JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal directed against the order of the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation (Labour Court No. 2) Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner) dated 7th December, 1973 in case No. 34/73-WC (F ). ( 2. ) THE short facts stripped off details leading to the present appeal and essential for its decision are these. One Gondia, an employee of the respondent died on 27th April, 1972 as a result of the injuries received in an accident while discharging his duties being in the employment of the respondent. His mother in her personal capacity and as the next friend of her minor children (that is minor brothers and sisters of the deceased) made an application under the Workmens compensation Act, 1923 (for short hereinafter referred to as the Act)claiming a compensation for Rs. 6,000. This application has been dismissed on the ground that mother is not a dependent within the meaning of section 2 (l) (d) of the Act and as her husband father of the minors is alive, she was not competent to make an application on their behalf as next friend. The relevant part of the Commissioners impugned order is quoted here-inbelow. "smt. Sunderbai is not a widowed mother of the deceased workman. She is not a dependent as defined by section 2 (l) (d) of the Workmens compensation Act, 1923. The claim on behalf of minor children, also must be dismissed. The father of the children is alive and as such the mother has no right to claim amount as a next friend. Moreover, the father of the children has applied for allotment of compensation. He examined himself and his wife Sunderbai also as witness. Shri Dajiba and Smt. Sunderbai has stated therein that they have minor children, but they could not prove that Shri Dajiba was dependent on the income of deceased Shri Gondia. The husband and father of children i. e. Shri Dajiba himself has failed to prove that he is dependent of deceased gondia, hence this second application is after-thought and is not maintainable. " ( 3. ) AT the outset it may be mentioned that the learned counsel for the appellant confined his argument only to the question whether mother is covered in the category of dependent in section 2 (l) (d) (iii) (b ). " ( 3. ) AT the outset it may be mentioned that the learned counsel for the appellant confined his argument only to the question whether mother is covered in the category of dependent in section 2 (l) (d) (iii) (b ). It may be mentioned that it was conceded by the learned counsel for the respondent that the dismissal of the application of the father does not operate as res judicata. Hence I shall proceed to decide that question only. ( 4. ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the word parent includes in it mother and what is excluded from it is widowed mother. ( 5. ) THE argument of the learned counsel for the respondent in counter was that under the definition of the dependents given in section 2 (l) (d) of the Act, in any of the categories of dependants, mother is not included. He argued that in section 2 (l) (d) (iii) (b) the word parent has been used to refer to father only and not the mother. ( 6. ) THE short question and the only question which can be draped in an issue is whether mother of a deceased workman who was wholly or in part dependant on his earnings at the time of his death is dependant within the meaning of section 2 ( l) (d) (iii) (b) of the Act. For an intelligent understanding and better appreciation of the point involved I would like to set out hereinbelow clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Act. "xxx xxx xxx (d) "dependant" means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely- (i) a widow, a minor legitimate son, and unmarried legitimate daughter or a widowed mother; and (ii) if wholly dependant on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, a son or a daughter who has attained the age of 18 years and who is infirm; and (iii) if wholly or in part dependant on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, (a) widower, (b) a parent other than a widowed mother, (c) a minor illegitimate son, an unmarried illegitimate daughter or a daughter legitimate or illegitimate if married and a minor or if widowed and a minor. (d) a minor brother or an unmarried sister or a widowed sister if a minor, (e) a widowed daughter in-law, (f) a minor child of a pre-deceased son, (g) a minor child of a pre-deceased daughter where no parent of the child is alive, or (h) a paternal grand-parent if no parent of the workman is alive. " ( 7. ) ON a bare reading of the forequoted definition of dependant it is clear that they have been classified in 3 classes; Class I-relations, who, ipso facto the relationship with the deceased, are dependants; Class II-relations, who were in fact financially depending wholly on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death; and Class Ill-relations, who were either wholly or in part depending on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death. ( 8. ) IT would thus be seen that Legislature sought to give an exhaustive connotation of dependants by setting out description of certain relations. In these relatives in the whole list widowed mother has been specifically mentioned in Class I-category; but father and mother by using the expression father or mother have not been mentioned in any class; all other near relations-brothers, sisters, daughter-in-law etc. are mentioned. It is undisputed that the word parent in its ordinary or popular sense according to its dictionary meaning means-father or mother. It is a well settled law to put it in the words of S. R. Das, J. who spoke for the Court in Jugalkishore Saraf v. M/s Raw Cotton Co, Ltd, AIR 1955 SC 376 "the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the Legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case a literal construction of the rule leads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from the golden rule of construction. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case a literal construction of the rule leads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from the golden rule of construction. " It is in the back-drop of the forediscussed canon for interpretation and in the back-drop of the facts already mentioned that we have to construe the meaning of a parent used in section 2 (1) (d) (iii) (b) of the Act. ( 9. ) TO iterate the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the word parent includes mother and the expression "other than a widowed mother" was used to exclude the widowed mother as she was included in Class I of dependants. The learned counsel for the respondent, in elaboration of his contention, had argued that on reading the word "a parent" in the context of the legal position that under law, it is the duty of the husband to maintain his wife, it can be well culled out that a parent means father only and not the un-widowed mother. He also relied on the following passage from the commentary in the book "the WORKMENs compensation ACT, 1923 by Suranjan Chakravarti", page 13. "6. Parent other than a widowed mother"-"widowed mother" has already been provided for under the first clause (d) (i ). "parent other than the widowed mother" can evidently mean the father, but he must be wholly or in part dependant on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death to enable him to claim the compensation. It may be noted that the original clauses contemplated the "parent" as one of the dependants of the deceased, which certainly included the father also. But in 1933, the clause was amended to include a widowed mother only as one of the dependants and the father was left out of that class and placed in clause (iii ). " ( 10. ) THE reasoning of the learned counsel for the respondent that on reading a parent in context of the legal obligation of the husband to maintain his wife, it should be held that a parent includes father only, cannot be accepted. " ( 10. ) THE reasoning of the learned counsel for the respondent that on reading a parent in context of the legal obligation of the husband to maintain his wife, it should be held that a parent includes father only, cannot be accepted. It is significant to note that in section 2 (1) (d) (iii) (d)of the Act, a minor brother, or an unmarried sister, to maintain whom the legal obligation is on father, are also subject to the same condition of factual dependency as is for a parent, included in the list of dependants. Their inclusion is not further conditioned with the condition if no parent of them is alive which is the condition in section 2 (1) (d) (iii) (g) and (h) of the act. Therefore, had the nexus for inclusion been the legal obligation to maintain, the persons included in section 2 (1) (d) (iii) (d) of the Act, would not have found place. Ordinarily dependant connotes actual dependency, as already observed by me in paragraph 7 of this judgment, the Legislature has made three classes wherein for dependants put in class I, actual dependency is not required. Thus it can well be seen that the object of definition was not solely to include only those persons to support whom, was the legal obligation of the deceased workman. In this view of the matter the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is repelled. ( 11. ) I shall now proceed to deal with the other reasoning of the learned counsel for the respondent, which is based on the inclusion of widowed mother distinctly amongst the dependants in class I. ( 12. ) I would like to place the relevant parts of section 2 (1) (d) prior to 1933 amendment and thereafter in juxtaposition for an intelligent understanding of the effect of the change. Before 1933 (d) dependant means any of the following relatives of deceased workman, namely, wife, a husband, parent, minor son, unmarried daughter, married daughter who is a minor, minor brother or unmarried sister and includes the minor children of a deceased son of the workman and, where no parent of the workman is alive, paternal grandparent. Before 1933 (d) dependant means any of the following relatives of deceased workman, namely, wife, a husband, parent, minor son, unmarried daughter, married daughter who is a minor, minor brother or unmarried sister and includes the minor children of a deceased son of the workman and, where no parent of the workman is alive, paternal grandparent. After 1933 (d) dependant means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely: (i) a (widowed), minor legitimate son, and unmarried legitimate daughter, or a widowed mother; and, (ii) if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, (a widowed), a parent other than a widowed mother, a minor illegitimate son, and unmarried and a minor daughter or if widowed, a minor brother, an unmarried or widowed sister, a widowed daughter-in-law, minor child of a deceased son, (a minor child of a deceased daughter where no parent of the child is alive), or where no parent of the workman is alive, a paternal grand-parent" : On the comparison of the position before 1933 amendment and thereafter it is apparent that before 1933 widowed mother was not distinctly mentioned. Therefore bearing in mind the natural ordinary and dictionary meaning of the word "parent" it can well be said that, that term included, widowed mother in it; but it does not appeal to reason that on the inclusion of widowed mother distinctly amongst the dependents in Class I only father was left in the term parent, that is, after 1933 amendment in the context of the changed position "parent" would mean only father. ( 13. ) A mother of a person would become widow after the death of his father; so it can well be said that the word mother is a wider term to include unwidowed mother as well as widowed mother. As already stated in paragraph 8 of this judgment, the ordinary, natural and dictionary meaning of word parent is father or mother. Therefore, the word parent includes mother also. ( 14. ) THE expression "other than a widowed mother" in section 2 (1) (d) (iii) (b) is nothing but a proviso, or exception. As already stated