JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a defendants revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against the order of the Additional District Judge, Kanpur dated 17-7-1976 striking off the defence under Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Suit No. 318 of 1973 was filed by the plaintiff for ejectment, recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation against the defendants. After the service of the notice of the plaint, the defendants filed the written statement denying their liability to ejectment. They also, claimed that the rent payable by them was Rs. 25/- per month. 3. On the pleadings of the parties the Judge small Cause Court framed issues on 14-3-1975. It, however, appears that thereafter some-time in July, 1976, an application was filed by the plaintiffs for striking out the defence on the ground that as the defendants had not paid the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation on 14-3-1975, the defence was liable to be struck off. The application was resisted by the defendants. They claimed that the application of the plaintiffs for striking off the defence was liable to be rejected inasmuch as the entire arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation had been paid by them before. The following details would show the position of payment made by the defendants : (a) Rent upto 31-12-1973 had been deposited in Misc. Case No. 156 of 1972. under section 7-C of the Old Act ; (b) A sum of Rs. 750/- towards rent for the period from 1-1-1974 to 31-7-1975 was deposited on 5-9-1975 ; (c) A sum of Rs. 50/-as rent for August and September, 1975 was deposited on 20-10-1975 ; (d) A sum of Rs. 100/- as rent for the period from October, 1975 to January, 1976 was deposited on 20-5-76. (e) A sum of Rs. 125/- as rent for the period from February, 1976 to June, 1976 was deposited on 8-5-1976. 4. Holding that as the defendants had not deposited the arrears of rent on the first date of hearing, the Judge Small Cause Court allowed the application of the plaintiffs and struck off the defence. Against the aforesaid order, the present revision was filed. 5. 4. Holding that as the defendants had not deposited the arrears of rent on the first date of hearing, the Judge Small Cause Court allowed the application of the plaintiffs and struck off the defence. Against the aforesaid order, the present revision was filed. 5. By U P. Act No. 37 of 1972 a new provision was added in the Order 15 of the C.P.C. as rule 5. Rule 5 provided for the striking off the defence, if the admitted rent or damages for use and occupation had not been paid. This rule can be divided into two parts. In the first part the rent due upto the date of the first hearing has to be deposited on that date and that there after the rent of the subsequent period has to be deposited monthly as and when it falis due. The Court has no power to extend the time for depositing the amounts under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. except on a representation of a defendant. There was, however, a further condition that the representation could be accepted only if the same was followed by depositing of security. It is needless to say that in a representation filed for condonation or extension of time, a defendant is liable to make out a case for the said purpose and to satisfy the Court by the grounds on which he could not deposit them within the time prescribed by Order 15 Rule 5 of the C.P.C. 6. In the instant case, now there is no dispute that the entire amount due upto February, 1975 had not been deposited. The defendants admitted that the amount had not been deposited on that date, but the case developed on their behalf was that since on the date on which the application for striking off the defence was considered by the Judge Small Cause Court, the entire amount had been paid up, the written statement was not liable to be rejected or struck off. According to the defendants in order to strike off a defence. under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. the defendant must be found to be in default on the date of passing of the order. According to them where, as is here, the defendant was not found in default having paid up the entire amount, he could not be deprived of his written statement. under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. the defendant must be found to be in default on the date of passing of the order. According to them where, as is here, the defendant was not found in default having paid up the entire amount, he could not be deprived of his written statement. It is not denied that the expression on first hearing' includes the date of the settlement of issues as well. The issues had been settled on 14-3-1975 when the Court applied its mind to the case while determining the issues. On that date, admittedly, the rent upto the period of February, 1975 had fallen due. This rent was deposited on 5-9-1975 and not on the date of the first hearing i.e. 14-3-1975. As a result thereof, the written statement was liable to be struck off. Under Order 15 Rule 5 of the C.P.C. a written statement is liable to be struck off, if the amount due upto the first date of hearing is not deposited on it. As a result of the non-deposit., the defendant incurs a liability under this provision. It is open to a Court to strike off the defence after an opportunity to the defendant. If, however, a Court does not strike off the defence immediately on the date of first hearing, its right to strike off the defence is not vanished. A written statement can be struck off even on some date in future when the Court is called upon to do so. A subsequent payment of the amount does not dispense with the consequences of the failure to comply with the requirements of Order 15 Rule 5 of the C.P.C. There is nothing in Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. which may justify the conclusion that the power to strike off the defence can be utilised only if it is found by the Court on the date on which it makes such an order that the defendant was in default even on that date. The liability to the striking off the defence having already been incurred, the defendant cannot be permitted to argue that the said power cannot be exercised if it was not done earlier. The liability to the striking off the defence having already been incurred, the defendant cannot be permitted to argue that the said power cannot be exercised if it was not done earlier. It is, therefore, not correct to say that for striking off the defence under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C continued default of the defendant is necessary on the date of passing of the order and the date of passing of the order is irrelevant, the relevancy only is that the deposit must have been made on the first date of hearing. Another ground on which a defence is liable to be struck off is that a defendant must pay regularly the amount of monthly rent. 7. If either of the two things is not done, the written statement would be struck off. It is another thing that on a representation made by a defendant, the Court may, on sufficient cause being shown, condone the default and extend the time upto the date on which the deposits has been made in the past or may be made in future ; but that does not mean that the continued default is required to be established on the date of passing of the order. 