Judgment :- THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1. In W.P. No. 3624 of 1973, the petitioner is A. Veerayya Vandiyar Memorial Sri Pushpam College, Poondi. On 19th January, 1966, a deed of declaration was executed by the founders of this College presided over by Sri Veerayya Vandayar. In and by that document, a permanent endowment for the establishment and maintenance of the college, for the construction of buildings and for equipments and furniture, was created. The deed of trust contains three schedules. The A schedule relates to an extent of 46 ac. 32 cents, of building sites in which the college is located. The B schedule consists of an extent of 399.95 ac. of land, dry, wet, house sites, topes, etc. in various villages in the district of West, Thanjavur. The B schedule properties were intended to provide funds for the establishment and maintenance of the college. Even the C schedule properties of an extent of 168.80 ac. were set apart by the forefathers of the donors under the declaration of trust for various charities referred to in an agreement dt. 9th September; 1864, and for the setting up of an institution for the advancement of education. With the help of such munificent donations made by the donors under the agreement, dt.9th September, 1864, and under the deed of trust, dt. 19th January, 1956, the petitioner College was started which was later on, affiliated to the University of Madras. Due to the untiring and selfless devotion and service of Sri Veerayya Vandayar, the petitioner has grown into a first Grade Post Graduate affiliated College of the University of Madras. The petitioner refers to the strength of the college the various humanities and sciences taught in the college, and in the main refers to the substantial agricultural lands endowed for the benefit and maintenance of the college. The lands consisted of certain inam lands which were taken over by the Government under the Inams Abolition Act. The other lands, which were ryotwari, came within the purview of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act (Tamil Nadu Act 58 of 1961) (hereinafter called the Land Reforms Act), which came into force on 6th April, 1960. Inter alia, the Land Reforms Act provided that on and from the date of commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area as prescribed therein. Inter alia, the Land Reforms Act provided that on and from the date of commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area as prescribed therein. The surplus lands have to be determined under S. 18 of the Act and a notification has to be made to the effect that the surplus lands are required for public purpose and as soon as surplus lands are taken over, compensation, according to the graded slab, has to be paid to the owner from whom such lands are taken over. Until 19 70, the lands belonging to the petitioner, being held by a charitable or educational institution, were not affected. Under the Tamil Nadu Act 37 of 1972, S. 73 of the Parent Act was amended which said that ‘nothing contained in this Act shall apply to any land held by any University constituted by any law. The result was that the Act was made applicable to educational institutions of a public nature including the petitioner college and the trust. Under the Tamil Nadu Act 37 of 1972, lands belonging to religious institutions or any religious trust of a public nature, which were in existence at the commencement of that Act was also excluded. The only salient feature was that as far as educational institutions were concerned, the ceiling area was fixed under the table prescribed under the Act. According to the said table, the ceiling area for any college affiliated to or recognised by any University was fixed at 40 standard acres and for any hostel attached thereto 25 standard acres. This Amending Act was assented to by the President on 8th December, 1972. But, a retrospective effect was given to it so as to make it effective from 1st March, 1972. This was again followed by another Act called the Fourth Amendment Act of 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1972), in and by which the compensation payable to such public institutions was also reduced. The petitioner was called upon to submit a return as to its holdings consequent upon the passing of the amending Acts in 1972. The petitioner objected and stated that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the petitioner-institution. The petitioner was called upon to submit a return as to its holdings consequent upon the passing of the amending Acts in 1972. The petitioner objected and stated that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the petitioner-institution. Finding, however, that the State of Tamil Nadu were taking steps to enforce the provisions of the Act, the petitioner has come up to this Court for the issue of a Writ of Mandamus or any other Writ or direction restraining the second and the third respondents from applying the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Acts 37 and 39 of 1972. The grounds on which the petition has been laid are in the main that as certain fundamental rights of the petitioner are involved and as the State Laws in question have been reserved for the assent of the President, it is said that the President would not have given his assent if he had applied his mind over all the implications thereto and as the President ordinarily acts on the advice of the Union Cabinet it is said that such assent is asmuch-an act of the Union Government and, therefore, cannot be deemed to be an act of the President, which is beyond judicial review. In any case, if the assent is deemed to have been given by the President, it is said that courts have the power to satisfy themselves that such assent was given properly by the President, even though under the advice of the Union