JUDGMENT : S.K. Jha, J. 1. These cases involve an enquiry into the validity of the State Government notification no. S.O. 566 dated 27th of March, 1979 published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary of the same date. The notification in question has been purported to be issued in exercise of the powers conferred on the Government by Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (Bihar and Orissa Act II of 1915) hereinafter to be referred to as the 1915 Act. By this notification, "the Governor of Bihar is pleased to prohibit throughout the State of Bihar the possession and/or consumption of any intoxicant other than Bhang and Tari by any person except a person specially authorised in this behalf or a holder of a licence, pass or permit duly granted in this behalf". The notification has been made effective from the 1st of April, 1979. There are two provisos to this provision in the notification to which reference may have to be made at an appropriate place. Suffice it to say that generally speaking by the impugned notification a complete prohibition on the possession and/or consumption of Intoxicating liquors--both country and foreign--has been imposed. The petitioners of all these applications some under Article 226 and some under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India-have challenged the validity of this notification as also of the circular preceding the notification, the circular being marked 'confidential' bearing no. 2390 dated 23rd March, 1979 addressed to all the Collectors and Deputy Commissioners in the State purporting to have been issued under the Bihar Prohibition Act, 1938 (Bihar Act 6, 1938) hereinafter to be referred to as the 1938 Prohibition Act, intimating that sale and consumption of country-made liquor as also foreign liquor shall be banned with effect from the 1st of April, 1979. Various grounds of attack have been suggested in the petitions as also submitted in course of arguments by various counsel appearing for different sets of petitioners. The real bone of contention, however. Is whether the impugned notification can be said to be an expression of the legislative will without which it can have no legal sanction. Various grounds of attack have been suggested in the petitions as also submitted in course of arguments by various counsel appearing for different sets of petitioners. The real bone of contention, however. Is whether the impugned notification can be said to be an expression of the legislative will without which it can have no legal sanction. Before coming to the legal aspects of the matter it is only meet and proper that I should give the bare; minimum and the only relevant facts on the basis of which such a challenge has been made. The petitioners of C.W.J.C. Nos. 999, 1029 and 1030 all of 1979 were licensees on the day they filed their applications of the country liquor shops. They were engaged in the trade of vending country spirit and Mashaladar country liquor. The petitioners of C.W.J.C. 1046 of 1979 were holders of licences on the date that writ application was filed for dealing exclusively in foreign liquor. Petitioner No. 16 of that writ application is an association of dealers called the Bihar Wine Association. The petitioners of C.W.J.C. 1031 of 1979 assert to be consumers of liquor, be it country liquor or foreign liquor, with temperance with a view to preserve their vitality which is essential for their life and health. Admittedly, on the 13th of March; 1978 the State Government took a decision for phase-wise prohibition in the State in course of four years. A copy of the notification of that date has been marked annexure 1 in C.W.J.C. 1029 of 1979. It is worthwhile to mention here that the legality and validity of that notification was also the subject-matter of challenge in a batch of cases, namely, C.W.J.C. 640 of 1978 and 3 other cases which came up for final hearing before a Bench of which I was the presiding Judge and delivering the JUDGMENT : on behalf of the Bench on 27th June, 1978, the validity, and legality of that notification dated 13-3-78 was upheld as being reasonable restriction by banning or prohibiting sale of liquor (mostly country liquor shops) in certain specified areas. The notification impugned in that writ application being in favour of a class of persons within the meaning of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act was upheld. The notification impugned in that writ application being in favour of a class of persons within the meaning of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act was upheld. Thereafter the licences in favour of the petitioners of all those cases except the consumers, who are the petitioners in C.W.J.C. 1031 of 1979, were renewed for the year 1978-79 ending on the 31st of March, 1979. The dealer petitioners filed their application for renewal in due course before the expiry of the date of their licences with due formalities as contemplated by the 1915 Act. While the licences were yet to be renewed, the aforementioned circular no. 2390 dated 23-3-79 was issued to all the collectors and Deputy Commissioners of the State contemplating to ban the sale and consumption of all intoxicating liquors under the provisions of the 1938 Prohibition Act. The petitioners came to know of such a step having been taken by the State Government on 24-3-79. From the same circular they also learnt that the State Government had taken a decision for total prohibition to be made effective from the 1st of April, 1979. It is not necessary for us to go into the question as to how and in what manner the circular marked 'confidential' (Gopnlya) came to the hands of the petitioners, since the petitioners have annexed a copy of that circular claiming that they had received it on the 24th of March, 1979, I proceed upon the assumption that it was duly communicated to the dealers concerned throughout the State. Thereafter came the notification in question marked Annexure 3 in C.W.J.C. 1030 of 1979 which, as already stated above, has been issued by the State Government in the purported exercise of the power vested in it by Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act. 2. So far as the petitioners of C.W.J.C. 1068 of 1979 are concerned, they are employees of country liquor and Ganja shops licensed by the Excise authorities under the 1915 Act. Petitioners 1 and 3 are respectively the General Secretary and the President of the Bihar Pradesh Desi Sharab aur Ganja Mazdoor Union, Patna. They have asserted that nearly 20,000 persons who were employed in such shops and were earning bread and butter for the essential needs both for themselves as also for their dependents have been deprived of their livelihood affecting nearly 1,00,000 persons who are their dependents including school-going children. 3. They have asserted that nearly 20,000 persons who were employed in such shops and were earning bread and butter for the essential needs both for themselves as also for their dependents have been deprived of their livelihood affecting nearly 1,00,000 persons who are their dependents including school-going children. 3. On these relevant facts, numerous grounds of attack were put forward in submissions. I shall divide the submissions made at the Bar by various counsel for the parties in these cases into 3 groups. The first point of attack was that both the circular dated 23-3-79 and the notification dated 27-3-79 were violative of the principles of some salutary provisions enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. It was submitted that they should be struck down not only as being violative of the freedoms enshrined in Article 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution but also as being a confiscatory measure inviting an infraction of Article 31 of the Constitution without any authority of law, for no compensation was provided in the notification in question for the stock to be seized by the authorities after 12 midnight between the 31st of March, 1979 and the 1st of April; 1979. It was further submitted that the impugned notification had made a discrimination between scheduled tribes and non-scheduled tribes. Under the second proviso, it was provided that-- any member of the scheduled tribe may manufacture and possess puchwal without a licence or permit for domestic consumption or on religious and social occasions, but such self-brewed pachwal shall not be sold under any circumstances. Thus, it was contended, the notification made an invidious discrimination between an Adibasi and a non-Adibasi in the matter of manufacture and consumption of the country liquor, attracting the inhibition of equality clause as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr. B.P. Singh, learned counsel representing the petitioners of C.W.J.C. 1046 of 1979, even went to the length of submitting that this complete prohibition or banning of possession and/or consumption of Intoxicating liquor offended the freedom of conscience and religion which was guaranteed under Article 25 in part III of the Constitution and was, for that reason, also liable to be struck down. In short, the impugned notification and the circular were attacked as being violative of the provisions of Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g), 25 and 31 of the Constitution. 4. In short, the impugned notification and the circular were attacked as being violative of the provisions of Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g), 25 and 31 of the Constitution. 4. In the other group of submissions came the attack of the impugned circular and notification on the ground that this instantaneous death blow to the then permissible dealings of the dealers in question overnight was not envisaged by Article 47 which had merely laid down a guide line to the State to endeavour to bring about prohibition as a part of the directive principles of state policy. The submission was that in the guise of carrying out a mandate, although the provision of Article 47 was not mandatory, the State had made a colourable exercise of power by destroying the whole business overnight through, as it is called, a revolutionary notification whereas Article 47 envisaged not an instantaneous death but a lingering one in such establishments through, what was submitted by learned counsel, an evolutionary process in well-timed phases. It was, therefore, argued that it was not only a colourable exercise of power permitted by Article 47 of the Constitution but was also Indiscriminately made under pretence of a constitutional provision. Mr. Shahabuddin, learned counsel for the employees of the shops, namely petitioners of C.W.J.C. 1068 of 1979, further argued that there was an operational conflict between Articles 39 and 41 of the directive principles on the one hand and Article 47 on the other. He further contended in this connection that the sudden cessation of their freedom through the pretended exercise of the police power of the State made it an unreasonable restriction not protected by Article 19(5) of the Constitution. It was argued by Mr. Shahabuddin rather with vehemence that the State, while throwing out of employment and depriving the petitioners of C.W.J.C. 1068 of 1979 and their dependents of their means of livelihood, had acted contrary to what was envisaged by