S. K. MAL LODHA, J.—These two connected revisions before me involve a common question of law and, therefore, it will be convenient to dispose them of by a common order. 2. The petitioner is defendant-tenant and the non-petitioner is plaintiff-land lady. The plaintiff instituted a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant in the court of Munsif City, Jodhpur on February 7, 1975 on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity under section 13(1) (h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (the Act hereafter). It is common ground between the parties that the shop was let out for commercial and business purposes. During the pendency of the suit, the Act was amended. By means of amendment sub-sections (2) and (3) were added by the amending Ordinance No. XXVI of 1975 with effect from September 29, 1975 Ordinance No. XXVI of 1975 was replaced by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Amendment Act, 1976 (No. XIV of 1976) published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extra-ordinary Part IV-A, dated February 13, 1976. Sub-secs. (2) and (3) of sec. 14, read as under : "(2) No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (h) of subsection (1) of section 13 shall be passed if the Court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either \6 the tenant or to the land-lord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant." As the premises were rented out on March 30, 1972 and the suit was brought on February 7, 1975, it was not within a period of 5 years from the date the premises in suit were let out to the defendant and, therefore, he raised an objection before the trial court that the suit was not maintainable because of sec. 14(3) of the Act. This plea was negatived by the trial court by its order dated August 14, 1976 and it held that there is no bar to the maintainability of the suit as the amendment is not applicable to a pending suit. The defendant preferred S. B. Civil Revision No. 501 of 1976 against that order to this court. The revision was dismissed and it was held that sec. 14(3) of the Act as amended by Ordinance No. XXVI of 1975 and replaced by the Amendment Act No. XIV of 1976 is prospective in operation and cannot apply to suits which had already been filed before the coming into force of Ordinance No. XXVI of 1975. It may be stated that this revision was decided on January 17, 1977. 3. It needs to be mentioned here that on November 9, 1976, an application was moved on behalf of the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint for incorporating the facts relating to comparative hardship between the landlady and the tenant. The learned Munsif allowed the application on April 24, 1977 and the amended plaint was submitted on May 5, 1977. The defendant-petitioner while resisting the suit, inter alia, raised an objection in para 7 of the written statement, the substance of which is that since the plaintiff had moved an application for amendment of the plaint on November 9, 1976, the suit for ejectment from the shop in dispute, is not maintainable under section 14(3) of the Act. The defendant-petitioner while resisting the suit, inter alia, raised an objection in para 7 of the written statement, the substance of which is that since the plaintiff had moved an application for amendment of the plaint on November 9, 1976, the suit for ejectment from the shop in dispute, is not maintainable under section 14(3) of the Act. The learned Munsif, after hearing arguments on the defendants application dated November 21, 1977, framed issue No. 10, which when translated into English, reads as follow: "Whether in view of the fact that the plaintiffs plaint was amended, on the basis of the amendment application dated October 9, 1976 (there is mistake in regard to the date of the application for amendment, in fact the application was moved on November 9, 1976), the suit is not maintainable." The learned Munsif, after hearing arguments on this issue, decided it in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant on January 23, 1978 and held that the suit is maintainable. Against this orbed dated January 23, 1978 by which issue No. 10 was decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant, the defendant filed S.B. Civil Revision No. 198 of 1978 on May 16, 1978. The defendant also preferred appeal under sec. 22 of the Act before the District Judge, Jodhpur against this very order dated January 23,1978. The learned District Judge, by his order dated April 4, 1978 dismissed the appeal on two grounds: (1) that the order dated January 23, 1978, passed by the learned Munsif is correct on merits, and (2) that the appeal preferred by the defendant was not maintainable. Feeling aggrieved by the appellate-order dated April 4, 1978, the defendant-petitioner has preferred S. B. Civil Revision No. 199 of 1978. 4. As stated above, in both the revisions, the order dated January 23, 1978, by which issue No. 10 was decided against the defendant is under challenge and, therefore, both the revisions are disposed of by a common order. 5. It may be stated here that the learned counsel, appearing for the defendant-petitioner, did not address me on the question that the finding of the learned District Judge holding that the appeal was not maintainable, is not correct. Mr. 5. It may be stated here that the learned counsel, appearing for the defendant-petitioner, did not address me on the question that the finding of the learned District Judge holding that the appeal was not maintainable, is not correct. Mr. M. L. Johari, learned counsel for the petitioner, has questioned the finding recorded by the Additional Munsif, on issue No. 10 and contended that the suit is not maintainable. He urged that on unamended allegations in the plaint and evidence in support thereof the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for ejectment because of restriction imposed by sec. 14(2) and therefore, it is when she has put in the amended plaint that the suit shall be considered to have been instituted under sec. 13(1)(h) and sec. 14(2). Learned counsel means to suggest that the suit on the aforesaid new ground would be considered to have been instituted when he files the amended plaint containing these grounds and, therefore, for the purpose of period provided under sec. 14(3) the suit will be deemed to have been instituted on the date when the application for amendment of the plaint was filed i.e. November 9, 1976. He, therefore, submitted that the suit of the plaintiff on the ground mentioned under sec. 14(2) is not maintainable in view of the provisions of sec. 14(3). In support of his arguments, he placed reliance on K. Ramchandran Chettiar vs. G. Lakhsminarayana Swami Chettiar(l), State of Rajasthan vs. Rao Dhir Singh (2) and B. Banerjee vs. Anita Pan(3). Mr. Calla, on the other hand, urged that though the application for amendment of the plaint was filed on November 9, 1976, it was allowed on April 24, 1976 and the amended plaint was filed on May 5, 1977. still the amendment so made would relate back to the date when the original plaint was filed i.e. February 7, 1975. He contended that no new grounds for eviction have been taken by the plaintiff for ejectment as sec. 14 deals with restriction on eviction whereas sec. 13(1) lays down grounds for eviction. 