JUDGMENT 1. - Shri Ravindra Kediya, Assistant Director, R. C. S. Vanaspati Industry, and Shri B. P. Agarwal, Factory Manager, have presented this application under section 482 Cr. P. C for quashing the proceedings initiated against them by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagaur under Section 2U (A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The facts and circumstances in which the present application came to be filed, may be briefly stated as under.:- 3. On 7.6.73, at about 3-40 p. m. Shri Sahdeo Chodhari, Deputy Chief Medical and Health Officer (Health), Nagaur visited the shop M/s Shobha Chand Ganeshmal, Ladnu dealing in vanaspati ghee. He purchased 1 Kg & 500 gms. of Veena Brand Ghee from a sealed container of 16,1/2 Kg. for a sum of Rs. 12.87. Necessary formalities were completed. The sample was divided into three parts in three bottles and the bottles were duly checked and sealed. One of the bottles was handed over to the accused and one bottle or sample was sent for analysis. On receipt of the report of the Public Analyst, it was found that the sample was adulterated as it did not conform to the prescribed standard of purity. After obtaining sanction for prosecution against Ganeshmal. Hansa Raj & Mool Chand, Shri Sahadeo Chodhari presented a complaint against the partners of M/s Sobha Chand Ganeshmal. The prosecution evidence was recorded. The statements of all the three accused persons were also recorded The accused persons also examined three witnesses D. W. 1 Sbyam Sundar, Junior Accountant, District Supply Office, D. W. 2 Bal Chand serving in supply department at Tehsil Ladnu, the present applicant D. W. 3, Shri R K. Kedia The accused Mool Chand further examined himself as D. W. 4. Before recording the defence evidence on 17.3.75 an application was moved on behalf of the prosecution for taking cognizance under section 7/16 of the Act against R. C. S. Vanaspati Industries, R. K. Kedia & Shri B. P. Agarwal. On 13.6.75, on behalf of the prosecution it was stated that the application may be disposed of after recording of the defence evidence. On 13.6.75, on behalf of the prosecution it was stated that the application may be disposed of after recording of the defence evidence. There upon, attention of the Chief Judicial Magistrate was invited to the earlier application dated 14.3.75 and the learned Magistrate passed order on 19.10.77 and took cognizance against the present application and M/s R. C. S. Vanaspati Industry, Jaipur under section 20 (A) of the Act and bailable warrants were issued against the present applicants. On appearance, by the present application was filed on 24.11.77. praying for setting aside the order whereby they were summoned and also prayed for their discharge. It was submitted that the original accused persons were wholesale dealers and as such the Court could not take cognizance against them under section 20 (A) of the Act. The learned Magistrate after hearing dismissed the application dated 24. 11. 77. Dissatisfied with the order of the learned Magistrate, the present application has been moved for quashing of the proceedings against the present applicants. 4. Shri Singhvi on behalf of the applicants vehemently submitted that the original accused persons are the wholesale dealers holding wholesale licence no. 29. In such a situation, manufacturer could not be proceeded against under section 20 (A) of the Act. In this connection Shri Singhvi referred to the documents Ex. D 2 and Ex. D3, the statements submitted by M/s Shobha Chand Ganeshmal under sub-clause (2) of clause (9) of the Rajasthan Hydrogenated Vegetable Oils Dealers Licensing Order, 1968, (hereinafter referred to as Licensing Order) in which the whole sale licence no, 29 of M/s Sliobhachand Ganeshmal finds mention. He also referred to the statement of Mool Chand, one of the original accused appeared as DW 4, who has deposed that his firm was issued a permit for the purchase of 500 tins of vanaspati ghee from M/s R. C. S. Vanaspati Industry, Jaipur and 200 tins from Premier Vegetable Products, Jaipur Vide Ex. D. 1 and a sum of Rs. 69,000/- were deposited towards the price of 500 tins with R. C. S. Vanaspati Industry vide receipt Ex. D 4 the said industry only supplied 100 tins. He also stated that a stock register was maintained at his shop and he submitted fortnightly statements to the Tehsildar which are Exs. D. 1 and a sum of Rs. 69,000/- were deposited towards the price of 500 tins with R. C. S. Vanaspati Industry vide receipt Ex. D 4 the said industry only supplied 100 tins. He also stated that a stock register was maintained at his shop and he submitted fortnightly statements to the Tehsildar which are Exs. D 2 & D 31 He has also stated that R. C. S. Vanaspati Industry was a licence holder for the manufacture of vanaspati ghee and its licence is Ex. D 7. Shri Singhvi thus, urged that from the statement of Mool