Judgment Chaudhary Sia Saran Sinha, J. 1. This criminal revision is directed against the order dated 13th March, 1978, passed by an Executive Magistrate of jehanabad, named Shri G. P. Singh, in proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (hereinafter referred to as "the Code" ). The petitioners of this criminal revision were the first party and some of the members of the opposite party were the second party, the rest being third party. 2. Undisputably, this proceeding under section 145 of the Code was drawn up on the 19th of November, 1973, in respect of several plots comprised in several khatas all bearing an area of 11 acres 84 decimals, situated in village Jhunathi, police station Karpi, in the district of Gaya. 3. In view cf the limited contentions raised before this Court it may not be necessary to give details of the respective cases of the parties set up in the said proceedings and it would suffice to say that this proceeding was earlier decided ex pane against the first party (petitioners) on 24th February, 1976. Being aggrieved, the first (petitioners)took up the matter to this court in Criminal revision No.523 of 1976 which was decided by a learned Single Judge of this court on 10th October, 1977. For reasons stated in the judgment of this Court, the impugned order dated 24th February, 1976, was set aside and the case was remanded with the following orders : - "i, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate dated 24.2.76 and remand the case to the file of the Subdivisional Magistrate, jehanabad. The learned Subdivisional Magistrate will give opportunity to the members of the first party and the third party to file their written statement, affidavits and documents. After the filing of all those papers, the learned Subdivisional Magistrate will fix a date for argument and after hearing the same, he will pass necessary orders in accordance with law. . . . . . . . . " 4. Accordingly, the records went back to the Subdivisional Magistrate, jehanabad, and the Second Officer of the subdivisional Office at Jehanabad, presumably acting as the Subdivisional Magistrate, by his order dated 14th november, 1977, transferred the case to the file of one Shri G. P. Singh, Executive magistrate, abovenamed, for disposal. 5. . . . . . . . " 4. Accordingly, the records went back to the Subdivisional Magistrate, jehanabad, and the Second Officer of the subdivisional Office at Jehanabad, presumably acting as the Subdivisional Magistrate, by his order dated 14th november, 1977, transferred the case to the file of one Shri G. P. Singh, Executive magistrate, abovenamed, for disposal. 5. It is undisputed that all the parties to this proceeding submitted to the jurisdiction of Shri G P. Singh, Executive Magistrate, filed written statements, affidavits and documents as ordered in criminal Revision No.523 of 1976 and there was a full dressed trial of the said case before that Magistrate. Ultimately, by his order dated 13th March, 1978, namely, the impugned order, Shri G. P. Singh decided the case against the petitioners, thereby declaring the possession of the second party (opposite party) over the disputed land until evicted in due course of law. The petitioners have once again come up to this Court in this criminal Revision. 6. Shri Shivnandan Roy, learned counsel for the petitioners, raised only two contentions before this Court. The first was that the operative portion of the impugned order was not in accordance with the requirements of section 145 of the Code and as such the order was illegal. The second contention was that the impugned order cannot be supportable in law inasmuch as against the specific direction given by this Court for disposal of this case by the Subdivisional magistrate, Jehanabad it was disposed of by Shri G. P. Singh, above named. Both the two contentions were refuted by Shri lakshman Saran Sinha, learned counsel for the opposite party Nos.1 to 5, none having appeared before this court on behalf of the third party, i. e. opposite party Nos.6 and 7 of this revision. 7. 3o far as the first contention is concerned, I must say at once that there is no force in this contention. The crucial date as contemplated in sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Code, is the date of the preliminary order i. e the date when the proceeding under section 145 of the code is initiated. 7. 3o far as the first contention is concerned, I must say at once that there is no force in this contention. The crucial date as contemplated in sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Code, is the date of the preliminary order i. e the date when the proceeding under section 145 of the code is initiated. The only exception to this rule is the case when one of the parties has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date of such order in which event the party so dispossessed may be treated as in possession on the crucial date above mentioned. It is for this limited purpose that sub-section (4)of section 145 of the Code creates a fiction. The proviso is based on the principle that a forcible and wrongful dispossession cannot be recognised under criminal law and merely recites the circumstances under which a presumption of possession may be made in favour of the dispossessed party. The relevant portion of the order of the learned Magistrate shows that the conclusion arrived at by him was that the second party was in actual physical possession of the disputed land on the date of the initiation of the proceeding. The learned magistrate, however, further added that the second party was in actual physical possession "even two months prior to that". The Impugned order does not show that the Magistrate, in order to decide the case, took advantage of the fiction created by the proviso to section 145 of the Code. As a matter of fact, in view of the clear finding arrived at by him about the second party being In possession on the crucial date which clinched the issue, his other observation about possession is totally redundant. In such circumstances, no illegality can be attributed to the impugned order on this ground and the contention raised by shri Roy fails. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by Shri roy regarding the second contention and I find myself unable to uphold the same. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974)relating to the class of Magistrate and the repeal and saving provisions, as contained in section 484 of the new Code, gave rise to some difficulties which are now being settled down by authoritative decisions. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974)relating to the class of Magistrate and the repeal and saving provisions, as contained in section 484 of the new Code, gave rise to some difficulties which are now being settled down by authoritative decisions. One such decision (though not very much relevant to the point in issue in this case) may be found in the case of Smt. Radha Devi V/s. Mani Prasad Singh and another, 1978 BBCJ 626 ). The conclusion arrived at in that case was that the application was allowed, the impugned order was set aside and the case remanded back to the Sub-divisional magistrate, Saharsa who was one of the various authorities by virtue of his office empowered under the old Code to initiate and pass a final order under section 145 of the old Code. The old Code empowered the District Magistrate, Subdivisional magistrate as also Magistrates of the First Class to proceed in the matter of initiation of section 145 proceeding as contemplated in sub-section (1) of section 145. Jehanabad being a Sub-divisional town, there is obviously no District magistrate. The criminal revision (No.523 of 1976) was disposed of by this court on 10th October, 1977, after the coming into force of Act 2 of 1974 ; there being no provision in this Code for the vesting of First Class powers on the migistrate on the executive side. Conveniently, therefore, in the orders passed in the said criminal revision his Lordship mentioned the word "subdivisional magistrate" as the person to whom the case was being sent back for disposal in accordance with law. As contended by Shri Lakshman Saran Sinha, learned counsel for the opposite party, the petitioner first took up a point that Shri g. P. Singh was not vested with the powers of a Magistrate of the First Class prior to the coming into force of Act 2 of 1974 and, as such, was not competent to dispose of the proceeding in question. This point, however, was given up by the petitioners on a report that Shri G. P. Singh was vested with such powers at the relevant time. 9. While construing on order of remand, the matter that crops up for primary consideration is as to what was the intention of the Court in remanding the case. This point, however, was given up by the petitioners on a report that Shri G. P. Singh was vested with such powers at the relevant time. 9. While construing on order of remand, the matter that crops up for primary consideration is as to what was the intention of the Court in remanding the case. Obviously, the prime intention is dispensation of justice by the appropriate authority. If, therefore, Shri G. P. Singh, the Executive Magistrate, was a competent authority to dispose of the proceeding, as undisputably he was, there can be no question of any failure of justice to the petitioners on account of disposal of this case by him and as a matter of fact no grievance was made by the petitioners on this score till they lost the proceeding before him. Shri roy did not attack before this Court the impugned order on merits and a prima facie scrutiny of the order also demonstrates that it has rightly been passed. 10. These apart, a distinction has to be made in a case which Is bad on account of lack of jurisdiction and the one which suffers from irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. This court having ordered the Sub-divisional Magistrate, jehanabad, to dispose of the proceeding, ordinarily the Sub-divisional Magistrate may not be said to be justised in transferring the case to Shri G. P. Singh for disposal. But even if overlooking the orders of this Court, the case was transferred to a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction and the parties having submitted to the jurisdiction of that Magistrate allowed that Magistrate to dispose it of in accordance with law, a question would arise whether such irregularity if any, could be cured by the provisions of section 537 of the Code. The answer to this question, in my opinion, should be in the affirmative. The reasons for this are that there has been no failure of justice in this case and any further remand may lead to unnecessary harassment to the parties without any conceivable advantage. Thus, there is no merit in the second contention as well and it fails. 11. The criminal revision is, accordingly, dismissed.