ORDER: This civil miscellaneous second appeal arises out of execution proceedings. It raises a question about the judgment-debtor's right to claim the protection of Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971, called the Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Conferment of Ownership) Act, 1971. 2. This statute, Act XL of 1971, was invoked for the first time in this case in execution proceedings. It was not an issue between the parties at any earlier stage. The subject-matter of the claim under the Act was a house and backyard in a village in Nannilam Taluk. This property and another figured as the subject-matter of the suit. The suit was for possession. The plaintiffs in the suit claimed ownership of the suit property as settlees under a registered deed of settlement of the year 1953. The defendant was a son of the settlor. He came to the village some time after the settlor's death in 1961. He is in occupation of the house and backyard ever since. The suit was instituted in 1968. In the suit, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was a tenant under them on a monthly rent of Rs. 5. The defendant denied the tenancy. He denied the title of the plaintiffs. He asserted his own title to the property by adverse possession. This defence was accepted, and the trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the District Court reversed the trial Court's decision and decreed the suit. This decree was confirmed by this Court in second appeal. The plaintiffs-decree-holders thereupon filed an execution against the defendant for delivery of possession of the suit property. It was at this stage that the judgment debtor put forward his claim under Act XL of 1971. He contended that the statute had conferred on him ownership of the suit house and backyard, and, that being so, execution cannot be levied against him so as to uproot him from the property. The executing Court, however, rejected this contention and ordered delivery of possession. The Court took the view that in the face of the decree for possession the judgment-debtor cannot avail himself of Act XL of 1971. The executing Court, however, rejected this contention and ordered delivery of possession. The Court took the view that in the face of the decree for possession the judgment-debtor cannot avail himself of Act XL of 1971. On appeal, the District Court took the same view as the executing Court: The District Court further observed that even in the execution proceedings, the judgment-debtor had not come forward with any evidence to establish the necessary facts which would entitle him to the benefits claimed by him under the Act. The District Court accordingly confirmed the order for delivery of possession passed by the executing Court. 3. In this civil miscellaneous second appeal preferred by the defendant-judgment-debtor, it is urged on his behalf that execution of the decree for possession is barred, because the suit house is his Kudiyiruppu within the meaning of Act XL of 1971. It is further urged that on the basis on which the plaintiffs themselves had filed their suit in ejectment and had obtained their decree for possession, there was no need for any further materials to sustain the judgment-debtor's claim to be entitled to the benefits under the Act on the basis of continued possession of the Kudiyiruppu. 4. Learned counsel for the decree holders, on the other hand, submits that the decree for possession against the judgment-debtor had become final after his appeals had proved unsuccessful. It was urged that the claim under the Kudiyiruppu Ownership Act does not lie at this stage He submitted that the Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 bars the jurisdiction of civil Courts only in respect of matters on which the authorised officer had jurisdiction to determine questions arising under the Act. He pointed out that the only question within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorised officer under the Act was to find out whether any agriculturist or agricultural labourer was occupying any kudiyiruppu on 19th June, 1971, so as to enable him to claim ownership of the kudiyiruppu under section 3 of the Act. All other questions such, for instance, as to whether the claimant was an agriculturist or not, whether he was a tenant or licence or not, were not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorised officer, and they were. All other questions such, for instance, as to whether the claimant was an agriculturist or not, whether he was a tenant or licence or not, were not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorised officer, and they were. therefore, not entirely outside the scope of the civil Court, and that a civil Court was not barred from entertaining and determining such questions either in a suit or in other proceedings. 5. Learned counsel sought support from a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court, N.S. Ramaswami, J. reported in Ganesan v. Madurai Achari1, On the strength of this decision, learned counsel submitted that the Courts below were right in entertaining and ordering the petition for executing the decree for possession against the judgment-debtor-appellant. 6. Arguments on either side so put forward bear on the construction of the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Conferment of Ownership) Act, 1971. The Act, under section 3 automatically confers absolute title over a kudi-. yiruppu if the person in occupation thereof is in occupation on 19th June, 1971 and is either an agriculturist or an agricultural labourer. Explanation I to section 2 (3) lays down a presumption that any person in occupation of a kudiyiruppu must be deemed to be an agriculturist or agricultural labourer, unless the contrary is proved. 