Articles 39 and 41. It was argued by Mr. Shahabuddin rather with vehemence that the State, while throwing out of employment and depriving the petitioners of C.W.J.C. 1068 of 1979 and their dependents of their means of livelihood, had acted contrary to what was envisaged by Articles 39 and 41. Article 39 which was mandatory in expression laid down that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women, equally have the right to an adequate means of livelihood, whereas Article 41, which again was mandatory in its expression, directed that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, etc., etc. 5. The third group of submissions, rather limited in their scope, was put forward by Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners of C.W.J.C. 1030 of 1979. While Mr. Sinha made a half-hearted submission with regard to the infringement of the provisions of Articles 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g) and 31, he very vehemently contended that in any event whenever the power of prohibition was to be enforced by the State, it must be in accordance with the legislative will expressed. It was argued by learned counsel that Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act was not such an expression of the legislative will as to empower the State Government to issue a notification imposing complete prohibition covering the entire public of the State in general. However laudable the object may be and whatever be the rationale behind the exercise of legislative power in this direction, in the absence of such a legislative mandate it was not open to the State Government by issuing an executive fiat to do that which the legislature did not empower it to do. In short, Mr. Sinha contended, Section 19(4) did not invest the State Government with the power to impose a complete prohibition covering the public at large of the State. In the alternative, he submitted, Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act must be struck down as covering the case of a delegation of power to the State Government in a blanket form so as to cover the entire public of the entire state as being a delegation of a legislative power which was not tenable in law. In the alternative, he submitted, Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act must be struck down as covering the case of a delegation of power to the State Government in a blanket form so as to cover the entire public of the entire state as being a delegation of a legislative power which was not tenable in law. On the strength of the alternative submission, learned counsel contended that, if Section 19(4) be held to empower the State Government to issue such notification, then that provision should itself be struck down as ultra vires being an excessive delegation of legislative power to the executive. 6. I propose to deal with the first two groups of submissions at the outset. In other words, I intend to show the hollowness in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners invoking the provisions of any of Articles 14, 19, 25, 31 and 47 of the Constitution. 7. There are certain facts of which judicial notice has been taken during ages past. These concepts still hold the field. Sale and consumption of ardent spirits and Intoxicants have since ages been believed to be pernicious in their effects and the cause of disease, pauperism and crime. Traffic in such spirits is injurious to the citizens and calculated to produce idleness, vice, debauchery or some thing of the like. It has seldom been felt necessary by Courts for the sake of justifying the State legislation under a specific constitutional provision to array the appalling statistics of misery; pauperism and crime which have their origin in the use or abuse of the ardent spirits. The police power of the States, it is well established, is alone competent to the correction of these great social evils: all measures of restraint or prohibition necessary to effect the purpose are within the scope of the legislative authority of the State [refer to the observations of Mr. Justice Grler in the Licence Cases (46 U.S. 5 How 504 : 12 Lawyers Edition 256)]. The question as to the constitutional power of a State to prohibit the manufacture and sale of Intoxicating liquors is no longer an open one in this Court. Justice Grler in the Licence Cases (46 U.S. 5 How 504 : 12 Lawyers Edition 256)]. The question as to the constitutional power of a State to prohibit the manufacture and sale of Intoxicating liquors is no longer an open one in this Court. Such power rests upon the acknowledged right of the States to protect the health, morals and safety of their people and emanates from the power conferred upon them by Entry 8 of List II of the seventh schedule corresponding to Entry 31 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935. The reason for the consensus of judicial opinion, which is no longer open to challenge, that regulation in the matters of Intoxicating liquors or Intoxicants includes the power of prohibition, rests upon a rationale which can well be summed in the language of Mr. Justice Field in (1) Crowley v. Christensen (137 U.S. 86 : 34 Lawyers Edition 620 at 623-24). I am tempted to take an extract from the JUDGMENT : of Mr. Justice Field and quote it in extenso. It is urged that as the liquors are used as a beverage and the injury following them, if taken in excess, is voluntarily inflicted and is confined to the party offending, their sale should be without restrictions, the contention being that what a man shall drink, equally with what he shall eat, is not properly matter for legislation. There is in this position an assumption of a fact which does not exist, that when the liquors are taken in excess the injuries are confined to the party offending. The injury, it is true; first falls upon him in his health; which the habit undermines; in his morals, which it weakens; and in the self-abasement which it creates. But; as it leads to neglect of business and waste of property and general demoralization; it affects those who are immediately connected with and dependent upon him. By the general concurrence of opinion of every civilized and Christian community; there are few sources of crime and misery to society equal to the drain shop where Intoxicating liquors, in small quantities, to be drunk at the time, are sold indiscriminately to all parties applying. The statistics of every state show a greater amount of crime and misery, attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail liquor saloons than to any other source. The statistics of every state show a greater amount of crime and misery, attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail liquor saloons than to any other source. The sale of such liquors in this way has therefore been, at all times by the courts of every state, considered as the proper subject of legislative regulation. Not only may a license be exacted from the keeper of the saloon before a glass of his liquors can be thus disposed of, but restrictions may be imposed as to the class of persons to whom they may be sold, and the hours of the day, and the days of the week; on which the saloons may be opened. Their sale in that form may be absolutely prohibited. It is a question of public expediency and public morality, and not of federal law. The police power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business mitigate its evils or to suppress it entirely. There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell Intoxicating liquors by retail; It is not a privilege of a citizen of the state or of a citizen of..........As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. That authority may vest in such officers as it may deem proper the power of passing upon applications for permission to carry it on and to "Issue licenses for that purpose. It is a matter of legislative will only." These passages have received the seal of approval by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, to wit, (2) Co-overjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 220) where Mahajan, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench quoted an extract from the above passage with approval. Since then that became the law of the land, as was pointed out by A.K. Roy, C.J., in (3) Nashirwar v. M.P. State (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 360). Since then that became the law of the land, as was pointed out by A.K. Roy, C.J., in (3) Nashirwar v. M.P. State (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 360). That being the rationale behind the holding of the regulatory power in the matters to include the power to put a complete ban and to completely prohibit the use of intoxicants or intoxicating liquors, it has been held throughout, with only one exceptional observation of our own Supreme Court and that to by a Constitution Bench in the case (4) Krishna Kumar Narula V. The State of Jammu & Kashmir (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1368) to which I shall make a reference at a later stage; that the competent legislature may absolutely prohibit the manufacture of intoxicants, their transportation, sale and possession and it may adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate these inhibitions and exercise full police authority in respect to them. It has, therefore, been held to be within the police power of a state to declare an intoxicating liquor contraband subject to immediate seizure. It has always been held to be a common nuisance liable to be abated through an appropriate legislative measure. 8. In this context, I may at once dispose of the submissions made under the first two groups as enumerated by me at the outset as being wholly untenable. There is no substance in the submission put forward on behalf of the petitioners that the law, if any, imposing complete prohibition of intoxicating liquors violates any fundamental right mentioned in part III or is not in conformity with the provisions of Article 47 or directive principles of the State policy. It is too late in the day now to take any exception to law in relation to the settled principles in these matters to the following effect: (i) The State Legislature is fully authorised and competent to make a provision regarding prohibition, its source of power being Entry 8 of List II of the 7th Schedule. That entry empowers the State Government to legislate with regard to intoxicating liquor including production, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquor. (ii) There is no fundamental right of any citizen to carry on trade or to do business in liquor. Whenever the State grants a licence or a lease, it is the bestowing of privilege and not regarding it as a matter of right of the person applying. (ii) There is no fundamental right of any citizen to carry on trade or to do business in liquor. Whenever the State grants a licence or a lease, it is the bestowing of privilege and not regarding it as a matter of right of the person applying. (iii) The history of excise law shows that the State has the renewal right of privilege of manufacture and sale of liquor. Trade in liquor has historically stood on a footing differ rent from the other trades. Restrictions, which are not permissible in other trades are lawful and reasonable so far as trade