Cabinet. As such assents are equivalent to executive orders made by the Union Government, which is also made as the first respondent to the writ petition, the bone of contention is that certain irrelevant materials were taken into consideration by the President under the advice of the first respondent when he gave the assent. Incidentally, it is said that as in the text of Art. 31(3) of the Constitution of India the main questions which arise for consideration are whether the State Government should be authorised to acquire properties at all and whether the compensation is adequate, and such matters have not been fully gone into and in this respect, therefore, the assent of the President is challenged. Incidentally, one question was raised whether the petitioners objections were taken into consideration at all before the State passed the law and sought for the assent of the President. Incidentally, one question was raised whether the petitioners objections were taken into consideration at all before the State passed the law and sought for the assent of the President. When the State fixed the ceiling originally at 60 standard acres, though later it only fixed 40 standard acres, it did not correctly apply its mind. Therefore, factually, it is said that the materials, which are required for the President to be considered were not placed before him and as a valid assent by the President can only take away the fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19 and 31, Art. 31-A cannot be applied. In any event, it is said that it is open to the Court to consider the reasonableness of the assent made by the President. On the merits, it is said that as, to a great extent, the burden on the citizens of the State, namely, the parents, is taken over by the institution by donating large extents of properties, there was no occasion or necessity for the State of Tamil Nadu to apply the Act to the petitioner institution. In these circumstances, it is stated that the impugned enactments, namely, Tamil Nadu Acts 37 and 39 of 1972 are ultra vires and have to be struck down. The above contentions were raised in W.P. Nos. 3624, 4815 and 4816 of 1973. 2. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Government of India, it is said that the President gave the assent to the bill after due examination and consideration of all relevant materials in accordance with the relevant rules of business and such an assent is beyond judicial review. It is asserted that the assent given by the President is not one akin to any Government Older of the Union Cabinet and it is not open to scrutiny in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the bill had been validly assented to by the President. 3. It is asserted that the assent given by the President is not one akin to any Government Older of the Union Cabinet and it is not open to scrutiny in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the bill had been validly assented to by the President. 3. The State of Tamil Nadu, in its counter-affidavit, while sustaining the ceiling limits fixed for educational institutions, such as, the petitioner institution, states that the petitioner was asked to submit its returns in accordance with Tamil Nadu Act 37 of 1972, and that as no such return was filed, the ceiling was fixed on the basis of the report of the field staff attached to the third respondent and a notice was issued to the petitioner declaring the surplus and fixing the ceiling. It is, therefore, expressly denied that the petitioner or its Correspondent was not aware of the provisions of law and that they were not given notice of the manner and method under which the ceiling was to be fixed in accordance with Tamil Nadu Act 37 of 1972. Originally, a surplus, after allowing 40 standard acres, was fixed and after notice to the petitioners Correspondent and those in charge of the institution, the ceiling had to be fixed in accordance with law. The respondents denied that the President did not give his proper assent to the Acts in question. They would state that the writ petitions are not maintainable, as the President has taken into consideration the relevant matters and given his assent after observing the necessary formalities. They deny that any rights of the petitioner under Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution are affected. In fact, the representations of the petitioner were taken into consideration and ultimately the ceiling area has been fixed at 40 standard acres and the petitioner cannot have any grievance af all. As the impugned Acts 37 of 1972 and 39 of 1972 are only amendments to the Principal Act 58 of 1961, they are not independent enactments transgressing the limitation imposed by the Constitution upon the legislative powers of the State it is also contended that the compensation awarded is fair and in accordance with the provisions of law. In those circumstances, the writ petitions are resisted. 4. In W.P. No. 5929 of 1973, the petitioner is Ukkadai Appavoo Thevar High School, Ammapet. In those circumstances, the writ petitions are resisted. 4. In W.P. No. 5929 of 1973, the petitioner is Ukkadai Appavoo Thevar High School, Ammapet. Similar objections as those raised by the writ petitioners in the other cases are repeated, in particular, it is said that Tamil Nadu Acts 37 and 39 of 1972 were not properly assented to by the President and that in the absence of such proper assent, the jurisdiction of the courts are not taken away to examine whether there has been such an assent at all. Here again, on the merits it is stated that the petitioner was not consulted and its representations were not taken into account at all. It is repeated that the educational and charitable institutions and trusts have to be treated on a different footing and as their fundamental rights to hold property is affected, the impugned Acts have to be struck down. Above all, it is said that there is no public purpose involved in the impugned enactments. Since the objects of the trusts themselves are of a public nature, on this ground also it is said that the provisions of Tamil Nadu Acts 37 and 39 of 1972, are beyond the competence of the State Legislature. 