JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - This is a defendants appeal arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiffs with the allegation that on May 10, 1952, the appellant took a loan of Rs. 925/- from them and agreed to repay the same together with interest at the rate of Rs. 1.25 P per month within five years. In consideration of the loan, the appellant had executed a deed of simple mortgage (Ext. 1) on the same date and hypothecated plot No. l/l area 25 Biswas situate in village Srikantpur of which he was fixed rate tenant. When the appellant failed to pay the mortgage money in spite of a notice of demand suit was instituted by the appellant under O. 34, R. 4 C. P. C. for the recovery of Rs. 2890/20 paise inclusive of principal and interest by the sale of mortgaged property. 2. The suit was resisted by the appellant on the ground that the payment of the mortgage money is entered into the account books of the respondents and that nothing was due by the defendants to the plaintiffs. It was further pleaded that after the abolition of the Zamindari under the U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951) the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree for the sale of the disputed plot under O. 34, R. 4 C. P. C. and that the suit is barred by time. The trial court decreed the suit for Rs. 2,890.20 p. and as costs, along with interest pendente lite and future at the rate of 6% per annum. It was directed that the decretal amount should be paid within six months of the date of the decree failing which the amount could be realised by putting the mortgaged property to sale. 3. The defendant appealed. The appeal was dismissed by the lower appellate court. 4. Aggrieved by the order of the lower appellate court, the defendant has filed the instant second appeal. In the appeal, an application has been filed purporting to be under Section 151 C. P. C,. in which it was prayed that it should be held that the defendant-appellant is a 'small farmer within the meaning of U. P. Debt Relief Act, 1977 (U. P. Act No. 4 of 1977) (hereinafter called as the Act) and proceedings for scaling down the debt be initiated. 5. in which it was prayed that it should be held that the defendant-appellant is a 'small farmer within the meaning of U. P. Debt Relief Act, 1977 (U. P. Act No. 4 of 1977) (hereinafter called as the Act) and proceedings for scaling down the debt be initiated. 5. The aforesaid application is supported by an affidavit. A counter-affidavit has been filed in which it is stated that the defendant-appellant is not a 'small farmer within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. A rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the defendant-appellant in which the assertions made in the counter affidavit are controverted and it is again claimed that the appellant is a 'small farmer within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. 6. The aforesaid Act was published in the U. P. Gazette dated July 23, 1977 and by virtue of Section 1 sub-cl. (3), it was deemed to have come into force in the whole of Uttar Pradesh on Feb. 21, 1977. 7. The suit out of which the appeal has arisen was filed on 18-7-1966 and was decreed by the trial court on 1-6-1967. An appeal against the order and decree of the trial court was filed being Civil Appeal No. 296 of 1967 in the Court of the District Judge on 9-9-1967. The appeal was dismissed by the order of the lower appellate court on 12-2-1968 and the present second appeal was filed on 10-7-1968. All these events have occurred before coming into force of the above-mentioned Act. The application which is being dealt with today claiming the benefit of the Act was filed on 24-5-1978. 8. A small farmer is defined under Section 2 (ii) of the Act as follows: - "Small farmer means a person residing in a village who, on the date of commencement of this Act, holds unirrigated land exceeding one hectare but not exceeding two hectares, and whose principal source of livelihood is income from agricultural land or by manual labour on such land and includes a person cultivating land as an asami or as a share cropper." 9. The defendant-appellant claims that he comes within the meaning of the tenant. He did not remit the rent the words 'small farmer as defined in the aforesaid Act. 9-A. Chap. The defendant-appellant claims that he comes within the meaning of the tenant. He did not remit the rent the words 'small farmer as defined in the aforesaid Act. 9-A. Chap. Ill of the aforesaid Act is headed as follows: - ''Moratorium on debts recoverable from small farmers." 