in liquor is concerned. Therefore, there is a police power of the State to enforce public morality to prohibit trade in noxious and dangerous goods. (iv) There is ample power in State Legislature to enforce an absolute prohibition of manufacture, sale, possession or consumption, etc. of Intoxicating liquor, as contemplated by our constitution-makers under Article 47 of the directive principles except for medical purposes. That is why the prohibition in the trade of liquor is not only permissible but also reasonable, the reason being public morality, public interest, harmful baneful and dangerous character or the like. (v) The State under its regulatory powers has the right to prohibit every form of activity in relation to intoxicants for manufacture, storage, sale, possession, consumption, etc. (vi) The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. It is a matter of legislative will only, as stated above, and the power of a state to ban such things as are illegal and injurious to health and welfare of the public has never been in doubt. It is in this contest that the courts have held that laws prohibiting trade in noxious and dangerous goods or trafficking in women or indulging in criminal activities like gambling have not been held to be illegal as affecting a prohibition and not a mere regulation; and that for the simple reason that the nature of these so-called businesses is an important element in deciding reasonable restrictions imposing complete prohibition. Complete banning or trafficking in women and complete banning of gambling cannot but be described as reasonable restrictions even as they are annihilating of the so-called right to carry on a business. Complete banning or trafficking in women and complete banning of gambling cannot but be described as reasonable restrictions even as they are annihilating of the so-called right to carry on a business. I say 'so-called' because such business has never been legally recognised as a business or as being termed 'trade and Commerce' within the meaning of the Constitution. Decisions are dozen on this point, not only in this country but also in the United States of America and the licensing law of England. Instead of enumerating all of them, I may merely recapitulate here a few of them, which reinforce the views that I have expressed, beginning from the year 1951 upto the year 1978. Reference in this connection may be made to those few cases, namely, (5) The State of Bombay V. Balsara (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318), Bharucha's case (supra), (6) State of Bombay V. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 699), (7) Nashirwar V. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 360) and (8) Har Shankar V. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1121), the latest being (9) P. N. Kaushal V. Union of India (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1457). It is no use multiplying the number of decisions. 9. I would have hardly taken notice of a submission made at the Bar but for the vehemence with which Mr. Shahabuddin seemed to argue the point that the only exceptional case wherein the right to carry on the trade or business in intoxicating liquor or intoxicants has been held by the Supreme Court to be a fundamental right is that of Narula (supra). Mr. Shahabuddin pressed upon our attention repeatedly the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme court in Narula's case (supra) for the purpose of persuading us to hold that that being a decision of the Constitution Bench should be held to be still a good law and ought to be held as not having been over ruled by any subsequent larger Bench. I am afraid there is hardly any substance in this submission. In Bharucha's case (supra) Mahajan, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench held, while construing the provisions of (Ajmer) Excise Regulation of 1915, that there is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen. I am afraid there is hardly any substance in this submission. In Bharucha's case (supra) Mahajan, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench held, while construing the provisions of (Ajmer) Excise Regulation of 1915, that there is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. That authority may vest in such officers as it may deem proper the power of passing upon application for permission to carry it on and to issue licences for that purpose. It is a matter of legislative will only. This decision has, times without number been understood to have laid down in no ambiguous terms that there is neither any inherent or any fundamental right of any citizen to carry on any business in intoxicating liquor of intoxicants. This Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court could not be over ruled and has not actually been over ruled by the Constitution Bench in Narula's case (supra). The nature of the trade or business being the enforcement of public morality, an advancement of social Justice, in so-called calling or profession or business of gambling was treated by Das, C.J., in Chamarbaugwala's case (supra). That again was a decision of the Constitution Bench where Das, C.J., observed that ordinary English word 'business' or 'trade' does not include crime and in this context it was said. "That crime is not a business is also recognised in (10) F.A. Lindsay, A.E. Woodward and W. Hiscox V. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue (18 T.C. 43) (per Lord President Clyde and per Lord Sands) and in (11) Southern (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) V. A.B. (1933) 1. K.B. 713. The fact that regulatory provisions have been enacted to control gambling by issuing licences and by imposing taxes does not in any way alter the nature of gambling which is inherently vicious and pernicious". I have been tempted to make reference to this gambling case because the nature of the so called trade in intoxicants is inherently as vicious and pernicious as that of gambling. I have been tempted to make reference to this gambling case because the nature of the so called trade in intoxicants is inherently as vicious and pernicious as that of gambling. The reasonable restriction with regard to regulation in the matter of gambling, which is a crime, as covering a complete ban of the same cannot, in my view, stand on a footing different from trafficking in ardent spirits. This again was a Constitution Bench decision. The distinction made in Narula's case by Subba Rao, C.J., while referring to Das, C.J.'s, observations in Chamarbaugwala's case was merely that there was a Jack of co.-herence of thought and expression in the observations of Das, C.J., and the decision in the gambling case was said by Subba Rao, C.J., to be limited exclusively to cases of gambling. As the learned Chief Justice in Narula's case did not find similarity in the so-called trading of gambling and the right of a business intoxicants or intoxicating liquors, the matter with regard to the decision in Narula's case still holding the field was canvassed before the supreme court in Nashirwar's case also wherein at page 363 of A.I.R. 1975 SC 360, Ray, C.J., observed that Bharucha's case negatived the contention of inherent right of a business in intoxicating liquors holding that There may be absolute prohibition of sale of liquor. At the root lies public expediency and public morality. The sanction is the police power of the State to regulate business and to mitigate evils. Or to do away with the noxious and pernicious effects of such trade. It was further held in Nashirwar's case that-- Bhrucha's case (supra) is a Constitution Bench decision. Narula's case is also a Constitution Bench decision. Narula's case (supra) cannot be said to have overruled Bharucha's case (supra). Mr. Shahabuddin argued that the decision in Nashirwar's case (supra) was not that of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. While advancing such an argument, learned counsel failed either inadvertently or otherwise to notice a later Constitution Bench decision of the supreme court wherein the same point was canvassed again at the Bar. That was in the case of (8) Har Shankar (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1121). A special reference to paragraphs 52 and 54 of the JUDGMENT : in Har Shankar's case at pages 1132 and 1133 need be made here. That was in the case of (8) Har Shankar (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1121). A special reference to paragraphs 52 and 54 of the JUDGMENT : in Har Shankar's case at pages 1132 and 1133 need be made here. Chandrachud, J. as he then was, speaking for the Constitution Bench, held in paragraph 52 as follows:-- In a recent JUDGMENT : delivered on November 27, 1974 (Nashirwar etc. V. State of Madhya Pradesh Civil Appeals Nos. 1711-1721 and 1723 of 1974) : (reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 360) it was held on a review of various authority including the decision in Krishna Kumar Narula's case ( (1967) 3 S.C.R. 50 : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1368) that the State had the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor, that it had the power to hold a public auction for granting the right or privilege to sell liquor, that traditionally intoxicating liquors were the subject-matter of State monopoly and that there was no fundamental right in a citizen to carry on trade or business in liquor, one of us the learned Chief Justice, observed while speaking on behalf of the 3-Judge Bench that: 'There are three' principal reasons to hold that these is no fundamental right of citizens to carry on trade or to do business in liquor. First, there is the police power of the State to enforce public morality to prohibit trades in noxious or dangerous goods second, there is power of the State to enforce an absolute prohibition of manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor. Article 47 states that the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. Third, the history of excise law shows that the State has the exclusive right or privilege of manufacture or sale of liquor. After reviewing all the relevant case laws, it was held in Har Shankar's case in paragraph 54 at cage 1133 of the All India Report that-- It was unnecessary in Krishna Kumar Narula's case ( (1967) 3 SCR 50 : AIR 1967 SC 1368 ) to examine the question from this broader point of view, as the only contention bearing on the constitutional validity of the provision impugned therein was not permitted to be raised as it was not argued in the High Court. The discussion of the question whether a citizen has a fundamental right to do trade or business in liquor proceeded in that case, avowedly, from a desire to clear the confusion arising from the different views expressed by the two Judges of the High Court. This may explain why the court restricted its final conclusion the holding that dealing in liquor is business and the citizen has a right to do business in that commodity. The court did not say, though such an implication may arise from its conclusion, that the citizen has a fundamental right to do trade or business in liquor. That, I think, should be sufficient to dispose of the contention of Mr. Shahabuddin with regard to the collect law being as written in Narula's case. 10. The