5. The Parent Act, namely, the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act, 1961, expatiates the prevailing economic philosophy in our country. In order to achieve the objective for which our Republic stands and whereas it was felt that the area of agricultural land available for cultivation in the State is limited, the Parent Act 58 of 1961 was thought of to provide for the fixation of ceiling on agricultural land holdings by certain people including institutions, so that there could be a fair distribution of land amongst the proper sections of the community. This legislation reflects the national intention which is to provide land to all sections of the community equitably, so that there may not be centrifuging of such estates or properties in the hands of a few. In order to achieve this object, the Parent Act was passed in 1961. On the concept of right to own properties, no doubt, Art. 31 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law, and it also provides that fair compensation should be paid to the land owners or properties so compulsorily acquired for a public purpose. On the concept of right to own properties, no doubt, Art. 31 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law, and it also provides that fair compensation should be paid to the land owners or properties so compulsorily acquired for a public purpose. As this general provision safeguarding the interests of proletariats might not serve the ends, meanings and the purpose of the Constitution, Art. 31-A was introduced so as to provide for an exception to the generality of the intention as provided in Art. 31-Art 31-A (1) says that notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 13, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights or the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property, etc., shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Art, 14, Art. 19 or Art. 31. The two provisos to Art. 31-A(1) are important. The first one is that any such law made by the Legislature of a State should be reserved for the consideration of the President and it should receive his assent. The second proviso says that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire an y portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force. Compensation also has to be paid to the land owner from whom such lands are acquired. Compensation also has to be paid to the land owner from whom such lands are acquired. Art. 31-A (2) reads as follows— “(2) In this Article—(a) the expression ‘estate’ shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has as the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include—(1) any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant and in the States of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, any jenmam right; (ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement: (iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purpose ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites or buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans; (b) the expression ‘rights in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder (raiyat, under-raiyat) or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue”. 6. It is therefore, seen that the Parent Act, namely, the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act of 1961 was passed under this provision of the Constitution. By the first Amendment of the Constitution in 1951, Art. 31-B was introduced. It reads as follows— “31-B. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Art. 31.A, none of the Acts and regulations specified in the ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsisent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competen-Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force’. By inclusion of any Act in the Ninth Schedule such an Act is beyond judicial review and shall not be called in question in any court of law. Art. 201 of the Constitution provides for the assent of the President when he is called upon to give his assent to the bills passed by the State. It runs as follows— “201. Art. 201 of the Constitution provides for the assent of the President when he is called upon to give his assent to the bills passed by the State. It runs as follows— “201. When a Bill is reserved by a Governor for the consideration of the President the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom; Provided that, where the Bill is not a Money Bill the President may direct the Governor to return the Bill to the House or, as the case may be, the Houses of the Legislature of the State together with such a message as is mentioned in the first proviso to Art. 200, and, when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of receipt of such message and, if it is again passed by the House or Houses with or without amendment, it shall be presented again to the President for his consideration.’ 