( 1 ) AT the apex of the Co-operative Societies of the Belgaum District, there is a Co-operative Society called as the District Central Co-operative bank Ltd. , Belgaum, (hereinafter referred to as 'the District Society) constituted and functioning under the provisions of the Karnataka Cooperative societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and the Rules framed thereunder. Among others, to the Committee of Management of the District Society, the Tarihal Vividha Seva Sahakari Sangha niyamita, Tarihal, represented by one Shri Ningangouda Basangouda, patil, a primary Society which is the petitioner before me, had been elected from the constituency of the Co-operative Societies of the District. ( 2 ) AS in the, case of many other primary Co-operative, Societies, the, petitions had borrowed various amounts from the District Society agreering to pay the same on or before a particular date with interest thereon. Before the due date, the petitioner, repaid the principal amounts borrowed by it to the District Society and has repaid the, interest due thereon before the end of June, 1978, but after the stipulated due, date. Very surprisingly, the Joint Registrar of Co-operative. Societies, Belgaum Division, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Joint Registrar issued a, notice No, D|dsq|nbp| 78-"9 dated 11-9-1978 to the, petitioner proposing to disqualify it from continuing on the, Committee of Management of the District Society on the ground that it had not paid the interest due on the amounts borrowed by it on or before the, dates due for repayment of the loans After some adjournments, the Joint Registrar posted the consideration, of the notice issued by him for hearing on 26-10-1978. At the hearing of the case the petitioner appeared through counsel and contended that the interest amounts had been paid after the due dates, but before the end of June as permitted by the Manager and Chief Executive Office of the District Society and thus there was no default in payment of either thq principal or the interest by the petitioner to the District Society and the petitioner was not therefore liable to be disqualified under any of the, provisions of the Act. By his order dated 27-10-1978 (Ext. By his order dated 27-10-1978 (Ext. A), the Joint Registrar repelled the contention of the petitioner and made an order as under:"in exercise of the powers conferred under S. 29c (7) of the karnataka Coroperative Societies Act 1975, read with S. 126a (1) of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1976 I Shri k. Venkataraimaiah, B. Sc. , HDC, Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, belgaum Division Belgaum, disqualify the Tarihal Vyasasava sevs Sahakari Sapgha Ltd. , Tarihal Taluk, Belgaum District Belgaum, for being elected or appointed or continued as a member of the Committee, of Management of the Belgaum District Central Cooperative bank Ltd. , Belgaum, and thus the Tarihal Vyayasaya Seva sahakari Sangha ltd Tarihal Taluk, Belgaum District, Belgaum, shall not be eligible for a period of one year from the date of this order for reflection or appointment as a member of the Committee of Management of the Belgaum District Central Co-operative Bank i further by order remove Tarihal Vyavasaya Se,va Sahakari sangha Ltd. Tarihal Taluka, Belgaum Dist. Belgaum, from the committee of Management of the Belgaum Dt. Cen. Co-op. Bank Ltd. Shri Ninganagouda Basanagouda Patil, the representative of the tarihal Vyavasaya Seva Sahakari Sangha Ltd. Tarihil an the committee of Management of the Belgaum District Central Cor operative Bank Ltd. , Belgaum therefore stands removed, from the committee of Management of the Belgum District Central Corop. Bank Ltd. , Belgaum. Against the said order of the Joint Registrar, the petitioner filed an appeal in Addl. RCS. Appeal No. 32l78-79 before the Additional Registrar of Cooperative societies (Industrial and Miscellaneous) who by his order dated 1. 3. 1979 (Ext. B) has dismissed the said appeal and; has affirmed, the: order of the Joint Registrar. In this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner represents by Shri Ningangouda Basangouda Patil and also by its Secretary has challenged the aforesaid orders of the Additional registrar and the Joint Registrar (Exts. B and A ). ( 3 ) THE petitioner has asserted that there was neither delay nor default in payment of the interest due by it and in view of the extension of time granted by the Manager and the' Chief Executive Officer of the District society, the findings of the authorities to the contrary are manifestly illegal. B and A ). ( 3 ) THE petitioner has asserted that there was neither delay nor default in payment of the interest due by it and in view of the extension of time granted by the Manager and the' Chief Executive Officer of the District society, the findings of the authorities to the contrary are manifestly illegal. The petitioner has also asserted that it was not shown as a defaulter by the District Soeiety before the, elections were held to the Committee of Management and the District Society had never complained that it was a defaulter and the suo-motu action taken by the Joint Registrar is wholly unauthorised and illegal. ( 4 ) BEFORE the Joint Registrar, the District Society respondent No. 2, inter-alia stated that its practice was to recover the principal amount in the first instance and then the interest due before the end of June on the basis of which the petitioner had paid all the amounts due by it and, there fore it was not treated as a defaulter. Even though that was the stand taken before the Joint Registrar, respondent No. 2 has now somersaulted and has supported the impugned orders. In its return, respondent No. 2 while denying the various allegations of the petitioner, has urged, that the petitioner by non-payment of the interest before the due date had become a defaulter and had incurred the dis-qualification found by the Registrar. ( 5 ) SHRI N. A. Mandagi, learned counsel for the petitioner, at the forefront contended that in the absence of a dispute; raised by respondent no. 2, S. 29c of the Act deep not empower the Joint Registrar to suo-motu initiate proceedings and disqualify the petitioner as had been done by him. Elaborating