evolutionary or the revolutionary process; which may have been envisaged by the constitution-makers while engrafting Article 47 in the Constitution; is of no consequence to us. If a law is properly made by the competent State Legislature under item 8 of List II of the 7th Schedule imposing an absolute cessation and complete prohibition of the consumption of the intoxicating liquor; it is well protected and re-inforced by the provisions of Article 47; that has been fully established by the Supreme Court by now. The contention that death ought to be lingering rather than instantaneous under Article 47; In the context, is of no avail to learned counsel for the petitioners; If there is the power in the legislature to kill the obnoxious trade or business, it matters little whether the death blow is dealt all at once or to kill such obnoxious trade step by step. In such cases, the well-known saying that the protraction of the agony is less preferable to immediate death is more appropriate and apt. 11. Since learned counsel for the petitioners in one form or the other invited our attention to the provisions of Article 31, for the purpose of challenging the circular dated 23-3-79 as also the notification dated 27-3-79 on the ground that it amounted to expropriation or confiscation of property legally held till 12 O' clock in the midnight between 31st of Match, 1979 and 1st of April, 1979 and sought to be seized and confiscated without any compensation and; hence; violates Article 31. I may as well dispose of that matter here and that too in a very few words. When a business is extinguished as obnoxious under the Constitution by the competent legislature, the owners cannot demand compensation from the Government. So it was said by Justice Holmes in the case of (12) Clarke V. Haberie Crystal Springs Brewing Co. (280 U.S. 384 : 74 I. Ed. 498). Mr. Lal Narain Sinha even conceded that the seizure of a contraband article would not entitle the holder thereof to any compensation nor can the seizing authority; If legally empowered, be liable for any compensation to be paid to the person from whom such a contraband article is seized. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents rightly pressed into service for such a proposition a Full Bench decision of Nagpur High Court in (13) Sheoshankar V. State Govt. of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1951 Nag 58). In paragraph 174 at page 84 of the Report in Sheoshankar's case, it was held by the Full Bench: What the Constitution safeguards is a right "that what is regarded as property or what is regarded as an object of trade shall for ever be continued to be so regarded? The decisions we have referred to justify the conclusion that it does not. No one will dispute that an article which has been rendered unfit for human consumption must not be allowed to be sold of consumed and ought to be destroyed. A law requiring the destruction of such article or penalising its sale will unquestionably have to be upheld. Even Shri Mani concedes that prohibition of the consumption of cocaine and such like drugs is proper though he expresses a different opinion regarding intoxicating liquor. But it seems to us that the principle is the same. We would repeat that the legislature having come to the conclusion that the consumption of intoxicating liquor is not in the public interest its conclusion is not open to question before a Court of law. From this conclusion it follows that intoxicating liquor must be regarded as a noxious object it, therefore, ceases to be a legitimate object of 'property' or a legitimate object of commerce. What has been rendered contraband cannot be the object of 'property'. See 'Miller V. Schoene', 276 US. 272; 'Clarke V. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 US. 384, State Board V. Young's Market Co., 299 US. What has been rendered contraband cannot be the object of 'property'. See 'Miller V. Schoene', 276 US. 272; 'Clarke V. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 US. 384, State Board V. Young's Market Co., 299 US. 59 at p. 63, 'Clason V. Indiana', 306 US. 439', 'Ziffrin Inc. V. Reeves', 308 US 132 and 'Mugler V. State of Kansas', (1887) 120 US. 623 . I have not the least doubt in my mind that the paragraph extracted above from the Full Bench decision represents the correct legal position, if I can say so with respect. The moment we come to the conclusion that intoxicating liquors as a noxious object have been prohibited, the keeping in possession of such an article would be keeping in possession a contraband article. If it ceases to be a legitimate object of property or a legitimate object of commerce, there is no deprivation of property for which compensation has to be paid. There is thus no force even in the argument that the notification is bad on account of infraction of Article 31, let alone Article 19. For, us I have already stated above, for the purposes of Article 19, such a prohibition must be held to be reasonable restriction. 12. There is equally no force in asking us to invoke the provisions of Article 14 for striking down any of the impugned annexures. The discrimination made in favour of the scheduled tribes, if at all a reasonable nexus is required for such classification, is based upon a legitimate object having a direct nexus with the classification in question. For, the scheduled tribes in their personality, in their habits, and in their personal traits on account of attributes common to them as a class could well be the subject matter of a proper classification. Even in their cases under the second proviso in the notification sale of pachwal which a member of the scheduled tribes is entitled to manufacture of process for domestic consumption or on religious social occasions is restricted to be sold under any circumstances. Nor, do I see any force in the contention that the discrimination between intoxicating liquors (country and foreign) on the one hand and Bhang and Tari on the other suffers from any vice of illegal discrimination. Nor, do I see any force in the contention that the discrimination between intoxicating liquors (country and foreign) on the one hand and Bhang and Tari on the other suffers from any vice of illegal discrimination. If at all, as is conceded at all hands, prohibition is to be effected, then it is to be effected in stages, and this may well be taken to be a stage yet to be covered in the future. Such a distinction between the two groups of intoxicants can very well be said to form a part of the regulatory measures which the state legislature is entitled to adopt. 13. Mr. Shahabuddin's contention with regard to the 'apparent conflict' between the provisions of Article 39(a) and Article 41 on the one hand and those of Article 47 on the other does not bring any difficulty at all, much less any unsurmountable difficulty. Firstly, the matter is not relevant to the issue at hand, For, if it is within the legislative competence of the State legislature, then merely because incidentally it may throw out of employment some of the persons engaged as employees in noxious or unsocial trades or business shall not make statutory provision invalid on the alleged ground of non-fulfilment of the mandates of Articles 39(a) and 41 of the directive principles. Evidently, in view of what I have already held above, there cannot be any right arising in any person to be employed in a business which has been declared noxious by a competent legislature and the State has neither any duty nor any liability to keep such persons employed in such trade or business. That can certainly not be a ground for striking down the legislative measure to bring about prohibition. It is a different matter that the State may find out avenues for their employment in some other legal occupation, avocation, business or trade. But the failure of the State to provide for employment for each and every citizen of the country can certainly, by no stretch of imagination, be justifiable. That is a goal for which a social welfare state should and is expected to direct its attention--a serious attention for the matter of that. But that is neither here nor there in so far as this batch of cases is concerned. 14. Much was argued by Mr. That is a goal for which a social welfare state should and is expected to direct its attention--a serious attention for the matter of that. But that is neither here nor there in so far as this batch of cases is concerned. 14. Much was argued by Mr. B.P. Singh as also some of the other counsel with regard to the non-mandatory nature of the provisions of Article 47, and in that connection the specific provisions of Articles 17, 18, 23 and 24 in part III of the Constitution were pressed upon us to show the peremptory nature of the language, whereas it was submitted that the language employed in Article 47 is that the State shall 'endeavour' to 'bring about' prohibition. This argument as to whether the nature of language employed in Article 47 is mandatory in character or merely persuasive in nature is also of no consequence in the context of what I have already said above. 15. Another interesting feature of the case, which Mr. B.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners in C.W.J.C. 1046 of 1979, with his usual industry and tenacity, tried to impress upon us, was the alleged infraction of freedom of religious belief and conscience as is guaranteed by Article 25. Learned counsel took great pains and persuaded us to go through various vedic literatures, Upanishads and various works of tantras including the Kularnava Tantra edited by Taranath Vidyaratna (Introduction by Arthur Avalon.) in an elaborate note supplied to us in course of his submissions. Mr. Singh tried to impress us that it has always been regarded since 'time immemorial as a religious ritual for the tantrikas and even the vaidics or the shaivas of the Hindu sect to dedicate spiritual liquors to the Gods and/or Goddesses and to partake of the prasad by consuming the same. I must confess I have never learnt the Vedas nor read much of Upanishads nor have I ever believed in a tantrika. And, for ought I know of, if the Gods refuse to be propitiated or satisfied with spirituous liquor being offered to them, I, for one, would not resort to such an act for the purpose either of performing any puja or propitiating the Gods or Goddesses. And, for ought I know of, if the Gods refuse to be propitiated or satisfied with spirituous liquor being offered to them, I, for one, would not resort to such an act for the purpose either of performing any puja or propitiating the Gods or Goddesses. It may be for some a matter of genuine belief and faith as a matter of fact, a creed--that such an offering specially to the Goddesses is a must and for persons belonging to such creed or sect there is no absolute prohibition in the notification. If it conveys the legislative will in the notification, it excepts a person specially authorised in this behalf by a pass or permit duly granted. There is no reason why, if such a staunch believer in the marg of tantra makes an application for the purpose connected with religion, such a pass on permit should not be granted to him. The notification, as it stands there, if it represents the legislative will, it has provided for a contingency that a freedom of conscience and religion may well be protected by obtaining a licence or permit from the authority concerned. The notification; therefore, cannot be said to be liable to be struck down on that ground either. 