appeal from that decree. But we think that there is no reason why they should not be allowed to urge the plea that the orders of sanction were invalid when the appellants want not only to maintain the decree passed by the High Court but also to get a decree charging the entire properties. In other words, the bar against urging the plea of the invalidity of the orders of sanction would apply only if the respondents seek to impugn the decree already obtained by the appellants but not when the appellants seek to obtain further reliefs in the appeal on the basis of the orders. In such a case we are not aware of any rule of law which would preclude the respondents from urging the plea." In paragraph 20 of the judgment, the Supreme Court referred to Venkat Rao's case and, as already mentioned above, approved of the same. In my opinion, therefore, where a landlord has filed a suit for eviction on one or the other of the grounds mentioned in the Rent Act, and has obtained a decree for eviction, he is free to support that decree on any other ground decided against him in an appeal preferred by the tenant from the decree of eviction passed by the lower Court. This view is fully supportable by the provisions contained in the first part of Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above. 23. Looking at the same question from another point of view, it is easy to see why this view is the most rational. This view is fully supportable by the provisions contained in the first part of Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above. 23. Looking at the same question from another point of view, it is easy to see why this view is the most rational. Under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Order XLI, an appeal lies not from a finding of the Court, but from a decree passed. If in the trial Court the landlord has succeeded in getting a decree for eviction, he cannot filed an appeal from any finding which might have been given against him, because in law an appeal does not lie from a finding; but only lies from a decree passed. In (Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others)19, A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 1126, this legal position has been pointed out with sufficient clarity and it is unnecessary to give any further reasons for the view which I have taken. It would not, however, be inappropriate to reproduce the following observations of a Division Bench of this Court in (Secretary of State for India v. Chimanlal Jamnadas)20, XLIV Bombay Law Reporter, 295 (at 320) :--- "Under Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code, they (the plaintiffs) can support the decree granted to them on any grounds decided against them in the Court below; but if they want a decree for the higher right of absolute ownership which they prayed for in the plaint but had not been granted to them, it is incumbent on them to file cross-objections or a cross appeal against the decree." 24. An attempt has also been made before me to challenge the finding on the question of the reasonable and bona fide requirement on the ground that the several documents on which the appeal Court placed reliance had not been in law proved in the trial Court. For example, the map which shows the extent of the area required by the respondent for constructing a new building has not been proved by examining the person who drew the map and the Municipal Authorities who sanctioned the same. In this connection, Mr. Ganatra invited my attention to several judgments which deal with the mode of proving documents. For example, the map which shows the extent of the area required by the respondent for constructing a new building has not been proved by examining the person who drew the map and the Municipal Authorities who sanctioned the same. In this connection, Mr. Ganatra invited my attention to several judgments which deal with the mode of proving documents. I am refraining from referring to those various judgments because, in my opinion, the documents which have been relied upon by the courts below are relevant and are clearly admissible in evidence. The strict mode of proof, however, has been dispensed with by the parties because when the documents on which reliance was placed by the respondent were tendered in evidence, they were not challenged. In (Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji)21, XLVI Bombay Law Reporter, 220, the Privy Council pointed out that where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. A party cannot lie by until the case comes before a Court of Appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. In the instant case, no objection was taken in the Court of first instance; no grievance was made even in the Court of first appeal; it is, therefore, not possible to allow Mr. Ganatra to impugn the decree on the ground that the documents on which reliance has been placed by the respondent cannot be made the basis of a legitimate finding regarding the reasonable and bona fide requirement. 25. Then Mr. Ganatra referred to some part of the evidence and contended that the plaintiff's only witness has failed to put before the Court all the relevant and essential facts which could enable the Court to come to a finding as to whether he reasonably or bona fide required the suit premises. It was Mr. Ganatra's criticism that mere bald assertions had been made by the plaintiff's witness without laying before the Court sufficient material which is necessary in a case such as this for arriving at a proper finding. It was Mr. Ganatra's criticism that mere bald assertions had been made by the plaintiff's witness without laying before the Court sufficient material which is necessary in a case such as this for arriving at a proper finding. In my opinion, this criticism also has come too late in the day because when the plaintiff's witness was in the box and asserted on the basis of whatever material he placed before the Court his reasonable and bona fide requirement of the suit premises, there was no effective cross-examination which detracted from the truthfulness of the assertion made by the plaintiff's witness. What was the exact area required for the construction of the new building ? Could the respondent not do without obtaining the area in the possession of the petitioners by constructing the building on the open site already in possession of the respondent ? Is it necessary that so much of the space, which is shown as vacant space in the map, should be kept open ? Mr. Ganatra says that these are the various questions on which sufficient material has not been placed by the plaintiffs before the Court. In my opinion, this criticism is not justified, because the plaintiff's witness has placed before the Court certain documents and has sworn that the area in possession of the defendants was necessary for constructing a structure which again was necessary for the expanding business. He also placed before the Court a plan prepared by the architect which showed that the area in possession of the defendant was necessary for the construction of the new structure. In any case, as pointed out by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in (A.E.G. Corapiet v. A.Y. Derderian)22, A.I.R. 1961 Calcutta 359, whatever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. This is not merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. This is not merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It is further pointed out that this rule serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice by giving notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. After all, the evidence given by the plaintiff's witness which was tested by whatever cross-examination was made on behalf of the respondent, commended itself to the final Court of facts and it is not possible for this Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution by sitting in judgment over the adequacy of evidence necessary for giving a judgment. 