JUDGMENT : J.K. Mohanty, J. - Defendant is the appellant against the confirming decision of the Additional District Judge, Ganjam-Boudh, Berhampur. 2. The property in dispute is a pucca house situated in Berhampur town. Plaintiff's case is that one G. Brundaban and his sons were the original owners of the suit house and they mortgaged it to Berhampur Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. on 13-11-1942 as security for some loan. As they could not discharge the loan within a reasonable period, the Bank filed Dispute No. 11 of 1949-50 (Ext. F), against the mortgagors under the Madras Co-operative societies Act, 1932 (hereinafter called as 'Madras Act') and obtained award from the Sub-Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies on 1-11-1949 (Ext. G). On 24-6-1950 an application was made for execution of the award (vide E.P. 213 of 1949-50, Ext. D) before the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Berhampur as a result of which the suit house was put to sale. On 31-1-1963 the plaintiff purchased the suit house and obtained sale certificate vide Ext. 1 and took delivery of possession of the suit house on 15-3-1963 and remained in possession thereof. In the mean time one K. Satyanarayan obtained a Money decree against the aforesaid T. Brundaban and his sons in M.S. 15 of 1949 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Berhampur. In Execution Case No. 34 of 1952 the disputed house was put to sale and one K. Rammurty Subudhi, father of the defendant, purchased the property in Court sale held on 20-10-1952 as per sale certificate (Ext. A) issued on 1-10-1956. The sale was confirmed on 10-5-1956. Thereafter K. Rammurty Subudhi applied for delivery of possession of the suit house in E.P. 34 of 1952. But by then the execution proceeding before the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies was also pending. The Bank also entered appearance in the civil Court and filed a petition dated 13-10-1952 a few days before the civil Court sale and wanted that the civil Court sale would be subject to mortgage and, it appears, the same position was accepted by the Court as the sale certificate, Ext. A, clearly mentions that the sale was subject to mortgage. A, clearly mentions that the sale was subject to mortgage. Plaintiff having come to know of the fact that K. Rammurty Subudhi had applied to the Court for delivery of possession filed a petition objecting to such delivery of possession, and contended that after the sale by the co-operative department to the plaintiff, the entire interest of K. Rammurty Subudhi over the suit property had been extinguished. The objection petition was dismissed by the executing Court. So the filed an appeal before the District Judge where she succeeded. Against the aforesaid order of the District Judge, two appeals were taken to this Court in M.A. 35 of 1967 by the Decree-holder K. Satyanarayan and M.A. 36 of 1967 by the defendant-auction-purchaser. The plaintiff was the respondent in both the appeals. By a common judgment (Ext. B) M.A. 35/67 was dismissed holding that the decree-holder had no further interest in the subject matter of that controversy after he had been paid his decretal dues. The defendant's appeal, M.A. 35/67 was allowed upholding Subordinate Judge's order of rejection of the petition for delivery of possession as premature. This order was on 20-9-1971. Thereafter the delivery proceeding was resumed. On 19-12-1971 the plaintiff again opposed the same. So on 20-12-1971 the defendant moved the Court for a direction to break open the lock. The plaintiff again entered appearance, put forward her claim and suggested that the defendant should make an application under Order 2l, rule 97, Civil Procedure Code so that a regular enquiry can be made. But the defendant did not do so. The plaintiff also did not file an application under Order 21, rule 100, Civil Procedure Code. So ultimately she came up with the suit with prayers for declaration that the defendant has no manner of right, title or interest in the suit house, and for permanent injunction against the defendant restraining him from seeking delivery of the suit house either by process of law or otherwise. 3. The defence contention was that it is true that K. Rammurty Subudhi, father of the defendant, purchased the suit house subject to the mortgage in favour of Berhampur Cooperative Urban Bank. It was further contended that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply as the defendant was not a party to the aforesaid dispute and also to E.P. No. 213 of 1949-50. It was further contended that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply as the defendant was not a party to the aforesaid dispute and also to E.P. No. 213 of 1949-50. The award in the aforesaid dispute as well as the order passed in E.P. No. 213/1949-50 are all without jurisdiction and are not according to the provisions of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1951 which succeeded the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932 on the ground that the Sub-Assistant Registrar, who passed the award was not the competent authority to decide the dispute under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act. There being no valid dispute, the sale in consequence thereof was also without jurisdiction and cannot prevail over the sale in favour of the defendant. Under the provisions of the Orissa Act, the pledged security ripened into a decree for enforcement and it ought to have been executed through the civil Court. 