16. So far I have proceeded upon the assumption that the impugned notification is an expression of the legislative will which alone can be the source of validity and power under it. The State Government cannot under Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act. This at once brings us to the more serious and difficult questions raised in these cases by Mr. Lal Narain Sinha with regard to the competence of the State Government to issue the impugned notification in purported exercise of the power conferred upon it by Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act. Learned counsel submitted that having regard to the expression used in Section 19(4) it cannot be said that there was any expression of any legislative will contemplating the authorisation of the State Government to issue the notification, to make an ORDER :of complete prohibition through the State, as has been sought to be shown by the impugned notification. That necessitates my quoting in extenso the whole of Section 19(4) of 1915 Act. That necessitates my quoting in extenso the whole of Section 19(4) of 1915 Act. (1) No person not being licensed to manufacture, cultivate, collect or sell any intoxicant shall have in his possession any quantity of any intoxicant in excess of such quantity as the Board has, under Section 5, declared to the limit of a retail sale, except under a permit granted by the Collector in that behalf. (2) Sub-section (1) shall not apply to-- (a) any foreign liquor (other than denatured spirit) which is in possession of any common carrier or warehouseman as such; or (b) any foreign liquor which has been purchased by any person for his bona fide private consumption and not for sale or for use in the manufacture of any article for sale, or (c) Tari intended to be used in the manufacture of Gur or molasses; (d) Tari intended to be used solely for the preparation of food for domestic consumption and not-- (i) as an intoxicant, or (ii) for the preparation of any intoxicating article, or (iii) for the preparation of any article for sale. (3) A licensed vendor shall not have in his possession at any place other than that authorised by his licence any quantity of any Intoxicant in excess of such quantity as the Board has, under Section 5; declared to be the limit of a retail sale, except under a permit granted by the Collector in that behalf. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections, the State Government may, by notification, prohibit the possession by any person or class of persons, either in the State of Bihar and Orissa or in any specified local area; of any intoxicant either absolutely; or subject to such conditions as it may prescribe. It was argued-and very seriously-that the State Government has been empowered by notification to prohibit the possession by "any person or class of persons" either in the State or in specified local area, of any intoxicant either absolutely or subject to such conditions as it may prescribe. The contention of learned counsel was that the expression may 'any person or class of persons' cannot mean and include the public generally and at large of the entire State. Learned counsel placed reliance on two Special Bench decisions--one of this Court and the other of the Bombay High Court in support of his contention. The contention of learned counsel was that the expression may 'any person or class of persons' cannot mean and include the public generally and at large of the entire State. Learned counsel placed reliance on two Special Bench decisions--one of this Court and the other of the Bombay High Court in support of his contention. A Special Bench of 5 Judges presided over by Sir Arthur Trevor Harries, Chief Justice, had gone to construe the expression 'any person or class of persons' occurring in Section 19(4) extracted in the case of Kanhai Sahu V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1941 Pat 53). One Kanhai Sahu was convicted by the Magistrate under Section 47(a) of 1915 Act and sentenced to 5 months' rigorous imprisonment. This was for violation of a Local Government notification no. 1600 L.S.G. dated 26th March, 1939. The notification, in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of 1915 Act, prohibited with effect from 1st of April, 1939 the possession of country liquor, tari, pachwal, ganja and bhang in any quantity by any person at any place within the jurisdiction of police stations of Hazaribagh, Ichak, Barkagaon, Mandu and Ramgarh in the district of Hazaribagh. Kanhai Sahu, the petitioner in that case, was found to be in possession of a bottle of country liquor. If the notification was held to be valid, the conviction was bound to be sustained. If, on the contrary, the notification was held to be ultra vires, the powers of the State Government under Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act, he was entitled to acquittal. Having crossed several stages, the case of Kanhai Sahu reached the stage of Special Bench for determination of the question as to whether the language employed by the Legislature in Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act could embrace within the expression 'any person or class of persons' all the persons constituting the public at large throughout the state. It was argued on behalf of the Crown that the words 'any person' are equivalent to every person and they were wide enough to include everybody in the province or any particular part thereof. This argument was held to be not tenable by the Special Bench. It was argued on behalf of the Crown that the words 'any person' are equivalent to every person and they were wide enough to include everybody in the province or any particular part thereof. This argument was held to be not tenable by the Special Bench. While rejecting this contention, Harries, C.J., held as follows:-- There can be no question that if this is the true construction of the phrase to which I have referred, Section 19(4) would give the local Government power to prohibit the public generally throughout the whole province from being in possession of any form of intoxicant or in short to enforce complete and total prohibition. It must be observed, however, that the notification empowers the Provincial Government to prohibit the possession of intoxicants not by 'any person' but by 'any person or class of persons' and in my view this latter phrase must be considered as a whole. It cannot be split up as suggested by counsel on behalf of The Crown. When the phrase 'any person or class of persons' is read as a whole and given its ordinary and natural meaning, it means, in my JUDGMENT :, any designated person or class of persons, that is, any person of class of persons designated by name of description. The phrase cannot, in my view, mean the public generally in the province or in any particular area therein and is wholly inappropriate to convey such a meaning. If the words 'any person' in the sub-section are wide enough to cover all persons, then it is difficult to understand why the words 'class of persons' were added immediately afterwards. If all persons, that is the public generally, could be prohibited, clearly a particular class or particular classes could be so prohibited as the greater must include the less. As the words 'or class of persons' follow immediately, after the words, any person, the words 'any person' cannot mean any or all persons in the province or any part thereof. If all persons, that is the public generally, could be prohibited, clearly a particular class or particular classes could be so prohibited as the greater must include the less. As the words 'or class of persons' follow immediately, after the words, any person, the words 'any person' cannot mean any or all persons in the province or any part thereof. If the words in Section 19(4) of the Act had been 'the Local Government may, by notification, prohibit She possession by any person of any intoxicant', there would be considerable force in the present contention of the Grown; but the addition of the words 'or class of persons' immediately after the words 'any person' clearly, in my view, cuts down the meaning of 'any person' and confines the meaning of those words to, any designated person or persons if the words mean as I hold they do that the local Government may, by notification, prohibit the possession of any intoxicant by any designated person or class of persons, then clearly the words are not wide enough to empower the local Government by notification to prohibit the public generally from being in possession of intoxicants of any form thereof. It is to be noted that the Crown does not contend that the words 'class of persons' are appropriate to cover the public generally in the province or in any particular area thereof. The persons in the province or in any part thereof vary from day to day and it would be impossible to hold that persons in the province or in any particular portion thereof at any particular time would constitute a class of persons. The sole contention of the Crown is that the power to prohibit is given by the words 'any person', and for the reasons which I have given I am satisfied that those words found as they are, followed Immediately by the words 'or class of persons' cannot mean the public generally. Laying down this chain of reasoning and having held, for the reasons already given, the Special Bench was satisfied that those words found, as they are today followed immediately by the words 'class of persons' could not mean the public generally. Laying down this chain of reasoning and having held, for the reasons already given, the Special Bench was satisfied that those words found, as they are today followed immediately by the words 'class of persons' could not mean the public generally. After having so held, the Special Bench also placed reliance on a JUDGMENT : of Sir Beaumont, C.J., speaking for the Special Bench of 5 Judges of the Bombay High Court in the case of Chunibhai Lalbhai V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1940 Bom 273). Incidentally, in the two Special Bench decisions a reference was made, after having already concluded that the expression 'any person or class of persons' cannot mean every person of the public at large, that the preamble gave no indication of the object of the Act to introduce total or partial prohibition. 