DWARKA PRASAD, J.—This writ petition has been referred to a larger Bench for decision, as the Division Bench before which it was placed for hearing thought that the points involved in this case ought to be decided by a Larger Bench. 2. The facts which have given rise to this writ petition may be briefly stated. The petitioner was appointed as a Munsif Magistrate in the former State of Bikaner on September 9, 1937. The date of birth of the petitioner, as entered in the civil list of the former State of Bikaner, is August 30, 1911. The petitioner was promoted in due course of time as a District Judge in the former State of Bikaner and was confirmed as such by the notification of the then Bikaner High Court dated July 2, 1947 with effect from February 13, 1947. Thereafter, the princely States of Rajasthan, including the former State of Bikaner, joined together to form the United State of Rajasthan, which came in to being on April 7, 1949. The petitioner, thereafter, came to be posted as Senior Civil Judge and Additional Sessions Judge at Jhunjhunu on ad-hoc basis in the newly formed State of Rajasthan, with effect from July 1, 1950. The officers belonging to the judicial services of the various covenanting States were integrated to form the Rajasthan Judicial Service and substantive appointments to the aforesaid service were made by the Government of Rajasthan by the notification dated April 23, 1951. The petitioner was placed in group C, relat-ing to Civil Judges and Munsifs, at Serial No. 18, in the integrated set up, by the aforesaid order of the State Government dated April 23, 1951. 3. The petitioner filed a writ petition in this court which was allowed by the order of this Court dated September 5, 1955 (1) and the appointments made in the integrated set up of the judicial service, as notified by the State Govern-ment on April 23, 1951, were set aside and the State Government was directed to provide suitable machinery for making first recruitment to the Rajasthan Judicial Service, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and to treat the appointments and postings made so far as having been made on ad-hoc basis. The petitioner then preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court of India against the aforesaid order passed by this court, but his appeal was dismissed on November 28, 1957 (2). It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that when one State is absorbed in another, whether by accession, conquest, merger or integration, all contracts of service between the prior Government and its servants automatically terminate and thereafter, those who elect to serve in the new State and are continued in service, do so on such terms and conditions, as the new State may choose to impose. Their Lordships held that Article XVI (1) of the Covenant signed by the High Contracting Parties, at the time of the integration of the former State of Bikaner into the new State of Rajasthan, indicates that the old contracts of service terminated and that those who continued in service did so on the basis of fresh contracts, the conditions of which had yet to be determined and the only guarantee which the employees of the old State were afforded by the aforesaid provision of the covenant was that the conditions of their empolyment under the new State would not be less advantageous than those on which the said persons were serving on November 1, 1948, but there was no further guarantee that the new conditions of service would be the same or better. It was also held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that there was no question of reduction in rank and Article 311 of the Constitution was not attracted if the petitioner was not posted as a District and Sessions Judge in the new set up, as all the postings made in the new State were purely transiotional and temporary, having been made on ad-hoc basis. The integration of employees of the various covenanting States necessarily involved a reorganisation of the service of the several integrating States and it was not incumbent upon the new State to post the petitioner necessarily as a District and Sessions Judge in the new set up. The integration of employees of the various covenanting States necessarily involved a reorganisation of the service of the several integrating States and it was not incumbent upon the new State to post the petitioner necessarily as a District and Sessions Judge in the new set up. The guarantee contained in Article XVI (l) of the covenant only contained an assurance that the pay and emoluments of the petitioner, as also his grade and earned increments and other conditions of service, would not be worse than that which were applicable to the petitioner while he was in the service of the former State of Bikaner. 4. After the judgment of this court in the petitioners writ petition was delivered on September 5, 1955, the Government of Rajasthan, in compliance with the directions of this Court, reframed the rules and made fresh appointments in accordance with them. The petitioner was eventually selected in the Rajasthan Judicial Service and he was appointed as a Civil Judge with effect from August 28, 1956. These facts were brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Supreme Court at the time of hearing of the petitioners appeal before them and it was held by their Lordships that the appointment of the petitioner as a Civil Judge with effect from August 28, 1956 under the newly framed Rules should be regarded as his first substantive appointment in the new State of Rajasthan and that the guarantee contained in Article XVI(l) of the Covenant was amply fulfilled and there was no question of any reduction in rank, so far as the petitioner was concerned. 