JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India for a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 9-12-1975 (Annexure F) of the Government of Madhya Pradesh whereby the petitioners service as Civil Judge was terminated, and in the alternative for an appropriate writ, transferring the services of the petitioner to the Revenue department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh. ( 2. ) THE petitioner was appointed as Naib Tahsildar by the Government of Madhya Pradesh vide its order No. 2339/6447/vii/estt. Date 21-5-69 and No. 3016/8292/seven/estt. dated 10-7-69 by the Government of Madhya pradesh which post he joined on 24-5-69. ( 3. ) THE petitioner during the period he was serving as Naib-Tahsildar, applied for the post of Civil Judge in pursuance of the advertisement (Annexure C) published in Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra dated 3rd April, 1970. The petitioner, having been selected by the Public Service Commission, was appointed by the State Government in the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service as Civil Judge, vide order Annexure D, dated 17-4-72 from the date of his taking over the charge, temporarily till further orders. The copy of petitioners appointment order Annexure D was also endorsed amongst other persons for information to the Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh and for enabling the petitioner to be relieved from the post of Naib Tahsildar and for joining his new appointment. The petitioner joined the service as Civil Judge on 17-5-72, and was placed on probation for two years in accordance with the terms of appointment, which were notified vide the advertisement inviting applications (Annexure C ). ( 4. ) THE service of the petitioner on the post of the Civil Judge was terminated vide order of the Government of Madhya Pradesh No. 36051 / f. N. 3 (b) 39/75/e/xxi dated 9th December 1975 with effect from the expiry of the period of one month from the date of the service of the order on the petitioner. This order was served on the petitioner on 16-12-1975. His service, therefore, stood terminated with effect from the 16th January, 1976. ( 5. This order was served on the petitioner on 16-12-1975. His service, therefore, stood terminated with effect from the 16th January, 1976. ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner had raised the following contentions: (i) That, as on counting the period of service as Naib-Tehsildar from 24-5-69, the petitioner had completed 5 years service under the government of Madhya Pradesh on 23-5-74, under Rule 3 (iii) of the madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi Permanent service) Rules (For short hereinafter referred to as the Quasi Permanent rules) which was introduced on 11th January, 1974 and was in force till 22nd December, 1975, the petitioner had acquired quasi permanent status and, therefore, as held by this Court in A. D. Tennirwar v. State of M. P. and another ( 1976 M P L J 6671) the termination of petitioners service, which admittedly is not in accordance with Rule 6 of the Quasi Permanent Rules, is invalid. (ii) That on account of petitioners continuance in service after the expiry of two years period of probation on 16-5-74, the petitioner must be deemed to have been confirmed in the post; therefore the impugned order of termination having deprived the petitioner of the post amounted to removal by way of punishment and was in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. (iii) That the petitioner belongs to schedule caste; there was no stigma on him regarding his conduct and work. Therefore, the termination of petitioners service is in violation of the constitutional guarantee and protection conferred on the members of the schedule caste and the spirit of the Constitution to improve, ameliorate the conditions of the members of the schedule caste and schedule tribe and to uplift them. ( 6. ) THE arguments in counter of the learned counsel tor the State were that the period from which the petitioner served as Naib Tahsildar in the revenue Department cannot be taken into account for reckoning 5 years service; that for acquiring quasi Permanent status under Rule 3 (iii) of the quasi Permanent Rule, 5 years service on specified post, and not on any post, was essential and as the petitioner had not completed 5 years service as Civil Judge till the date of his termination, he had not acquired quasi permanent status. With regard to the question of confirmation his argument was that the petitioner cannot be deemed to have been automatically confirmed; an express order of confirmation was imperative as indicated in annexure C and more so when there is no statutory rule providing either for automatic confirmation or an outer limit for the extension of the period of probation. ( 7. ) THE first question arising for decision is whether the period during which the petitioner served on the post of Naib Tahsildar can be taken into account for calculating 5 years service to attract Rule 3 (iii) of the Quasi permanent Rules. ( 8. ) FOR an intelligent understanding and better appreciation of the point for decision it would be advisable to set out hereinbelow the relevant rules from the Quasi Permanent Rules as they existed prior to 11-1-1974 and thereafter till they were further amended on 22-12-1975. "rule 2 (b) of the Rules defined quasi permanent service to mean "temporary service commenced from such date as may be specified in that behalf in the declaration issued under rule 3 consisting of periods of duty and leave (other than extraordinary leave) after that date. " Specified post was defined by