17. It is worth noticing here that soon after the special Bench decision in Kanhai Sahu's case, which was delivered on 15th November, 1940, the Governor of Bihar in the exercise of the legislative power which he had assumed on his proclamation on 3rd November, 1939 under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935 enacted a Governor's Act entitled 'The Bihar Excise (Amendment) Act, 1940'. By Section 2 of this Act, a paragraph was inserted to the preamble in the original Act of 1915 to the following effect:-- whereas in ORDER :to promote, enforce and carry into effect the policy of prohibition, it is necessary to prohibit the import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and possession of liquor and of intoxicating drugs in the province of Bihar or any specified areas thereof. And by Section 3 of the amending Act, it was provided that Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act should be so amended as to prohibit the possession of intoxicating liquor why any person or class of persons or subject to such exception, if any, as may be specified in the notification, by all persons either in the province of Bihar or in any specified local area". After this amendment of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act by the amending Act of 1940, a fresh notification dated 18th of November, 1940 was issued in the same terms as the original notification which had been quoted by the Special Bench of the Patna High Court, another person, one Bhola Prasad was in the meantime prosecuted and acquitted by the Magistrate trying him presumably on the strength of Special Bench decision of this Court. But in view of the amendment of 1940, this Court set aside the ORDER :of acquittal and convicted Bhola Prasad who went up in appeal to the Federal Court of India. Learned counsel for the State relied very much on the decision of the Federal Court in the case of (14) Bhola Prasad V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1942 FC 17) for the purpose of impressing upon us that the special Bench decisions of the Bombay and the Patna High Courts must be deemed to have been Impliedly overruled by the Federal Court and this too he had taken from an observation of mine in course of the submissions by the learned counsel for the petitioners as also from the editorial note in the placitum of the Report. This argument deserves to be noticed with some care and caution. 18. Before reverting to the decision of the Federal Court in question, I think it worthwhile even at the cost of repetition to analyse the reasons advanced by the Special Bench of this Court in Kanhai Sahu's case for the interpretation that it had put on the language of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act. The Special Bench proceeded upon this chain of reasoning. The notification contemplated under Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act empowers the Provincial Government (now the State Government) to prohibit the possession of Intoxicants not by 'any person' but by 'any person or class of persons'. The phrase 'class of persons' must be construed along with 'any person', i.e., the entire phrase must be construed as a whole. Read as a whole and given its ordinary and natural meaning. It means any designated person or class of persons which, in its turn, seems any person or class of persons designated by name or description. The phrase 'class of persons' must be construed along with 'any person', i.e., the entire phrase must be construed as a whole. Read as a whole and given its ordinary and natural meaning. It means any designated person or class of persons which, in its turn, seems any person or class of persons designated by name or description. It was held that the phrase cannot mean the public generally in the province (now the State), or in any particular area therein since the language is wholly inappropriate to convey such a meaning. If, the reasoning proceeds, the words 'any person' in the phrase 'any person or class of persons' be deemed to be wide enough to cover all persons, then the words "class of persons" added Immediately afterwards would be meaningless. If all persons that means the public generally could be prohibited under the expression 'any person', hardly a particular class or classes could be so prohibited as the greater must include the less. In the context, 'any person' cannot mean and does not mean all persons in the province (the State) or any part thereof. The addition of the words 'or class of persons' cuts down the meaning of 'any person' and confines the meaning of those words to any designated person off persons. Harries, C.J., has stated at page 56 (left hand column, 2nd paragraph):-- The sole contention of the Crown is that the power to prohibit is given by the words 'any person', and for the reasons which I have given I am satisfied that those words found as they are, followed immediately by the words 'or class of persons' cannot mean the public generally. This is the main ground for rejecting the argument put forward on behalf of the Crown in that case that any person included all persons or the public at large. Having reached that conclusion, the same was sought to be reinforced on account of submissions at the Bar by resorting to the construction of the Preamble of the 1915 Act as it before the 1940 amendment. In that connection, it was observed that the preamble did not indicate that the Excise Act of 1915 was brought on the Statute Book for the purpose of enforcing total prohibition, because, it was held, the preamble indicated that the Excise Act of 1915 was mainly for the benefit of the provincial fisc. In that connection, it was observed that the preamble did not indicate that the Excise Act of 1915 was brought on the Statute Book for the purpose of enforcing total prohibition, because, it was held, the preamble indicated that the Excise Act of 1915 was mainly for the benefit of the provincial fisc. It did not appear from the preamble to the Act on its provisions generally that the Legislature bad intended that the Act should be used for the purpose of introducing the abolition what is commonly known as prohibition. Sir John Beaumont, C.J., in the case of A.I.R. 1940 Bom 273 (supra) had also construed identical language of the corresponding Act--Abkari Act, 1878 of Bombay--on its own language and had taken resort to a construction of the preamble in support of the conclusion arrived at. In this context, we have to see what Sir Maurice Lind ford Gwyer, C.J., had said about the two cases in the case of Bhola Prasad (supra). To quote the language of Gwyer, C.J., at page 21 (left column):-- Having regard to the view which we have taken of the effect of the Act of 1940, it is not necessary for us to consider, as we, might otherwise have found ourselves compelled to do the earlier JUDGMENT : of the Patna High Court to which we have already referred and which followed a JUDGMENT : of the High Court of Bombay in which similar questions were raised; I.L.R. (1940) Bom 587 (Chunibhai Lalbhai V. Emperor). We do not therefore, express any opinion with regard to those two JUDGMENT :s, except in respect of one matter, on which we think fit desirable to say a few words because it was also the foundation of part of the argument addressed to us in the present case. And, that one matter in respect of which Gwyer, C.J. felt impelled to make observations was with regard to the construction of the preamble of the Excise Act, 1915 and of Bombay Abkari Act, 1978 (Act 5 of 1878). With regard to the preamble, it was observed by the Federal Court that it was very much open to doubt whether the preamble retrospectively inserted in 1940 in an act passed 25 years before can be locked at by the Court for the purpose of discovering what the true intention of the Legislature was at the earlier date. With regard to the preamble, it was observed by the Federal Court that it was very much open to doubt whether the preamble retrospectively inserted in 1940 in an act passed 25 years before can be locked at by the Court for the purpose of discovering what the true intention of the Legislature was at the earlier date. It was further said that it is not a universal role nor for that matter a general rule that an Act should have one object only. It was stated that in law there was nothing wrong on a proper construction of the various statutory provisions of a particularly Act to say that there was a double object for bringing that Act on the Statute Book. In that context, the Federal Court went on to say that the 1915 Excise Act could very well be said to have a double object in the mind in spite of such an express language in the preamble. The two objects in view, mainly the interest of the public exchequer or provincial fisc. as it has been described, as also the Introduction of prohibition as a policy, could not be ruled out. No observation has been made with regard to the construction of the language employed by the Legislature in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the 1915 Act by the Patna Special Bench in the JUDGMENT : of Sir Maurice L. Gwyer, C.J. The well-settled principles of construction of statutory provisions which have been taken note of by the Special Bench of the Patna High Court in A.I.R. 1941 Pat 53 have not even been referred to, not touched, what to talk of their being overruled. We have to repeat the Federal Court JUDGMENT : in this manner otherwise I can attach no reason for the clear statement of Gwyer, C.J., that-- "We do not therefore express any opinion with regard to those two JUDGMENT :s, except in respect of one matter..." On a careful consideration of the Special Bench decision of this Court in Kanhai Sahu's case (supra) and that of the Federal Court in Bhola Prasad's case (supra), I am firmly of the view that the construction put by the Special Bench of this Court on the language of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act has not been whittled down or in any way detracted from by the JUDGMENT : of the Federal Court. I am reinforcing my view having regard to some well established canons of construction of statutory provisions, says Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes; 12th Edition, Page 36-- A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. But, as Crales has said on Statute Law, 5th Edition; page 98-- It is a good general rule in jurisprudence' said the Judicial Committee in Ditcher V. Denison [ (1857), 11 Moor P.C. 325, 337] that one who reads a legal document whether public or private, should not be prompt to ascribe--should not, without necessity or some sound reason impute--to its language tautology or superfluity; and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every words intended to have some effect or be of "some use"--And this is as justly and even more tersely put by Lord Bramwell, who said, in Cowper Essex V. Acton L.B. [(1889), 14 App. Cas. 155, 169]. The words of a statute never should in interpretation be added to or subtracted from, without almost a necessity. It has further been said by Crales in the same page-- --'a statute is never supposed to use words without a meaning.' Therefore, if the language used in a statute is ambiguous and capable of two constructions, the rule as enunciated by the Judicial Committee in Cargo ex Argos [ (1873), L.R. 5 P.C. 134, 153] is, to adopt that construction which will give some effect to the words rather than that which will give none. I am not unmindful of the view of the Judicial Committee as also of the House of Lords wherein rejection of a surplusage has not been ruled out. But that is where the language is absolutely unambiguous and capable of two constructions. In the instant case, certainly two views are possible--one view being that 'any person' means every person or the entire public in general as is the explanation of the learned Government Advocate and the other being that 'any person' must mean a designated person as contended by Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, being fortified in his submission by the view expressed by 10 Judges of the two High Courts, namely, two Special Benches of 5 of this Court and 5 of the Bombay High Court. Lal Narain Sinha, being fortified in his submission by the view expressed by 10 Judges of the two High Courts, namely, two Special Benches of 5 of this Court and 5 of the Bombay High Court. If there be two such views possible, I do not think it would be presumptuous on my part to act upon the unexceptionable rule that the language in the expression 'or any class of persons' occurring in Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act must not be read as a surplusage to the expression 'any person'. The connotation of every person would render the subsequent expression 'or any class of persons' completely redundant and otiose. There being no necessity either express or by necessary Intendment for taking any exception to those well settled principles of statutory constructions, I am constrained to hold that the view on the linguistic and grammatical construction of Section 19(4) as advanced in Kanhai Sahu's case (supra) still holds the field being supported in principle by the authoritative canons of construction extracted above. In the absence of any express or implied over-ruling of the Special Bench decision of this Court, I am afraid, sitting in Division Bench we find ourselves unable to take a view different from that taken by the Special Bench. 