Chand and the documents submitted by him it is evident that M/s Shobha Chand Ganeshmal was a whole sale dealer in Vanaspati and so the original prosecution was launched against the dealer, that being so, during the course of the trial, cognizance could not have been taken against the manufacturer. He contended that section 20 (A) of the Act applies only when trial is pending against any person not being a manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, but in case, trial is pending against a dealer, then section 20 (A) cannot be invoked and no cognizance can be taken against the manufacturer or distributor. The learned counsel supported his arguments by placing reliance on D. Mitra v. The State of Bihar (1978 CRI. L. J. 657) . All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal, 1978,201 & Roshan Lal Singhania v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1978 CRI. L. J. 1027) 5. Shri N. M. L. Lodha, Public Prosecutor on the other hand, submitted that M/s Shobha Chand Ganeshmal was not prosecuted as a dealer but was prosecuted as a vendor and that during the trial of a vendor, Cognizance can be taken against a manufacturer. It was also urged that as to whether the original accused persons are dealers or not would be a question of fact. That question needs evidence, so in an application under section 482 Cr. P. C this Court cannot enter into this disputed question of fact. It was also submitted by Shri Lodha that the word "dealer" is to be read in the context in which it is placed. The word "dealer" appears after expressions manufacturer and distributor. That question needs evidence, so in an application under section 482 Cr. P. C this Court cannot enter into this disputed question of fact. It was also submitted by Shri Lodha that the word "dealer" is to be read in the context in which it is placed. The word "dealer" appears after expressions manufacturer and distributor. So, in this context, the word "dealer" may mean a dealer authorised or appointed by the manufacturer or the distributor and not simply a dealer of a particular commodity. There is no material on record on the basis of which it can be said that M/s Shobha Chand Ganeshmal were the authorised and appointed dealers of R. C. S Vanaspati Industry. Shri Lodha conceded that if it is found that M/s Shobha Chand Ganeshmal were prosecuted as dealers, then in that circumstance cognizance could not be taken under Section 20 (A) of the Act. 6. I have given my earnest consideration to the contentions advanced before me. 7. The first question which emerges for consideration is as to what is the status of the original accused persons whether they could be considered as dealers. In case it is found that the original accused persons were dealers, the legal position appears to be quite clear that no cognizance can betaken against the manufacturer or distributor under section 20 (A). It may be stated that there is sufficient material on record on the basis of which it can be said that M/s Shobha Chand Ganeshmal is a whole sale dealer of vanaspati though there is no material that the said firm was the authorised and appointed dealer of Veena Brand Vanaspati produced by M/s R. C. S Vanaspati Industry. It is necessary that under section 20 (A) of the Act, a dealer should be an authorised or appointed dealer of the manufacturer or distributor of a particular commodity and if such appointed or authorised dealer is originally prosecuted, manufacturer or distributor cannot be added as co-accused. If he is a simple dealer of a particular commodity, for which some other person has been prosecuted, then the manufacturer, distributor or deaier of that commodity cannot be arrayed or impleaded as a co-accused along with original accused. Thus, what is to be seen is as to whether M/s Shobha Chand Ganeshmal are the dealers of Veena Brand Vanaspati produced by R. C S. Vanaspati Industry. Thus, what is to be seen is as to whether M/s Shobha Chand Ganeshmal are the dealers of Veena Brand Vanaspati produced by R. C S. Vanaspati Industry. Under the Licensing Order the licensees have to purchase vanaspati ghee in accordance with the directions issued by the State Government or the Collector and for that permits are issued. The question of authorised or appointed dealers of the producers does not arise. Thus, section 20 (A) does not contemplate authorised or appointed dealer only. It applies to a dealer of any article of food simply. 