G. T. NANAVATI, S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was a Head Constable serving at Mehsana in 1975. From Mehsana he was sent on deputation to Ahmedabad. On 31st May 1975 he was found drunk. He was prosecuted under the Bombay Prohibition Act. The learned Magistrate acquitted him on 23rd February 1976. Thereafter a departmental enquiry was instituted against him after serving upon him a chargesheet. The chargesheet cited two charges against him. The first charge was that he was found drunk and had thereby committed breach of the relevant provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The second charge was that when he was asked to disclose his name and address he gave false name and false address He gave his name as Gajendrasing Savanth Rathod which is not his real name. The Enquiry Officer found that the charges against the petitioner were not proved. He accordingly reported to the District Superintendent of Police the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority after having considered the report and the evidence tentatively came to the conclusion that the report could not be sustained. Therefore on 20th August 1976 a notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause why charges levelled against him should not be held to have been proved. The petitioner filed his reply. On 12th November 1976 the disciplinary authority made an order holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. Since the charges were held proved against him by the disciplinary authority he was dismissed from service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) THE second ground which Mr. Supehia has raised is that since the learned Magistrate acquitted the petitioner no departmental enquiry could be held against him. We have seen the judgment recorded by the learned Magistrate. He has in course of his judgment staled that he was not accepting the prosecution evidence because there was no independent corroboration for it. Supehia has raised is that since the learned Magistrate acquitted the petitioner no departmental enquiry could be held against him. We have seen the judgment recorded by the learned Magistrate. He has in course of his judgment staled that he was not accepting the prosecution evidence because there was no independent corroboration for it. Want of independent corroboration when it is made a ground for acquittal does not lead to an honourable acquittal. In this case therefore there was no honourable acquittal. It was therefore open to the department to institute a departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Mr. Supehia has invited our attention to the decision of Mr. Justice Thakkar in ABDUL HAKIM AHMAD V. DIST. SUPDT. OF POLICE AND OTHERS IS G. L. R. 210 in that behalf. The learned Judge has tried in that decision to spell out the circumstances under which a departmental enquiry can be held against a delinquent who has been acquitted by a criminal Court for a criminal offence. The principle which has been laid down in that decision is that the departmental proceedings cannot be instituted as a matter of course when a Court of law has acquitted the delinquent. It can be instituted only if there are special circumstances. He has then illustrated five circumstances which are as follows: ( 3 ) IF the Court has acquitted the accused on the ground of failure to obtain the requisite sanction. ( 4 ) IF the acquittal is grounded on the circumstance that there was no sufficient evidence by reason of the fact that the prosecution witnesses had not remained present and that the request made for adjournment to enable the prosecution to examine witnesses was not granted. ( 5 ) IF the charge was defective and the trial was vitiated on account of prejudice occasioned to the accused. ( 6 ) WHEN the case is that of circumstantial evidence and acquittal is rendered by extending benefit of doubt on the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. ( 7 ) WHEN some of the witnesses who implicate the accused are believed but others are not believed and in view of conflict of evidence acquittal is ordered on the doctrine of benefit of doubt. IT has been argued by Mr. ( 7 ) WHEN some of the witnesses who implicate the accused are believed but others are not believed and in view of conflict of evidence acquittal is ordered on the doctrine of benefit of doubt. IT has been argued by Mr. Supehia that the acquittal recorded by the learned Magistrate in favour of the petitioner did not fall under any of these five categories and that therefore the enquiry could not have been ordered against him. In a case where a delinquent has been tried in a criminal Court and acquitted a departmental enquiry may be held by a department. Indeed the department has got to follow the norms of fairness and justice while instituting a departmental enquiry against him. We are unable to accept the proposition that a departmental enquiry can be held only if the case falls in one straightjacket formula or another. Whether a departmental enquiry should be held or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is wrong to fetter the judgment of the disciplinary authority by specifying circumstances for holding a departmental enquiry and observing that a case must fall under one or the other circumstance. We are not able to hold that the circumstances which the learned Judge has laid down are exhaustive and that a departmental inquiry can be held only if the case falls under any one of those five circumstances. It is difficult to imagine innumerable situations which may develop in a dynamic society consisting of innumerable patterns of unpredictable human behaviour. Against the background of such a social structure which is otherwise inevitable no straightjacket formulae can be propounded or enunciated and it can never be said that a departmental enquiry is incompetent merely because it does not fall under one straight jacket formula or another. ( 8 ) SO far as the facts of this case are concerned it presents no difficulty even if we are required to find out whether it falls under one of the straightjacket formulae enunciated by the learned Judge. We have no doubt in our minds that it falls under the last mentioned formula which he has enunciated. When we state this we should not be understood to say that we are accepting the rigour and the rigidity of the approach evident in that decision. We are therefore unable to accept the second contention which Mr. We have no doubt in our minds that it falls under the last mentioned formula which he has enunciated. When we state this we should not be understood to say that we are accepting the rigour and the rigidity of the approach evident in that decision. We are therefore unable to accept the second contention which Mr. Supehia has raised before us. ( 9 ) THESE three contentions which Mr. Supehia has raised show that in a Letters Patent Appeal arising out of a writ petition instituted against the order of dismissal recorded by the disciplinary authority points without substance were raised. Those three points were argued and evidence was read before us. We could not convert ourselves into a court of appeal against the order of dismissal recorded by the disciplinary authority. These three frivolous points having no substance whatsoever in them were argued for well nigh two hours. We therefore asked Mr. Supehia to proceed further and state to us other contentions if he had any. He did not do so. He persisted in arguing the third point. We therefore refused to hear him. ( 10 ) MR. Supehia thereafter asked us to send this case to another Bench We could not oblige him by doing so. We have no difficulty whatsoever in deciding this case. There is no reason for sending it to another Bench merely because the learned Advocate would like to persist in arguing for hours inarguable points. The Court has the right to control proceedings before it and to save judicial time. He thereupon made a request that he should be allowed to withdraw his appearance. We refused to grant that request of his also. No point could have been served by allowing him to withdraw his appearance after he had argued the case before us. He could Dot tell us that we should hear his arguments without controlling them. The question which arises in such a situation is:- Does the Court have right and authority to control the judicial proceedings before it or is it open to an advocate to go on arguing his case in an endless manner making the Court helpless ? We have no hesitation in stating that we have opted for the first proposition and rejected the second. Appeal dismissed. .