19. There is yet another aspect of the matter which needs to be emphasised here. The Federal Court in Bhola Prasad's case (supra) has already noticed the legislative history in particular about the insertion and introduction of the amending Act, 1940. By the amendment of 1940, the lacuna which was found by the Special Bench of this Court in Kanhai Sahu's case (supra) was sought to be filled in by the Governor's proclamation under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the expression "by all persons either in the province of Bihar or in specified local area" was inserted. This amending Act died a natural death through efflux of time. I shall not be treading on any delicate ground in assuming that the subsequent Legislature did know what the Special Bench had said with regard to the true intent and purpose of the provisions of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act before its amendment in 1940. This amending Act died a natural death through efflux of time. I shall not be treading on any delicate ground in assuming that the subsequent Legislature did know what the Special Bench had said with regard to the true intent and purpose of the provisions of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act before its amendment in 1940. Our Legislators must also be given the wisdom to appreciate that public at large either of the entire State or of any specified local area was expressly included by the amendment of 1940. The legislators must also further be presumed to have known that by the effacement of the amendment from the Statute Book the language of Section 19(4) stood as it was before the 1940 amendment. If the intention of the State Legislature even in the post-constitution era were to include within the ambit of Section 19(4) the public at large, I see no reason as to why that expression could still not have been so inserted by way of an amendment. This error goes to re-Inforce my view that there have been a deliberate omission on the part of the State Legislature to bring within the sweep of Section 19(4) the public at large being all the time unmindful of the interpretation of the expression 'any person' given by the Special Bench of this court in Kanhai Sahu's case, Since I am in the sphere of past legislative history--I say 'past' meaning thereby-of the period later than 1915 when the Excise Act being a consolidating Act was brought on the Statute Book. I think it worth-while to mention one other aspect of the matter also. The Bihar Prohibition Act, 1938 received the Governor's assent and was published in the Bihar Gazette on the 28th September, 1938. It is admitted at all hands that the Prohibition Act; 1938 was brought about to introduce an extent of the prohibition of manufacture, sale and consumption of liquor, Tail and the intoxicating drugs in the State of Bihar. Section 3 of the 1938 Prohibition Act is the definition clause whereas Section 19 prohibits advertisement by way of printing or publishing in any newspaper leaflet, booklet or any other single or periodical publication, etc. commending, soliciting the use of or offering any liquor, Tari or intoxicating drug other than liquor; Tari or drugs exempted under Section 28; with which we are not concerned. commending, soliciting the use of or offering any liquor, Tari or intoxicating drug other than liquor; Tari or drugs exempted under Section 28; with which we are not concerned. By Section 1(3) of this Prohibition Act Sections 3 and 19 were declared to have come into force in the whole of the State of Bihar at once, but under Subjection (4) of Section 1 the remaining provisions of this Act were to have come into force in any local area in the State of Bihar on such date as the Governor may, by notification, appoint and different dates were to be appointed for different provisions. Different provisions have been incorporated with regard to prohibition of different kinds of Intoxicants and penalties have been prescribed for violating such prohibitions. Some provisions of Part III, namely, Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 deal with such prohibition and penalties of different kinds of intoxicants of manufacturer, import, export; transport, sale etc., even of different kinds of intoxicating liquors. As we were informed at the Bar even by the learned Government Advocate these provisions of the 1938 Prohibition Act still remain more or less on paper; they have not been made effective by any notification whatsoever. I have felt tempted to take notice of the 1938 Prohibition Act because the circular dated 23-3-79 issued to all the Collectors and Deputy Commissioners of this State and communicated to the parties concerned; specifically refers to the prohibition law being enforced in pursuance of the provisions of the 1938 Prohibition Act. If that was the Government decision, as we were told by learned Government Advocate; even before the circular of the 23rd March was issued, it is baffling to the mind as to why and how without even mentioning any provision of the 1938 Prohibition Act the notification was sought to be issued and actually issued on 27th March, 1979. It was purported to be so done in the exercise of the power vested in the State Government by Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of 1915 Act. Even the policymakers, therefore, cannot be said to be oblivious of the fact and the legal position that there was a law of prohibition which should be made effective and forceful throughout the territory of the State with regard to intoxicating liquors and drugs. Even the policymakers, therefore, cannot be said to be oblivious of the fact and the legal position that there was a law of prohibition which should be made effective and forceful throughout the territory of the State with regard to intoxicating liquors and drugs. Merely by issuing a notification under that particular Act, issuance of notification under the 1938 Prohibition Act would have had the sanction and approval of the law. If the interest of public expediency and public morality, health and hygiene impelled the Government to take a policy decision to bring about prohibition at once; I; for one, fail to see rationale in not choosing to issue the notification under the Bihar Prohibition Act, 1938 which is still there on the statute Book and to resort to an ambiguous provision, if at all the provision of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act can be said to be ambiguous after the Special Bench decision of this Court in Kanhai Sahu's case (supra). We have noticed the state of law in the 1915 Act and before the 1940 amendment. We have noticed the state of law after the natural death of the amending Act of 1940. We have further seen the provisions of the 1938 Prohibition Act. We have also noticed the purported action of the respondents as mentioned in the circular dated 23rd March, 1979 reflecting the policy decision of the Government on the basis of the 1938 Prohibition Act. In this background, if we were to construe the provisions of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act as a matter of first impression as on this date, I would not hesitate to come to the conclusion that I have already arrived at. "The Court," said Sir George Jessel M.R., "is not to be obvious....of the history of law and legislation. In this background, if we were to construe the provisions of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act as a matter of first impression as on this date, I would not hesitate to come to the conclusion that I have already arrived at. "The Court," said Sir George Jessel M.R., "is not to be obvious....of the history of law and legislation. Although the Court is not at liberty to construe an Act of Parliament by the motives which influenced the Legislature; yet when the history of law and legislation tells the Court, and prior JUDGMENT :s tell this present court, what the object of the legislature was, the court is to see whether the terms of the section are such as fairly to carry out that object and no other; and to read the section with a view to finding out what it means, and not with a view to extending it to something that was not intended." And, again, says Maxwell, 12th Edition, at page 64-- Previous legislation may be relevant to the interpretation of later statute in two ways- (i) The course which legislation on a particular point has followed often provides an indication as to how the Act at present in force should be interpreted, and (ii) Light may be thrown on the meaning of a phrase in a statute by reference to a specific phrase in an earlier statute dealing with the same subject-matter. In the present case, I think, our task is lighter still because it is the very same provision which was the subject-matter of construction of the Special Bench before the 1940 amendment, and after the intervention of the amending Act of 1940 if we are left in a situation when even the amendment had been effaced from the Statute Book, I am constrained to take the view that there can be no other construction of the provision of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act except the one that I have taken even de hors reference to Kanhai Sahu's case (supra). 20. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents very frankly conceded the position: the notification was not in respect of any class of persons. But his sole ground of protection of the notification was the construction of the expression 'any person' which I have unhesitatingly rejected. 21. 20. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents very frankly conceded the position: the notification was not in respect of any class of persons. But his sole ground of protection of the notification was the construction of the expression 'any person' which I have unhesitatingly rejected. 