8. Now proceed to consider the status of the original accused as dealers or not. 9. The matter is required to be examined in the light of the document and statement of Mool Chand. There is sufficient material on record and can be taken to be a fact which cannot be disputed that M/S Shobha Chand Ganeshmal is a whole sale dealer of vanaspati for which the firm holds a licence. A whole sale licence was issued under the Licensing Order. Under clause (9) of the said Order a licensee is required to maintain a true account of stock in form 'D' of the daily balance, receipts and distribution or sale, as the case may be, and under clause (2) the licensee is required to submit to the Licensing Authority a true fortnightly stock and sale return in Form ' E" of each variety of hydrogenated vegetable oil received or sold as the case may be, within three days after the close of the fortnight. Wholesaler and retailer licenses are issued under the Licensing Order. The documents D 2 & D 3 are in the form 'E' submitted by M/S Saobha Chand Ganeshmal. The original wholesale licence of this firm was also ordered to be produced was directed to produce the same but the same was not produced. Despite that it cannot be disputed that the original accused were holding the whole sale licence and not the retailer licence and the original accused were thus prosecuted as wholesale dealer of vanaspati ghee including Veena Brand ghee manufactured by R C. S. Vanaspati Industry. Being the wholesale dealers, the original accused were something more than a vendor or seller who sales the commodity to the consumer. Thus, on the basis of the material on record, hold that the original accused were the dealers of hydrogenated vegetable oils. Being the wholesale dealers, the original accused were something more than a vendor or seller who sales the commodity to the consumer. Thus, on the basis of the material on record, hold that the original accused were the dealers of hydrogenated vegetable oils. 10. The next question which arises for consideration is as to whether cognizance can be taken against the present applicants under section 20 (A). In order consider this question, it would be proper to have a look to section 20 (A) of the Act, which is as under : "Power of court to implead manufacturer etc. - Whether at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3)of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in Section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under Section 20." A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that if the Court is trying any person other than the manufacturer, distributor or dealer and if in the course of the trial, it is satisfied on evidence that the manufacturer or distributor or dealer of the adulterated food is concerned with the commission of the offence, it may proceed against such manufacturer, distributor or dealer as if prosecution had been instituted against him under section 20 of the Act. The word "dealer has not been defined anywhere in the Act but from the perusal of several provisions of the Act, it would be clear that the expression 'dealer' is distinguished from the word 'vendor' or seller'. A dealer is something more then a seller or vendor of a particular article of food. A vendor cannot be considered to be a dealer- Shri Lodha placed reliance on the cases of Ratanlal Rostogi v. The Corporation of Calcutta (1972 FAC 742) of the Calcutta High Court and Ranganath Agencies v. Food Inspector Badgara Municipality (19-73 FAC 75) of the Kerala High Court. Both the cases are distinguishable on facts. A vendor cannot be considered to be a dealer- Shri Lodha placed reliance on the cases of Ratanlal Rostogi v. The Corporation of Calcutta (1972 FAC 742) of the Calcutta High Court and Ranganath Agencies v. Food Inspector Badgara Municipality (19-73 FAC 75) of the Kerala High Court. Both the cases are distinguishable on facts. In those cases the original accused were held to be vendors or persons other then dealer and the ordinary vendor or seller was considered to be different from dealer. The Calcutta was referred to in the Kerala case, The Calcutta High Court considered the meaning of the expressions vendor and dealer and various provisions of the Act were examined and discussed the matter as under:- "A reference to Act XXXVII of 1954 would bring to light the word used in the other sections is not "dealer" but seller or vendor. Section 2, containing definitions, as defined "sale" but not a "dealer", section 7 and 16 prohibit and penalise respectively "manufacturer for sale, or store, sell or distribute" etc. , Section 14 again relates to "sale", Section 19 (l)and (2) contain the word ',vendor", and Section 23 (1) (g) (1) and (m) (iii) again refer to "sale". It is necessary also to note the context in which the said word has been used in Section 20 (A) of the Act. The words "manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food" are preceded by the preposition "that". It is significant that the word "dealer" comes after the other words "manufacturer, distributor". Some meaning and effect must be given to the use of the said words in the body of the provision and it is there for pertinent to refer to the canons of interpretation of the statutes in this context as also the object of the Act. It is significant that the word "dealer" comes after the other