his contention, Shri Mandagi laid great stress on the language of sub-section (7) of S. 29c of the Act and urged, that S. 29c doeg not permit the Joint Registrar to suo-motu initiate proceedings for any default incurred or to be incurred by any member ( 6 ) SHRI B. G. Naik, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, refuted the contention of Shri Mandagi and urged that the Joint Registrar had the power to initiate suo-motu proceedings and disqualify the, petitioner. Shri Naik maintained that in any event the power exercised by the Joint registar could be traced, to S, 126a of the Act, ( 7 ) S. 29c of the Act in terms does not say as to who can initiate proceedings for dis-qualifying a member of the Committee of Management. S. 29c occurs under Chapter IV, the heading of which is Management of co-operative Societies'. The final authority of a Co-operative, Society shall vest it. the general body of members. S. 27 provides for holding of Annual general Meetings of a Society. S. 28 provides for Special General Body meetings of a Society. S. 29 provides for nomination of members by the government or, the Committee of Management of the Society. S. 29a provices for commencement of term of office of the elected members of a committee of Management. S. 29b provides for resignation of a member of a Committee of Management other than a nominated member. The heading of S. 29c is 'disqualification for membership of the Committee clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S. 29c in absolute and imperative terms provides that a person who is in default to any Co'-operative Society in respect of any dues from him either as borrower or as surety, shall not be eligible for being elected or appointed or continued as a member of the commitee of Management. Clause (a) in very comprehenaive terms prohibits a defaulter from being elected, appointed or continued as a member of the Committee of Management. Elections to a Society normally take place at a general body meeting of that Society. At the electuns to a committee of Management of a Society a person in default is ineligible to be elected. In the very nature of things, whether a person is a defaulter and eligible to, be elected has necessarily to be raised by a rival candidate who has filed his nomination, the Society or suo-motu by the Returning officer at the scrutiny of the nomination papers. We may assume that the authority that has the power to appoint a person has also the power to remove him if such person has committed default. The word 'continued in the context means to allow the person elected or appointed to remain as a member of the Committee of Management. We may assume that the authority that has the power to appoint a person has also the power to remove him if such person has committed default. The word 'continued in the context means to allow the person elected or appointed to remain as a member of the Committee of Management. By using the term continued the Legislature has provided that an elected or a nominated member if he is found to be a defaulter shall not continue or remain on the. Committee: of management of a Society. Clauses (b) to (f) of sub-section. (1) and subsection (2) to (6) do not throw any light in deciding the question arid there fore it is unnecessary to notice them. Sub-section (7) is material to decide the question and therefore it is useful to read the same and the same leads thus: - (7) Any question as to whether a member of the committee was or has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in this section shall be decided by the Registrar after giving the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. On a plain reading of this provision, it provides for determination of the questions relating to dis-qualification mentioned in sub-sections (1) to (6) to be determined by the Registrar after giving the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. As to who should raise the question or issue relating to the disqualification of a member elected. Of nominated to a Committee of Management is not indicated, in the Section, it self. The decision of a Registrar disqualifying a person has serious consequences on such person for which reason, the Legislature has provided, a safeguard of an opportunity of hearing being given to him. As there are, likely to be serious disputes in such matters, the Legislature has conferred, the power on an independent authority like the Registrar to decide those disputes between the parties. In deciding the question, the Registrar acts as an independent authority exercising quasi-judical functions. With tnis background can it be said that the Registrar can suo motu initiate proceedings against any and every member of the Committee of Management of a Society and disqualify any and every member of a Committee, of management of a Society. In my opinion, having regard to the scheme and object of the Act. With tnis background can it be said that the Registrar can suo motu initiate proceedings against any and every member of the Committee of Management of a Society and disqualify any and every member of a Committee, of management of a Society. In my opinion, having regard to the scheme and object of the Act. the naturq of the power conferred and the consequences of a decision, the answer can only be in the negative. It is now useful to examine whether S. 126a of the Act on which grea,t reliance was placed by Shri Naik supports the suo-motu action of the Joint registrar. The heading of S. 126a is 'removal and disqualification of a member of a committee. The heading of a section also gives a clue in understanding the true scope and ambit of a section though it cannot control the language of the section itself. Section 126a confers power op the registrar to remove a member of a Committee of Management of disqualify him from serving on a Committee of Management or holding any office in any Co-operative Society for such period not exceeding 3 years. The former part of clause (d) of sub-section (1) confers power on the registrar to remove a member of the Committee of Management on a report made to him or otherwise. The word otherwise in the context can only mean suo-motu. The suo-motu power to remove a member, if the disqualification is under