21. In the view that I have taken of the construction of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act, the alternative submission of Mr. Lal Narain Sinha that on a contrary view being taken, Section 19(4) would amount to an excessive delegation of legislative power and, therefore, would be rendered liable to be struck down as ultra vires, falls into insignificance. The matter is merely academic. But if I were compelled to express my view on this point, I should, without any hesitation, overrule learned counsel's contention in so far as this submission is concerned. Section 19(4) even if construed in a manner contrary to what I have held, it would not amount to any illegal delegation of power. For, the reasons may be found in the numerous decisions which I have referred to above wherein it has been said that valid legislative power to enforce prohibition is to be gathered from the intention of the Legislature expressed in a Statute. The agency through which such a prohibition can be enforced is always the responsible Government officials who are supposed to act fairly in the matter of enforcement--only more so in the case of a complete prohibition being imposed, if the Statute were so intended to do, because there is no scope of any arbitrariness on the part of the responsible Government officials through whose agency the prohibition law is to be enforced. As a matter of fact no guide lines would be required; for the legislative intent of absolute prohibition is already there. If the notification is valid, there being no scope for arbitrariness and there being no possibility of any unbridled and unguided action on the part of the executive, the question of excessive delegation would not arise at all. 22. In the view that I have taken of Section 19(4) of the 1915 Act, however, I would allow all these writ applications and quash the impugned notification no. S.O. 566 dated 27th of March, 1979 and issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to this notification. It goes without saying that circular no. S.O. 566 dated 27th of March, 1979 and issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to this notification. It goes without saying that circular no. 2390 dated 23rd of March, 1979 has no authority of law nor has the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents sought to sustain the imposition of prohibition by treating that circular as a source of exercise of legislative power. The respondents are, therefore, further restrained from giving effect to the previous circular no. 2390 dated 23.3.79. 23. When some of these applications were admitted and rule nisi issued on the 30th of March, 1979 the Bench admitting the cases passed an interim ORDER :in these terms: It will be open to the respondents to seal the stock of intoxicant in the premises of the petitioners but they will not remove the stock from their premises. The stock still remaining in the custody of the petitioners shall now continue to remain in their custody and possession as learned Government Pleader No. 5 appearing before us today accepts. He further assures us that the applications for renewal of licences of the individual petitioners shall now be considered on their own merits in accordance with the provisions of the 1915 Act. Let that be so done. The respondents shall, of course, white dealing with the applications; be not affected or influenced by the considerations of the issuance of the notification dated 27-3-79. 24. In the circumstances of the case, however, I do not propose to make any ORDER :as to costs. I have had the opportunity of hearing the JUDGMENT : delivered by my learned Brother, S.K. Jha, J. while agreeing with the final result in holding the impugned notification ultra vires, I propose to give some of my own views. 25. Much light has been thrown on the issue of prohibition i.e., possession and/or consumption of any intoxicant (except Bhang and Tari). There definitely lies the question of public health and morality behind it. Doubtless, there hangs the Democle's sword over the heads of the members of the family of the petitioners. In most of such cases, their economic situation is shattered to ruination. Its virus spreads in epidemic form. This engulfs even the younger ones spoiling the prodigies of the nation. There is but the State to put a check on it. Doubtless, there hangs the Democle's sword over the heads of the members of the family of the petitioners. In most of such cases, their economic situation is shattered to ruination. Its virus spreads in epidemic form. This engulfs even the younger ones spoiling the prodigies of the nation. There is but the State to put a check on it. Therefore, nobody can doubt and question the expediency of it. But is it the end of all the stakes of the welfare State. Consideration for health and hygiene of the people never implies impairment of economic, scientific and political prosperity of the State. There are and must be both skilled and unskilled persons engaged in manifold nation-building activities. They, as they claim, after long hours of strenuous labour would like to be relaxed with some medicinal doze of alcoholic drink only to rise up fresh and fine next morning. Should they be deprived of it they ask? That is none of our concern if law envisages in the national interest to put a curb even upon such a relaxation. In any view, the Government action in clamping and enforcing prohibition through legislation is quite legitimate but not by a fiat of executive act. The propriety of policy of temperance cannot be questioned. 26. The impugned notification, which is the subject-matter of our consideration in this series of writ applications exhibits an executive act unsanctioned by legal authority. It is not within my domain to criticise any Government policy provided it has the backing of the law, but I find without the expression of any legislative will there is no urgency no cause shown for such drastic measures by the executive, and it appears that there was no proper application of the executive mind. The change in mentality through nonviolent principles will result in maximum good for the common people in understanding for abstention from Alcoholic drink. The preamble of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) does not speak of prohibition. And, yet; as has been observed by the Federal Court in the case of Bhola Prasad (supra), in accordance with the well-settled principles of construction of preambles, the language of the Preamble is not a decisive factor. The preamble of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) does not speak of prohibition. And, yet; as has been observed by the Federal Court in the case of Bhola Prasad (supra), in accordance with the well-settled principles of construction of preambles, the language of the Preamble is not a decisive factor. So, I have to examine if the impugned notification has an expression of any such legislative intent with special reference to the language of Section 19(4) of the Act, which could make it valid, or is merely an executive action which can not be deemed to have been taken under a proper legislative sanction. It must be done in accordance with the legislative will expressed. However good the intent might be, in absence of legislative mandate it must be deemed to be ultra vires. 27. The impugned notification, as it appears to me, is more or less a hasty act and opposed to the idea of winning over people by nonviolent persuasion, in absence of which, there is more possibility of virus being compounded. There is no question as to the authority of law forbidding the traffic in intoxicating liquor nor as to the wisdom in ordaining it. But the authoritarian direction may prove futile without an effort to mould the character of an individual and the enforcement of it in an inappropriate atmosphere. I say so for the simple reason that judicial notice can be taken of the fact, at least in this State, of the ineffectiveness and or apathy on the part of the executive machinery to implement even the laws properly framed with all the sanction for the enforcement of the legislative will. The boot-legger seem to carry the day causing hardships to many and to the addicts and their families. The evil of prohibition is on the increase and the good of it seems to have gone off. 28. It has been rightly urged that sudden deprivation of business and trade and retrenchment of persons employed in the job may raise the boggle of economic imbalance. It may put the economy of the State in reverse gear and will give rise to the bootlegging activities. 29. There is another point raised for our consideration. 28. It has been rightly urged that sudden deprivation of business and trade and retrenchment of persons employed in the job may raise the boggle of economic imbalance. It may put the economy of the State in reverse gear and will give rise to the bootlegging activities. 29. There is another point raised for our consideration. It has been contended that in pursuance of the impugned notification, the properties, i.e., the liquor and other intoxicants in possession of the petitioners which they had legally acquired were seized by the executive ORDER :of the State Government, which means that the properties of the petitioners were acquired without compensation and it violates Article 31 of the Constitution. In my opinion, the submission so made is not wholly tenable. find that the impugned notification does not mention of any such seizure or acquisition of the properties of any of the petitioners. In pursuance of the impugned notification, the possession of any intoxicant (other than Bhang and Tari) becomes penal under Section 47 of the Act and under Section 70 of the Act, the officers of the Excise Department or any persons empowered by the State Government in this behalf have the right to seize and detain such articles which they have reason to believe to be liable for confiscation under the Act. Whenever an offence has been committed, the intoxicating material shall be liable to confiscation. By this JUDGMENT :, I do not propose to justify the act of seizure in the least as no case under the Act appears to have been instituted against any of the petitioners. The act of the executive in so doing may be a wrong, illegal or an unauthorised act but the question arises whether the impugned notification can be struck down as being ultra vires on this ground. In my opinion, since, there is no provision for any acquisition/seizure of the properties of the petitioners in the impugned notification, the subsequent conduct of the State or its officials cannot be judged as a ground to strike down the notification itself as ultra vires. My learned Brother, S.K. Jha, J., in his elaborate JUDGMENT : has discussed all the pros and cons and has referred to a catena of decisions and impact of the impugned notification, and I do not propose to detain myself in repeating any one of those issues. My learned Brother, S.K. Jha, J., in his elaborate JUDGMENT : has discussed all the pros and cons and has referred to a catena of decisions and impact of the impugned notification, and I do not propose to detain myself in repeating any one of those issues. As I have said above, I am in agreement with the final result in holding that the impugned notification lacks expression of legislative intent and, therefore, it must be struck down and is being struck down as such.