Judgment :- 1. The judgment of the Appellate Authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is absolutely unsustainable. The petitioner-landlord filed the application for possession of his own premises, since he was only residing with nil father in a building which is not his own, on three grounds. Firstly, he wanted the downstairs portion for non-residential purpose, as he intended to start a business of his own and as he was already acquainted with business when he was associated with his father; secondly, he required the upstairs portion of the premises for his own residential purposes; and thirdly, since the tenant has sublet the premises to a betel-nut shop keeper and admittedly was collecting rent from him and thus parted, without authority, with the possession of the property. The landlord claimed that the tenant was, therefore, liable to be evicted under the provisions of the Act. 2. The Rent Controller agreed with the landlord. The Appellate Authority, on a curious reasoning, reversed the same. I shall take up the three grounds one after another. The first one is whether the petitioner was entitled to ask for possession of the premises at all, since he was residing with his father. It is the admitted case of both parties that the petitioner, who was 20 years old, was naturally residing with bis father but in a building which is not his own. The premises in question, however, is indisputably his own. He wanted to occupy his own premises and sought for eviction. The curious reasoning of the appellate Judge was that as he was a young man of 20 years and was a bachelor and was residing with his father, there is no necessity for him to shift. This is a curious reasoning in a State like ours. It is expected that young persons should develop as far as possible by themselves without any prop being given by their parents and if such an enterprising young man is prepared to come out of the family to stand on his own and seeks for a premises admittedly belonging to him, it should not be negatived on the only ground that he is young and ‘that he is a bachelor and that he is with his father. The Appellate Authority has not given any acceptable reasoning for negativing the request of the petitioner for his own occupation. The Appellate Authority has not given any acceptable reasoning for negativing the request of the petitioner for his own occupation. The second contention was that even though the petitioner was young he was not carrying on any independent or appreciable business for him to seek a non-residential premises for purpose of carrying on the business of his own. In the counter-affidavit filed by the tenant, he himself admits that the petitioner is carrying on a jewellary business along with his father at No. 301, Triplicane High Road. But his sate is that the Triplicane High Road is better than the place in which the property in question is situate and, therefore, there is no bona fide in his request. The petitioners case, on the other hand, was that he was not only an associate with his father, but he was doing other business of his own and he was very anxious to set up an independent business of his own in his own house and that was the reason why he sought for eviction of the respondent. The appellate authority would say that it can be presumed that there is no business at all which is being carried on by the petitioner, even though he found, as a fact, that he was indeed associated with his father in a business, even according to the tenant, and that the petitioners case was that he was engaged in other such businesses as well. It is not for the tenant to find out as to what is the nature of the business which the landlord wants to do. What the law requires is to find out whether there is a bona fide intention on the part of the landlord to set up a business of his own which he is carrying on in a premises of his own occupied by a tenant who is indulging in a non-residential activity. The necessary criteria required under the Act are satisfied in the instant case. The reasoning of the learned appellate Judge, who would not agree with the Rent Controller, appears to be without any foundation or without any reasoning whatsoever. 3. The third ground on which the petitioner sought for eviction was that the respondent sublet the premises. The necessary criteria required under the Act are satisfied in the instant case. The reasoning of the learned appellate Judge, who would not agree with the Rent Controller, appears to be without any foundation or without any reasoning whatsoever. 3. The third ground on which the petitioner sought for eviction was that the respondent sublet the premises. Subletting is practically admitted, because the respondents case is that he has let it out to the betelnut shop keeper and that he was collecting the rent from him. The suggestion of the appellate authority appears to be that ‘the covenant against subletting will restrain the assignment, but a mere covenant against subletting does not prohibit under-letting a part of the premises”. I am unable to follow either the legal exposition which the appellate authority thought he was doing in his judgment; nor am I in agreement with him. So long as the Act says that if a tenant sublets the building which is only a part without written authority from the landlord, then that would be a ground for eviction, “Underletting” referred to by the appellate authority is nothing but a synonym of subletting and Why he makes a difference between the two I am unable to understand Even the learned counsel for the respondent also is unable to sustain as to the mind behind the appellate authority when he wrote this judgment. He is not able to make out clearly what the writing means. I am also in the same difficulty. Subletting, which is equivalent to underletting being admitted in this case, the question whether there has been a parting of possession of the property becomes unnecessary for consideration. As the third ground on which the petition was opposed, namely, that the tenant sublet without authority is practically admitted, the tenant is liable to be evicted on this ground also. The Rent Controller was, therefore, right in directing eviction on all the three grounds. The bona fide requirement of the landlord is established beyond doubt. The appellate authority order is without jurisdiction and bristles with material irregularities. The judgment and the order of the appellate authority are set aside and the civil revision petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The tenant is granted six months time to vacate.