JUDGMENT-The petitioner-landlord rented out his house in Nagpur to the respondent No. 1 and after the house was so rented out, for about 10 years, the respondent No. 1 used it for preparing handloom saris on a hand loom installed in the house Then after 10 years he put in a power-loom for manufacture of Saris. The petitioner-landlord served notice on the tenant objecting to this, and, as the tenant did not pay any heed, he filed an application to the Rent Controller, Nagpur, for permission to terminate the tenancy of the respondent No. 1 inter alia under clause 13 (3) (iv) and (ix) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Order). In that application the petitioner specifically stated that the house had been let out to the respondent No.1 "for purposes of handloom." To this allegation the respondent No. 1 gave a very guarded reply by stating that the premises were let out to the respondent No.1 "for business purposes i. e. for purpose of manufacturing handloom goods". The allegations of the petitioner-landlord were that the respondent No.1 had used the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was leased out, and, that putting a power-loom in place of a handloom in the house had amounted to the tenant committing a nuisance within the meaning of clause 13 (3) (ix) of the Rent Control Order. After recording evidence, the Rent Controller, negatived the contention of the petitioner-landlord that the respondent No.1 had committed nuisance within the meaning of clause 13 (3) (ix). However, he upheld the contention of the petitioner that the respondent No.1 had used the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was leased out. Therefore, the Rent Controller granted permission to the petitioner to terminate the tenancy of the respondent No.1 under clause 13 (3) (iv) of the Rent Control Order. Aggrieved by this decision, the respondent No. 1 tenant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Deputy Collector, Nagpur, who allowed the appeal and rejected the application of the petitioner-landlord, for permission to terminate the tenancy of the respondent No. 1 under clause 13 (3) (iv) of the Rent Control Order. Aggrieved by this decision, the respondent No. 1 tenant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Deputy Collector, Nagpur, who allowed the appeal and rejected the application of the petitioner-landlord, for permission to terminate the tenancy of the respondent No. 1 under clause 13 (3) (iv) of the Rent Control Order. This order of the Appellate Deputy Collector, Nagpur, dated 16th August 1972 has been challenged by the petitioner-landlord in this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 2. The only ground on which the appellate Court allowed the appeal was that the Rent Control Order recognises only two purposes viz., residential and non-residential, and none other. The appellate Court held that in this case the house was rented out for business purpose i. e. for non· residential purposes i. e. for running a hand-loom. In accordance with the advancement of times and the all round use of electric power, the respondent No. 1 had merely put in a power-loom worked on electricity instead of the out dated handloom. The purposes in both the cases being the same i. e. non-residential, it could not be said that the tenant had changed the purpose for which the house was let out merely because he had put in a power-loom worked on electricity in place of a handloom. Further the appellate Court observed that there was nothing on record like a rent-note etc. to prove that the landlord had rented out the house for use of a handloom only and not a powerloom. 3. It is difficult to accept this reasoning of the appellate Court. The very circumstance that after the house was let out, for nearly 10 years the respondent No.1 used the house for working a handloom, together with the fact that immediately after he switched over to the power-loom, the landlord objected to it by sending a notice in writing to the tenant, clearly supports the stand of the petitioner-landlord that the house was originally let out for working a handloom there and not a power-loom. 4. It is again difficult to accept the reasoning of the appellate Court that the Rent Control Order envisages only two purposes i. e. residential and non-residential. It is true that the Rent Control Order does provide these two broad classifications, particularly in the words used in clauses 6 and 7 of the Rent Control Order. 4. It is again difficult to accept the reasoning of the appellate Court that the Rent Control Order envisages only two purposes i. e. residential and non-residential. It is true that the Rent Control Order does provide these two broad classifications, particularly in the words used in clauses 6 and 7 of the Rent Control Order. Before proceeding further it is necessary to quote the provisions of clause 7 (1) and 7 (2) of the Rent Control Order which are as follows :- "7. (1) In determining the fair rent under clause 5 of a house constructed before the 1st April 1940 and occupied wholly and mainly for non-residential purposes, the Controller shall have due regard to the prevailing rates of rent for the same or a similar house in similar circumstances during the twelve months immediately before that due date and may, after considering any general rise in the rental values for business or other similar purposes, increase the rent so determined up to 50 per cent if he is satisfied that the house has been maintained by the landlord in a proper state of repair: Provided that where a house has been let for educational purposes the increase shall not exceed 12 1/2 per cent. (2) In determining the fair rent under clause 5 of a house constructed after the 1st April 1940 and occupied wholly or mainly for non-residential purposes, the Controller shall have due regard to the prevailing rates of rent for the same or a similar house