Judgment.- The petitioner is a Member of the Andhra Pradesh State Higher Judicial Service working as a District and Sessions Judge. He had been recruited directly from the Bar to that post in the year, 1968. Under the Rules regulating the service conditions of the State Higher Judicial Service, the posts of District and Sessions Judge, were divided into two Grades. The initial appointment of the petitioner was to the post of District and Sessions Judge, Grade-II. His next post of promotion is that of District and Sessions Judge, Grade-I. 2. When the petitioner was recruited in the year, 1968, as a District and Sessions Judge, Grade-II he was placed as number one and the third respondent as number two in the list of candidates recommended by the High Court for appointment as District and Sessions Judges. Respondents 4 to 6 had become District and Sessions Judges by promotion from the lower ranks after the petitioner had been appointed as District and Sessions Judge. He was, therefore, undoubted senior to the respondents 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the category of District and Sessions Judge, Grade-II. The petitioner been however, overlooked for promotion as District and Sessions Judge, Grade-I on three successive occasions. First on 23rd November, 1977, when Respondent No. 3, was promoted under G.O. Rt. No. 4066, G.A.D. (SC. X) As District and Sessions Judge, Grade-I and next on 2nd December, 1977 when respondent No. 4, was promoted under G.O. Rt. No. 4149, G.A.D. (SC. X) and finally on 25th May, 1978 when respondents 5 and 6 had been promoted as District and Sessions Judges, Grade-I, the petitioner was overlooked. The petitioner has, therefore, filed this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a declaration that the aforesaid orders promoting respondents 3 to 6 as District and Sessions Judges, Grade-I, are void. He also asked for a direction to be issued to the State of Andhra Pradesh and this Court to consider the petitioner’s claim for promotion as District and Sessions Judge, Grade-I, according to his position of seniority without taking into consideration the adverse remarks communicated to him in the year 1975 and 1976. 3. He also asked for a direction to be issued to the State of Andhra Pradesh and this Court to consider the petitioner’s claim for promotion as District and Sessions Judge, Grade-I, according to his position of seniority without taking into consideration the adverse remarks communicated to him in the year 1975 and 1976. 3. The petitioner stated that he worked as an Additional District Judge and later as the Principal District and Sessions in several parts of the State and held the post of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hyderabad, Presiding Officer and Chairman, Industrial Tribunal, Guntur, Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad and Secunderabad and completed a period of nearly ten years as District and Sessions Judge, Grade-II, discharging his duties to the best of his ability. He alleged that there were no adverse remarks in his confidential records at any time during his service till the year, 1975, although he does not deny that the High Court informed him on 30th August, 1976, that his confidential reports for the year, 1975 contained two adverse entries one, that the quality of his work was unsatisfactory and two, that his reputation had not been good in recent years. Similarly, it is admitted before me by the petitioner that the High Court communicated on 29th July, 1977, another adverse entry for 1976 that he should improve his image. The petitioner made a representation on 5th December, 1976, requesting for the expunction of the said remarks for the year, 1975. In his representation to the High Court, the petitioner pointed out that the no judgment of the High Court commenting upon the unsatisfactory nature of his work was brought to his notice. Regarding the second remark, the petitioner complained that the remark was vague and there was no indication as in what respects his reputation was not good. The petitioner, therefore, asked for a personal hearing to explain his position. Against the adverse entry for the year, 1976 the petitioner submitted another representation on 18th August, 1977, and once again asked for a personal hearing protesting against the vagueness of this remark too and absence of evidentiary material. 4. At the request of the petitioner, the High Court had fixed 13th November, 1977, as the date for personal hearing. Against the adverse entry for the year, 1976 the petitioner submitted another representation on 18th August, 1977, and once again asked for a personal hearing protesting against the vagueness of this remark too and absence of evidentiary material. 4. At the request of the petitioner, the High Court had fixed 13th November, 1977, as the date for personal hearing. In that hearing given by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, the learned Chief Justice laid bare the whole material on the basis of which the High Court made those adverse entries. It was brought to the notice of the petitioner that the first remark regarding the petitioner’s unsatisfactory nature of work was based upon the judicial pronouncements of this Court. Regarding the second remark, it was pointed out to the petitioner in the course of the hearing that he had unsavoury episodes both at Anantapur and Hyderabad and that the High Court was even obliged to direct seizure of certain records. 