5. The case set up by the petitioner now is that he did not opt to be governed by the Rajasthan Service Rules, which came into force with effect from April 1, 1951, after his appointment in the integrated set up in the new State of Rajasthan as a Civil Judge with effect from August 28, 1956. According to the petitioner, he opted to retire under the rules of the former State of Bikaner and that after the rejection of his appeal by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, he again sought retirement in December 1957 and applied for leave preparatory to retirement under the Bikaner State Service Rules, but the same was refused. According to the petitioner, he opted to retire under the rules of the former State of Bikaner and that after the rejection of his appeal by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, he again sought retirement in December 1957 and applied for leave preparatory to retirement under the Bikaner State Service Rules, but the same was refused. However, these allegations have been controverted by the respondent State of Rajasthan in its reply and it has been asserted that the petitioner did not opt to be governed by the Bikaner State Service Rules nor he could have opted for them after the time specified in the proviso to Rule 2 (ii) of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"). 6. The petitioner worked as Senior Civil Judge and Additional Sessions Judge in the integrated set up of the State of Rajasthan and, thereafter, as District & Sessions Judge. According to the petitioner, under Rule 41 of the Government of Bikaner Pension and Gratuity Rules, issued by the Finance Department of the then Government of Bikaner, the age of retirement of a government servant in the erstwhile State of Bikaner was 58 years. In the United State of Rajasthan after the integration of the various covenanting States, the age of superannuation was 55 years, but it was raised from 55 to 58 years from December 1, 1962 by introducing an amendment in Rule 56 of the Rules. But again rule 56 of the Rules was amended by a notification dated June 13, 1967 published in the Rajasthan Gazette (Extraordinary) dated June 14, 1967 by which the age of superannuation was reduced from 58 to 55 years, which became effective from July 1, 1967. The petitioner, having attained the age of 55 years on August 30, 1966, was made to retire from the service of the State of Rajasthan with effect from July 1, 1967, as his case was covered by the proviso to clause (a) of Rule 56 of the Rules. 7. The petitioners contention is two fold. In the first place, it was contended by him that having opted to be governed by the rules of the former State of Bikaner, he had a right to continue in the service until he attained the age of 58 years and could not be made to retire earlier thereto. 7. The petitioners contention is two fold. In the first place, it was contended by him that having opted to be governed by the rules of the former State of Bikaner, he had a right to continue in the service until he attained the age of 58 years and could not be made to retire earlier thereto. In the second place the petitioner contended that the reduction in age of superannuation by amendment of Rule 56 of the Rules could not have affected him as the said amendment was brought about without consultation with the High Court. Both these contentions are contested by the respondents and their case is that the petitioner was rightly retired on attaining the age of 55 years, in accordance with the provisions of rule 56 of the Rules, as amended by the notification dated June 13,1967 and that the amended rule 56, which was also operative before December 1, 1962 and according to which the date of retirement of a government servant is the date on which he attains the age of 55 years was effective, so far as the petitioner was concerned, as neither the amendment made on December 1, 1962 nor subsequent amendment made by the notification dated June 13, 1967 were made in consultation with the High Court, and further that the fixation of the age of superannuation and compulsory retirement is not a matter which is governed by the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution. 8. The petitioner in support of his first contention argued that rule 41 of the Bikaner State Pension and Gratuity Rules was applicable to him and as such he could not have been retired before attaining the age of 58 years and in support thereof he placed reliance upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bholanath J. Thaker vs. The State of Saurashtra (3). The petitioner in that case was an employee of the former State of Wadhwan, whose ruler by Section 5 of Dhara No. 29 of St. 2004 enacted that the age of superannuation of Civil servants of that State would be 60 years. The petitioner in that case was an employee of the former State of Wadhwan, whose ruler by Section 5 of Dhara No. 29 of St. 2004 enacted that the age of superannuation of Civil servants of that State would be 60 years. After the merger of Wadhwan State with other States of Kathiawad to from the United State of Saurashtra, it was argued that the petitioner was entitled to remain in service of the Saurashtra State upto the age of 60 years because of a similar provision contained in the covenant. It was held, in that case, by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the obligation of the Ruler of Wadhwan State passed on to the Saurashtra State and the new State could not dispense with the services or compulsorily retire the employee before he attained 60 years of age, as all the ex-isting laws of the Wadhwan State were continued even after the formation