8. Sri K.M. Dayal, counsel appearing for the defendants however, contended that since the power conferred by Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. is discretionary and not mandatory, the Court has ample jurisdiction to refuse to strike off the defence in spite of the fact that the deposits have not been made in accordance with the manner provided in Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. Reliance has been placed on the expression 'may' used in the aforesaid provision. It is true that the word 'may', by itself, does not acquire the meaning of 'must' or 'shall' ; but it is equally settled that this word 'may' is capable of meaning 'must' or 'shall' in the light of the context and that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation. In such an event the word 'may' may assume the shape of a commend and not discretion. For that purpose it becomes necessary to consider the purpose of the relevant empowerment and its impact on those who are likely to be affected by that exercise of the power. 9. In such an event the word 'may' may assume the shape of a commend and not discretion. For that purpose it becomes necessary to consider the purpose of the relevant empowerment and its impact on those who are likely to be affected by that exercise of the power. 9. In Frederic Guilder Julicus v. The Right Deo, 5 A.C. 215., the Lord Blackburn said 'I do not think the words it shall be lawful' are themselves ambiguous. They are apt words to express that a power is given, and as, prima facie, the donee of a power may either exercise it or leave it obused, it is not accurate to say that, prima-facie, they are equivalent to say that the donee may do it, but if the object, for which the power is conferred, is for the purpose of enforcing a right, there may be a duty cast on the donee of the power to exercise it for the benefit of those, who have that right, when required on their behalf. When there is such a duty, it is not inaccurate to say that the words conferring the power are equivalent to saying that the donee must exercise it. It by no means follows that because there is a duty cast on the donee of a power to exercise it, that mandamus lies to enforce it. That depends upon the nature of the duty and the position of the donee. 10. The principle laid down above has been consistently followed in a number of cases and it had been held that where the word 'may' carries with it an obligation to exercise a power in a particular manner or direction, the word 'may' means must. 11. It is clear from what has been said above that if the conditions in which the power is to be exercised in particular cases are also stated, then on the fulfilment of those conditions, the power becomes annexed to a duty (This principle can be deducted from the cases reported in A.C. Agarwal, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi v. Smt. Ram Kali 1968(1) S.C.R. 205 . Bashira v. State of U.P., 1969(1) S.C.R 32 . and Shri Ranga Swami v. Sagar Textile Mills (P) Limited and another, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1516. 12. Bashira v. State of U.P., 1969(1) S.C.R 32 . and Shri Ranga Swami v. Sagar Textile Mills (P) Limited and another, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1516. 12. In the instant case, the power to strike off the defence is coupled with the obligation inasmuch as this rule confers a right on a plaintiff to get the written statement struck off, if the rent and damages have not been paid. The conditions under which this power has to be exercised are detailed in Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. it is not open to an authority to refuse to exercise the power simply because it does not choose to do so. The power has got to he exercised if the conditions mentioned in Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. have been made out. It would not be correct that merely due to the conferment of power of extension the rule can be treated as discretionary. The extension also cannot be granted by a Court unless a ground for the same is made out. It has further to be subject to the condition of furnishing security. Accordingly, the nature of the power being coupled with an obligation, the word 'may' should be construed to mean a command. 13. In Tolaram Pelumal and another v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 496. relied upon by the defendants, the controversy was different. In that case the question was whether section 18 (l) of the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act made punishable receipt of money at a moment of time when the lease had not come into existence, and when there was a possibility that the contemplated lease might never come into existence, relying upon the settled rule of construction of penal statute that if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put a penal construction, the penal provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. In the instant case such a controversy does not arise. Neither in Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. is penal in that sense nor that two constructions are possible. 14. In the instant case such a controversy does not arise. Neither in Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. is penal in that sense nor that two constructions are possible. 14. In Seksaria Cotton Mills v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 Supreme Court 278, the Supreme Court while dealing with the contravention of a notification with regard to the essential supplies (temporary powers) held that in a penal statute it is the duty of the Court to interpret the words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense. There is no quarrel with this proposition of law. The controversy arisen for decision in the present case is different than that which arose before the Supreme Court in that case. 15. For all these reasons the revision is dismissed with costs.