5. In the course of the personal hearing it was also pointed out to the petitioner that the High Court had received several complaints against the petitioner when he was working as a Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Guntur which compelled the High Court to transfer the petitioner to Adilabad. The petitioner protested his innocence and contended that the allegations were not true. But what the learned Chief Justice said was is worthy of note here. The Hon’ble Judge informed the petitioner that the petitioner’s reputation as a Judicial Officer was brought under a cloud by these allegations. In other words, in the personal hearing the adverse remarks against the petitioner contained in his service register were not expunged. 6. Under the laws, the post of a District Judge, Grade-I is a Selection Post and a person cannot be appointed, to that post except on the basis of the recommendation of the High Court. The High Court cannot make any such recommendation except on grounds of merit and ability. Accordingly, the High Court met on 24th October, 1977, and unanimously “resolved to recommend to the Government to promote and appoint: (1) Sri T. Lakshminarayana Reddy and in preference to Sri M.S. Sharma, and (2) Sri P.V. Ranga Reddy; and (3) Sri R. Natesan having regard to their superior merit, ability and integrity for promotion to the Category of District Judges, Grade-I, from the dates as indicated below”. Subsequently, the High Court has met again on 17th March, 1978, when it ‘resolved to recommend to the Government to promote and appoint: (1) Sri K. Sriranganayakulu; and (2) Sri K.P. Narayana Rao in preference to Sri M.S. Sharma having regard to their superior merit, ability and integrity to the Category of District Judges, Grade-I, from the dates as indicated below’. It is on the basis of these recommendations, the petitioner has been bypassed and respondents 3, 4, 5 and 6 had been promoted as District arid Sessions Judges, Grade-I by the three impugned orders made by the Government dated 23rd November, 1977, 2nd December, 1977 and 25th May, 1978. 7. The above orders of the Government are attacked by the petitioner in the present) proceedings on the following grounds: (1) The reliance of the High Court on the adverse entries which were not communicated to the petitioner violated the principles of natural justice and fairplay. The petitioner therefore, argued that those materials ought to have been excluded. (2) The adverse entries which were communicated to the petitioner were vague and incapable of being answered. (3) The supersession of a senior like the petitioner is prima facie, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution unless the act of supersession is based on some valid and justifiable grounds. The petitioner contended that there are no such grounds in this case. (4) Finally the petitioner contended that reasons must be recorded in the files showing why the applicant is rejected and others are preferred. 8. To begin with, I must note the importance of the Post of a District Judge in the scheme of our constitutional values. Under our Constitution, a District Judge is the Head of our judiciary at the grass-root level. It is at this level that the ordinary man comes into daily contact with the judicial process. It is therefore imperative that the integrity of the judicial process at this level and the image of the judicial personnel manning the lower judiciary are well kept and maintained. It is at this level that the ordinary man comes into daily contact with the judicial process. It is therefore imperative that the integrity of the judicial process at this level and the image of the judicial personnel manning the lower judiciary are well kept and maintained. Considering the fact that the High Court is at the apex of the State Judiciary and is in regular contact with the lower judiciary with various opportunities to Judge, the relative merits of those manning the subordinate judiciary it is no wonder the Constitution placed the entire direction and control and composition of the lower judiciary in the hands of the High Court. It is in discharge of this constitutional obligation, the High Court had seriously found fault with the official performance and public image of the petitioner. No one could suggest that if a fair and impartial body like the High Court with its technical qualifications finds one of its Subordinate Officers not fit to be promoted, such a decision should ordinarily be set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, there is no such violation either. By the time of the first meeting of the High Court on 24th October, 1977, the petitioner has already been communicated with some of the adverse entries. By the time of the second meeting of the High Court, in March, 1978, the petitioner has a full hearing accorded by the learned Chief Justice. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner has been denied fairplay. 9. In R.L. Butail v. Union of India1, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the legal efficacy of administrative proceedings denying promotion to the petitioner on the basis of uncommunicated adverse remarks. 10. Butail, the appellant in the above case, began his service career in the Simla Electricity Supply Undertaking. In 1949, he was appointed as a Project Officer in the Central Electricity Commission otherwise called, the Central Water and Power Commission. In 1950 Butail was confirmed in that post as Project Officer and was later on, promoted to the post of a Director, in which he was confirmed in the year 1963 with retrospective effect from 1960. 11. By a communication dated 16th September, 1965, Butail was informed of an adverse entry in the annual confidential report for the year 1964. In 1950 Butail was confirmed in that post as Project Officer and was later on, promoted to the post of a Director, in which he was confirmed in the year 1963 with retrospective effect from 1960. 