Rule 2 (c) to mean "a particular post, or the particular grade of posts within a cadre, in respect of which a Government servant is declared to be quasi permanent under Rule 3". Rule 8 provided as to when a Government servant would be deemed to be in quasi permanent service. This rule reads as follows : "3. A Govern ment servant shall be deemed to be in wow-permanent_ service (i) if he has been in temporary service continuously for more than 3 years; and (ii) if the appointing authority being satisfied as to his suitability in respect of age, qualifications, work and character for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity, has issued a declaration to that effect, in accordance with such instructions as the Governor may issue from time to time. Explanationin computing continuous service for the purposes of this sub-rule, any period of break in service during a vacation shall be counted as a period of actual service where, upon re-employment immediately after the vacation, the Government servant has been allowed to draw his full pay and allowances in respect of such period. Explanationin computing continuous service for the purposes of this sub-rule, any period of break in service during a vacation shall be counted as a period of actual service where, upon re-employment immediately after the vacation, the Government servant has been allowed to draw his full pay and allowances in respect of such period. " Rule 4 of the Rules deal with the declaration referred to in Rule 3 and reads as follows: 4 (1 ). A declaration issued under Rule 3 shall specify the particular post or the particular grade or posts within a cadre, in respect of which it is issued and the date from which it takes effect. (2) Where recruitment to a specified post is required to be made in consultation with the Public Service Commission, Madhya Pradesh, no such declaration shall be issued, except after consultation with the commission. " By notification dated 11th January, 1974, a very material amendment was made in Rule 3 and a new clause was inserted as clause (iii) which was as follows: " (iii) If he is declared quasi permanent as a result of clauses (i) and (ii) or in the absence of such declaration if he has completed five years of continuous service. " Rule 4 of the Rules was also amended by adding two provisos in sub-rule (2 ). The provisos so added read as follows : "provided that where according to any rules the appointments or promotions were required to be made in consultation with the Commission and where such consultation has been made, no further consultation with the Commission shall be necessary at the time of declaring the government servant as quasi permanent; provided further that where the appointments were to be made in consultation with the Commission, but appointments were made on adhoc basis without consulting the Commission, in such cases, before a Government servant is declared quasi-permanent consultation with the Commission shall be necessary. " ( 9. ) WE may state that the argument of the learned counsel was based on the assumption that the service as Naib Tahsildar and as Civil Judge of the petitioner was a continuous service. This assumption of the learned counsel for the petitioner was based on the ground of following endorsement in the appointment letter (Annexure D ). " ( 9. ) WE may state that the argument of the learned counsel was based on the assumption that the service as Naib Tahsildar and as Civil Judge of the petitioner was a continuous service. This assumption of the learned counsel for the petitioner was based on the ground of following endorsement in the appointment letter (Annexure D ). The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the endorsement clearly showed that the services of the petitioner were transferred from the Revenue Department to the Judicial Department and hence his service was continuous. 9-A. The endorsement of the copy was simply for information and for facilitating the petitioner to be relieved for joining his new appointment. This endorsement cannot be read as a transfer of his services to the Judicial department. No law was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept this argument. The argument of the learned counsel that petitioners service was a continuous service is accordingly repelled. However, we also proceed to examine the contention of quasi permanent status postulating that the service of the petitioner was a continuous service. ( 10. ) THE bed rock of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that in rule 3 (iii) the expresssion used is "if he has completed five years of continuous service"; the grammatical meaning of this expression is total continuous service of complete five years, not necessarily on a particular post or the particular grade of posts within a particular cadre. ( 11. ) IT is a well settled law that a grammatical construction has to be avoided when such a construction is controlled by the context and/or by other provisions in the enactment or it would lead to absurdity or inconsistency or anomalous position or would be in manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment. ( 12. ) IT cannot be gainsaid that the purpose and object of Rule 3 of the quasi Permanent Rules before and after addition of clause (iii) to it was the same, that is, conferral of quasi permanent status on a Government Servant. Before the addition of clause (iii) the Government servant could be deemed to be quasi permanent only if he was so declared in accordance with clauses (i) and (ii) read with Rule 4 (1 ). Before the addition of clause (iii) the Government servant could be deemed to