of the new State of Saurashtra, until repealed. However, it was observed by their Lord-ships of the Supreme Court in that case that the rights of the employee were carried over after the coming into force of the Constitution, when the Indian Republic was formed, with the difference that the employee became an Indian citizen and that the only way to defeat his rights was legislation, if that could be done under the Constitution. In Bholanaths case, their Lordships specifically noted that there was no subsequent legislation on the subject enacted by the Saurashtra State and in such circumstances the rights of the employee continued to be governed by the service conditions of the former State of Wadhwan and his original contract of service. Thus, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in that case that the rules as regards the age of superannuation, which prevailed in the covenanting State of Wadhwan, continued to govern the service conditions of those government servants, who were earlier employees of the government of that State and were absorbed on account of integration in the service of the state of Saurashtra, because there was no legislation on the subject enacted by the new State. 9. 9. After the aforesaid decision was delivered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the State of Saurashtra made the Saurashtra Covenanting State Services (Superannuation Age) Rules, 1955, which provided that a government servant shall, unless for special reasons otherwise directed by Government, retire from Government service on his completing 55 years of age. Later on the Sauashtra State merged, as a result of reorganisation of States, into the bigger State of Bombay and the Bombay Civil Service Rules were made applicable to Saurashtra area as well. These subsequent events have been noticed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their decision in Takhetray Shivdattray Mankad vs. State of Gujrat (4). 10. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bholanaths case (3) has no application to the facts of the present case because after the integration of the various covenanting States, including the former State of Bikaner, and the formation of the new State of Rajasthan, the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan made the Rajasthan Service Rules, in exercise of the powers vested in him under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution and they came into force with effect from April 1, 1951. Thus, the new State enacted a law governing the service conditions of the employees of the new State of Rajasthan, including those who were appointed by integration of the services of the covenanting States, like the petitioner. Rule 2 of the Rules made them applicable to all persons appointed by the Government of Rajasthan to posts of services under its administrative control or in connection with the affairs of the State of Rajasthan on or after the Seventh day of April, 1949, as well as to all persons appointed on or after the aforesaid day to such posts or services as a result of integration of the services of the Covenanting States, and to all persons appointed to such posts or services on the basis of contracts entered in to by the Government of Rajasthan or by the Government of a Covenanting State, in respect of such matters covered by those Rules, as are not specially provided for in their contracts for service. The proviso to rule 2 specifically lays down that all persons who were appointed on or after the 7th day of April, 1949 to the posts or services of the Rajasthan State, as a result of integration! The proviso to rule 2 specifically lays down that all persons who were appointed on or after the 7th day of April, 1949 to the posts or services of the Rajasthan State, as a result of integration! of the covenanting States, could within two months of the commencement of those Rules or of their appointment, as a result of the said integration, which ever was later, could apply for retirement and could be granted pension or gratuity in accordance with the rules by which they were governed previously to such commencement or appointment. The petitioner has tried to urge that after his appointment, as a result of the integration of the judicial service of the State of Rajasthan, he opted to retire, but this averment on the part of the petitioner has been controverted by the respondents and the petitioner has not placed on record any material to support his contention in this respect. On the other hand, the Fact is that the petitioner continued to hold an appointment in the Rajasthan Judicial Service, in the integrated set up, after he was appointed as a Civil Judge in Group C with effect from August 28, 1956. The petitioner not only continued thereafter in the service of the new State of Rajasthan, but he also took advantage of promotion to the post of District & Sessions Judge and also availed of the provisions of the Rajasthan Service Rules relating to pay, leave, joining time and other matters, provided for therein. Thus, it cannot be accepted that the petitioner sought to retire from the service of the State within two months of his appointment as a result of the integration of the judicial service of the Covenanting States. As the new State of Rajasthan made and promulgated the Rajasthan Service Rules, which had the effect of repealing the rules of the Covenanting State of Bikaner and as the petitioner accepted the appointment in the Rajasthan Judicial Service formed as a result of the integration of the services of the employees of the Covenanting States, and continued to Serve in the new State of Rajasthan, untill he was made to retire on attaining the age of superannuation on July 1,1967, his case would be governed by the provisions of the Rajasthan Service Rules. 11. 11. A similar argument, as has been advanced before us, was also taken in this Court by Narendra Mohan, who was an employee of the former State of Jaipur in S.B. Civil writ Petition No. 1955 of 1972, which was decided, along with other connected cases, by the Judgment of this court in Deep Chand Jain vs. State of Rajasthan (5). The petitioner in that case argued that the service regulations of the former Jaipur State provided for compulsory retirement after completing 30 years of qualifying service and that condition of service could not be altered to his disadvantage, because of the provisions of Art. XVI of the Covenant. In that case, also reliance was placed on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bholanaths case (3). Honble Shinghal, J., as he then was, however, rejected the contention of the petitioner in that case and distinguished the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bholanaths case on the ground that the petitioner accepted appointment in the service of the State of Rajasthan, as a result of the integration of the services of the employees of the Covenanting States and was, therefore, governed by rule 2 (ii) of the Rules, which provides that the Rules shall apply to all persons appointed on or after April 7, 1949 to posts in the service of the State of Rajasthan, as a result of integration of the service of the employee of the Covenanting States. His Lordships observed that in Bholanaths case the old Dhara No.29 of Samwat 2004 continued to be in force, as the State of Saurashtra had not made any legislation on the subject, while in Rajasthan the Rajasthan Service Rules were promulgated, which had the effect of repealing the corresponding Rules of the Covenanting States. 12. The very same argument was also advanced before one of us, sitting singly, in Kishan Chand Mathur vs. The State of Rajasthan(6) and it was argued by the employee, who was initially appointed in the erstwhile State of Jodh-pur, that in regulation No. 8 of the former Jodhpur State Service Regulations there was no provision for compulsory retirement of a government servant, who could be retired only on attaining the age of 55 years extendable upto 60 years on public grounds. In that case, also the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bholanaths case was relied upon by the employee and it was distinguished on the very same ground, as was given in Deepchand Jains case (5) that a new legislation having been made by the New State of Rajasthan, the service rules of the covenanting |States stood repealed and the persons who were initially employed in the covenanting States, but who continued to serve after integration in the new State of. Rajasthan as a result of the integration of the services of the employees of the covenanting States would be governed by the provisions of the Rajasthan Service Rules. It was observed in Kishan Chands case:— "In the present case, after the formation of the new State of Rajasthan and after the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the Raj Pramukh of Rajasthan promulgated the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951, in exercise of the powers vested in him under the provisions of the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution Rule 2(ii) of the Rajasthan Service Rules made those rules applicable to all persons appointed on or after the 7th day of April, 1949 to such posts or services, which were under the administrative control of the Government of Rajasthan or in connection with the affairs of the State of Rajasthan, as a result of integration of the services of the Covenanting States. It is admitted by the petitioner in the writ petition that he was appointed to the post of Senior Overseer in the service of the United State of Rajasthan, as a result of integration of the services of the Covenanting States and was thereafter promoted as Officiating Assistant Engineer in the service of the State of Rajasthan. It is admitted by the petitioner in the writ petition that he was appointed to the post of Senior Overseer in the service of the United State of Rajasthan, as a result of integration of the services of the Covenanting States and was thereafter promoted as Officiating Assistant Engineer in the service of the State of Rajasthan. As such, the service of the petitioner was governed by the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951." Thus, as the petitioner has himself stated in the writ petition that he was appointed as a Civil Judge in the integrated set up of the Judicial Service of the new State of Rajasthan with effect from August 28, 1956 and was also subsequently promoted to posts in the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service and as he also obtained the benefit of the provisions of the Rajasthan Service Rules relating to pay, leave, joining time and other conditions of service, he cannot be heard to say that his service conditions should be governed even now by the Rules which prevailed in the erstwhile State of Bikaner. The Rajasthan Service Rules became applicable to the petitioner by virtue of the provisions of clause(ii) of rule 2 of the Rajasthan Service Rules and as he accepted appointment in the integrated set up, according to the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 1955 and have also taken advantage of promotions and other benefits under the Rules, it will be presumed that he accepted service under the new State of Rajasthan as a result of the integration of the services of the Covenanting State and agreed to be governed by the Rajasthan Service Rules. The first contention of the petitioner, therefore, fails and is repelled. 