JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - These two connected writ petitions arise out of the Additional District Judge, Saharanpur dated 18.11.1978 dismissing the appeals filed by the petitioner of these two petitions. As the points involved in these petitions are common, they can be disposed of by a common judgment. 2. On 31st October, 1972 Mool Raj Singh, respondent No. 3 (hereinafter referred to as "the landlord") filed two applications for release of the two portions of a building situated at the Clock Tower, Dehradun Road, Saharanpur against Vishwanath Sabharwal and Laiq Ahmad. Vishwanath Sabharwal was tenant of the portion on the first floor whereas Laiq Ahmad was a tenant of a shop situated not the ground floor. The Third portion of this building was in occupation of the landlord himself. The building had been purchased by the landlord in the year 1971. In the applications filed for release under Section 21 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the landlord alleged that the building was about more than 200 years old and was in a dilapidated condition and was required to be demolished and reconstructed. He alleged that the accommodation in his occupation was insufficient and that he required the two portions occupied by the aforesaid two tenants. The ground further stated was that the landlord would demolish the building and thereafter make a new building in its place. The landlord asserted that Laiq Ahmad, the tenant of the shop had another premises in his occupation and that he did not require the disputed shop for his personal occupation. With regard to Vishwanath Sabharwal the allegations were that he had an office in the first floor but the said office mostly found closed inasmuch as he had office at Dehradun and that the premises in his occupation was needed by him for his requirement. 3. The applications were contested by Vishwanath Sabharwal and Laiq Ahmad the petitioners. They denied that the need of the landlord was bonafide and further claimed that the portion of the building in the occupation of the landlord was sufficient for his requirement. The tenants asserted that the landlord had other buildings available with him and in case he needed the accommodation he could occupy the said buildings. They denied that the need of the landlord was bonafide and further claimed that the portion of the building in the occupation of the landlord was sufficient for his requirement. The tenants asserted that the landlord had other buildings available with him and in case he needed the accommodation he could occupy the said buildings. Regarding his own need the case set up by Vishwanath Sabharwal was that he was doing timber and transport business and that the building in question was required by him for running his office. Although he admitted that his office was at Dehradun yet he denied that he had any residential house either in Janakpur or at Saharanpur. Laiq Ahmad also filed a written statement and challenged the allegations made in the application. He did not deny that he had started retreading business at another place and alleged that the premises in dispute was also being utilised for the business. The allegations were that he was likely to suffer greater hardship. 4. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties led evidence and filed affidavits. A Commissioner was also appointed for making the local inspection of the premises in dispute. The Commissioner inspected the premises on 30th October, 1973 in the presence of the parties. He measured the entire building and prepared a site plan. According to him the area in occupation of the landlord was 3151 square yards including some portion of Vishwanath Sabharwal's office while the area in the tenancy of Laiq Ahmad was 46 sq. yards. The Commissioner also stated that the level of the disputed building was lower than of the road. 5. After considering the evidence of the parties, the Prescribed Authority held that the need of the landlord was bonafide ad further that the tenants would not suffer any hardship, inasmuch as alternative accommodations were available to them. Aggrieved the tenants preferred two appeals before the District Judge. These appeals were transferred to the Additional District Judge who dismissed the same by the impugned judgment. 6. Being aggrieved, Vishwanath Sabharwal preferred writ petition No. 1004 of 1978 whereas writ petition No. 10043 of 1978 was filed by Laiq Ahmad. 7. Before proceeding to discuss the points urged, it may be pointed that the application filed by the landlord was under Section 21(1), clause (a) and (b). 6. Being aggrieved, Vishwanath Sabharwal preferred writ petition No. 1004 of 1978 whereas writ petition No. 10043 of 1978 was filed by Laiq Ahmad. 7. Before proceeding to discuss the points urged, it may be pointed that the application filed by the landlord was under Section 21(1), clause (a) and (b). An application under Section 21(1) clause (a) is filed by a landlord when the building is required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself for any member of his family, whereas an application under clause (b) is filed when the building is in dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction. In the instant case, both the authorities found that the building was not in a dilapidated condition but held the same was bonafide required by the landlord for demolition and new constructions for occupation by himself and members of his family. The controversy therefore is confined only to seeing whether the order passed under clause (a) of Section 21(1) was valid. 8. It may be noted here that even under clause (a) an application can be made by a landlord for occupation of the building in its existing form. It is not necessary under this clause that the building must be in a dilapidated condition. What is essential for succeeding in an application under clause (a) Section 21(1) is to prove that the landlord required the same for his occupation. In such a case landlord can establish that the existing building would not be suitable to him and that he would make a new building in place of old one. 9. Coming to the points urged, the counsel first contended that the appellate authority committed an error in holding that a landlord has absolute right to occupy his building and as such, the application filed by a landlord has to be allowed irrespective of its need. The submission made is not correct. The subordinate authorities examined the need set up by the landlord in the application and found that requirement was bonafide. For coming to this conclusion the entire evidence was examined. It will not be correct to say that the mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he required the premises for demolition was found to be sufficient for granting his prayer made in the application. For coming to this conclusion the entire evidence was examined. It will not be correct to say that the mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he required the premises for demolition was found to be sufficient for granting his prayer made in the application. The Courts below were aware of the requirement of law that the mere desire on the part of the landlord was not enough and that the law required him to establish his need for succeeding in such an application. Neither the Prescribed Authority nor the appellate authority misdirected himself in regard to these matters, for example by misconstruing the word 'required' or by erroneously placing the burden of proof on the tenants. 