26. Mr. Ganatra then pointed out what he called the failure of the appeal Court below to consider what he characterised as the mandatory provisions contained in sub-section (3) of section 13. The said provisions says that the Court may pass the decree on the ground specified in Clause (h) or (i) of sub-section (1) only in respect of a part of the premises which in its opinion it is necessary to vacate for carrying out the work of repairs or erection. It is contended that the appeal Court below has not borne in mind the question as to whether it was necessary to pass a decree in respect of the whole of the premises in possession of the petitioners and whether it would not have been sufficient to pass a decree in respect of a part of the premises only. Accordingly to Mr. Ganatra, it was incumbent upon the appeal Court below to consider these questions irrespective of the fact that the petitioners may not have in their written statement raised a particular contention in that regard. On a similar provision contained in sub-section (2) of section 13 read with section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act, the Court is required to consider the feasibility of meeting the requirement of the landlord by passing a decree in respect of the part of the premises only. On a similar provision contained in sub-section (2) of section 13 read with section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act, the Court is required to consider the feasibility of meeting the requirement of the landlord by passing a decree in respect of the part of the premises only. The question whether it is incumbent upon the Court itself to raise a necessary issue in terms of the second part of section 13(2) or whether the defendants in a Rent Act suit must make a specific contention was the subject matter of some difference of opinion between two Judges of this Court. That difference of opinion has, however, been now resolved by a Division Bench of this Court in (Kisanrao Madhavrao Bartakke v. Narayan Dhondi Shete)23, 1978 Maharashtra Law Journal, 859. The Division Bench has now held that it is not obligatory on the Court to raise an issue in terms of the second part of section 13(2) in the absence of pleadings to that effect. It was further held that if the Court with awareness of the provisions contained in section 13(2) by express discussion or by implication where facts speak for themselves has done its duty properly, there is no infirmity of any kind either in procedure or substantive disposal of the dispute. I have pursued the evidence involved in this case in sufficient detail to see that the Court below had considered the area in the respective possession of the parties and the necessity for passing a decree in respect of the whole of the premises in possession of the petitioners. Indeed, in paragraph 22 of his judgment the learned Appellate Judge has in sufficient detail discussed the various areas involved and has come to the conclusion that it was necessary to pass a decree in respect of the whole of the premises in possession of the petitioners. In my opinion, therefore, there has not been failure of any type on the part of the appeal Court below in relation to the provisions contained in section 13(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. 27. A challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions contained in section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act was then mounted by Mr. Ganatra. In my opinion, therefore, there has not been failure of any type on the part of the appeal Court below in relation to the provisions contained in section 13(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. 27. A challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions contained in section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act was then mounted by Mr. Ganatra. His contention was that by not providing a provision similar to section 13(2) in a case governed by section 13(1)(i), there has been discrimination against the tenants of the open pieces of lands and, therefore, section 13(1)(i) suffers from the vice of hostile discrimination against such tenants. That provision must, therefore, be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Here again, Mr. Ganatra was equally fair in pointing out that a Single Judge of this Court in (Mangharam Chubarmai v. B.C. Patel)24, LXXIII Bombay Law Reporter, 140, has upheld the Constitutional validity of the impugned provision. I have gone through the said judgment with the assistance of the learned Advocates and do not find any reason to differ from the view taken by Bhasme J., in the said case. The different types of premises which are in possession of the tenants and the different grounds on the basis of which the landlord could recover possession have been dealt with in great details in that judgment and it has been shown that the tenants on open pieces of lands are not similarly situated as those occupying constructed premises. In this view of the matter, the validity of section 13(1)(i) on the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution could not be challenged. In my opinion, this view is perfectly valid despite certain observations made by Bhagwati J., in (Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another)25, (1978)1 Supreme Court Cases 248 (at page 283), on which Mr. Ganatra place considerable reliance. I am unable to find that this judgment or the observation made therein by Bhagwati J., are of any assistance to the petitioners. In the petition some grounds have been taken challenging the constitutional validity of section 13(1)(i) as being violative of Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. I have no hesitation in holding that this challenge is wholly misconceived. In the petition some grounds have been taken challenging the constitutional validity of section 13(1)(i) as being violative of Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. I have no hesitation in holding that this challenge is wholly misconceived. The provisions which are meant for the protection of the tenants and in the absence of which the tenants would have been evicted by mere termination of the tenancy cannot be said to be violative of any right enjoyed by the tenant in the leased premises. The right to hold premises on lease is a subject matter of a contract of lease and in the absence of the provisions contained in section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act, the landlord would have been free to determine the lease and to evict the tenant. Provisions such as those contained in section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act have imposed restrictions upon the right of the landlord to recover possession from the tenant and do not impose any fetters on the right of the tenant to remain in possession of the leased premises. This challenged has, therefore, no substance. 28. In the result , rule issued in Special Civil Application No. 1311 of 1974 is discharged with no order as to costs. Rule issued in Special Civil Application No. 2652 of 1974 is also discharged with no order as to costs. 29. Mr. Ganatra has mentioned that during the pendency of the suit and appeal, certain amounts have been deposited by the petitioners. An enquiry into future mesne profits will naturally be held under Order XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After the amount of mesne profits payable by the petitioners is determined in that enquiry, the same will be satisfied from the amounts deposited by the petitioners. Balance if any, shall be refunded to them. 30. A prayer made on behalf of the petitioners for a certificate under Article 132 of the Constitution is rejected. 31. The learned Advocates appearing have agreed that the decree shall not be executed before 31st October, 1979. -----