13. As regards the Second contention, it is the admitted case of the petitioner that after he was substantively appointed as a Civil Judge by integration of services of the Covenanting States, with effect from August 28, 1956, he was promoted as a District & Sessions Judge and he ultimately retired from service from the post of District & Sessions Judge on July 1, 1967. The Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 1955 were made by the then Raj Pramukh of Rajasthan in consultation with the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan and rule 29 there of made the Rajasthan Service Rules applicable to the members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service and it was provided therein that the pay, allowances, pension, leave and other conditions of service of the members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service would be regulated by the Rajasthan Service Rules. Thus, the provisions of rule 56 of the Rules were made applicable to the petitioner as soon as he was substantively appointed in the integrated set up of the new State of Rajasthan as a Civil Judge with effect from August 28, 1956. The provisions of rule 56 of the Rules provided at that time that the date of compulsory retirement of a government servant is the date on which he attains the age of 55 years. This rule was amended with effect from December 1, 1962 so as to make the age of retirement as 58 years. But it was further amended with effect from July 1, 1967 so as to make the age of retirement as 55 years age in. Thus, at the time of substantive appointment of the petitioner initially in the Rajasthan Judicial Service as well as at the time of his retirement with effect from July 1, 1967, the age of superannuation was 55 years. Thus, at the time of substantive appointment of the petitioner initially in the Rajasthan Judicial Service as well as at the time of his retirement with effect from July 1, 1967, the age of superannuation was 55 years. As a matter of fact, the petitioners complaint that the age of retirement could not have been reduced from 58 years to 55 years by the State Government without consultation with the High Court is without any substance, because the amendment brought about in rule 56 of the Rules with effect from December 1, 1962 raising the age of superannuation from the age of..55 years to 58 years was also likewise brought about without consultation with the High Court Even if the petitioners contention could be accepted that consultation with the High Court was mandatroy in such matters, in accordance with the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution, then both the amendments introduced in rule 56 of the Rules, the one brought about with effect from December 1, 1962 raising the age of superannuation to 58 years and the other with effect from July 1, 1967 bringing the same back to 55 years, would be likewise illegal and both of them will have to be ignored, with the result that the original rule, as it was in force in the year 1955, when the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules were promulgated and the petitioner was substantively appointed in pursuance thereof as a member to the Rajasthan Judicial Service, should be enforced. 14. It was argued by the petitioner that under Article 235 of the Constitution, the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto, including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the Judicial service of a State shall be vested in the High Court. It was also argued by him that the expression "appointment" includes the terms and conditions of service. There can be no dispute so far as the general proposition mentioned above is concerned. It was hid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as early as in General Manager, Southern Railway vs. Rangachari (7) that the expression "matters relating to Employment" must include all matters in relation to employment, both prior or subsequent to the employment, which are incidental to and form part of the terms and conditions of such employment. It was hid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as early as in General Manager, Southern Railway vs. Rangachari (7) that the expression "matters relating to Employment" must include all matters in relation to employment, both prior or subsequent to the employment, which are incidental to and form part of the terms and conditions of such employment. In the State of West Bangal vs. Nripendra Nath Bagchi (8), it was held that the word control employed in Article 235 of the Constitution includes pisciplinary jurisdiction and the High Court was made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary by the Constitution. Hidayatulla, J. speaking for the Court observed in the aforesaid case:— "In our judgment, the control which is vested in the High Court is a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter, of appointment (including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of District Judges. Within the exercise of the control vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal, subject however to the conditions of service, and a right of appeal if granted by the conditions of service, and to the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as required by cl. (2) of Art. 311." 