Short Note : 1. The trial Court held that the quit notice, was not valid; that the plaintiff did not require bona-fide the suit accommodation for starting the business of his son; that the plaintiff has no other alternative accommodation available to him and that the defendant has failed to prove that the plaintiff wanted to enhance the rent. On the finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the suit accommodation was bona-fide required by him for the business of his son and that the quit notice was invalid the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The trial Court held the quit notice invalid on the ground that the appellant had failed to prove a ground for eviction under section 12 (1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. The notice was not defective in any other respect. The lower appellate Court, therefore, set aside the finding of the trial Court regarding invalidity of the notice. The appellate Court maintained the finding of the trial Court that the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff wanted to enhance the rent of the accommodation. However, the lower appellate Court maintained the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the suit accommodation was required bona-fide by him for starting the business of his son. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. The plaintiff has challenged the decree of the Court below in this appeal. Held : One of the grounds mentioned by the trial Court for not accepting the evidence of the plaintiff and his son Mehmood Hasan that the suit accommodation was bona-fide required by the plaintiff for the business of his son was that in the quit notice as also in the plaint the nature of the business to be started by Mehmood Hasan was not disclosed. The lower appellate Court while discussing this aspect observed that the non-disclosure of the nature of the business in the quit notice as well as in the plaint and even not furnishing it by amendment in the plaint in the face of a specific objection to that effect raised by the defendant in the written statement robbed the evidence of the appellant and his son of good deal of credibility regarding bona-fide requirement for business of the tenanted premises. There is force in the criticism of the learned counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate Court committed an error in observing that the non disclosure of the nature of business in the notice as well as in the plaint robbed the evidence of the appellant and his son of a good deal of credibility. It may be stated that in the plaint the plaintiff stated that the suit premises were required bona-fide by him for starting the business of his son. It is difficult to appreciate how on account of the non-disclosure of the nature of the business in the quit notice as also in the plaint the evidence of the plaintiff-appellant and his son could be robbed of good deal of credibility. The law does not require the plaintiff to disclose the nature of the business either in the quit notice or in the plaint. In the plaint only the material facts have to be pleaded. The nature of business to be started by a person for whose requirement the tenanted premises are claimed is not a fact to be pleaded. The nature of business falls in the domain of evidence which is not required to be pleaded under Order 6 of the C.P.C. The lower appellate Court, therefore committed an error of law in observing that the non-mention of the nature of business in the quit notice as well as in the plaint robbed the evidence of the plaintiff and his son of good deal of credibility. 2. Another ground on which the requirement of the plaintiff's son was not held bona-fide was that the plaintiff's son Mehmood Hasan remained idle for three years after passing his matriculation examination without even trying to gain experience with his father who was himself dealing in the business of drums of tar. It is difficult to appreciate that from the mere fact that the plaintiff's son remained idle for three years after passing his matriculation examination his requirement can be held to be not bona-fide, if a person wants to start business after so me period of discontinuing his education it cannot be said that he does not intend to start the business merely on that ground. 3. 3. In the evidence the plaintiff also stated that his son would start the business of sale and purchase of tar drums as a Kabadi and that if that business fail he would take up another business. The lower appellate Court concluded from this that the plaintiff was not certain as to what business the plaintiff's son would start. There is no reasonable basis for this observation made by the lower appellate Court because when in the cross examination the plaintiff was put this fact he said that if the business of sale of drums of tar was not successful his son would carryon another business. There was nothing unnatural or uncertain in the said statement of the plaintiff. 4. Lastly the plaintiff's requirement was held to be not bona-fide on a mere surmise and conjecture for which there was no basis. The learned Judge has observed that to his mind it was rather difficult to accept that a landlord would loose income of rent of Rs. 100/- p.m. to indulge in risking his son to be put in those premises for starting Kabadi business with a small capital of Rs. 2000/- which naturally cannot be expected to return income more than the assured rent of Rs. 100/- and that too when the son himself is apathetic towards the business. The learned Judge committed a grave error of law in negativing the claim of the plaintiff on the basis of the said conjecture and surmise for which there is no basis on record. 5. It is thus apparent that the learned Judge of the Court below rejected vital evidence on a wrong appreciation of the legal position. In Deochand v. Shivram ( 1970 JLJ 66 ) the Supreme Court has held that if some vital evidence was left out on a wrong appreciation of the legal position the finding would obviously vitiate and in such a case the finding of fact was assailable in second appeal. 6. In Deochand v. Shivram ( 1970 JLJ 66 ) the Supreme Court has held that if some vital evidence was left out on a wrong appreciation of the legal position the finding would obviously vitiate and in such a case the finding of fact was assailable in second appeal. 6. I am therefore, of the opinion that the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the suit accommodation was bona-fide required for starting the business of his son is vitiated because the vital evidence of the plaintiff and his son was left out on wrong appreciation of the legal position and the finding was based on conjectures and surmises not warranted by the facts and evidence on record. 1975 JLJ 1 (SC), 1973 JLJ 294 , 1970 JLJ 66 (SC) relied on. Appeal allowed.