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1979 DIGILAW 160 (ORI)

LOKANATH PRASAD DAS v. BIJOYA KUMAR BHUYAN

1979-12-04

N.K.DAS, R.N.MISRA

body1979
JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This application for a writ of certiorari is directed against the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal passed in as appeal under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. Petitioner and opposite party No. 1 along with three others had applied for grant of a stage carriage permit on the Balasore to Anjit via Rasulpur and Gopalpur route pursuant to a notification of the Regional Transport Authority, Balasore. (Opposite party No. 2) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Transport Authority'). The Transport Authority granted the permit to one Ranjit Kumar Samantray. Opposite party No. 1 preferred Motor Vehicle Appeal No. 10 of 1976 challenging the grant to Samantray and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal vacated the grant and remitted the matter to the Transport Authority for a fresh disposal. While remitting the matter the Tribunal had not given any direction for hearing of the five applicants and for a re-disposal of the matter after such hearing. On the earlier occasion in Motor Vehicle Appeal No. 10 of 1976 the petitioner and opposite party No. 1 were the only parties. The statement to that effect in the appellate order is not disputed before us. The Transport Authority noticed all five applicants and directed the permit to be granted to the petitioner who admittedly was not a party to Motor Vehicle Appeal No. 10 of 1976. Opposite party No. 1 challenged the grant by a fresh appeal and contended that with the rejection of the application of the present petitioner, his application for grant of a stage carriage permit had been finally disposed of. There was no provision for re-opening it unless he had preferred an appeal and had obtained a direction for remand of the matter. Therefore, the Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to grant the permit to him. This stand of opposite party No. 1 was accepted by the Tribunal and the Tribunal having found that all other applicants for the route had been out of the field and opposite party No. 1 was the only applicant left for consideration, a direction was given in appeal to the Transport Authority to grant the permit to him. This order is assailed before us. 3. This order is assailed before us. 3. The Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Cumbum Roadways (P) Ltd. v. Somu Transport (P) Ltd. AIR 1966 S.C. 1366 , in support of the proposition that the Appellate Authority could not direct the Transport Authority to consider the application of those who had been contented with the decision of the Transport Authority and had not appealed against the decision. To the same effect was the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Anamalais Bus Transport v. T.K. Transports AIR 1966 Mad. 470 . In the Madras decision reference was made to a Supreme Court Judgment which has been placed before us. It is a judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in The Hanuman Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Meenakshi alias Rama Bai and others Civil Appeal No. 794 of 1963 (S.C.) dd. on 20-12-1963, disposed of on 20th December, 1963. One of the contentions advanced before the Supreme Court was that Gopal Shetty, the subsequent grantee, having failed to appeal to the Tribunal against the original order of the Regional Transport Authority rejecting his application for grant of a permit, it was not open to the Transport Authority after remand to consider that application and grant a permit on its basis. The remand order in the said case ran in the following terms : "Accordingly these appeals are allowed, the order of the Regional Transport Authority is set aside and the case is remanded for fresh disposal according to law in the light of the above observations." The Supreme Court pointed out :- "What the Tribunal said is undoubtedly wide enough to permit a fresh consideration of all the applications before it. But perhaps in the context of the fact that appeals by four only of the fourteen applicants were before it (one having been already withdrawn) it would be legitimate to construe the order of the Tribunal as being limited to the applications of the four appellants before it. Thus construed, the Regional Transport Authority could not be said to have had the power to reconsider the applications of the non-appealing applicants, including Gopala Shetty. Thus construed, the Regional Transport Authority could not be said to have had the power to reconsider the applications of the non-appealing applicants, including Gopala Shetty. Since, however, while dealing with the appeals from the order of the Regional Transport Authority after remand the Tribunal appears to have construed its original order as one requiring consideration of all the fourteen applications, what we have to consider is whether it was within the competence of the Tribunal to make such an order when all it was seized of was only the four appeals before it. Where a Regional Transport Authority rejects the application of an applicant before it, that application comes to an end. Such a person has, however, a right under section 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, to prefer an appeal against the rejection of his application. Where he avails himself of this remedy, the application can still be deemed to be pending consideration in as much as it would be open to the Appellate Authority to consider it and if it was of the opinion that it was wrongly rejected by the Regional Transport Authority to grant it or to remit it for fresh consideration by the Regional Transport Authority. The Appellate Authority would thus be seized of an application of an unsuccessful applicant provided he prefers an appeal before it. Where, however, he omits to prefer an appeal, his applicant could not be said to be before the Appellate Authority at all. Now, since Gopala Shetty did not appeal against the rejection of his application by the Regional Transport Authority his application could not be said to have been before the Mysore State Appellate Tribunal which is the Appellate Authority in the State of Mysore. That being the position the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to remand his application for a fresh consideration by the Regional Transport Authority. It may be that the ground on which the remand was made by the Tribunal was common to all the applicants but there being no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act analogous to Order XLT, rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not possible to hold that the Tribunal had the power to give the benefit of its remand order to a non-appealing, unsuccessful applicant. Therefore, in law the position was that there were only four applications (omitting of course the application of the person who withdraw his application) before the Regional Transport Authority after the matter was remanded to it by the Tribunal. Gopala Shetty's application was not one of them and consequently it had no jurisdiction to consider that application and grant a permit on that basis...." In view of the clear decision, we are inclined to agree with the Tribunal that it was right when it said that the petitioner was not entitled to consideration by the Transport Authority as his application had long been rejected and the matter in the absence of appeal had become final. The order of the Tribunal on the earlier occasion must be construed as limiting the consideration to the two parties in the appeal by the Transport Authority and since Samantray had allowed the matter to become final against him and petitioner was not entitled to consideration at all, opposite party No. 1 was the sole applicant left in the field. In the premises, the direction for grant of permit to him is not open to challenge. 4. The writ application fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at rupees one hundred. N.K. Das, J. - I agree. Final Result : Dismissed