7. It is the case of the decree-holders that the judgment-debtor was not a tenant or licencee of the premises. This submission seems to me to be against the teeth of the decree-holders’ own case as put forward in the suit. It may be remembered that the whole basis of the suit was that the judgment-debtor who inducted into the suit properties subsequent to 1961 as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 5. Indeed, one of the reliefs prayed for in the suit against the judgment-debtor was that he had fallen in arrears of rent. There was a prayer in the suit for recovery of arrears of rent in the sum of Rs. 175. It is, therefore, futile to claim that the judgment-debtor cannot qualify for rights of ownership under section 3 of the Act as a tenant of the premises. 8. It was then submitted that the judgment-debtor had not established that he was an agriculturist or an agricultural labourer entitled to the benefits of the Act. 175. It is, therefore, futile to claim that the judgment-debtor cannot qualify for rights of ownership under section 3 of the Act as a tenant of the premises. 8. It was then submitted that the judgment-debtor had not established that he was an agriculturist or an agricultural labourer entitled to the benefits of the Act. It was pointed out that apart from a bare assertion to that effect, the judgment-debtor had not adduced any evidence to support his claim in that behalf. This argument again misses the Explanation I to section 2 (3) of the Act which enacts a rebuttable presumption to the effect that any person occupying a kudiyiruppu is an agriculurist or agricultural labourer until the contrary is proved. In my view, the learned District Judge was in error in requiring the judgment-debtor to establish that he was an agriculturist or agricultural labourer and rejecting his claim under the Act for want of proof in that regard. What the learned District Judge ought to have done was to apply the presumption under the Explanation and call upon the decree-holders to adduce evidence to rebut the initial presumption in favour of the judgment-debtor. 9. The most important condition which the judgment-debtor had to fulfil for invoking section 3 of the Act was to establish that he was in occupation of the kudiyiruppu on 19th June, 19.71. On this question, there does not seem to be any controversy. As I earlier mentioned, according to the decree-holders’ own case, the judgment-debtor entered upon the possession of the suit properties subsequent to 1961. The prayer In the suit was for recovery of possession from the judgment-debtor. The trial Court, as I earlier mentioned, dismissed the decree-holders’ suit which meant that it was the appellate Court which decreed the suit on appeal, This was confirmed by this Court in Mohamed Nuruddin v. Ameena Ammal and Mohamed Abdullah1. Even after the decree passed by the first appellate Court, as confirmed by this Court, it became necessary for the decree-holders to file an execution petition for actual delivery and possession. It is, therefore, quite clear that during the interregnum it was the judgment-debtor who was in actual physical occupation of the suit premises. The suit was filed as early as on 11th December, 1967 and right from that date, it was the judgment-debtor who had been in occupation of the suit premises. It is, therefore, quite clear that during the interregnum it was the judgment-debtor who was in actual physical occupation of the suit premises. The suit was filed as early as on 11th December, 1967 and right from that date, it was the judgment-debtor who had been in occupation of the suit premises. There can, therefore, be no doubt that he was in actual possession on the crucial date viz., 19th June, 1971. It seems to me therefore that prima facie the judgment-debtor is entitled to invoke section 3 of the Act and claim the full ownership which has been conferred by that section on him as the occupant of the kudiyiruppu. 10. Even if the decree-holders wish to contest the claim of the judgment-debtor to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971, it seems to me that the proper forum would be not a civil Court, but the authorized officer functioning under the Act. section 4 of the Act provides that if any dispute arises as to whether any agriculturist or agricultural labourer was occupying any kudiyiruppu on the 19th June, 1971, for purposes of section 3 of the Act, such a dispute shall be decided by the authorised officer. section 5 of the Act provides for an appeal to the aggrieved person against the order of the authorised officer. Sub- section (2) provides for the procedure to be prescribed by the rules. It is in this context that the provisions of section 23 of the Act are to be examined, section 23 provides: “Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the ‘Government are or the authorised officer is, empowered by or under this Act, to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.” It may be observed that the Act leaves certain specified matters for being agitated before the civil Courts such, for example, as the question of compensation. But it is quite clear from the section that where the statute empowers the authorised officer as a proper authority to determine any question arising under the Act, the civil Court's jurisdiction, to that extent, is negatived. But it is quite clear from the section that where the statute empowers the authorised officer as a proper authority to determine any question arising under the Act, the civil Court's jurisdiction, to that extent, is negatived. It is further clear from the enactment of section 3 and section 4 of the Act that the authorised officer is the sole authority to decide the question as to whether an occupant of a kudiyiruppu is entitled to ownership rights under section 3. Therefore, this question, in any case, has ultimately to be decided only by the authorised officer. In this view also, the execution petition has got to be rejected. 