4. No oral evidence was adduced by either side and the parties went to trial on the basis of a large number of documentary evidence, mostly pertaining to the two simultaneous proceedings before the Assistant Registrar and before the civil Court. The trial Court after hearing the parties came to the following finding : (A) Under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act any transfer during pendency of any suit or proceeding cannot affect the rights of any of the parties to the suit or proceedings and the transfer must be held subject to the decree or final order which may be made in the pending suit or proceeding. The pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction till the disposal thereof by the final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order. If the Co-operative dispute was itself a suit or a proceeding and the Assistant Registrar who passed the award was a Court, then the lis continued till the co-operative loan which was decreed under an award, was fully discharged. The Assistant Registrar discharging the function of a Registrar is a Court both under the Bihar & Orissa Co-operative Societies Act as also under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act. The Assistant Registrar discharging the function of a Registrar is a Court both under the Bihar & Orissa Co-operative Societies Act as also under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act. Therefore, if any sale took place in an execution proceeding based on a money decree during the pendency of an Execution proceeding before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies on the strength of an award passed in a dispute, the sale would be affected by the doctrine of lis pendens. The doctrine of lis pendens extends not only to persons but also to the property in dispute. Therefore, the sale in favour of the defendant is hit by lis pendens and the sale in favour of the plaintiff must prevail over the sale in favour of the defendant. (B) While the purchaser in execution of a money decree is only representative of the judgment debtor, the purchaser in execution of a mortgage decree combines in himself the interest of the judgment debtor as also that of the decree-holder. (C) Plaintiff being a purchaser of the property on the strength of the mortgage decree, her purchase relates back to the date of the mortgage and therefore it will prevail over the subsequent purchase made by the defendant in the execution proceeding based on a money decree. The defendant who stepped into the shoes of the mortgagor judgment debtor could only avail himself of the right of redemption till the sale in the execution of the mortgage decree was confirmed. Since he slept over his right of the redemption and allowed the execution on the mortgage decree to be proceeded with before the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies which ultimately ended in sale on 31-1-1963, the defendant lost all his rights that has accrued to him by the purchase which was subject to mortgage. (D) Under section 57-A of the Madras Act the Registrar or any other person subordinate to him empowered by the Registrar on his behalf, may, subject to such rules as may be prescribed by the local Government and without prejudice to any other mode of recovery provided by or under this Act, recover the amount due together with the interest by attachment and sale of the property of the person against whom such decree, decision, award or order has been obtained or passed. Under the Act "Registrar" means a person appointed to do the duty of the Registrar under the Act. Under the Act "Registrar" means a person appointed to do the duty of the Registrar under the Act. Under the Rules framed under the Act, the "Registrar of the District" means a person subordinate to Registrar, who is empowered to exercise in that district, the powers of a Registrar under section 57-A of the Act. The very fact of issuing of award itself indicates that every thing has been done according to law and it must be presumed that the award has been validly issued. (E) The award was to be executed as per the provisions of the section 105 of the Orissa Act which lays down that there are 3 simultaneous modes of recovery of the dues from the judgment debtor. (i) The Registrar himself or by the help of an officer authorised by him may recover the amount by attachment/sale. (ii) He can also make reference to the revenue Court to recover it under the Public Demands Recovery Act as an arrear of land revenue. (iii) He can also refer the matter to the civil Court for execution of the award as a decree. The only exception is that if there is a decision or award under section 74 of the Act, only the civil Court and no other Court can execute it. Section 74 refers to a dispute involving property pledged as collateral security and the word 'pledge" shows that the property covered must be movable property. Therefore, section 74 can have no application to a dispute regarding immovable property. (F) Therefore, the sale before the Assistant Registrar was legal, valid and within its jurisdiction and consequently the right of the defendant to redeem the mortgage was extinguished by the sale in favour of the plaintiff before the Assistant Registrar. Therefore, the suit was decreed and the defendant was permanently restrained. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, defendant preferred Title Appeal No. 103 of 1972 and the same was confirmed by the appellate Court and the appeal was dismissed. Hence this appeal. 5. In this appeal Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the appellant raises the following points : (a) That section 51(2) of the Madras Act was in force when the award was passed. As there was no notification vesting the powers of the Registrar with the Asst. Hence this appeal. 5. In this appeal Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the appellant raises the following points : (a) That section 51(2) of the Madras Act was in force when the award was passed. As there was no notification vesting the powers of the Registrar with the Asst. Registrar and the Assistant Registrar having entertained the dispute without reference by the Registrar, the award is invalid; and (b) That the sale in favour of the plaintiff was under the Orissa Act (Act XI of 1952) which came into force on 1-7-1955 whereas the award was passed under the Madras Act. Under sections 4 and 5 of the Orissa Act proceeding instituted earlier i.e. under the Madras Act must be deemed to have been made under the said Act. So under section 106(c) of the Orissa Act read with rule 99 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Rules, 1953 execution has to be taken in the civil Court which has jurisdiction over the subject-matter. 