for similar purposes and also to any general increase in the costs of sites and building construction." It has to be noted that even while considering the premises let out mainly for non-residential purposes i. e. under clause 7 (1) and 7 (2) of the Rent Control Order, the plural expression "non-residential purposes" is used in sub-clause (1) of clause 7 and again in sub-clause (2). In sub-clause (I) of clause 7, the words "rental values for business or other similar purposes" are again used, normally indicating that even among non-residential purposes a variety of class of purposes was envisaged viz. business purposes and other similar purposes. Contradistinguished with this plural expression used in clause 7 of the Rent Control Order, it may be observed that clause 13 (3) (iv) uses the singular expression "a purpose". business purposes and other similar purposes. Contradistinguished with this plural expression used in clause 7 of the Rent Control Order, it may be observed that clause 13 (3) (iv) uses the singular expression "a purpose". Item (iv) of clause 13 (3) is as follows :- "(iv) that the tenant has used the house or premises or any part thereof for a purpose other than that for which it was leased." If the idea was to have only two classifications of the purposes i. e. a residential purpose and non-residential purpose, the words used in item (iv) would have been similar to those used in clause 15 of the Rent Control Order, which provision reads as under :- "15. No tenant shall convert a residential house or any portion thereof into non residential house except with the written consent of the landlord and the written approval of the Controller." The use of the singular expression "a purpose other than that for which it was leased" in item (iv) of clause 13 (3) clearly shows that the intention was that having obtained the house on rent for a particular purpose, it was not open to the tenant to use it for a different purpose, though both the purposes may be of a non-residential nature. Clearly the idea is not to put the house to needless hazards not within the contemplation of the landlord at the time he let out the premises, merely by reason of the tenant using the house for a purpose other than that for which it was obtained from the landlord. One can easily perceive the principle behind this provision. The landlord letting the house for a particular non-residential purpose may not desire that it should be used for another non-residential purpose not within the contemplation of the landlord at the time the house was let out for example a landlord may Jet out a house for the purposes of an office, surely he would not like the tenant to use it later as a hotel or shop premises. One could think of several such examples of different non-residential purposes diversely apart from each other. 5. Here Mr. Sanyal argues that there is no change of purpose, inasmuch as the end-product, the manufactured handloom goods, are the same as before, only the method and manner of manufacture is changed, which according to Mr. One could think of several such examples of different non-residential purposes diversely apart from each other. 5. Here Mr. Sanyal argues that there is no change of purpose, inasmuch as the end-product, the manufactured handloom goods, are the same as before, only the method and manner of manufacture is changed, which according to Mr. Sanyal should be permissible in view of the general scientific advancement and progress. Mr. Sanyal argues that a premises let out for operating a typewriting class could still be used for the same purpose and there would be no major change in the purpose if instead of mechanical typewriters, electrically operated typewriters are put into use, or to take another example, a premises in which a hand operated fan in being used could with impunity be used with better ventilation supplied by an electrically operated fan. Similarly in a house let out for hotel purposes, the mere change from a coal oven to an electric oven would not make any difference. Now these instances are not of a major change in the use of the premises and could well be considered as within the permissible limits. However, it would be stretching things too far to say that a person who takes the premises on rent, say for preparing hand-made bidis, could with impunity, and without breach of the provisions of clause 13 (3) (iv) of the Rent Control Order, instal a factory for preparation of cigars in the same premises. There too the end-product would be similar or same. But in these cases, as in the present case, the house would necessarily be subjected to more hazards than before. Surely it is not left to the tenant to consider what is permissible and what is not permissible within the ambit of item (iv) of clause 13 i 3). Surely it is for the landlord to consider whether he would permit the change or not. In this view, it would seem to me that a house taken on rent for using it for handloom purposes could not be used for manufacturing saris by putting in a power-loom there, unless the landlord were to consent to the same. This would clearly amount to a breach of the provisions of clause 13 (3) (iv) of the Rent Control Order. This would clearly amount to a breach of the provisions of clause 13 (3) (iv) of the Rent Control Order. It would little matter that in this particular case the Rent Controller held that no damage has already been caused to the house. So far as clause 13 (3) (iv) is concerned, that consideration would be entirely irrelevant. 6. In my view this writ petition will have to be allowed. The order of the appellate Court i.e. the Appellate Deputy Collector, Nagpur, is quashed and that of the Rent Controller giving permission to the petitioner to terminate the tenancy of the respondent No.1 under clause 13 (3) (iv) of the Rent Control Order is restored. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.