JUDGMENT : This second appeal is at the instance of the defendants against whom the Court below have granted permanent injunction restraining them from digging any part of the field belonging to the plaintiff and taking canal water through the same for irrigating their fields. 2. The facts giving rise to the suit out of which this second appeal arises were that certain fields belonging to the defendants and the right of being irrigated -from the irrigation canal under Distributory No. 12 and Minor No. 6. For taking water the defendants constructed a channel on the embankment of the field of the plaintiff. The channel in question undisputedly passed through the embankment in between Khasra Nos. 266/1 and 270 owned by the plaintiff It was also not disputed that the aforesaid fields belonged to the plaintiff. It was also pointed out that the plaintiff owned Survey No. 265 also and had constructed a channel on his field for securing the flow of water for the field Khasra No. 268/1 which was on higher level. The case of the plaintiff was that the defendants had no right to dig any portion of the embankment of his fields and to utilize the channel for taking water from the canal towards their fields. It was also pointed out that there was already another course of taking water to the fields of the defendants and the act of the defendants in digging the embankment and flowing water was unauthorised causing irreparable recurring injury resulting in damage to the standing crops in his field. The Courts below concurrently found it as a fact that the defendants have no right to take water by having a channel on the embankment of the fields of the plaintiff. It was also found that the aforesaid act of the defendant did cause damage to the standing crops of the plaintiff and, accordingly, the defendants were restrained from doing so. 3. Since the controversy in between the parties has been decided by the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below on the aforesaid questions of fact, the same were binding for the purpose of this second appeal. This appeal was, however, admitted for final hearing on the question of maintainability of the suit. 3. Since the controversy in between the parties has been decided by the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below on the aforesaid questions of fact, the same were binding for the purpose of this second appeal. This appeal was, however, admitted for final hearing on the question of maintainability of the suit. The objection regarding tenability of the claim before the civil Court was based on the provisions of section 257, read with section 131 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Code). The argument was that since in the present suit the dispute about the course by which the cultivator in the defendant may avail himself of water was involved the subject-matter was triable by revenue Court under section l3l of the Code, and since the revenue Courts were competent to adjudicate and decide such a dispute, the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred according to sub-section (1) of section 257 which provides that the jurisdiction of the civil Court will be barred in respect of such matters which can be tried and determined by the revenue officer according to the provisions of the Code. 4. After hearing the learned counsel for both the sides, I am of the opinion that in view of the pleadings and the nature of the relief claimed in the suit, the objection raised by the defendants regarding the maintainability of the suit before the civil Court cannot be sustained. Apparently, it was a suit claiming permanent injunction for restraining the defendants from doing an unauthorised act, i.e. digging a channel and taking water through the embankment of the fields belonging to the plaintiff. Such a relief could be claimed according to the provisions of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Apparently, it was a suit claiming permanent injunction for restraining the defendants from doing an unauthorised act, i.e. digging a channel and taking water through the embankment of the fields belonging to the plaintiff. Such a relief could be claimed according to the provisions of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The opening part of section 257 of the Code itself makes it clear that the provisions of the said section are qualified by the expression "Except as otherwise provided in this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force." A civil Court can always entertain a suit under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act for the relief of perpetual injunction such a suit is of civil nature and unless cognizance of the same is expressly or impliedly barred, it cannot successfully be contended that simply because the defendants claimed a right to take water through the land belonging to the plaintiff, the plaintiff should have presupposed the defence and should have approached the revenue officer. The plaintiff instituted the suit on the allegation that the act of the defendants in digging the embankment of his fields for taking water was unauthorised causing irreparable injury and since it was apprehended that the said act may cause irreparable injury, the relief of perpetual injunction was claimed. It was not a suit by the plaintiff for the relief of getting his right to take water for irrigation from a particular course established. It was thus a suit for grant to perpetual injunction under the general law. His right to bring such a suit is fully preserved by the opening words of section 257 of the Code because section 34 of the Specific Relief Act was the provision of an enactment for the time being in force and the operation of the same was already excepted by section 257 of the Code itself. There is neither any express nor implied bar for bringing such a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. 5. In this respect, the observation made by Hon'ble A. P. Sen J. (as he then was) in the case of Mahant Gopidass and others v. Ramkrishna and another 1971 MPLJ 893 are relevant, and I rely on the same for taking the aforesaid view. 5. In this respect, the observation made by Hon'ble A. P. Sen J. (as he then was) in the case of Mahant Gopidass and others v. Ramkrishna and another 1971 MPLJ 893 are relevant, and I rely on the same for taking the aforesaid view. Shri N. K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, placed reliance on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nathurum v. Shiyasharan 1969 JLJ 115 and contended that the decision of the D. B. holding that the suit was not maintainable would apply to the present case. I have gone through the decision in Narhuram's case (supra) and find that the present case is apparently distinguishable on facts and the ratio laid down in the said case cannot be applied to the case in hand. In Nathuram's case (supra) the suit filed by the plaintiff was for getting the order made by the revenue officer under section 131 (1) of the Code set aside by contending that the decision given by the revenue officer was wrong on merits. In respect of such a suit, the Division Bench observed that the bar created by section 257 of the Code was attracted and the same was not tenable. The Division Bench also considered that sub-section (2) of section 131 of the Code which permits institution of a suit, was also not attracted because the suit was not for establishing any right of easement claimed by the plaintiff. An unreported decision in Bashri v. Sarfuddin Civil Revision No. 210 /1977 decided on 13-3-1979 was referred during the course of arguments. In the aforesaid decision also, the learned Judge (Hon'ble Mishra J.) had an occasion to distinguish the ratio of the above mentioned two decisions, i.e. of the Division Bench in Nathuram's case (supra) holding the suit to be not maintainable and the other in the case of Mahant Gopidass (supra) holding that the suit for declaration and permanent injunction was maintainable according to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. The question of maintainability of the suit is to be decided on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint and the nature of the relief claimed. The question of maintainability of the suit is to be decided on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint and the nature of the relief claimed. A possibility that some such defence may be raised which may incidentally relate to a subject matter covered by any provisions of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 will not be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court if the suit as per averments made in the plaint and the relief claimed therein was tenable. 6. For the reasons stated above, it is held that the suit was maintainable and was not barred by the provision of section 257 read with section 131 of the Code. 7. This appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee according to schedule, if certified.