6. I have carefully examined the rival contentions. In the original plaint, the eviction was sought on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity under sec. 13(1)(h) of the Act. Sec. 14 deals with restriction and sub-sec. 14 deals with restriction on eviction whereas sec. 13(1) lays down grounds for eviction. 6. I have carefully examined the rival contentions. In the original plaint, the eviction was sought on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity under sec. 13(1)(h) of the Act. Sec. 14 deals with restriction and sub-sec. (3) thereof merely provides that the suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall not lie against the tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant. It has been held in Smt. Kishan Pyari vs. Smt. Shanti Devi (4), which is a decision between the parties, that this provision is prospective in operation and cannot apply to suits which had already been filed before coming into force of Ordinance No. XXVI of 1975. This Ordinance came into force on September 29, 1975 and the suit was instituted on February 7, 1975. It is settled law so far as this Court is concerned, that Sec. 14(2) of the Act is retrospective and before passing a decree for eviction on the ground contained in sec. 13(l)(h) of the Act, the Court is required to give finding with respect to comparative hardship and, therefore, whether amendment is allowed or not the court has to adjudicate on the question of comparative hardship of the landlord and tenant. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that when the plaintiff moved an application for incorporating the facts relating to the comparative hardship on November 9, 1976, and in pursuance thereof when the amended plaint was filed on May 5, 1977 it would tantamount filing of a new plaint and as amendment application was moved before the expiry of the five years from the date of tenancy, the suit is not maintainable. Section 14 (2) of the Act merely provides that relief for eviction would not be granted even if the plaintiff succeeds in proving reasonable and bonafide necessity unless the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 14 do not contain any grounds for eviction. They merely restrict eviction when the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity under section 13 (1) (h) is established. When the plaintiff has incorporated the facts relating to comparative hardship, it cannot be said that by doing so, he has taken a new ground of eviction. The amendment of plaint by incorporating facts regarding comparative hardship would relate back to the date of the suit as originally filed where new ground is added. After considering the provisions of S. 13 (1) and cls. (f) and (ff) and 13 (3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (No. XII of 1956) (as amended by Act XXXIV of 1969), it was observed in B. Benarjees case (3): "Institution of a suit earlier has to be ignored for this purpose since that was not based on grounds covered by cls. (f) and/or (ff) and is not attracted by sub-section (3A). He begins proceedings on these new grounds only when he puts in his pleading setting out these grounds. In spirit and in letter he institutes his suit for recovery on the new grounds only on the date on which he puts in his new pleading. We cannot be ritualistic in insisting that a return of the plaint and a representation thereof incorporating amendments is the sacred requirement of the law. On the other hand social justice and the substance of the matter find fulfilment when the fresh pleadings are put in subject of course to the three-year interval between the transfer and the filing of the additional pleading. Section 13 of the Amendment Act speaks of suits including appeals." Section 13(3A) forbids, for a period of three years from the date of acquisition, suits by new acquirers of landlords interest in premises, for recovery of possession on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (f) or clause (ff) of sub-section (1). In my opinion, Benarjees case (3) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The provisions of section 13(3A) and sub-sections (f) and (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act are retrospective whereas provisions of section 14 (3) are prospective. In this case, no additional ground has been taken by the plaintiff for evicting the defendant. In my opinion, Benarjees case (3) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The provisions of section 13(3A) and sub-sections (f) and (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act are retrospective whereas provisions of section 14 (3) are prospective. In this case, no additional ground has been taken by the plaintiff for evicting the defendant. It may be mentioned here that the order allowing the amendment of the plaint was passed by the trial court on April 24, 1977. The defendant was not at all aggrieved against that order and the amended plaint was filed on May 5, 1977. In this case the tenancy commenced from March 30, 1972 and the amended plaint was filed on May 5, 1977 and thus, on this date, five years from the commencement of the tenancy had already expired. Even if for the arguments sake, it is assumed that the amended plaint contained a new ground for eviction as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, still in accordance with the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in B. Benarjees case(3), the proceeding on the new ground had begun when the plaintiff had filed the amended plaint setting out the new ground covered by sec. 14(2) of the Act. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned Additional Munsif and the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, while confirming the finding in appeal, have exercised their jurisdiction illegally when it was held that the maintainability of the suit is not affected by the fact of moving an amendment application on November 9, 1976, and obtainning an order for the amendment of the plaint in consequence whereof the amended plaint was filed on May 5, 1977. 7. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to discuss in detail the other two authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. For the reasons mentioned above, the decision on issue No. 10 calls for no interference by this Court. 9. No other point was raised by any of the parties before me. 10. The result is that these revision applications have no force and are accordingly dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs of these revision applications.