11. It is true that N.S. Ramaswami, J., had laid down a different understanding of the scope of the bar under section 23 of the Act in the decision reported in Ganesan v, Madurai Achari1, According to the reasoning of the learned Judge while the authorised officer has got exclusive jurisdiction under section 4, that jurisdiction is limited only to a determination of the question whether any agriculturist or agricultural labourer was occupying any kudiyiruppu on the 19th June, 1971. If the parties are at variance on the question whether it was a kudiyirupppu under the occupant or whether the occupant was a tenant or a licensee under the landlord, then these questions cannot be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorised officer under section 4 of the Act. The learned Judge observed thus: “It is not possible to read these provisions as conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the authorised officer to decide the question whether a site is a Kudiyiruppu or not. The Act nowhere says that such a question is one that has to be decided by the Authorised Officer. As already seen, all that section 4 says is that if there is a dispute as to whether an agriculturist or agricultural labourer was occupying a Kudiyriuppu on the 19th June, 1971 ( — if he had so occupied, the ownership of the site would vest in him), this dispute has to be decided by the Authorised Officer. That does not mean that the question whether the site is a Kudiyiruppu, or not is within his exclusive jurisdiction. It should also be remembered that this Act is allied to the other Act, namely, the Kudiyiruppu Protection Act. That does not mean that the question whether the site is a Kudiyiruppu, or not is within his exclusive jurisdiction. It should also be remembered that this Act is allied to the other Act, namely, the Kudiyiruppu Protection Act. It was already noticed that under the Act only an owner of a Kuddiyirrupu can approach the Authorised Officer to evict the tenant on any one of the grounds contained in section 3 (3) of the said Act, which presupposes that if the owner does not concede that the site is a Kudiyiruppu, he cannot possibly go to the Authorised Officer. Therefore, I am quite clear that even under the Kudiyiruppu Ownership Act the question whether a site is a Kudiyiruppu or not is within the jurisdiction of the civil Court. A decision by the civil Court on the point would be final. If, however, before any civil Court renders a decision on the question whether the site is a Kudiyiruppu or not, the dispute. under section 4 (1) goes before the Authorised Officer, he may incidentally have to decide whether it is a Kudiyiruypu. But, if the civil Court has given a decision already, that would be binding on the parties.” I am unable to accept this view of the jurisdiction of the authorised officer as correct. It seems to me that when section 4 leaves for decision by the authorised officer the dispute as to whether any agricultural labourer was occupying a Kudiyiruppu on 19th June, 1971, it leaves for decision the following matters: 1. Whether the person concerned is an agriculturist or an agricultural labourer or not? 2. Whether the property under his occupation is Kudiyiruppu or not? and 3. Whether the person claiming the rights under section 3 of the Act was in occupation of the Kudiyiruppu on 19th June, 1971, or not? Ramaswami, J., has observed that the Act nowhere says that the controversy as to the nature of the Kudiyiruppu is to be settled by the Authorised Officer. I do not agree with this view. section 4 of the Act has to be read in line with section 3 . section 3 confers full rights of ownership only on an agriculturist or agricultural labourer in occupation of the Kudiyiruppu on 19th June, 1971. Any dispute concerning this right is the dispute which is referred to under section 4. I do not agree with this view. section 4 of the Act has to be read in line with section 3 . section 3 confers full rights of ownership only on an agriculturist or agricultural labourer in occupation of the Kudiyiruppu on 19th June, 1971. Any dispute concerning this right is the dispute which is referred to under section 4. The words cannot be literally understood as to mean that only disputes as to the date of possession are to be decided by the Authorised Officer. It is implicit in the phraseology of section 4 , when construed in line with, and in association with section 3 , that all disputes which arise between a person in occupation and the owner of Kudiyiruppu are properly determined only by the Authorised Officer under section 4 subject to the right under section 3. I do not agree with the view of Ramaswami, J., that a civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether a particular site is a Kudiyiruppu or not and if it decides that question, such a decision shall be final and shall be binding on the parties. The learned Judge concedes that the Authorised Officer may incidentally have to decide whether it is a Kudiyiruppu, thereby conceding that part of his function under section 4 is to decide that question. I do not, therefore, see any logic behind the theory that if a civil Court were to enter its finding that finding is binding on the parties; but not if the civil Court had not so rendered a finding. The learned Judge does not say what would be the position if an Authorised Officer had gone into the matter already as to whether a particular site is a Kudiyiruppu or not and whether any such finding can be canvassed before a civil Court when it had already been rendered by the Authorised Officer. It seems to me that the whole approach of the learned Judge has been conditioned by the fact that he had regarded the Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Conferment of Ownership) Act, 1971 , Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 as one of a fascicule of Acts and hence it had to be construed in the light of the terms of another Act, the Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Protection from Eviction) Act (Act XXXI of 1961). The learned Judge says that under the Kudiyiruppu Protection Act, only the owner of Kudiyiruppu can approach the Authorised Officer to evict the tenant. According to the learned Judge, if the owner does not concede that the site is a Kudiyiruppu, he cannot possibly go to the Authorised Officer. Even assuming that this view of the learned Judge is correct, I cannot see how it has any bearing on section 4 of Tamil Nadu Act No. XL of 1971. Both the Acts may deal with the same subject viz., the occupants of Kudiyiruppu in Tamil Nadu; but there is a difference between the two Acts with reference to the scope of the subject-matter. For instance, under Tamil Nadu Act XXXVIII of 1961protection from eviction is granted to occupants of Kudiyiruppu only in cases where the person in occupation was in occupation thereof on 31st March, 1959. Those who came to occupy Kudiyiruppus subsequent to that date are not entitled to such protection from eviction. Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 does not state that only those who are entitled to protection from eviction under Tamil Nadu Act XXXVIII of 1961 would be entitled to conferment of ownership rights of the Kudiyiruppu under section 3 of the Act. On the contrary, it is provided under section 3 of Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 that they must be in occupation on a particular date i.e. on 19th June, 1971. That section does not say that the persons claiming the rights under the Act ought to have been in occupation of the Kudiyiruppu on 31st March, 1959, or any other later date or to be in continuous occupation thereof. Secondly, there is a pertinent difference in the scope of the two Acts: In Tamil Nadu Act XXXVIII of 1961, the agricultural land is so defined as to exclude plantation. An agriculturist or agricultural labourer is also similarly defined to exclude cultivators and workers in plantations. This exclusion is not to be found in the definitions of “agricultural land: agriculturist and agricultural labourer” found in Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971. In my view, it would be a mistake to construe the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 in the light of the Tamil Nadu Act XXXVIII of 1961. This exclusion is not to be found in the definitions of “agricultural land: agriculturist and agricultural labourer” found in Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971. In my view, it would be a mistake to construe the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 in the light of the Tamil Nadu Act XXXVIII of 1961. In any case, I cannot accept the view that the Authorised Officer cannot look further beyond his nose, to go into incidental questions. In other words, an occupant may not be entitled to protection if his occupation is on any date later than 31st March, 1959; but he will none the less be entitled to claim ownership under section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971, if he establishes no more than that he was in occupation on 19th June, 1971. He will be entitled to such rights even though he was not in occupation on 31st March, 1959. A person may succeed in establishing his claim to ownenrship under the Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 even though he may not be entitled to protetion under Tamil Nadu Act XXXVIII of 1961. It may be that Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 conferring ownership rights has rendered otiose or nugatory the provisions of the earlier legislation. Suffice it to say that the two Acts are not identical. The condition precedent for the conferment of rights under the one Act is different from the conditions in the other Act. It would not, therefore, be proper to construe the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 as though its provisions were controlled by the scheme and structure of the earlier enactment, Tamil Nadu Act XXXVIII of 1961. Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 has to be construed and understood on its own terms and not with reference to any other enactment. 12. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor cited, in his support, a Division Bench decision reported in Muniyandi v. Rajangam Iyer1. I am, however, not able to derive any support from that judgment since it deals with quite a different matter. I am inclined to rest my decision on my understanding of the scheme, the language and the required purpose of Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971. 13. The bar under section 25 of Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 is not couched in any difficult language. I am inclined to rest my decision on my understanding of the scheme, the language and the required purpose of Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971. 13. The bar under section 25 of Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1971 is not couched in any difficult language. It seems to me clear beyond doubt that the Court's jurisdiction is completely ousted in all matters which the Authorised Officer is empowered by or under the Act to determine. I am quite clear that under section 4 of the Act read with section 3 , it is the Authorised Officer and the Authorised Officer alone who has got the jurisdiction to decide the disputes between the owner and the occupier of the Kudiyiruppu on all questions which arise between them concerning the rights conferred by section 3 of the Act. 14. For all the above reasons, I hold that the Courts below were in error in rejecting the objections put forward by the judgment-debtor. I have earlier held that the judgment-debtor has at least established that he is a tenant in occupation of the Kudiyiruppu on 19th June, 1971, and he is entitled to invoke the initial presumption in his favour that he is an agriculturist or an agricultural labourer. This does not, however, preclude the decree-holders from instituting appropriate proceedings before the Authorised Officer for the relevant relief in this regard. But so far as the execution petition is concerned, I am quite satisfied that the Courts below were in error in ordering his eviction 15. For all the reasons stated above, this civil miscellaneous second appeal is allowed and the orders of the Courts below are set aside and E. P. No. 65 of 1975 is dismissed. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. R.S. ----- Civil miscellaneous second appeal allowed.