11. By a communication dated 16th September, 1965, Butail was informed of an adverse entry in the annual confidential report for the year 1964. By another communication dated 7th July, 1966, Butail was informed of an adverse entry for the year 1965. On receiving these adverse entries, Butail made representations asking for specific instances on which the adverse opinions were based. Those representations, were however, rejected. However in the year 1964-65, he was overlooked by the Departmental Promotion Committee and the Public Service Commission and his junior was promoted to the post of a Director, Selection Grade Deputy Chief Engineer. Butail was compulsorily retired with effect from 15th August, 1967. Challenging the validity of the adverse entries and praying that the aforesaid two entries should be expunged and proper entries made, Butail had filed three writ petitions which were dismissed by the High Court and against which Butail had filed the appeals. In the Supreme Court, before the Constitution Bench, one of the contentions urged by Butail was that the two confidential reports were placed before the Departmental Promotion Committee as well as Public Service Commission even before they were communicated to him and therefore even before he could make representations against them. In answering this argument of the appellant, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “The confidential report for 1955 was prepared in 1966. Therefore, the report for 1965 would not be before that Committee when it declined to recommend the appellant in 1965. This time report for 1964 would be before it and that too without his representation against it as that report had been conveyed to the appellant in September, 1965. That fact, however, cannot make any difference. The representation made by the appellant, though made subsequently, was actually rejected with result that the confidential report for 1964 remained unchanged. The practice followed by the Promotion Committee was that if in such a case a representation were to be accepted and in consequence the confidential report was altered or expunged, the Promotion Committee would have to review it recommendation in the light of such a result. The practice followed by the Promotion Committee was that if in such a case a representation were to be accepted and in consequence the confidential report was altered or expunged, the Promotion Committee would have to review it recommendation in the light of such a result. In the present case, however, no question of such a review arose as reports for 1964 and 1965 were, inspite of representations by the appellant, neither altered nor set aside. There was, therefore, no question of any injustice having been done to the appellant despite the fact that the Committee had before it the confidential report’ without there being along with it any representation made by the appellant. Nor did the question of a breach of natural justice arise in view of the aforesaid practice followed by the Promotion Committee”. These observations of the Supreme Court furnish a complete and total answer to the first complaint of the petitioner. In this case, even on the assumption that by the time of the first meeting of the High Court in the year 1977 when the petitioner was overlooked, the petitioner had no opportunity, the complaint of the petitioner that there was a violation of principles of natural justice must be rejected because, he had a full-length hearing explaining his case to the High Court on 13th July, 1977, and in that hearing the adverse entries against’ the petitioner were neither set aside nor altered. I must say, following the judgment of the Supreme Court, that there is no denial of justice to the petitioner on the ground that he did not have an opportunity to explain himself by the time the High Court had first superseded him in 1977. There is another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Prakash Chand v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission1, decided by another Constitution Bench. In that case, the Supreme Court observed: “It appears to us that in this case there was no discrimination, purposeful or otherwise, and at’ the best, the Committee’s taking into consideration confidential reports with respect to which the petitioner had been given no chance to make a representation was merely fortuitous. In such a State of affairs, we are not satisfied that any interference is called for.”.......... In such a State of affairs, we are not satisfied that any interference is called for.”.......... This case decided by the Supreme Court does not even countenance the charge of violation of principles of natural justice as being involved in consideration of uncommunicated adverse entries. The case reported in Mallinato Jain v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi2, also does not help the petitioner. In that case the Delhi High Court had to consider the effect of denial of promotion based on uncommunicated adverse entries which were subsequently toned down. The Departmental Promotion Committee taking into account the adverse entries against the petitioner in that case ranked him as No. 3 below his two immediate juniors who were placed as Nos. 1 and 2. Subsequently, the petitioner made a representation against the adverse entries. The authority which considered the petitioner’s representation observed: “In the light of the subsequent performance I will have no objection of the competent authorities decided to accept Sri Jain’s representation and expunge the adverse remarks given by me in good faith”. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court considered these observation as having the effect of toning down the adverse entries and on that basis, the Delhi High Court had quashed the earlier panel prepared placing the petitioner as No. 3. The judgment of the Delhi High Court referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhutail case1. It noted that while in Bhutail’s case1, the subsequent representations made by the appellant were rejected by the authorities, in the case before it the adverse entries were toned down. Based on this difference in facts, the Delhi High Court held that the Departmental Promotion Committee which acted upon the uncommunicated adverse entries which are subsequently toned down, went wrong. This case, as Bhutail’s case1, only lays down the rule that injustice in the matter of promotion discovered either by foresight or hind-sight, should not go unexpurgated. Unfortunately, for the petitioner, all the adverse entries in his confidential files and in the record of his service remain both before and after personal hearing before the Hon’ble Chief Justice, as bad as ever and as unaltered as ever. In these circumstances, I must reject the mam contention of the petitioner. 12. The next submission of Mr. Venkata Ramanaiah is that the communicated adverse entries are vague and therefore, are incapable of being answered. In these circumstances, I must reject the mam contention of the petitioner. 12. The next submission of Mr. Venkata Ramanaiah is that the communicated adverse entries are vague and therefore, are incapable of being answered. The petitioner knew the meaning and the significance of those remarks and he used this knowledge to the fullest extent in his meeting with the Hon’ble Chief Justice. He cannot now be heard to say that he did not know what those entries mean. 13. The next contention of Mr. Venkata Ramanaiah must be rejected in view of the voluminous record staring in the fact of the petitioner. The High Court has condemned the petitioner both on its administrative side and also on its judicial side. Judge after Judge of this Court had found the petitioner’s performance inadequate and unsatisfactory. What is more, the High Court was obliged to direct the seizure of certain records from the petitioner’s office. Nothing more is required for the supersession of a Judicial Officer. 14. The last submission of Mr. Venkata Ramanaiah with which I am in entire agreement is that whenever the State Authorities choose a junior in preference to a senior, reasons for that preference should be recorded by the authorities. This salutary principle is approved by the Supreme Court in the following words in Union of India v. M.L. Capoor2: “It is incumbent on the Selection Committee to state reasons in a manner which would disclose how the record of each superseded Officer stood in relation to records of others who were to be preferred. This is in the context of the effect upon the right’s of aggrieved persons who are entitled to protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and particularly this is the only remaining visible safeguard against possible injustices and arbitrariness in making selections”. Our Constitution establishes supremacy of fundamental rights and charges the superior Courts with the duty to enforce those fundamental rights. This implies that any question relating to the infringement of fundamental rights must be de novo tried by and in Our Superior Courts. (K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras3.) This concept of de novo trial forbids us from accepting without examining any statement of fact made by the State authorities in support’ of State action. This implies that any question relating to the infringement of fundamental rights must be de novo tried by and in Our Superior Courts. (K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras3.) This concept of de novo trial forbids us from accepting without examining any statement of fact made by the State authorities in support’ of State action. The concept of de novo trial is no doubt alien to the system of British Crown Practice from which we have borrowed our system of remedies although it is akin to the American Constitutional thinking (See Justice Brandies in St. Josephstock Market Yard v. United States1, and also Justice Reed in Stark v. Wickard2.) But we cannot allow the forms to rule from their graves our fundamental rights. The assigned role of Courts must be fulfilled and it could be performed better only if the State authorities are compelled to record reasons for their preferential treatment. The insistence of this rule also has the added advantage of compelling the State authorities to apply their mind to the facts of the situation in all its complexity before arriving at the decision involving infringement of fundamental rights instead of trotting out the post-facto justification in Courts. But, as applied to the facts of this case, I cannot but reject this contention. The High Court has clearly stated that in view of the superior merit, ability and integrity of other persons, the petitioner is being overlooked. 15. In a democracy those who seek to exercise the Supreme coercive power of the State attached to Public Offices dealing with lives and liberties of the people must not only be fair, upright and honest but also appear to be so. The Law of Criminal Jurisprudence that every one must be presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty, cannot apply to the holders of these august Offices. They, like Ceasars wife, should be above suspicion. They must ‘set it down to thyself as well to create good precedents as to follow them’ (Bacon). 16. The writ petition is dismissed but without costs. Advocate’s fee Rs. 150.