D. C. GHEEWALA, M. K. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) AN interesting question with regard to the interpretation of sec. 484 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974) arises in this appeal against an order of acquittal passed in appeal by the lower appellate court in favour of respondents Nos. 1 2 and 3 original accused Nos. 1 2 and 5. ( 2 ) THE appellant before this court is the original complainant who filed a complaint against her husband Arjandas Jethanand Chhabaria original accused No. 1 and four others that is original accused Nos. 2 to 5 on the allegation that while the complainants marriage with accused Arjandas was subsisting he contracted a second marriage with accused No. 2 Bharati alias Bina on 14th February 1971 in which act accused No. 2 that is the alleged second wife parents of accused No. 1 viz. accused Nos. 3 and 4 and accused No. 5 brother of accused No. 4 aided and abetted and that therefore accused No. 1 had committed an offence under sec 494 of the Indian Penal Code and the rest of the accused had committed an offence under sec. 494 read with First sec. 109 of the said Code. The learned Judicial Magistrate First class second court Baroda who heard the said criminal case No. 8133 of 1973 on the evidence led before him came to the conclusion that the complainant had proved that the marriage between her and accused Nos. 1 was subsisting on 14th February 1971 when accused No. 1 remarried accused No. 2 and that accused No. 2 and 5 aided and abetted the same. But so far as accused No. 3 and 4 are concerned he found that the complainant had failed to prove her case against them. He therefore passed an order dated 23rd September 1975 convicting original accused Nos. 1 2 and 5 for the offences with which they were charged and awarding sentence of R. I. for six months and a fine of Rs. 300. 00 in default further R. I. for one month to each of the convicted accused and acquitting accused Nos. 3 and 4. 1 2 and 5 for the offences with which they were charged and awarding sentence of R. I. for six months and a fine of Rs. 300. 00 in default further R. I. for one month to each of the convicted accused and acquitting accused Nos. 3 and 4. It may be noted at this stage that the complaint was filed before the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) hereinafter referred to by the new code had come into force and the proceedings were pending before the learned Magistrate when the new Code came into force. The learned Magistrate therefore followed the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (5 of 1898 that is the old Code while dealing with and disposing of the said complaint. ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED by the said order of conviction and sentence passed against them the convicted accused that is accused Nos. 1 2 and 5 preferred criminal appeal No. 113 of 1975 in the court of the Additional Sessisions Judge Baroda. In this appeals the State of Gujarat was made a party respondent and the original complainant was neither made a party nor was any notice of the said appeal served on her and the appeal was disposed of after hearing the appellants that is accused Nos. 1 2 and 5 and the respondent State of Gujarat. The learned Additional Sessions Judge Baroda by his order dated 5th June 1976 allowed the said appeal he having come to the conclusion on appreciation of evidence that the complainant had failed to establish the bigamous marriage on the part of accused No. 1 as alleged and he therefore set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court against the said accused and acquitted them of the offences with which they were charged. It is against this order of acquittal passed by the lower appellate court that the original complainant has preferred this appeal after having obtained the necessary leave to appeal from this court. ( 4 ) MR. Patel relies on the provisions contained in sec. 385 (1) (iii) in support of his submission which he has taken up by the additional grounds. The relevant part of sec. ( 4 ) MR. Patel relies on the provisions contained in sec. 385 (1) (iii) in support of his submission which he has taken up by the additional grounds. The relevant part of sec. 385 reads thus : 4385 (1) If the appellate court does not dismiss the appeal summarily it shall cause notice of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard to be given. (I) x x x (ii) x x x (iii) if the appeal is from a judgment of conviction in a case instituted upon complaint to the complainant. sub-sec. (2) prevails that the appellate court shall then send for the record of the case if such record is not already available in that court and hear the parties. There is no dispute that in the instant case no such notice as is contemplated in sec. 385 (1) (iii) was issued and served on the complainant that is the present appellant and the appeal has been disposed off after hearing the learned Advocates appearing for accused Nos. 1 2 and 5 and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State. ( 5 ) THE new Code came into force on and from 1st April 1974 Admittedly at that time the proceedings before the trial court were pending. By sec. 484 (1) the old Code is rep and. But saving provisions are contained in sub-sec (2) and the material provisions so far as they are relevant for our purpose read thus :484 (2) Notwithstanding such repeal (a) if immediately before the date on which this Code comes into force there is any appeal application trial inquiry or investigation pending then such appeal application trial inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of continued held or made as the case may be. in accordance wish the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (5 of 1898) as in force immediately be fare such commencement (hereinafter referred to as the old Code) as if this Code had not come into force". The proviso is not relevant for our purpose. (B) all notifications published proclamations issued. powers conferred forms prescribed local jurisdictions defined sentences passed and orders rules and appointments not being appointments as Special Magistrates made under the old Code and which are in force immediately before the commencement of this Code shall be deemed respectively to have been published issued conferred prescribed. (B) all notifications published proclamations issued. powers conferred forms prescribed local jurisdictions defined sentences passed and orders rules and appointments not being appointments as Special Magistrates made under the old Code and which are in force immediately before the commencement of this Code shall be deemed respectively to have been published issued conferred prescribed. defined passed or made under the corresponding provisions of this Code; (B) any sanction accorded or consent given under the old Code in pursuance of which no proceeding was commenced under that Code shall be deemed to have been accorded or given under the corresponding provisions of this Code and proceedings may be commenced under this Code in pursuance of such sanction or consent" the rest of the provisions are not relevant for our purpose. ( 6 ) IT would be thus seen that on the day on which the new Code came into force if any proceedings of the descriptions which are set out in clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) were pending then the same are to be disposed off under the old Code as if the new Code had not come into force and therefore the complaint which was pending before the learned Magistrate in the instant case on 1-4-1974 had to be dealt with and disposed off according to the provisions of the old Code though the new Code had already come into force. But it would be difficult to read from this saving clause a proposition as is canvassed by Mr. Parikh the learned Advocate appearing for respondent No. 1 in the instant case that even an appeal from the decision of such proceedings which were pending on the day when the new Code came into force or any other remedies which would be available to parties by way of revision applications etc. till final disposal of the complaint would also be governed by the provisions of the old Code and that therefore the provisions contained in sec. 385 of the new Code would not apply to the appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the instant case but the provisions contained an sec. 422 of the old Code which contained no provisions for service of such notice on the complainant will apply. ( 7 ) MR. 385 of the new Code would not apply to the appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the instant case but the provisions contained an sec. 422 of the old Code which contained no provisions for service of such notice on the complainant will apply. ( 7 ) MR. Parikh in support of his submission drew our attention to a Full Bench decision of this court in Hiralal Nansa Bhavsar and Another v. The State of Gujarat 15 G. L. R. 725. The Full Bench was dealing with the question as to whether the appeal filed by the accused person against the conviction in a summary case by the Metropolitan Magistrate in Ahmedabad under sec. 66 of the Bombay Prohibition Act can lie to this court in view of the repealing and saving provisions of sec. 484 of the new Code and after setting out the relevant provisions contained in sec. 484 and referring to some decisions the Full Bench observed that the right of appeal is a substantive right which crystalises at the date of the institution of action and this right includes a right to go in appeal to the superior court. The forum to file the appeal is also thus determined as soon as the action is instituted. Till the case is instituted no litigant has any right to the forum in which the case can be instituted. In a criminal case this right of appeal and the right to file the appeal in the forum prescribed by law would precipitate at the date when the court takes cognizance of an offence against the accused. It is perfectly competent for the legislature to affect this vested right retrospectively. The legislature may do so by making express provisions to that effect or by the disclosure of such an intention by necessary intendment. It is also competent to the legislature to save pending proceedings from operation of the new Act. The Full Bench held that the intention was not to give retrospective effect to the provisions of the new Code so far as pending proceedings mentioned in sub-sec. 2 (a) of sec. It is also competent to the legislature to save pending proceedings from operation of the new Act. The Full Bench held that the intention was not to give retrospective effect to the provisions of the new Code so far as pending proceedings mentioned in sub-sec. 2 (a) of sec. 484 were concerned as the intention of the Parliament was that the pending proceedings were only to be continued or held or made according to the provisions of the old Code and the Full Bench inter alia held that the cases of accused persons against whom the trial court had taken cognizance of the prosecution prior to coming into force of the new Code in which the trial was held after 1st April 1974 and in which the judgment and order of conviction were made thereafter would be governed by sub-sec. (2) (a) of sec. 484 of the new Code and the same have to be disposed of finally in accordance with the provisions of the old Code as if the new Code had not come into force. It will be thus seen that the question which was before the Full Bench was as to whether in a case which was instituted before the new Code came into force but which was disposed of thereafter the right to file an appeal and the forum before whom the right to file an appeal would be governed by the provisions contained in the old Code or in the new Code. The Full Bench came to the conclusion that the right of appeal and the right to file appeal before a particular forum is in the nature of a substantive right and not a procedure one and therefore such a right springs into life when the proceedings are instituted or an offence is taken cognizance of and it continues till final disposal of the matter. ( 8 ) BUT the question which arises in the present appeal before this court belongs to a distinct and different category of questions as compa- ared to the question which arose before and/or was dealt with by the Full Bench. In the instant case as the trial was pending when the new Code came into force the same has to be disposed of under the provisions contained in the old Code by virtue of the saving provisions contained in sec. 484 (2) of the new Code. In the instant case as the trial was pending when the new Code came into force the same has to be disposed of under the provisions contained in the old Code by virtue of the saving provisions contained in sec. 484 (2) of the new Code. The right of appeal viz substantive right of appeal as also the forum to whom the appeal lies will also remain protected and will not be affected by the provisions of the new Code. But that does not mean that if under the new Code a procedure is prescribed for issuance of notice to the complainant with regard to the hearing of the appeal preferred by the convicted accused persons such an appeal court can act in disregard of such an obligation cast on it by specific provisions which entitle the complainant to a notice. ( 9 ) IT is true that the substantial right of appeal including the right with regard to the filing of the appeal before a particular forum which had already vested in a party cannot be taken away. But that is far from saying that no procedure can be prescribed enjoining upon the court to cause a notice to be served on the complainant in such an appeal. Apart from the question as to whether the provisions contained in section 385 (1) (iii) with regard to issuance of notice on the complainant are of a procedural nature and therefore do not affect any vested rights or substantive rights of any party which require to be saved enactment of statutory obligations requiring courts to cause notice to be given to the complainant about the hearing of such an appeal assuming that the same is by a party whose substantive right to file appeal before a particular forum is protected and requires to be kept protected would not amount to depriving of trading away from such a party its vested right of the nature described above because the section merely requires a notice of the hearing of such an appeal to be given to the complainant without in any way abridging or affecting the said substantive right of the appellant. In any event sec. 385 by its very nature and content is a procedural section prescribing the procedure for hearing appeals not dismissed summarily. In any event sec. 385 by its very nature and content is a procedural section prescribing the procedure for hearing appeals not dismissed summarily. Therefore in an appeal which might be preferred by the convicted persons in trials which were pending at the time the new Code came into force and which trials ended thereafter through the substantive right of appeal is saved as also the forum before whom the same lis to be heard Act if a procedural enactment is brought on the statute book laying down the procedure to be followed for hearing such appeals when they are not dismissed summarily and if that procedure inter alia enjoins upon the appellate court no cause a notice about hearing of the appeal to be given to the complainant if the appeal is from the judgment of conviction in a case instituted upon a complaint then that does not amount to affecting or taking away any substantive right of appeal which the convicted accused have got. ( 10 ) IN this view of the matter the lower appellate court was patently in error in hearing the appeal and in passing the order of acquittal in disregard of the provisions contained in sec. 385 of the new Code. In our opinion it was incumbent upon the lower appellate court to cause such notice to be given to the complainant and to hear the complainant before disposing of the appeal filed by the convicted accused and the order of acquittal therefore passed in such an appeal is likely to cause prejudice to the complainant as would be evident from the fact that the complainant has lost an opportunity of convincing the lower appellate court about the soundness of the judgment of the trial court convicting the concerned accused. ( 11 ) IF the lower appellate court had issued such a notice and heard the complainant the complainant would hale a fuller opportunity to argue the case against the accused and to support the judgment of the trial court. ( 11 ) IF the lower appellate court had issued such a notice and heard the complainant the complainant would hale a fuller opportunity to argue the case against the accused and to support the judgment of the trial court. If the lower appellate court found substance in the arguments which would have been advanced on behalf of the complainant had such a notice been served and the complainant heard the result would have been the dismissal of the appeal and confirming the order of conviction in which case the only right of the accused would have been to come to this court in revision where the scope would be far limited as compared to the one in a regular appeal. It is true the complainants right of being heard is not lost. Even in this appeal before this court against the order of acquittal passed by the lower appellate court the cemplainant can urge submissions supporting the judgment of the trial court and demonstrating the errors if any committed by the lower appellate court. But here also the complainant is handicapped to some extent looking to the nature of the appeal which is an appeal against an order of acquittal. Though while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal this court has full power to review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach a conclusion that upon such evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed it is not permissible to this court to take a different view if two reasonably probable views are possible and unless this court is convinced that the conclusions of the lower appellate court are not based upon any evidence or that they are such as no reasonable body of men properly instructed in law can reach on the evidence or they are so palpably wrong as to shock the sense of justice this court would not be justified in taking a contrary view by giving its own reasons. Before this court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal it has to be demonstrated clearly the unworthiness of the conclusions of the lower appellate court. Before this court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal it has to be demonstrated clearly the unworthiness of the conclusions of the lower appellate court. Thus in an appeal against an order of acquittal it becomes rather an uphill task for the complainant to convince the court that the order of acquittal should be interfered with as compared to the task of supporting the order of conviction before the lower appellate court. ( 12 ) ON the aforesaid considerations in our opinion this is a fit case in which the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in appeal should be set aside and the matter be remanded to the learned Additional Sessions Judge Baroda with directions to hear the ap peal after issuing notice to the complainant and following the procedure prescribed in sec. 385 of the new Code and then to dispose of the matter according to law after hearing all the parties including the complainant. Appeal allowed accordingly. Appeal allowed: Leave to appeal refused. .