6. Regarding point no. 1, it is worthwhile mentioning here that the district of Ganjam (where the disputed property is situated) which formed a part of the Madras Presidency formed a part of Orissa with effect from 1-4-1936 after the State of Orissa was constituted. The Madras Act remained in force until the Orissa Act came into force with effect from 1-7-1955. So the dispute which was referred to in this case, vide Ext. F, in 1949 was regulated by the Madras Act. The execution proceeding also commenced while the Madras Act was in force. The Orissa Act came into force while the execution proceeding was pending. It would appear from Ext. F that Dispute No. 11/49-50 was filed before the Assistant Registrar and the award, vide Ext. G. was passed by the Arbitrator-cum-Sub-Assistant Registrar, it is contended by Mr. Mohanty that under section 51 of the Madras Act it is only the Registrar who had jurisdiction to entertain a reference and either decide it himself or transfer it to any person who has been invested by the local Government with powers under Section 51(2)(b) or refer it for disposal to an Arbitrator or Arbitrators under section 51(2)(c). There is nothing to show that the Assistant Registrar was empowered to entertain a dispute and so the award is invalid. There is nothing to show that the Assistant Registrar was empowered to entertain a dispute and so the award is invalid. Under section 2(g) of the Madras Act, 'Registrar' has been defined as a person appointed to perform the duties of a Registrar. Section 3 of the said Act provides that the local Government may appoint a person to be a Registrar for the Presidency of Madras and may by general or special order confer on any other person all or any of the powers of a Registrar. Once such delegation is made to any such person other than the Registrar, he may of course decide the dispute himself or refer it to an Arbitrator. In the present case the Courts below have decided that the Assistant Registrar was an officer to whom Registrar's powers had been delegated and accordingly he entertained the dispute and referred the same to the Sub-Assistant Registrar to give an award as an Arbitrator. The relevant notifications were not placed before the Subordinate Judge. So he drew the presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act that such powers had been duly conferred on the Assistant Registrar. He relied on a decision reported in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and another AIR 1967 S.C. 856 . In the appellate Court, however, a copy of the relevant notification of the Madras Government published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated 30-8-1932 which was placed in the guard file of the Urban Bank and all connected documents were produced and the appellate Court after examining the records was satisfied that the Assistant Registrar had been duly vested with the powers under section 51(2) of the Orissa Act to entertain the dispute. The learned appellate Court has thoroughly discussed this in paragraph 8 of his judgment. 7. Mr. Mohanty next contended that the relevant order sheet or the files of the Assistant Registrar are not available to show if the dispute had been referred by him to the Sub-Assistant Registrar for arbitration, no notification has been filed to show if the Sub-Assistant Registrar had been by special or general order of the State Government appointed as an Arbitrator. Mohanty next contended that the relevant order sheet or the files of the Assistant Registrar are not available to show if the dispute had been referred by him to the Sub-Assistant Registrar for arbitration, no notification has been filed to show if the Sub-Assistant Registrar had been by special or general order of the State Government appointed as an Arbitrator. But the learned appellate Court held :- "There is, however, no difficulty to apply the presumption under section 114, Evidence Act to hold that the Assistant Registrar duly referred it and further that the Sub-Assistant Registrar was a proper person to act as arbitrator and that he gave the award properly." After hearing the arguments of the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the relevant documents, I also agree with the above finding of the learned appellate Court. 8. The next question is about the validity of the execution proceedings before the Assistant Registrar. Mr. Mohanty referred to section 105(1)(c) of the Orissa Act and challenged the validity of the execution proceedings before the Assistant Registrar. Section 105(1) of the Orissa Act contemplates three modes of execution. Clause (a) provides that any sum payable to the State Government or to a Society or to a liquidator shall be recoverable by the Registrar, or by a Sale Officer authorised by the Registrar in this behalf by the attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of the property. Under clause (b) the recovery can be made as an arrear of land revenue. Clause (c) provides : "In the case of any decision or award under section 74 upon application for execution by any civil Court having local jurisdiction in the same manner as if the decision or award are a decree of such Court." In the Madras Act the corresponding provisions are not there. But the same are in rule XV(7) which also consists of clauses (a), (b) and (c). Clauses (a) and (b) are almost in the same terms as of Section 105(1)(a) & (b) of the Orissa Act. But the same are in rule XV(7) which also consists of clauses (a), (b) and (c). Clauses (a) and (b) are almost in the same terms as of Section 105(1)(a) & (b) of the Orissa Act. Clause (c) of the Madras Act is as follows :- "On application to the Civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the decision or award, that Court shall enforce the decision or award as if it were a final decree of the Court." When the execution application was filled, the Madras Act and Rules were in force. But by the time of the sale, the Orissa Act had come into operation. Under section 105(1)(c) of the Orissa Act reference is made to section 74 of the said