S. 29c, can be exercised by the Regtr. only when he has determined the disqualification under the said provision and not otherwise, the latter part of clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) confers power on the registrar to disqualify persons for any of the matters enumerated in clauses (b), (c) and (d) from serving on the Committee of 3 Co-operative society or holding any office in a Co-operative Society as he may specify. Clause (d) does not expressly refer to clause (a) of the same section viz. , to a case of a person who has become subject to disqualification under s. 29c of the Act, while the same in exprqss terms refers to other clauses viz clauses (b), (c) and' (d) of the same Section. This omission cannot be said to be unintentional. S. 29c refers to disqualification incurred far default in payment of the dues by a member. This omission cannot be said to be unintentional. S. 29c refers to disqualification incurred far default in payment of the dues by a member. Clauses (b) (c) and (d) of s. 126a refer to ether disqualifications like (1) a member has octed or has been acting fraudulently or with gross negligence or in contravention of the provisions of the Act, the Rules or the Bye-laws of a, Co-opefative society or without the sanction of Committee of the Society where such sanction is necessary or contrary to the resolution or in any way prejudicial to the, interests of the Society, (2) has acted or has been acting persistently against the directions or orders issued under the Act or the rules made thereunder, and (3) is not discharging his duties satisfactorily. The disqualification under S. 29c and clauses (b), (c) and (d) of S. 126a are. not one and the same, for these reasons I am of the, opinion that S. 126a does not in any way assist Shri Naik in sustaining the impugned orders. ( 8 ) SHRI Mandagi next contended that respondent No. 2 haying regard to the circular or representation made on the faith of which the petitioner had acted, was estopped from contending that the petitioner was a defaulter, for which reason the authorities were precluded from holding the contrary. Shri Naik, in my opinion rightly, did not dispute that the Manager and the Chief Executive. Officer of respondent No. 2 had written circulars or made representations to the petitioner permitting the payment of interest before the end of June, 1978 and that the petitioner had in fact paid all the interest due by it before, the said period and the petitioner was not shown as a defalter in the list of defaulters of the Society. But he vehemently contended that under Bye law No. 26 (9) of respondent no. 2, the one and the, only authority that was competent to extend the period for payment of the amounts due. either the principal or the interest was the Committee of Management of the Society which had not granted extension of time and the extension of time, granted by the manager and the Chief Executive Officer being unauthorised is of no avail to the petitioner. either the principal or the interest was the Committee of Management of the Society which had not granted extension of time and the extension of time, granted by the manager and the Chief Executive Officer being unauthorised is of no avail to the petitioner. The Manager and the Chief Executive Officer of respondent-No. 2 who had permitted the payment of interest before the, end of June of the year in the case of the, petitioner and all other Societies of. the District is its officer and continues to be in its service. He had granted time for payment of interest on the faith of which the petitioner at any rate had acted and had changed its position to its disadvantage. When, the principal officer of respondent No. 2 permits the extension of time, it would be too much to expect for the petitioner that he was acting without the authority of respondent No. 2. Whether these circumstances attract the rule of estoppel is the next question that arises for my consideration. In the oft-quoted case of Pickard-vs-Sears 1832 A and E 469 the rule of estoppel on which S. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 is founded, is stated in these words: - where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things and induces him to act on that belief so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time, the principle of estoppel by conduct applies to Corporations as well as to individuals. A Corporation is bound as much as an individual by the wrongful acts of its servants as in the case of an individual. (See eastern Ry Co. v. Hawkes 5 H. L. Cas. 331 5 H. L Cas 331: Houlasworth v. City of glasgow Bank L. R. 5 Ap. Cas. 317 L. R. 5 Ap. Cas. 317: Caspersz's Etoppel 4th Ed. Ch viii vide page 1094 of Sarkar on Evidence ). An examination of the; facts and circumstances of this cape shows that they would clearly attract the above principle, and therefore respondent No, 2 is estopped from contending that the petitioner is a defaulter to it. Cas. 317 L. R. 5 Ap. Cas. 317: Caspersz's Etoppel 4th Ed. Ch viii vide page 1094 of Sarkar on Evidence ). An examination of the; facts and circumstances of this cape shows that they would clearly attract the above principle, and therefore respondent No, 2 is estopped from contending that the petitioner is a defaulter to it. ( 9 ) EARLIER I have noticed that respondent No. 2 did not complain that the petitioner was a defaulter. On the other hand, before, the Joint registrar, respondent No. 2 supported the case of the petitioner. I have found earlier that respondent No, 2 is also estopped from contending that the petitioner is defaulter. In these circumstances, I do not see any reason as to why the Joint Registrar assuming that he had the jurisdiction and power to suo-motu examine, should have taken upon himself the task of deciding a trifling question and should have decided against the petitioner for which reason also his order as also the appellate, order affirming his order are liable to be quashed. In the light of my above discussion, I hold that the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. I therefore quash the impugned orders. Rule issued is made absolute,. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the; parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .