D. C. GHEEWALA, M. K. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS ease has got rather peculiar facts. A police constable entrusted with a rifle to perform duties assigned to him for patrolling after the duty was over it is alleged by the prosecutions went to a place in the company of friends and without rhyme or reason or any apparent motive or previous enmity between him and the deceased aimed the rifle at the chest of the deceased an utter strangers and in the twinkling of an eye fired a shot therefrom which went through and through the body of the deceased with the result that a young life just ushered into the youthful arena was extinguished in no time. ( 2 ) MR. A. D. Shah the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant fairly concedes that he is not in a position to challenge the findings of the trial court with regard to the possession of the rifle with the accused at the time of the incident and with regard to the fatal bullet having emerged from the said rifle and having pierced through the chest of the deceased causing his death. In view of the voluminous evidence of a number of witnesses including documentary evidence on record with regard to the patrolling duty assigned to the accused from 13th May 1978 onwards at Ranavav railway track; his being entrusted with the rifle from which the gunshot was fired and his being found with the rifle in police uniform with his two companions at the scene of the incident on the night of 18th and morning of 19th May 1978 and the gunshot from the very rifle having caused the death of the deceased the bullet having pictured through and through from his chest and back there is no doubt in our mind that the learned Judge was fully justified with regard to the findings arrived at by him in this connection. ( 3 ) BUT Mr. ( 3 ) BUT Mr. Shah attacks the order of the trial court on the ground that in spite of sufficient material on record the learned Judge failed to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective and in arriving at the conclusion which is inescapable in view of the evidence on record that the act of the accused was not an intentional one and that the bullet from the rifle carried by the accused emerged out of the rifle accidentally killing the deceased. At the most further submits Mr. Shah the offence if any committed by the accused would be one punishable under section 304 or 304 II of the I. P. Code. ( 4 ) IT is true as pointed out by Mr. Shah there is an apparent motive for committing the crime that there was no enmity between the parties and that there is no evidence showing that any exchange of words or raising of tempers had preceded the unfortunate incident. But that does not mean that the act of the accused in voluntarily and deliberately aiming a loaded rifle against the deceased and firing the same point blank at him at rather a close range resulting in his death would not amount to an offence under sec. 302 but would be at the most as submitted by Mr. Shah an offence punishable under Section 304-A on the basis that the death of the deceased was caused by committing a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide. Motive is not synonymous with intention and the two should not be mixed up as they project two distinct and different concepts. The former denotes the reason or so called justification a person may have for acting while the latter denotes the state of mind accompanying an act which a person does on purpose with the requisite state of mind at the time of doing such an act. (Emphasis supplied.) ( 5 ) IT is true in the instant case there is no apparent motive or reason which becomes discernible from the material on record and which would have actuated the accused to act in such an irresponsible and wanton manner. (Emphasis supplied.) ( 5 ) IT is true in the instant case there is no apparent motive or reason which becomes discernible from the material on record and which would have actuated the accused to act in such an irresponsible and wanton manner. It is also true that the deceased was not known to the accused before the incident; any previous enmity between them is ruled out and there is also nothing on record to justify a conclusion that just before the incident anything had happened between the deceased and the accused to cause tempers to run high or to generate excitement. But there is no doubt that the accused had the requisite intention when he committed the said act of causing bodily injury or injuries to the deceased by his reckless act which injuries were in the ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause the death of the deceased. There is also no doubt that the injuries which were in fact caused were ones which were intended. This is not a case in which the accused fired in the air or aimed at some other object and accidentally the bullet landed on the chest of the deceased. In any event the accused knew when he committed the said act that it was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the deceased. The provisions contained in clause thirdly or in any event clause fourthly of sec. 300 of I. P. C. are therefore clearly attracted in this case. ( 6 ) WE are therefore unable to persuade ourselves to accept Mr. Shahs further submission that in any event. this would be an offence punishable under sec. 304 II on the ground that the act done by the accused was an act done with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In order to bring the case within the purview of sec. 304 first of all it has to be shown that the case is covered by any of the exceptions to sec. 300. It is not shown by Mr. Shah as to how and under which of the exceptions the act of the accused would fall. In order to bring the case within the purview of sec. 304 first of all it has to be shown that the case is covered by any of the exceptions to sec. 300. It is not shown by Mr. Shah as to how and under which of the exceptions the act of the accused would fall. On the contrary in our opinion this is a case which falls squarely within clause thirdly of sec. 300 because firstly a bodily injury is caused to the deceased by means of a gunshot secondly as per medical evidence this bodily injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and thirdly there is nothing on record to justify a conclusion that the injury which was caused was not the one intended or than it was accidentally caused. It cannot be said that the injury caused was unintentional or accidental. If the accused a member of the police force supposed to be the guardian of peoples life liberty and property is entrusted with a rifle for the purpose of discharging his patrolling duty specially assigned to foil the attempts of the antisocial elements to plunder public property and if such a person on learning about general orders of withdrawal from such special duty leaves his duty and while not on duty goes out for a stroll at the dead of night with the uniform on and carrying a loaded rifle in the company of friends and then uses this weapon on an innocent person like the deceased who was a young man hardly 20 years old on the threshold of his life and if he voluntarily and deliberately aims the same at the unfortunate victim and first a shot therefrom causing fatal injuries as a result of the bullet going through and through from his body no other intention than the one of causing the very injury which was caused could be ascribed to the accused. Such a wanton callous and irresponsible act cannot fall within the category of an unintentional or accidental act. In any case there cannot be any doubt that such an act would be one which the accused who committed the same knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In any case there cannot be any doubt that such an act would be one which the accused who committed the same knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. There is also no doubt that he committed the act without any cause for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury. This act would therefore in any event be severed by cause 4thly of see. 300. The learned Judge therefore did not commit any error in recording a finding against the accused of guilty for the offence punishable under see. 302 of the I. P. C. ( 7 ) MR. Shah drew our attention to some of the observations of the learned Judge in his judgment wherein inter alia he had referred to the statement which the accused is alleged to have made immediately after the incident before police constable Jamsinh and head constable Kanubhai to the effect that an innocent man had been killed and that it was a ease of 302 and that he should be taken to the police station. It is true no confession made to a police officer by a person accused of any offence can be proved against such person as per the prohibition contained in sec. 25 of the Evidence Act and the learned Judge therefore should not have taken into consideration this part of the evidence of the said head consideration and the said police constable examined at exs. 47 and 46 respectively. But as earlier stated we have ourselves closely scrutinised the evidence and even leaving aside this part of the evidence there is no doubt in our mind that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the case against the accused viz. 47 and 46 respectively. But as earlier stated we have ourselves closely scrutinised the evidence and even leaving aside this part of the evidence there is no doubt in our mind that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the case against the accused viz. that he fired the said shot from his rifle with an intention of causing the very injury which was caused and which injury in the opinion of the doctor was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or in any event the act of the accused in finding the said shot against the deceased was one which the accused knew was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the deceased and that the accused committed such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Appeal dismissed. .