be quasi permanent only if he was so declared in accordance with clauses (i) and (ii) read with Rule 4 (1 ). As a result of addition of clause (iii)a Government servant could be deemed to be quasi permanent in absence of declaration also - provided he completed five years of continuous service. In other words in respect of Government servants in continuous service for more than five years declaration was dispensed with; the conferral of the status was made automatic, ipso facto on completion of live years continuous service. To put it differently after the addition of clause (iii) declaration for the acquisition of the quasi permanent status was essential requirement in respect of a Government servant who has been in continuous service for more than 3 years but had not completed 5 years. The continuous service for two more years service itself was taken to be the recognition of his suitability under clause (iii) within absence of clause (iii) was required to be declared in the declaration under clause (ii ). ( 13. ) NOW if we look to the definition of specified post which remained unchanged even after the addition of clause (iii) to Rule 3 till 22-12-1975, when further amendments were notified, it becomes clear that this status is acquired on a particular post, or the particular grade of posts within a cadre. In clause (i) also the expression used is "service continuously" which means the same as "continuous service". This clause (i) has to be read in conjunction with clause (ii) which clearly bears out that declaration of satisfaction as to suitability under clause (ii) by the appointing authority is with reference to the post on which that person has been continuously serving for more than 3 years. This conclusion is but tressed from Rule 4 (1) which says "a declaration issued under Rule 3 shall specify the particular post or the particular grade or posts within a cadre, in respect of which it is issued" (emphasis supplied by us ). Now when this is the meaning that has to be assigned to the expression "service continuously" a different meaning cannot be assigned to the expression "continuous service" in clause (iii ). Now when this is the meaning that has to be assigned to the expression "service continuously" a different meaning cannot be assigned to the expression "continuous service" in clause (iii ). It has to be read in the context, to avoid inconsistency and repugnancy with the earlier clauses in the same rule, when the object of this clause (iii) and the clauses (i) and (ii) is the same. The interpretation put by the teamed counsel for the petitioner can only be accepted if the expression under question is read torn of context and being oblivious of the object and the other provisions of the Quasi Permanent Rules which control its meaning. We may also point out that the interpretation that is being put by the learned counsel for the petitioner if accepted would lead to absurdity as we shall just illustrate. a a peon in the Revenue Department who was in service in that department since 15-1-1969, during his temporary service on that post, in pursuance of the advertisement applied for the post of Civil Judge, was selected by the Public Service Commission and appointed temporarily as such and he joined that post on 8-1-1974. There were other direct recruits who were previously not in Government service and were appointed on this post as temporarily since 1971. Then consequent to the addition of clause (iii) to Rule 3 as per the interpretation of the learned counsel for the petitioner a would acquire the quasi permanent status on I5-1974, that is, after having worked as Civil Judge for only 7 days whereas these persons working on that post temporarily since 1971 would not acquire that. This is nothing but leading to most unjust, unreasonable and absurd result. In the absence, therefore, of some specific indication, this harsh, or ridiculous or absurd effect was intended by the Legislature cannot be thought of. The net result is that under clause (iii) of Rule 3, the quasi permanent status is acquired on a specified post and to attract that clause five years service must be on a particular post or on posts of particular grade within a cadre. The net result is that under clause (iii) of Rule 3, the quasi permanent status is acquired on a specified post and to attract that clause five years service must be on a particular post or on posts of particular grade within a cadre. This view is in line with the decision of this Court in A. D. Tannirwars case (Supra); the relevant observation whereof reads as under : "but in cases where no declaration is necessary and the conferral of quasi permanent status is automatic by operation of clause (iii), the specified post on which the quasi-permanent status is acquired must be deemed to be that post on which the Government servant was working continuously for more than 5 years. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the post of Lecturer on which the petitioner was working was a permanent post and that he was continuously working on that post from 22nd July 1966. The petitioner, therefore, was in continuous service on that post for more than 5 years when clause (iii) was inserted in Rule 3 on 11th January 1974. The petitioner thus acquired a quasi permanent status. " ( 14. ) IT is undisputed that the cadre of Naib Tehsildar and that of the civil Judge is not the same and are different cadres. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing discussion we are of the firm opinion that the period of service rendered by the petitioner as Naib Tehsildar cannot be taken into account for counting five years service so as to give the benefit of clause (iii) of Rule 3 of the Quasi Permanent Rules. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, repelled. ( 15. ) WE now come to the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is a common ground that the petitioner was appointed temporarily and placed on probation for 2 years as was provided in the advertisement for the post (Annexure C ). The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that as the petitioner was continued in service, till the impugned termination, after the expiry of two years period of probation in 1974, the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed in his appointment which was against a permanent post. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that as the petitioner was continued in service, till the impugned termination, after the expiry of two years period of probation in 1974, the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed in his appointment which was against a permanent post. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in view of Rule B of the Madhya pradesh Civil Service (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter for short referred to as the Service Rules) the period of probation could not be extended beyond one year so also after on the expiry of 8 years period on 17-5-1975, the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed. ( 16. ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be repelled for the reasons to follow. The Service Rules cannot be pressed into service for the decision of the point at hand. Rule 3 (C) read with proviso of the Service Rules clearly provides that the Service Rules do not apply to persons appointed to the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service except in respect of any matter not covered by the special provisions relating to them, their services or their posts. It may be mentioned that this Court has in Jayant Kumar v. Public Service Commission, M. P. (1978 M P L J 784), reiterating the view of this Court in an earlier decision in Anant Kumar v. State of M. P. (1975 M P L J 624.)held that State Government in exercise of its executive powers issue executive instructions relating to the matters of appointment and services of persons to the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service. The validity of the terms and conditions contained in Annexure c has rightly not been disputed before us. In this view of the matter there being a specific provision in Annexure C, regarding probation and confirmation, resort cannot be made to Rule 8 (2)of the Service Rules. ( 17. ) WE now turn to the provision made regarding period of probation and confirmation in Annexure C. The relevant portion is set out below. (Emphasis supplied by us)From what is extracted above, especially the underlined portion it has been expressly indicated that after the period of probation on his work being found satisfactory the employee shall be confirmed and there is no maximum probationary period provided. (Emphasis supplied by us)From what is extracted above, especially the underlined portion it has been expressly indicated that after the period of probation on his work being found satisfactory the employee shall be confirmed and there is no maximum probationary period provided. The necessary corollary, therefore, is that in absence of formal order of confirmation, if the employee is allowed to continue in service after the original period of probation, he shall be deemed to continue as probationer till the formal order of confirmation. In other words the necessary implication is that after the completion of the specified period of probation, if the employee is allowed to continue in the post without a formal order of confirmation, his original specified period of probation is deemed to have been extended. Thus the forequoted condition permitted extension of the probationary period for an indefinite time. The principle deducible from the leading decision on the point of the supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (AIR 1968 S C 1210) is that unless there is a Service Rule providing for an automatic confirmation on the expiry of the specified period of probation or an outer limit for the extension of the period of probation, the employee shall be deemed to continue on probation if he is allowed to continue without confirmation after the expiry of specified period. ( 18. ) IN the light of the foregoing discussion, admittedly as there was no order of confirmation of the petitioner, he continued as probationer till the termination of his service. Though in the light of our view already expressed that Rule 8 of the service Rules cannot be utilised for the decision of the point at hand, it is not necessary to consider the implication of that rule; but even on assuming that it applies, we are of the opinion that even according to that Rule also the petitioner could not be deemed to have been confirmed on his post. ( 19. ) THE learned counsel tor the petitioner has sought to rely on sub-rule (2) of rule 8 of the Service Rules, which reads as under : "8. Probation.- (1) ** ** ** (2) The appointing authority may, for sufficient reasons, extend the period of probation by a further period not exceeding one year. ( 19. ) THE learned counsel tor the petitioner has sought to rely on sub-rule (2) of rule 8 of the Service Rules, which reads as under : "8. Probation.