9-B. Moratorium was imposed by the provisions of this Chapter on the institution of suits for the recovery of any debt or part thereof including interest thereon due from any 'small farmer on :he date of commencement of this Act for a period of one year which period extendable by the State Government by virtue of Section 12 of the Act. By Section 13 of the Act, the provisions of Section 9 of the Act which were to be found in Chap. II were applied to small farmers and the effect, inter alia, was that no interest would accrue in respect of any debts payable by a 'small farmer after the commencement of the Act and that the maximum rate of interest which was payable under the Act was 6% and interest was to be calculated up to the date of the enforcement of the Act. 10. Thereafter there is a provision in Chap. IV which deals with the scaling down of debts of 'small farmers. Section 16 of the Act provides for appointment of Debt Settlement Officer for settlement of debts between the 'small farmers and their creditors. Section 17 deals with applications filed either by the 'small farmers or by a creditor for the determination of the debts payable by the 'small farmers to creditors, Section 18 specifies particulars to be stated in the application under Section 17. 11. Section 19 provides that the Debt Settlement Officer, shall, after giving an opportunity to the parties concerned to appeal and be heard, determine the amount of principal and the amount of interest at the rate of six per cent up-to the date of the commencement of the Act, sub-sec. (2) of that section makes the decision of the Debt Settlement Officer determining the debt under sub-sec. (1) thereof final subject to the decision of an appeal under Section 23. It has further provided that a determination shall not be called into question in any Civil Court. Thereafter Section 20 provides for the maximum liability of a 'small farmer for the payment by him of his liability towards the debt. (1) thereof final subject to the decision of an appeal under Section 23. It has further provided that a determination shall not be called into question in any Civil Court. Thereafter Section 20 provides for the maximum liability of a 'small farmer for the payment by him of his liability towards the debt. Section 21 provides that any amount of debt in excess of that which is determined under Sec. 19 of the Act shall stand discharged and shall not be recoverable. 12. Thereafter, there is provision relating to the barring of certain suits. 12-A. Section 22 of the Act runs as follows : "Bar to certain suits - Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force. (a) no civil or revenue court shall entertain a suit, application or proceeding against a small farmer in respect of any debt to which the provisions of this Chapter apply; (b) every such suit, application or proceeding pending before any such court on the date of commencement of this Act shall abate; (c) no decree of a civil court in relation to the debt to which the provisions of this Chapter apply shall be executed." 13. Section 23 provides for appeal against the order of the Debt Settlement Officer determining the debt of a 'small farmer and, thereafter, Section 24 of the Act provides that every order of a Debt Settlement Officer determining a debt payable by a 'small farmer shall be executed by a Munsif having territorial jurisdiction as if it were a decree or order passed by that Court. 14. The submission of Sri G. P. Bhargava appearing on behalf of the defendant appellant is that the appeal filed by the appellant along with the suit shall abate in view of the provisions of Section 22 (b) quoted above. He submits that the word, 'suit in Section 22 (b) would include an appeal. He submits alternatively that even if an appeal was not comprehended within the term 'suit, which he submits it is, the appeal would nevertheless, fall within the terms application or proceedings. 15. In support of his proposition, learned counsel has relied on certain decisions. He submits that the word, 'suit in Section 22 (b) would include an appeal. He submits alternatively that even if an appeal was not comprehended within the term 'suit, which he submits it is, the appeal would nevertheless, fall within the terms application or proceedings. 15. In support of his proposition, learned counsel has relied on certain decisions. In the case (1950 All LJ 642) equivalent to ( AIR 1950 All 396 ) Niranjan Lal Bhargava v. Ram Kali Devi wherein, it was held that the word suit included an appeal within the meaning of Section 15 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, (U. P. Act No. III of 1947). The aforesaid Section ran as follows; - "In all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3." The respondents in the second appeal had obtained a decree for eviction. It was submitted on his behalf that the word 'suit in Section 15 would only include a suit pending in the court of first instance and not apply in the appellate court. This argument was negatived by the Division Bench of this Court which observed in para 10 of their judgment as follows: - "Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that Section 15 provides for a suit only and does not apply to an appeal. In our opinion, there is no force In this contention, for the Act does not anywhere provide specifically for appeals and we consider that the "suit" mentioned in S, 15 