words "manufacturer, distributor". Some meaning and effect must be given to the use of the said words in the body of the provision and it is there for pertinent to refer to the canons of interpretation of the statutes in this context as also the object of the Act. The first principle is that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together monscuntur a socials, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense, Maxwell in his "interpretation of Statutes" (11th Edn.) observed that "They taken, as it were, their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general- "On such interpretation the word "dealer" should not be interpreted in "the more general sense" including anybody and every body dealing in a commodity but should be restricted to its cognate sense along with the words" ' manufacturer or distributor" ruling out thereby any and every seller or a vendor of any article of food. The next principle to be considered is the principle of ejusdem generis. In the said section, the general word "dealer" has followed other less general terms like ' manufacturer, distributor" and therefore, should be interpreted ejusdem generis. Maxwell in his "interpretation of Statutes." (11th Edn) has observed that "but the general word which follows particular and specific words of the same nature as itself taken its meaning from them and is presumed to be restricted to the same genus as those words." In the same para, it was observed by N.C. Talukdar J. who delivered that he has taken into consideration the use of the words and the context thereof in the body of the provision in question and found that the same does not indicate that a wider sense was intended when the legislature used the word "dealer" as distinguished from the world "vendor" or "seller'' in the other provisions of the same statute. The point was also approached from another stand point On the facts of that case, it was the accused did not come within the meaning of the word "dealer" 11. The point was also approached from another stand point On the facts of that case, it was the accused did not come within the meaning of the word "dealer" 11. D. Mitra's case cited by Shri Singhvi, Directly dealt with the point in question and it was held in this case if the case is initaily instituted against a dealer of adulterated food, then the manufacturer or distributor cannot be made accused under section 20 (A). In such a case the manufacturer or distributor may be proceeded against under section 20 and reliance was placed on I. M. Nayak v. Kantilal Sambalal Sah (1974 FAC 148) . In that case, Desai J. (as he then was) observed in para 15 of the judgment as under:- "Section 20 (A) cannot be invoked where the prosecution is lodged against a manufacturer, distributor or dealer. It can only be invoked where the prosecution is initially bodged against any person other than the manufacturer, distributor or dealer. In other words, if the Vendor is being tried and the court in the course of trial is satisfied that a manufacturer, distributor or dealer is concerned with the commission of an offence, the latter can be joined as a co-accused with the Vendor. The Vendor of an article is some other than a manufacturer or distributor or dealer." 12. In Roshanlal Shighania's case (supra) preconditions for the exercise of power under section 20 (A) were laid down. One of the essential conditions prescribed for the exercise of power under section 20 (A) is that the trial should pending against a person other than a manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of Food. As a necessary corollary of it, power under section 20 (A) cannot be exercised when trial for an offence is pending against a manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food. The provision of section 20 (A) is to be read in the context of section 14 & 19 and on such reading, a distinction has to be made between a dealer and a Vendor. Thus, in a case where a dealer is being tried, then under section 20(A) manufacturer cannot be arrayed as an accused and no cognizance can be taken against the manufacturer or the distributor. Thus, in a case where a dealer is being tried, then under section 20(A) manufacturer cannot be arrayed as an accused and no cognizance can be taken against the manufacturer or the distributor. In view of the fact that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed against the present applicants under section 20 (A), it would be proper to exercise the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 Cr. P.C. In the light of the fore going discussion, this application deserves to be allowed and the proceeding against the present applicants need to be quashed. 13. In the result, the application is allowed and the orders dated 19. 10. 1977 and 18.5.78 are set-aside and proceedings against present applicants are quashed.Application Allowed/Proceedings Quashed. *******