- (1) ** ** ** (2) The appointing authority may, for sufficient reasons, extend the period of probation by a further period not exceeding one year. " The effect of sub-rule (2) had come up for consideration before this Court in maheshchandra v. State of M. P. (1975 M P L J 493 ). When this sub-rule (2) had come up for consideration in the said decision before this Court, there was following note below sub-rule (2) "notea probationer whose period of probation is not extended under this sub-rule but who has neither been confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation shall be deemed to have been continued in service, subject to the condition of his service being terminable on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side. " It was held in Makeshchandra v. State of M. P. (Supra) on the basis of this note that in the case of civil servant whose initial period of 2 years probation was not extended under sub-rule (2) but who continued in service beyond a period of 3 years from initial appointment and his service was later terminated by giving one month notice, termination was not illegal as it was covered by the note to sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 of the Service Rules and the employee could not be deemed to have been confirmed. ( 20. ) SINCE 20th December, 1974, the forequoted note below sub-rule (2)of Rule 8 of the Service Rules has been omitted vide notification No. F-3-15-74-3-1, dated 9-12-1974, which was published in Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra part IV (Ga) dated 20th December, 1974 and also the original sub-rule (6)was amended and a new sub-rule (7) was added. ( 20. ) SINCE 20th December, 1974, the forequoted note below sub-rule (2)of Rule 8 of the Service Rules has been omitted vide notification No. F-3-15-74-3-1, dated 9-12-1974, which was published in Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra part IV (Ga) dated 20th December, 1974 and also the original sub-rule (6)was amended and a new sub-rule (7) was added. This amended sub-rule (6)and the added sub-rule (7) are set out below : " (6) On the successful completion of probation and passing of the prescribed departmental examination, if any, the probationer shall, if there is a permanent post available, be confirmed in the service or post to which he has been appointed, otherwise a certificate shall be issued in his favour by the appointing authority to the effect that the probationer would have been confirmed but for the non-availability of the permanent post and that as soon as a permanent post becomes available he will be confirmed. (7) A probationer, who has neither been confirmed, nor a certificate issued in his favour under sub-rule (6), nor discharged from service under sub-rule (4), shall be deemed to have been appointed as a temporary government servant with effect from the date of expiry of probation and his conditions of service shall be governed by the Madhya Pradesh government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-Permanent Service) Rules, 1960. " ( 21. ) ON reading sub-rule (2) along with sub-rules (6) and (7) and rule 8 of the Service Rules, it is very clear in the light of the view taken in the forequoted decision of this Court, Mahesh Chandra v. State of M. P. (Supra) that after the expiry of the specified probationary period the employee shall not be deemed to be confirmed on his post but would continue as a temporary government Servant and shall be governed by the Quasi Permanent Rules. Even in this view of the matter, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have been confirmed on the expiry of the original period of probation and the termination of his service by giving one month notice cannot be held to be illegal. The second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, also repelled. ( 22. ) WE now turn to the third contention. The second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, also repelled. ( 22. ) WE now turn to the third contention. The learned counsel for the petitioner, being alive to the spinal weakness of his fore referred contention in law, he played upon the judicial sensitivity to the justice, equity and good conscience, and argued that the Constitution guarantees special protection to the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, realising their social and economic hardship; therefore, the service of the petitioner, when his work was unblemished and his performance during the year ending 31-3-1973 was appreciated by the then Chief Justice as indicated vide annexure E, dated 12-7-1973, ought not to have been terminated. At best the petitioner should have been sent back to his original Revenue Department. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, though attractive is unacceptable under the four corners of law. The Constitution guarantees special concession to the members of the scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in the matter of recruitment; but no constitutional provision or any other law was brought to our notice providing special protection regarding termination of services of Government servants belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. ( 23. ) WE quite appreciate the sentiments of the learned counsel for the petitioner; but judicial activism cannot be invoked to do violence to the norms set by legislation and set at nought the statutory provision. If the statute speaks on the subject, Judge has to be silent and stopped. Statutory provision cannot be controlled by or whittled down by the general principles of equity, justice and good conscience. These principles have no application in face of statutory provision. In this view of the matter and in the light of our having repelled the other two contentions, we find no merit in the petition. ( 24. ) IN the result the petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.