includes a suit while It is before the Court of first instance and also while it is before the appellate court. An appeal is but a continuation of a suit. In our opinion, there is no force In this contention, for the Act does not anywhere provide specifically for appeals and we consider that the "suit" mentioned in S, 15 includes a suit while It is before the Court of first instance and also while it is before the appellate court. An appeal is but a continuation of a suit. The learned counsel for the appellant, Is therefore, right in his contention, that the decree for the eviction of the appellant should not be passed unless it is shown that the case is covered by any one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of the Act 15-A. The aforesaid decision was followed in a case reported in (1951 All LJ 154): ( AIR 1951 All 396 ) Manzoor All Usmani v. Lal Devi wherein it was observed as follows (at p. 154 of All LJ): - "The first contention raised by Sri Gopi Nath Kunjru on behalf of the appellant is that, having regard to the provisions of Section 15 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, no decree for ejectment can be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of the Act. Is this section the word "suits" has been used. The question, therefore, first arises whether it applies also to appeals. On this point there are two Bench decisions of this Court viz. Niranjan Lal Bhargava v. Mist. Ram Kali Devi (1950 All LJ 642): ( AIR 1950 All 396 ) and Lala Raj Narain v. Sita Ram Sri Kishan Das, S. A. No. 979 of 1945, decided by this Court on Nov. 3, 1949 : (Reported in 1952 All LJ 3: AIR 1952 All 584 ). In both these cases it has been held that the word "suit" in Section 15 includes an appeal. Section 15, therefore, is applicable to the present appeal," 16. The same view was taken in the case reported in (1952 All LJ 3): ( AIR 1952 All 584 ) Lala Raj Narain v. Sita Ram Sri Kishan Das, wherein it was held that the word 'suit used in Section 15 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 included an appeal. 17. The same view was taken in the case reported in (1952 All LJ 3): ( AIR 1952 All 584 ) Lala Raj Narain v. Sita Ram Sri Kishan Das, wherein it was held that the word 'suit used in Section 15 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 included an appeal. 17. Thereafter, Sri G. P. Bhargava referred to the case of Ram Saroop v. Board of Revenue U. P. Allahabad 1954 All LJ 364: ( AIR 1954 All 639 ) in which case "the question involved was, whether the word 'suit in the rules framed under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 included appeals also. One of the questions argued was that the rules permitted the stay of suits and not the stay of appeals." This argument was negatived by the High Court. The learned Judge who decided the case has observed as follows (at p. 366 of All LJ): "The first contention of the learned counsel is that Section 6 (1) only says that suits and proceedings of the nature to be prescribed shall be stayed and the rule does not say that the appeals also are to be stayed. Rules 4 and 5 permitted the stay and the abatement of the appeals as well as the suit. The argument of the learned counsel is that rules in respect of the abatement of appeals were not authorised by Cl. (1) of Section 6 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. I do not agree with the contention because the word 'suit really included appeals also. The appeals are really a continuation of the suit and the suits continue not only in the court of first appeal but also in the court of the Second appeal. There are a number of decisions ' of this Court on the point, and it is not necessary to mention those decisions. It is well settled that the word 'suit includes appeals and Section 6 (1) which permitted the framing of rules with respect to abatement of suits, therefore, also conferred power on the State Government to frame rules with respect to abatement of appeals as well." 18. The last decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhry, ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ). The last decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhry, ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ). In that case the question for consideration bean appeal was integrally connected with a suit. 18-A. In para. 23 of their judgment, their Lordships of Supreme Court summarised the position. That part of the judgment which is relevant is reproduced below: - "From the decisions cited above, the following principles clearly emerge (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an. intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceedings." 19. Apart from the aforesaid submission, a perusal of Section 22 of the Act itself indicates that the word 'suit should also include an appeal. Sub-section (c) of Section 22 provides that no decree of a Civil Court in relation to the debt to which the provisions of this Chapter apply shall be executed. 