Act whereas the same is not there in clause (c) of Rule XV(7) of the Madras Rule. Section 51 of the Madras Act corresponds to sections 71 and 73 of the Orissa Act. But in the Madras Act there is no provision corresponding to section 74 of the Orissa Act. Section 74 of the Orissa Act is as follows :- "Where a dispute involves property pledged as collateral security, the person deciding the dispute may issue an award, which shall have the same force and effect as a final mortgage decree of a Civil Court having jurisdiction to make such a decree." Mr. Mohanty contended that the execution case was filed under the Madras Act, vide Ext. D. So the sale by the Co-operative Societies is a nullity as the execution was to be taken in the civil Court. Mr. Mohanty next contended that the word 'pledged' occurring in section 74 means nothing but mortgage. But on the other hand on behalf of the respondent it is contended that the term is used to mean hypothecation of movables, but not mortgage of immovable property. In order to appreciate the argument it will be convenient to refer to Chapter XI of the Orissa which contains the provisions for enforcement of orders and recovery of sums due. Under Rule 116(1) the decree-holder shall apply to the principal officer of the district (in this case the Assistant Registrar). Rule 115 provides for conditional attachment of property. Rule 116 provides for procedure in execution of decree, decision or award. Under Rule 116(1) the decree-holder shall apply to the principal officer of the district (in this case the Assistant Registrar). Rule 115 provides for conditional attachment of property. Rule 116 provides for procedure in execution of decree, decision or award. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 116 provides that any decree-holder requiring the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 105 of Act to be applied, shall apply to the principal officer of the Co-operative Department in the district who has jurisdiction over the area in which the case of action arose and shall deposit necessary costs etc. In this case the Assistant Registrar is the principal officer of the district. Rule 117 provides for procedure to be followed on receipt of application by the principal officer. It also requires that the decree holder may indicate whether he wishes to proceed in the first instance against the immovable property mortgaged to the decree holder or other immovable property or to secure the attachment of movable property. Sub-rule (3) of rule 117 provides that unless the decree holder has expressed a desire that proceedings should be taken in a particular order as laid down in sub-rule (1), execution (shall ordinarily be) taken against movable property first and shall not preclude the immovable property being proceeded against simultaneously in case of necessity, and if there is no movable property or if the sale-proceeds of the movable property or properties attached and sold are insufficient to meet the full demand of the decree holder, the immovable property mortgaged to the decree-holder or other immovable property belonging to the defaulter may be proceeded against. Rule 136 provides that immovable property shall not be sold in execution of a decree unless such property has been previously attached. In the proviso to the above rule it is mentioned that where the decree has been obtained on the basis of mortgage of such property, it shall not be necessary to attach it. Rule 137 provides for description of immovable property to be proceeded against and Rule 138 provides mode of service of demand notice. In these two rules reference has been made to 'sale without attachment'. On a reading of these provisions, there is no room for doubt that an execution proceeding before the Assistant Registrar in respect of a mortgage award is maintainable. In these two rules reference has been made to 'sale without attachment'. On a reading of these provisions, there is no room for doubt that an execution proceeding before the Assistant Registrar in respect of a mortgage award is maintainable. The learned appellate Court on a consideration of the relevant provisions, as indicated above, the provisions of Chapter XII of the Orissa Rules which provides special procedure for the sale of the mortgage property under section 91 of the Act and of sections 90 and 91 and the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, as discussed in paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of his judgment, has come to the finding that the Assistant Registrar has power and jurisdiction to execute the mortgage award and sell the property. I also see no reason to differ from the above finding. 9. Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that the plaintiff being a purchaser of the property on the strength of the mortgage decree, her purchase relates back to the date of the mortgage and, therefore it will prevail over the subsequent purchase made by the defendant in the execution proceeding based on a money decree. The defendant who stepped into the shoes of the mortgagor-judgment debtor could only avail himself of the right of redemption till the sale in the execution of the mortgage decree was confirmed. Since he slept over his right of redemption and allowed the execution on the mortgage decree to be proceeded with before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies which ultimately ended in sale, the defendant lost all his rights that has accrued to him by the purchase which was subject to mortgage. In this connection it may be mentioned here that in Ext. A, the sale certificate, it has been clearly mentioned that the sale is subject to mortgage. The aforesaid contention of Mr. Mohapatra has some considerable force. 10. After considering the arguments of both sides and the facts and circumstances of the case, I see no reason to interfere with the findings of the Courts below and so this appeal is dismissed. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are confirmed, but in the circumstances of the case, parties are to hear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Dismissed