10. At this place it would be relevant to point out that the disputed house was originally a Tarikhana. In so far as the accommodation held by the landlord is concerned, the inspection note showed that on the ground floor the accommodation in possession of the landlord consisted of a bath room, one kitchen and six small rooms, in addition of one drawing room. The six rooms were around a big court yard enclosed by walls inside in possession of the landlord. There was only one tin shed which was being used by him as a room. The two authorities found that these small cells which were in possession of the landlord had been previously constructed with a view to provide drinking cabins. These cabins were found to be wholly unsuitable for the need of the landlord. It had come in evidence that the landlord was a man of status and that he could not be forced to continue to live in this house in this condition. 11. Apart from the fact that the purpose of the construction was to run a Tarikhana, it had also come in evidence that the level of the disputed building was lower than the level of the road as a result whereof during rains the whole building used to become a tank and a lot of damage is done to the building. Furthermore, the beams of the rooms have been eaten up by white ants. In these circumstances the condition of the building was not such in which the landlord could be forced to live with his family. Apart from the condition of the building, the accommodation was also insufficient. Furthermore, the beams of the rooms have been eaten up by white ants. In these circumstances the condition of the building was not such in which the landlord could be forced to live with his family. Apart from the condition of the building, the accommodation was also insufficient. The two Courts below examined the evidence and found that the six rooms could hardly be said to be sufficient for the three married couples grown up and studying daughters and sons. 12. During the pendency of the appeal, the learned Presiding Officer had made an inspection. He had also found that the landlord stood in need of the Additional accommodation and that additional accommodation could be satisfied by demolition and reconstruction. All these findings would show that the Courts below could be said to have committed any error in holding that the need of the landlord was boa fide. It is also not correct to say that the building was not required by the landlord for demolition and reconstruction. The emphasis of the learned counsel for the tenants that the landlord could demolish the portion in his occupation was unjustified. A new house cannot be constructed without getting possession of the portions let out to the tenants. In order to make it habitable the release of the portions in occupation of the tenants was essential. It is worthy of being stated that even the tenants did not challenge that the landlord would not demolish the building and would not reconstruct the same. As a matter of fact, in order to prove his bonafide the landlord gave an undertaking before the Appellate Authority that he would demolish the whole building within month of getting its possession and would reconstruct the same within a year. For what I have said above, it cannot be said that the findings of the Courts below that the building was required by the landlord was incorrect or is liable to be interfered with. 13. Coming to the question of comparative hardship it would be noticed that Laiq Ahmad has got a big house and business premises at Dehradun Road at Saharanpur. This was in the name of his mother where he was residing and was carrying on his retreading business. The premises in dispute is only being used for the purposes of supplying air. Coming to the question of comparative hardship it would be noticed that Laiq Ahmad has got a big house and business premises at Dehradun Road at Saharanpur. This was in the name of his mother where he was residing and was carrying on his retreading business. The premises in dispute is only being used for the purposes of supplying air. The Courts below found that he could conveniently do this business at the premises where retreading was being done. As such, it is established that Laiq Ahmad has an alternative accommodation and that he was not likely to suffer any hardship from release of the shop. 14. So far as Vishwanath Sabharwal is concerned, it may be pointed out that the finding of the Courts below was only doing corresponding business from the disputed shop. No business was actually being transacted in the disputed accommodation by him. It had further been found that the head office of his business was situated at Dehradun Road where he had some properties in the name of his wife. In this background the finding that he was not likely to suffer any hardship cannot be said to be correct. He could arrange for an alternative office. 15. An attempt was made to show that the findings of the Courts below that the need of the landlord was bonafide suffered from the defect of wrong inferences drawn from the evidence. The learned counsel could not substantiate the submission. It may, however, also be pointed out that in writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court can interfere only if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Mere formal or technical error would not be sufficient to attract this jurisdiction. It is further settled that mere error in appreciation of documentary evidence of facts, errors in drawing inferences or omission to draw inferences or in other words, errors which a Court sitting as a Court of appeal only could have examined and if necessary, corrected, did not give jurisdiction to this Court to interfere. 16. For all these reasons, the writ petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with costs. Both the petitioners are granted four months time to vacate the premises.