20. Thus there is a general bar to the execution of any decree passed by a Civil Court. A Civil Court is defined in Section 2 (3) of the Act as follows: Civil Court includes "(a) Any court exercising jurisdiction under the Provincial Insolvency Act. 1920. (b) a Nyaya Panchayat established under the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. (c) A court exercising powers under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887." 21. The definition of the words 'Civil Court is an inclusive definition and not a definition which is exclusive. A High Court would certainly be a Civil Court within the meaning of Sec. 2 (3) of the Act. A decree of the High Court cannot be executed if it falls within the scope of Chap. IV of the Act in view of the provisions of Section 22 (c) of the Act. Considering that a decree of the High Court cannot be executed, there is no reason why the suit in the trial court or the first appeal in the court of the First instance and a second appeal in the High Court should not abate as provided in sub-section (b) of Section 22 of the Act. 22. Considering that a decree of the High Court cannot be executed, there is no reason why the suit in the trial court or the first appeal in the court of the First instance and a second appeal in the High Court should not abate as provided in sub-section (b) of Section 22 of the Act. 22. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the interpretation placed on the Statute on behalf of the defendant-appellant should not Section 5 which is to be found in Chap. II of the Act and which provides relief for debtor (small farmers are not debtors within the meaning of the Act) in view of Sec. 2 (b) of the Act, it is provided in sub-cl. (c) that all suits, proceedings, including appeals, revisions, attachment or execution proceedings, pending on the date of commencement of this Act for the recovery of any such debts against such debtor shall abate. His argument is that where the legislature intended that an appeal be abated, it said so expressly as for instance in Section 5 (c) of the Act. His submission is that there is no parallel provision found in the Statute in relation to 'small farmers. According to his argument the appeal along with the suit cannot be held to have been abated under the provisions of Section 22 (b) of the Act. 23. Section 4 provided for the discharge of the debts of debtors and Section 5 provides for consequence of the discharge of the debtors. There is no such automatic discharge of the debts of small farmers as there is in the cases of debts of a debtor under the Act. Therefore, there is no provision exactly parallel to Section 5 in Chap. IV of the Act which applies to the scaling down of the debts of small farmers. Thus, in this view of the matter, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. 24. The question then remains as to whether an issue should be remitted to the Civil Court or the dispute as to whether the appellant is a 'small farmer should be left to the special machinery created under the Act. 25. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the final authority to determine the question as to whether the defendant-appellant is a small farmer is for the adjudication by the Debt Settlement Officer. 25. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the final authority to determine the question as to whether the defendant-appellant is a small farmer is for the adjudication by the Debt Settlement Officer. He refers in this connection to the provisions of Section 30 of the Act which provides as follows: - "Finality of decision - If any question arises in any proceedings under this Act whether a loan or liability is a debt or not or whether a person is a debtor or a small farmer or not, the decision of the Tabsildar or the Debt Settlement Officer, as the case may be, shall, subject to the result of an appeal under Section 8 or Section 23, be final, and shall not be called in question in any court." 26. Section 30 on the face of it will not apply because the dispute as to whether the defendant-appellant is a small, farmer, or not, has arisen in this case. It is not a question which has arisen; in any proceedings under the Act and, therefore, Section 30 will have no application. 27. In view of the foregoing discussions, the following issue is remitted to the lower appellate court for its decision. "Whether the defendant-appellant is a 'small farmer within the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the U. P. Debt Relief Act (U. P. Act No. 4 of 1977)?" 28. The parties will be at liberty to lead evidence before the Court concerned on this Issue alone. 29. The court should transmit its finding to this court within three months from the date of the receipt of the record by it. 30. The parties will appear before the lower appellate court on April 2, 1978 so that the court concerned can fix a date for appearance and evidence bi this case. 31. The record of the case should be sent to the lower appellate court immediately.