in paragraph 8 of this judgment, the ordinary, natural and dictionary meaning of word parent is father or mother. Therefore, the word parent includes mother also. ( 14. ) THE expression "other than a widowed mother" in section 2 (1) (d) (iii) (b) is nothing but a proviso, or exception. It is a general rule of construction, which is well acknowledged that the effect of proviso is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso or exception would be within it. In this respect, I can do no better than to quote the words of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Abhoy Pada Saha v. Sudhir Kumar mondal, AIR 1967 SC 115 . "now a thing can be excluded from another only if it was other-wise within it. " Applying this test it can safely be said that widowed mother, but for the expression "other than widowed mother" was included in the word "parent". ( 15. ) NOW reading this expression "other than a widowed mother" in the context of my foregoing discussion that word parent ordinarily means father or mother-the mother may or may not be a widow,-the effect is that it carves out mother provided she is widow, obviously for the reason that widowed mother is placed in Class I and, therefore, she cannot be included in two classes, that is, Class I as well as Class II. ( 16. ) THIS apart on no rational reasoning it can be held that even if factually the mother was dependant on the deceased son-workman; still she would not be able to claim compensation though the father can. There can be certain examples where a husband for various reasons may not be able or might not be maintaining his wife and she has to depend on her son; one of such reasons just to illustrate may be bad relations between the two. ( 17. ) IN the light of the foregoing discussion I am of the view that mother is included in the word a parent in section 2 (1) (d) (iii) (b) of the act. ( 18. ) LEARNED counsel for the parties have relied on a decision of this court in Mst. Intiyajbi Amirkhan v. Newton Chikhli Colliery, 1959 MP L J 819=a I R 1959 MP 329. ( 18. ) LEARNED counsel for the parties have relied on a decision of this court in Mst. Intiyajbi Amirkhan v. Newton Chikhli Colliery, 1959 MP L J 819=a I R 1959 MP 329. in support of their respective contentions. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following observations, in paragraph 4. "in my opinion the interpretation cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the relationship of mother and son is not destroyed even if the mother remarries. In spite of the remarriage she still remains the mother of her son. On account of remarriage, she does not lose her rights, which she might have acquired in the property of her deceased husband under the Mohammadan Law. I am of the view that the use of the word widowed is specifically for the purpose of distinguishing the mother, who is widowed as against a mother, who is not widowed. Thus if the father of the deceased be living, a mother of the deceased would have no claim whatsoever, as she cannot be a widowed mother. It is from this point of view, that the Legislature qualified the word mother in order to provide for her, when the father of the deceased was not alive. The suggestion that a mother who remarried cannot be considered to be a widowed mother, does not appeal to me for the reason that the relationship of a mother is not destroyed and, moreover, the word widowed has been used in contradistinction to the word unwidowed. Sub-clause (i) of sub-section (d) of section 2 of the workmens Compensation Act does not lay down that the persons in that sub-clause must be financially dependent on the deceased. " ( 19. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent relied on the following observations of the said decision Intiyajbi v. N. C. Colliery {supra) in paragraph 4. "even if the interpretation suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant were to be accepted, the mother who has remarried, would fall under the category "the parent other than a widowed mother". ( 20. ) IN that decision Mst. Intiyajbi Amirkhan v. Newton Chikhli Colliery (supra), the point involved was whether a woman who had remarried was entitled to claim compensation as dependent on the earnings of her son from her first husband. The controversy was that as she had remarried,- could she make a claim as a widowed mother. ( 20. ) IN that decision Mst. Intiyajbi Amirkhan v. Newton Chikhli Colliery (supra), the point involved was whether a woman who had remarried was entitled to claim compensation as dependent on the earnings of her son from her first husband. The controversy was that as she had remarried,- could she make a claim as a widowed mother. Dealing with this question it has been held that though she had re-married, she was a widowed mother of the son from her first husband and was entitled to claim as such. It was also held that even if she could not claim as widowed mother she was entitled to claim as mother being included in the expression "a parent other than a widowed mother" as she was a mother alright. In this view of the matter, the decision of this Court in Intiyajbi v. Newton Chikhli Colliery (supra) has taken the view which I have taken. ( 21. ) IN this view of the matter I am of the view that Sunderbai in this case was entitled to maintain the claim being covered under section 2 (1) (d) (iii) (b) of the Act and the Commissioner was not right in rejecting the claim on a preliminary ground that she did not fall in that category of the dependents. The Commissioner ought to have investigated whether Sunderbai was wholly or partly depending on the earnings of the deceased son at the time of his death. ( 22. ) IN the result the appeal is allowed; the impugned order is set aside; and the case is remanded to the Commissioner with a direction that he should investigate whether the applicant Sunderbai was wholly or partly depending on the earnings of the deceased at the time of his death and dispose of the matter according to law. I make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.