15. In Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab (9) it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the members of the subordinate judiciary are not only under the control of the High Court but are also under the care and custody of the High Court. In High Court of Punjab and Haryana vs. The State of Haryana (1G), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, approving the dictum laid down in Bagchis case (8) observed that the word control, as used in Article 235 of the Constitution, includes disciplinary control or jurisdiction over district judges, and it was further observed as under:— "This control is vested in the High Court to effectuate a purpose, namely, the securing of the independence of the subordinate judiciary and unless it includes disciplinary control the very object would be frustrated. The word "control" is accompanied by the word "vest" which shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. The word "control" is accompanied by the word "vest" which shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. Control is not merely the power to arrange the day to day working of the court but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction on the presiding judge. The word "control" includes something in addition to mere superintendence over these courts. The control is over the conduct and discipline of judges. The inclusion of a right of appeal against the orders of the High Court in the conditions of service indicates an order passed in disciplinary jurisdiction." Thus, it was held that the High Court has complete control over the district judges and the courts subordinate thereto, including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and also the power to confirm persons appointed or promoted to the posts of district Judges vests in the High Court. Therefore, only the initial appointment of the persons to be district judges as well as the initial promotion of persons to the posts of district judges rests with the Governor. Once they are appointed or promoted to be District Judges, the entire control thereafter vests in the High Court, including further promotions, such as appointment to Selection Grade Posts. 16. In State of Haryana vs. Inder Prakash Anand (11) following the decision in Samsher Singhs case (9), it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court :- "The vesting of complete control over the Subordinate Judiciary in the High Court leads to this that the decision of the High Court in matters within its jurisdiction will bind the State. The Government will act on the recommendation of the High Court. That is the broad basis of Article 235." It was also observed in the aforesaid case that:— "It is true that the fixation of the age of Superannuation is the right of the State Government. The curtailment of that period under rule governing the conditions of service is a matter pertaining to disciplinary control as well as administrative control. Disciplinary control means not merely jurisdiction to award punishment for misconduct. The curtailment of that period under rule governing the conditions of service is a matter pertaining to disciplinary control as well as administrative control. Disciplinary control means not merely jurisdiction to award punishment for misconduct. It also embraces the power to determine whether the record of a member of the service is satisfactory or not so as to entitle him to continue in service for the full term till he attains the age of superannuation. Administrative, judicial and disciplinary control over members of the Judicial Service is vested solely in the High Court. Premature retirement is made in the exercise of administrative and disciplinary jurisdiction. It is Administrative because it is decided in public interest to retire him prematurely. It is disciplinary because the decision was taken that he does not deserve to continue in service up to the normal age of superannuation and that it is in the public interest to do so." (Italic added). The same view was again reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Baldev Raj Guliani vs. The Punjab and Haryana High Court (12),wherein it was observed that Article 235 made reference to the conditions of service which are prescribed under Article 309 of the Constitution. The Judicial Officers also hold posts in connection with the affairs of the State and the rules made under Article 309, so far as applicable, would govern their conditions of service as well. It was also observed in the aforesaid case that the judicial officers although holding posts in civil capacity are not serving under the Government of a State but they hold posts in connection with the affairs of the State and they are entirely under the jurisdiction of the High Court for the purposes of control and discipline. 17. Thus, it has been clearly laid down in Inder Prakash Anands case (11), by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, that the fixation of the age of superannuation is the right of the State Government, although the matter of earlier or premature retirement of a judicial officer before attaining the age of superannuation, is one which relates to "control" vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution. Where therefore, the Governor of the State, acting under the powers conferred upon him under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, amends the rule relating to the age of superannuation, he acts by virtue of the legislative power vested in him under the Constitution. The authority relating to the fixation of the age of superannuation of a person holding a judicial post in the State like persons holding other civil posts in connection with the affairs of the State, vests in the legislature of the State under Article 309 of the Constitution & until any anactment is made in that respect by the concerned legislature, the Governor of the State can exercise the said power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution by making rules in respect