7. It is conceded that the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Third Amendment) Act, 1972, (Tamil Nadu Act 37 of 1972) as well as the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1972) have been included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. The first question that was mooted by the learned counsel for the petitioners is whether the Presidents assent under Art. 31-A of the Constitution has been validly given or not. It is unnecessary for us to consider this question in detail, in view of the definite pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 161=85 L.W. 7 (S.N.). In that decision, the Supreme Court said— “In order to avoid the bar of Art. 31-A a curious plea was put forward. It was urged that when the concerned bills were submitted to the President for his assent as required by the first proviso to Art. 31-A the President was not made aware of the implications of the Hills. This contention is a wholly untenable one. There is no material before us from which we could conclude that the President or his advisers were unaware of the implications of those bills. This contention is a wholly untenable one. There is no material before us from which we could conclude that the President or his advisers were unaware of the implications of those bills. We must proceed on the basis that the President had given his assent to those bills after duly considering the implication of the provisions contained therein.” On the merits, we are satisfied that the petitioners were given every opportunity to place their objections to the Acts in question, and it was only after due consideration that the Acts were passed and it can, therefore, fairly be presumed that every material that was necessary to be placed before the President for his assent under Art. 31-A was placed before him. We are unable, therefore, to accept this first contention that the assent to these two Acts in question, which are impugned in these writ petitions was not given properly by the President. 8. In another case reported in Jagannath v. Authorised Officer, L.R. Madurai A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 425=85 L.W. 32 (S.N.) the Supreme Court said— “Apart from the Question as to whether fundamental rights originally enshrined in the Constitution were subject to the mandatory process of Art. 368, it must now be held that Art. 31-B and the Ninth Schedule have cured the defect, if any, in the various Acts mentioned in the said schedule as regards any unconstitutionality alleged on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights, and by the express words of Art. 31-B such curing of the defect took place with retrospective operation from the dates on which the Acts were put on the Statute book. These Acts, even If void or inoperative at the time when they were enacted by reason of infringement of Art. 13(2) of the Constitution, assumed full force and vigour from the respective dates of their enactment after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule read with Art 31-B of the Constitution. The States could not, at any time, cure any defect arising from the violation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and therefore, the objection that the Ma dras Ceilings Act should have been re-enacted by the Madras Legislature after the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment came into force cannot be accepted”. 9. The States could not, at any time, cure any defect arising from the violation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and therefore, the objection that the Ma dras Ceilings Act should have been re-enacted by the Madras Legislature after the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment came into force cannot be accepted”. 9. The second contention that is raised in these writ petitions is whether, even after the inclusion of the Acts in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, still judicial review is possible by Civil Courts exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept this contention in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Venkatrao v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 126 in which the Supreme Court has said— “The provisions of the Maharashtra Act as also of the Hyderabad Act XXI of 1950 together with the amending Act are immune from any challenge on the ground of contravention of Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution. By the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, after Entry 20, Entries 21 to 66 were inserted in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. Entries 35 and 36 relate to the Mahrashtra Act and Hyderabad. Act. XXI of 1950 respectively. Art. 31-B gives full protection to an Act and its provisio ns in the Schedule against any challenge on the ground of inconsistency with or abridging of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. This would be so notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal to the contrary. The Amending laws and, in particular, Hydrabad Act III of 1954, which inserted S. 38-E would also be covered by the same protection because the Parent Act, namely, the Hyderabad Act XXI of 1950 was included in the year 1964, which was long after the enactment of the amending Act. 10. These are the main contentions which were argued before us as regards the Constitutional validity of the enactments in question. As they are covered by the pronouncements of our highest Court, we hold that Tamil Nadu Acts 37 and 39 of 1972 having received the assent of the President should be deemed to have been accepted by the President after he fully applied his mind to them and that these Acts having been included in the Ninth Schedule, it is beyond judicial review. 11 On the merits, we are not satisfied that the petitioners have got any case at all, They have been given every opportunity to submit their returns and usual objections and they were considered if they did object by the statutory functionaries from time to time. It was only thereafter that the State Legislature passed the enactments in question and forwarded them to the President for his assent. The complaint of the petitioners that they were not consulted is without any substance We, therefore, hold that no public duty having been violated by any of the respondents in these cases, no Writ of Mandamus, as prayed for, can be issued, and these writ petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.