JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition has been filed against the order of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer dated June 13, 197', confirming the order passed by the Assistant Collector, Rajgarh, District Alwar, directing the defendant petitioner Birji to deposit a sum of Rs. 2,000/- per year in the Tehsil by way of security. It appears that Smt. Girraji and Smt. Ashrafi daughters of Chhotelal and Rajendra son of Smt. Girraji filed a suit for possession of agricultural land against Birji, who is alleged to be the adopted son of Chhotelal, deceased father of the two plaintiffs Girraji and Ashrafi. There appears to be some dispute about the adoption of Birji by Chhotelal deceased which gave rise to litigation's between the parties in the civil court as well as in the revenue court. In the plaint, the plaintiffs have also made an alternative prayer for partition and possession of their separate share in the property in dispute. The plaintiffs also submitted an application under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') before the Assistant Collector, but the Assistant Collector felt that it would not be proper to grant either a temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs or to appoint a receiver, as Birji was in physical possession of the agricultural land in dispute. However, he directed that Birji should deposit a sum of Rs. 2,000/- per year in two instalments in the Tehsil until the decision of the suit and that at the time of the final decision of the suit, the trial court would be entitled to direct the payment of the amount so deposited in the court to the persons entitled thereto. This other was upheld in appeal by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Alwar and the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan by its order dated June 13, 1977 refused to interfere in revision. A review petition filed before the Board of Revenue also failed. Hence, the petitioner has filed this writ petition before us. 2. This other was upheld in appeal by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Alwar and the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan by its order dated June 13, 1977 refused to interfere in revision. A review petition filed before the Board of Revenue also failed. Hence, the petitioner has filed this writ petition before us. 2. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order passed by the learned Assistant Collector in the present case directing the petitioner to deposit a cash security year after year is the nature of an order under section 212(2) of the Act and that such an order could only be passed after the Assistant Collector would have come to the conclusion that a receiver should be appointed or a temporary injunction should be granted, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (I) of section 212 of the Act. We have perused the order passed by the learned Assistant Collector in the present case and are satisfied that the contention of the learned counsel is not well founded. The Assistant Collector clearly held that he was not inclined either to grant a temporary injunction, in the facts and circumstances of the case, nor he thought it fit to pass an order appointing receiver under sub-section (2) of Section 212 of the Act. He also did not purport to pass an order under sub-section (2) of Section 212 of the Act, yet we find that the order passed by the learned Assistant Collector in the present case is eminently just and proper in the circumstances of the case in as much as the trial court was duty bound to safe-guard the rights of the parties even if it considered that no temporary injunction should be granted and there was no proper case for appointment of a receiver. The plaintiffs had prima facie some right in the land in dispute, being the daughters of deceased Chhotelal, who was admittedly the joint khatedar tenant of the land in dispute before his death. In order to safe-guard the rights of the plaintiffs in case a decree for partition and separate possession of their share may be ultimately pissed in the suit, the trial court thought it fit to direct the petitioner to furnish a cash security in the sum of Rs. 2000/-. In order to safe-guard the rights of the plaintiffs in case a decree for partition and separate possession of their share may be ultimately pissed in the suit, the trial court thought it fit to direct the petitioner to furnish a cash security in the sum of Rs. 2000/-. We may observe that apart from Section 212 of the Act, the revenue court had inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has been made applicable to revenue courts by the provisions of Section 208 of the Act, to impose such condition. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manoharlal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal ( AIR 1962 S.C. 527 ) that if the case is not covered under order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court has power to issue temporary injunction in its inherent jurisdiction. We are inclined to hold that in the present case although the provisions of Section 212 of the Act were not applicable, yet the Assistant Collector was justified in passing an order directing the petitioner to deposit a cash security, in the inherent jurisdiction of that court. It is because of this reason that both the appellate court and the Board of Revenue in revision refused to interfere with the order passed by the learned Assistant Collector in the present case However, in order to allay the fear expressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we may make it clear that the sum of Rs. 2,000/- which the petitioner has been ordered to deposit every year by way of security is not the final amount which has been determined by the revenue court by way of compensation It will be open to the re venue court at the time of the final decision of the suit to determine as to whether any amount and what amount should be paid to the plaintiffs by way of compensation or mesne profits, if their suit succeeds. 3. With this clarification we think that there is no necessity for this court to interfere with the order passed by the competent revenue courts. Moreover, we may observe that this is an interlocutory order and it needs no interference by this Court. The writ petition has no force and the same is dismissed. *******