thereof and it is not a matter relating to control vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution. The fixation of the age of superannuation is similar to laying down the other conditions of service, such as salary, allowances, pension, leave and the like, in respect of persons in the employment of the State which includes the members of the Judicial Service and they can be regulated by a statute made by the legislature of the State under Article 309 of the Constitution and until such a statute comes into existence the Governor of the State has the requisite legislative power to determine the aforesaid conditions of service of all employee of the State, including members of the Judicial Service. The tenure of a civil servant is undoubtedly a condition of his service. But the fixation of the age of superannuation of a Government employee cannot be regarded as a measure of control over him. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the State of U.P. vs. Baburam (13) that the words "conditions of service" in Article 309 of the Constitution in their comprehensive sense take in the tenure of a civil servant and that Article 309 is subject to the provisions of Article 310. However, if there is a specific provision in some part of the Constitution giving a tenure different from that provided in Article 310, then such persons are excluded from the operation of Article 310 of the Constitution. However, if there is a specific provision in some part of the Constitution giving a tenure different from that provided in Article 310, then such persons are excluded from the operation of Article 310 of the Constitution. Reference may be made in this connection to the provisions of Articles 124, 148; 218, 316 and 324 of the Constitution, which provide the tenure of office in respect of the judges of the Supreme Court, the Auditor General, the judges of the High Court, the Members of the Public Service Commissions and the Chief Election Commissioner, who cannot be removed from their offices except in the manner laid down in those Articles and subject to different tenures specifically prescribed in the aforesaid Articles. The result is that while Article 310 provides for a tenure at the pleasure of the President or the Governor, Article 309 enables the legislature or the executive, as the case may be to make any law or rule in regard to the tenure of service of persons appointed to public services. Thus, the matter of fixing the age of superannuation or compulsory retirement does not relate to the "control" vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution, in respect of persons belonging to the judicial service of the State. The same view, as we have expressed above, was also taken by a majority of the Judges constituting the Full Bench of the Kerla High Court in N Srinivasan Vs. State of Kerla (14). 18. The last submission made by the petitioner was that the reduction in the age of superannuation amounts to "removal" of the petitioner from the service, within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution. It has been repeatedly held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that a person who substantively holds a permanent post has a right to continue in service subject, of course, to the rule of superannuation and the rule as to compulsory retirement. If for any other reason that right is invaded and he is asked to leave his service, the termination of his service is in the nature of a penalty and amounts to removal from service. In other words, termination of the service of a permanent government servant, otherwise than on the grounds of superannuation or compulsory retirement,may amount to his removal within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In other words, termination of the service of a permanent government servant, otherwise than on the grounds of superannuation or compulsory retirement,may amount to his removal within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. Thus, it is cleart hat termination of service occuring as a result of superannuation or compulsory retirement or by an amendment of the service rule reducing the age of superannuation or compulsory retirement would not be violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, We may refer to the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Motiram Deka vs. General Manager, North East Frontier Rly.(15) and Guradevsingh vs. State of Punjab(16). A similar question also arose in Bishnu Narain vs. State of U.P. (17). In that case, the Governor of U.P. by an amendment of the relevant service rules brought about the reduction of the age of compulsory retirement from 58 years to 55 years, in exercise of the powers conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and the employee concerned was retired from government service inconsequence of such an amendment of the rules relating to superannuation. Repelling the contention that the amendment in service rule reducing the age of superannuation was hit by Article 311 of the Constitution, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case, that Article 311 has no application to the termination of service of a government employee resulting from change in the age of superannuation. Thus, the argument of the petitioner that the termination of his service on account of the amendment in the service rules relating to compulsory retirement or superannuation amounts to removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution is without any substance. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in the submissions made by the petitioner. The writ petition is consequently dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.